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

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BROWNSON'S

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VOLUME III.

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If the question were an open one, whether we shall or shall not have a periodical and newspaper press, that is, journalism or no journalism, we are not sure but we should decide in the negative. The press may have its advantages, but it certainly has its disadvantages, and is productive of serious evils. Its natural tendency is to bring literature down to the level of the tastes and attainments of the unreasoning, undisciplined, and conceited multitude, and to lessen the demand for patient thought, sound learning, and genuine science. Under its influence, the more light and superficial literature is, the more popular it becomes, and the richer the reward of its authors. It must be adapted to the most numerous class of readers, and win them by appeals to their prejudices or their passions ; and if profound, if it go to the bottom of things, and treat its subjects scientifically, it will transcend the popular capacity, demand some mental discipline and application on the part of readers, and be rejected as heavy, uninteresting, and therefore worthless. There will be no demand for it in the market, and it will lie on the shelves of the bookseller.

At the same time, too, that the press, in the modern acceptation, tends to make literature light, shallow, and unprofitable, in order to meet the popular demand, it reacts on the public

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mind, and unfits it for a literature of a more respectable character. A people accustomed to read only newspapers and the light trash of the day can relish nothing else. The stomach that has long been fed only with slops loses its power to bear solid food. We find every day that even newspapers of the more respectable class are too heavy and too learned for the people. It is but a small minority of their subscribers who read their more elaborate editorials. The majority can find time and patience only to glance the eye over the shorter paragraphs, catch a joke here and an item of news there. Nothing that cannot be read on the run, and comprehended at a glance, is looked upon as worth reading at all. To expect that the mass of readers will read essays of any length and solidity, — unless essays in defence of some humbug, or in exposition of some new theory for turning the world into chaos, — otherwise than by running the eye over them, and catching the first sentence of here and there a paragraph, is to prove one's self a real antediluvian, and a far greater curiosity than the Belgian Giant or the Mammoth Ox.

Moreover, the tendency of the press is to bring before an unprepared public questions that can be profitably discussed only before a professional audience. The people need and can receive the results of the most solid learning and the most profound and subtle philosophy, but they can neither perform nor appreciate the processes by which those results are obtained. Hodge and Goody Jones have little ability to follow the discussion of the higher metaphysical questions, or of the more intricate points of theology. The great body of the people are not and cannot be scholars, philosophers, theologians, or statesmen. They must have teachers and masters, and are as helpless without them as a flock of sheep without a shepherd. Do what you will, they will follow leaders of some sort, and the modern attempt to make them their own teachers and masters results only in exposing them to a multitude of miserable pretenders, who lead them where there is no pasture, and where the wolves congregate to devour them. You may call this aristocracy, priestcraft, want of respect for the people, what you will; it is a fact as plain as the nose on a man's face, proved by all history, and confirmed by daily experience. There is no use, no sense, no honesty, in attempting to deny or to disguise it. There never was a greater humbug than the modern schemes for introducing equality of education, whether by levelling upwards or by levelling downwards. The order of the

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world is, — the few lead, the many are led ; and whether you like it or not, you cannot make it otherwise, and every attempt to make it otherwise only makes the matter worse.

It is strange that our wise men, as they would be thought, do not see this. Go into your political world, and is it not so ? What mean, if not, your town, county, state, and national committees, your party organizations, party usages, caucuses, conventions, and nominations prior to elections ? If the people are capable of managing for themselves, of having their own leaders, why do you undertake to lead them ? Why, when the French republicans had overthrown the monarchy, and proclaimed universal suffrage, did they establish their clubs, and send out their commissioners through all the departments, armed with power to compel the people to vote for a given description of candidates for the National Assembly ? If they believed either in the right or the capacity of the people to govern themselves, why did they not trust them ? Who knows not that the fashionable democracy of the day is a humbug, got up by miserable demagogues, solely because by it they, instead of king or nobility, may stand a chance of governing the people, and deriving a profit from them ? Who knows not that the people are as much led under a democracy as under any other form of government, only by a different and, perhaps, a more numerous, as well as a more hungry and despotic, class of leaders ? Who does not know that the despotism your prominent democrats dread is simply the despotism which prevents them from being despots ? O, it goes to an honest man's heart to see how the poor people are deceived, duped, to their own destruction !

We speak not in contempt of the people, or in disregard of their claims. God has made it our duty, for his sake, bound us by our allegiance to him, to love the people, to devote ourselves to their service, to live for them, and, if need be, to die for them. There is nothing too good for them. Scholars, philosophers, teachers, magistrates, all are for them, are bound to live and labor for their temporal and spiritual well-being ; and they neglect the duties of their state, if they do not. That they often do not is but too lamentably true. The people have been most shamefully, sinfully neglected, in all ages and countries of the world, and their wrongs have cried, and do still cry, aloud to Heaven. The rich, the learned, the great, the powerful, too frequently look upon the possessions Almighty God has given them as if they were given them for their own especial benefit, instead of a sacred trust to be employed in the

service of the poor and needy. Their shameful neglect of their duty, their sinful abuse of their trusts, has furnished the occasion to modern radicalism, and given to radicals a pretext for the destructive war they are carrying on against them. But this, though it condemn them, does not justify the radicals, or prove that the people can get on without teachers and rulers. It only proves, that, when their legitimate leaders abuse their trusts, they will grow rebellious and seek a new set of leaders, who will be only less competent and more unfaithful.

Assuming that the people must have leaders, that they cannot dispense with teachers, it is evident that there must be questions which are not proper to be brought before them, — not precisely because of their sacredness, but because of their unintelligibility to the unprepared intellect; because they involve principles which transcend the reach of the undisciplined mind, and require for the right understanding of them preliminary studies which the bulk of mankind do not and cannot make. The people need and may receive the full benefit of law, and yet they cannot all be lawyers; for the law demands a special study, and a long and painful study, in those who would be worthy legal practitioners. The same may be said of medicine, and with even more truth of theology. Theology requires a professional study, and men, whatever their genius, natural abilities, and general learning, can only blunder the moment they undertake to treat it, unless they have made it a special study, under able and accomplished professors. Theological science does not come, like Dogberry's reading and writing, by nature, is not a natural instinct, your transcendental young ladies to the contrary notwithstanding. To bring it into the forum, and to discuss it before the populace, is only to divest it of all that transcends the popular understanding.

We have seen this among Protestants. Luther and his associates knew perfectly well that their novelties would be instantly rejected in the schools, scouted by professional theologians, called upon to judge them by the laws of theological science; they therefore appealed to the public, to an unprofessional jury, that is, from science to ignorance, as do and must appeal all innovators. They supposed they obtained a verdict, and they raised the shout of triumph; but their triumph has been, in general terms, the complete destruction among Protestants of theological science, the rejection of all the definitions and distinctions of scholastic theology as unmeaning, the virtual discarding of all the mysteries of faith, and the re-

duction of the whole Christian doctrine to a vague sentiment, or to the few propositions of natural religion which do not rise above the level of the vulgar. The people, if made arbiters, will always decide that what transcends their understanding is unintelligible, and that what is unintelligible is false, — non-existent.

The practice of appealing to the people, in controversies which lie out of their province, has a bad effect on the controversialists themselves. In controversies confined to professional audiences, the controversialists are held in check, are forced to be exact in their statements, and close and rigid in their deductions; for the slightest error, they know, will be detected and exposed. But when the controversy is carried on before the people, who know nothing of the subject but what they learn from the controversialists themselves, and have neither the ability nor the patience to follow step by step a long and closely linked argument, the disputants are tempted to indulge in loose statements, misstatements, and sophistications. Before the professional audience, the question must be discussed on its merits, and each party is obliged to seek for, and confine himself to, the truth; but before a popular audience, the parties, knowing that the tribunal is incompetent to decide the question on its merits, are free, so far as exposure is concerned, to seek only a verdict, and, consequently, to hold themselves free to resort to any methods which will secure it. False assertions and false reasoning, if they will weigh with the jury, will answer their purpose as well as truth. One party may detect the falsehood or the sophistry of the other, but what of that? How often have Catholics detected and exposed the falsehoods and sophistries of Protestants! But what has it availed? The Protestant appealed to the people, reasserted his falsehood, reproduced his sophistry, and triumphed.

The practice, also, has a bad effect on the people. It places them in a false position, and makes them judges where they should be learners. It destroys the docility of their dispositions, the loyalty of their hearts, and makes them proud, conceited, arrogant, turbulent, and seditious. It throws them into a state in which there is no good for them, in which Almighty God himself cannot help them, if he respects their free-will, if he does not convert them into machines, and annihilate them as men. We see this in the present state of the Protestant world. The child is hardly breeched before he is wiser than his parents, and regards it as a violation of his natural rights that

he should be required to obey them. The pert youth, with the soft down on his chin, has no idea that he shows any lack of modesty in telling a Webster or a Calhoun that he differs from him in his political views ; or in saying to the most grave and learned divine, " Sir, we differ in opinion, and are not likely to agree." Hodge sits in judgment on the Angel of the Schools, and Goody Jones instructs her minister in the interpretation of Scripture. The pretty miss, hardly in her teens, never once doubts that she has discovered that all mankind have hitherto been wholly in the wrong, and that nobody ever had a clear and comprehensive view of the truth in morals, politics, or religion, till she planted herself on her young instincts, and mastered all things. Sentiment is placed above reason, even by your great Dr. Bushnell ; instinct is declared the great teacher of wisdom, by your greater Emerson, said to be the greatest man in America ; and Alcott and Wordsworth tell you to sit down by the cradle, and look into Baby's eyes, if you would learn the secrets of the universe. It requires no great wisdom to sneer at what transcends our own limited capacity, no great knowledge to reject as non-existent whatever appears not within the circle of our own mole-eyed vision, or to forego all the accumulations of the race, to strip ourselves naked, and to run through the streets of the city calling out to the people to look and see what marvellous progress we have made, how far we have advanced on our predecessors.

But the question is no longer an open one. We may see and deplore the evils of the press or journalism, but it exists, and we must deal with it as a fact, and as a fact which will exist in spite of us. The only question for us is, whether we will use it in the cause of truth, religion, freedom, social order, or suffer it to be used exclusively by radicals and socialists against them. There is no doubt in our mind that the press has done immense harm, by bringing before the public questions which should be discussed only in the schools, by and for those who are to be the teachers of the people, and by whittling literature and science down to the narrow aperture of the vulgar understanding. We cannot help regretting those old times, — those ages of monkish ignorance and superstition, as modern sciolists and unbelievers term them, — when science and learning flourished in the schools, and the few who were to teach and govern were well and thoroughly trained for their state, and the people were docile and loyal. But those ages have passed away, never to return. They cannot be recalled,

and we have only to determine and to make the Christian use of what has taken their place. No man of sound sense and respectable scholarship can countenance, for a moment, the modern doctrine of progress, belied by all the monuments of the past ; no man, with any just appreciation of the fact, that we are pilgrims and sojourners here, that this world is not our home, that we are here to secure a good to be possessed only hereafter, can for a moment doubt that we have fallen on evil times, and that there was much in the past the loss of which is to be deeply deplored. Nevertheless, it is not the part of wisdom to waste ourselves in idle regrets for the past, any more than in vain apprehensions for the future. No state is or can be so bad, that we cannot serve God in it, if we will, do our duty, and gain the heaven for which our good Father intended us, — all that is or can be desirable. After all, those glorious old monkish times may not have been so superior, all things considered, to the present, as we and those who think with us sometimes persuade ourselves. All who see no wisdom or piety in cursing the mother that bore them are apt to remember of the past only the good it had which the present needs, and to dwell on those evils which the present has which the past had not. They sometimes thus overlook present good, and forget past evil. The evil we have and the good we have lost are always the things which the most sensibly affect us. But there is seldom a loss on the one hand without a gain on the other. Every age has its peculiar defects and its peculiar merits, and it may be that the absolute superiority of one age over another is far less than is commonly imagined. Perhaps, after all, if we were transported to those old times which we regret, we should find them not more tolerable than we find the present.

All things, not divine, are mutable, and constantly changing under our very eyes. Nothing continues as it was ; nothing will remain as it is. This is the law of this sublunary world, and we cannot abrogate it, if we would. We must submit to it, and the more cheerfully we submit, the better. We need not suppose that every change is an advance, for, in itself considered, every change may be a deterioration. But when one change has been effected, another often becomes necessary, in order to restore or preserve proportion or equilibrium. Institutions which were good in a given state of things, and better than any thing which can take their place, may, in another state of things, in which they are out of proportion, prove useless,

may, even hurtful. True wisdom then requires them to be changed; and to change them will be, relatively to the new order of things, an improvement, if you will, a progress, though involving the loss of a good once possessed. Thus, the Church, which, as a divine institution, is invariable and immovable, proposing always the same end, holding the same principles, teaching the same doctrines, offering the same sacrifice, and employing the same agencies, consults always, in her *modes of acting* on the world, in relation to its affairs, the exigencies of time, place, and circumstance. If she did not do so, she would fall, as an active agency, into the past, and fail to accomplish her mission in governing the world and saving souls. To cling to an old mode of acting after it has become superannuated, or to a human institution after it has served its purpose, is as unwise as to seek uncalled-for changes. The Church does not insist upon all the provisions even of the canon law in a missionary country, where many of them are and must be inapplicable, and would only embarrass her missionaries and impede her operations. She does not adopt the same mode of dealing with the civil government that is uncatholic that she does with the one that is Catholic and enacts Catholicity as the law of the land. Matters which were disposed of without direct resort to the Sovereign Pontiffs, while the great Patriarchs of Jerusalem, Antioch, or Alexandria retained the Apostolic traditions, were necessarily transferred to Rome when those Patriarchs had fallen into schism or heresy, and Rome alone retained the faith. Changes of this sort do and must take place, as changes in the world around the Church go on. It is hardly necessary to add, that these changes in her modes of acting to meet external changes imply no change in the Church herself, no development of doctrine, and no spirit of compliance with the age. She remains the same, and only changes her policy in as far as it falls within the province of human prudence, — and even this only so as to place herself in the attitude to resist the world more effectually, and to guard the faithful against the new dangers to which the external changes expose them. The spirit of compliance does not belong to the Church, and it is only in the sense antithetical to the one insisted on by the men of the world, that her children are free to conform to their age. To conform to it only in the sense of being always ready to confront it, and to battle against it in the new position it takes up.

In those old times when the people were contented to learn

of their pastors, and to obey their lawful rulers, both in church and state, popular literature was not needed, and could serve no good purpose. Special literature in the schools was needed for those whose office it was to teach or to govern, and was cultivated to an extent far beyond what it is now ; but a general literature, for the great body of the people, was and could be no want of the times. It was enough for the people to be instructed in the elements of Christian doctrine, and the practical duties of their state of life. Any thing more would have done them no good, and might have done them harm. All they needed was to be firm believers in the things necessary to salvation and good practical Christians. To this end they did not need to be speculative philosophers, classical scholars, or profound and learned theologians. Science and literature for amusement, for their own sake, or as a means of keeping people out of mischief, are not wanted, when men have faith in the Gospel, and understand that their sole business in this world is to prepare for another. If people must have amusement, they can always find it in something better than in lying on the sofa after dinner reading the last new novel.

But when those old times passed away, and a new state of things was ushered in, — when the people become indocile, disloyal, restless, — when literature became the *rage*, — when all the passions were stimulated into fearful activity, and all questions, sacred and profane, were wrested from the schools and brought before the multitude, and placed at the mercy of an unenlightened and capricious public opinion, — evidently something more became necessary, and new modes of meeting the enemies of religion indispensable, if the people were not to be abandoned to their own ignorance, conceit, and self-will. Religion must then possess herself of literature, or suffer its influence to be wielded against her. The world had changed ; the enemies of truth and justice appeared in new disguises ; new evils sprung up, and new dangers threatened, not to be met and discomfited on the old battle-ground, and with the old kind of armor. The enemy having changed his tactics and his armor, the Church was obliged to change hers. The amount of instruction in Christian doctrine, the amount of popular intelligence, amply sufficient before, ceased to be adequate, and if not increased, the faithful in large numbers must fall a prey to the artful and designing demagogues, heretics, and infidels lying in wait to seize them. Authority ceased to be respected, law to have any hold on the conscience of the people, and they

could be saved only by being enabled, in some degree, to detect and despise the subtilties and the specious promises of their enemies. While there remained, as in the earlier stages of Protestantism, some degree of modesty, even in the heretical populations, and their chiefs retained some traces of the culture they had received in the old Catholic schools, it was possible to carry on the war through books elaborately written, and proportioned in size to the magnitude of the subjects treated; but now, when the folio has disappeared, the quarto become a scandal, and the octavo a burden, — when there is a great dearth of clergymen, and nobody respects his superior, or is willing to be taught *vivâ voce*, we are forced to resort to the press, to *Journalism*, as our only practicable medium of reaching that public which most needs to be addressed.

Questions of vital importance have come up which cannot be properly discussed from the pulpit, and which can be treated in a popular manner only through a periodical press that can penetrate where the voice of the preacher cannot reach, and the printed volume will not find its way. Whatever opinion, then, we may form of journalism in itself considered, and however obvious the fact, that editors, as such, do not constitute an order in the Christian hierarchy, we must resort to the means of influence left us by the age in its changes, and, subjecting editors to their legitimate superiors, and confining them within proper limits, employ them to diffuse Christian doctrine, and to defend the rights of the Church and the freedom of religion, as well as the social order and the rights of man, or abandon no small portion of the modern world to demagogues, infidels, and heretics, — or, in a word, to the Socialism of the age.

The chief danger to be guarded against, in using the press, is that of confounding it with the Church, and its managers with Divinely commissioned teachers. The modern doctrine of the uncatholic world ascribes to the press most of the attributes which Catholics ascribe to the Church, and claims for editors the authority which we concede only to the pastors whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us. Hence it is that editors, and now and then even Catholic editors, forget their place, and seem to regard themselves as so many sovereign pontiffs commissioned to superintend all the affairs of both church and state, and to dictate to the Pope, the patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, and clergy the policy they are to pursue. We have before us a work translated from the French, by the able and

spirited editor of the *London Tablet*, entitled, *How to enslave a Church*, in the preface to which, the translator with great force and earnestness speaks of the necessity of bringing public opinion to bear upon the legitimate pastors and governors of the Church. The worthy man in his zeal forgot that he was appealing from authority to the mob, and adopting the very principle of Protestantism and of the grand heresy of modern times. The press is not at liberty to dictate to the Church or to her officers, or to superintend or supervise her acts. It must act under authority, under the direction of the Church, as her servant, according to her views of what is her service, not as her mistress. It must do her bidding, and have no thought, will, or wish, but hers, — derived from her through legitimate channels. Bearing this in mind, and never forgetting that the press is a mere instrument in the hands of the Church, which she condescends to use for her own purposes of charity to mankind, it may not only be resorted to, but resorted to with great profit to the sacred cause of truth and piety.

This has, evidently, become the conviction of Catholics at home and abroad. Hence, within a few years, a Catholic press has sprung up in our own country, in England and the English Colonies, and, recently, the Bishop of Ivrea, in Piedmont, has established a journal entitled, *Harmony of Religion with Civilization*, with the express sanction of the Holy Father, — the first journal, we are told, ever established in Europe directly by a bishop. But its establishment, the approval of the design by the Holy Father, who pronounces it very opportune at the present time (*consilium hoc temporibus istis valde opportunum*), and the encouragement which has been given to the Catholic press in this country, by our illustrious prelates and the venerable clergy, prove sufficiently that the Church accepts the press, and is willing to use it against the heresy, infidelity, apostasy, and pernicious socialism of our times.

The Catholic press has already acquired no inconsiderable extension among ourselves. Aside from several papers owned and conducted by Catholics, but devoted chiefly to secular matters, such as the *Boston Pilot*, the *Truth-Teller*, the *Nation*, &c., which we do not include in the Catholic press, we have thirteen journals, of which eleven are published once a week, one once a month, and one once in three months; ten in the English language, two in the German, and one in the French. Leaving our Review out of the question, of which it

does not become us to speak, these journals are, in general, conducted with learning, spirit, and ability ; and several of them deservedly rank high among the periodicals of the country. In them all, with one or two exceptions, there has been a manifest improvement during the last two or three years. They have assumed a bolder tone, and exhibited a freer and more independent spirit, taken a wider view, and shown a more correct appreciation, of the general characteristics of the age.

Undoubtedly, the Catholic press, with us, has not in every respect met, and does not yet meet, the wants of the age and country. It has had difficulties of no ordinary character to contend with. Laymen, ordinarily, are not the proper persons to conduct a Catholic press, and never, unless they have made special theological studies, or take the precaution to submit what they write or intend to write to some one who has, — and our clergy have been too few in number for the Catholic population of the country, have been necessarily engrossed with the multiplicity of their missionary duties, and have had, after being placed on missions, little time for study, and still less to write for newspapers. That they have been able to do no more need not surprise us ; that they have been able to do so much, and to do it so well, is the wonder.

Moreover, the people on whom our journals have had to depend for their support were, for the most part, recent emigrants from foreign countries, and limited in their education and in their means. They came from countries subjected to Protestant or infidel rulers, where their religion was oppressed, and all that power, malice, and ingenuity could do had been done to degrade and brutalize its adherents. They were, as to the majority, firm believers, sincere Christians, honest and hard-working men and women, but they were not profound philosophers or erudite scholars. They knew of their faith all that was necessary to salvation, and understood the practical duties of their state ; but they did not understand the Catholic doctrine in all its relations to the several departments of human thought and action, nor did they take enlarged and comprehensive views of the various tendencies or peculiar heresies of the age or country. How should they ? It had been as much as they could do to continue to live and to practise the Catholic worship. They could not understand or feel the importance of discussions, however necessary for the age, which were foreign to their habits of thought and sphere of action. They were strangers, exiles from home, and their interests and affections naturally

clustered around the land from which they had been driven. If they took a paper, it was to learn something of the home which they had left beyond the blue waves, of the friends and relatives dear to their memories, still lingering and suffering there ; nothing more natural, nothing more innocent, nothing more honorable to the human heart. The press was obliged to recognize this state of the Catholic population, and to confine itself, in no small degree, to the news and interests of the several foreign countries from which they had emigrated. Beyond these, it could go no farther than to touch upon a few matters connected with the rights and duties of Catholics here, and to repel such attacks upon their religion as in their daily intercourse with non-Catholics they were most exposed to. More than this Catholics did not ask from their journals ; more than this they were not prepared to receive ; and for an editor to to have attempted much more, even if he had had the leisure, would only have lessened the interest of his paper and endangered its existence. While things so remained, it was impossible for our Catholic press to be other than it has been. The individuals amongst us disposed to speak lightly of it, and to complain that it has not assumed a higher tone and broader views, should remember this, and withhold their censures. Instead of finding fault, we should give our hearty thanks to those who, amid so many difficulties and so many discouragements, have labored so successfully to build up for us a Catholic press.

But the position of Catholics in this country has already changed, and is every day changing, for the better. It is still, in many respects, no doubt, " the day of small things." Every thing cannot be done in a moment. The Church was six hundred years in expelling paganism from the old Roman Empire. But all is every day taking a more favorable turn ; our strength is daily increasing, and our population is becoming more compact and homogeneous. We have already a large and intelligent body of Catholics, who look upon this country as their home, and who feel, without forgetting their fatherland, that this is to be the home of their children, and that it is their first duty to make it a *Catholic* home for them. They are finding themselves in easy circumstances, and begin to see that they are no longer mere outcasts, but in a position to take part in the affairs of the country and the great questions of the day. We have now our own colleges and seminaries ; shall soon have our own primary schools, and form a strong, compact, and influential body in the American republic. All this

poses upon us new duties, and developes new wants, literary and social. The state of things with us has evidently changed, and the Catholic press must change, and, in fact, is changing accordingly. It may and it must assume a higher tone, enlarge the range of its discussions, and rise to the exigency of the times.

The salvation of the American republic depends on Catholicity. The principles adopted by Protestants and infidels, if logically developed, can give us nothing but the most ultra Socialism; yet Catholics, at least many of them, the moment they come out of the sphere of what is immediately of faith, unwittingly adopt these very principles, and sustain in literature and politics premises which, in their legitimate consequences, are hostile, not only to the Church, but to social order and to all natural morality. They mean nothing of all this; they love their religion, and would not knowingly do or say aught inconsistent with it; but in proportion as they take part in the political world, they catch the spirit of the age, and that spirit is Socialistic, against which the Holy Father, Pius the Ninth, in his noble Encyclical, has solemnly warned us. What portion of the American population has outdone the nominally Catholic population of our cities, in their enthusiastic admiration of the late infidel and Socialistic revolutions in Europe? And does not all this prove that the bulk of our Catholic population do not understand the relations of their religion to the great questions of the day,—that they do not understand their religion in its application to politics and social reforms, and, therefore, in these matters, borrow their notions from the world, which seeks, first of all, to crush the Church? Catholicity can save our republic only by being practised in public as well as in private life,—only by prescribing our public as well as private morals.

Here is a great subject of immediate practical importance, on which our Catholic press may and must speak, if it would not fail in its duty, with a boldness, an energy, and a distinctness it has never yet assumed. On this point, with a few exceptions, it has been feeble and timid, and, apparently, half afraid to grapple with the monster heresy of modern times. Indeed, if a Catholic editor ventures to repeat the words of our Lord, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice," and to censure as uncatholic the contrary doctrine, there are not wanting papers, owned and conducted by Catholics, and having a wide influence over the Catholic community, to denounce him, sneer at him, and to hold him up to the contempt

of the Catholic public, and not altogether without success. Here is an evil to be remedied, and in remedying which the Catholic press must unite with one voice, heart, and soul, and speak out as becomes a Catholic press.

The press, to be useful, must understand thoroughly the age and the form of its heresy. The heresy of our times is Socialism, — manifesting itself in indifferentism on the one hand, and in the elevation of the earthly above the heavenly on the other. The press, without intending it, may, and sometimes does, strengthen this heresy. In a particular locality there occurs a particular act of bigotry. The press, in exposing it, declaims against bigotry and intolerance, and thus gives occasion to the inference, that Catholics hold that men have the moral right to be of any religion they choose, and that, if a man is only honest and sincere in his religion, be that religion what it may, it is enough. We have heard Catholics actually say as much. Foolish men allege that the Church is hostile to liberty. A Catholic editor feels that he must repel the charge ; and, in doing so, gives occasion to the inference, that the Church approves of liberty not merely in its true sense, but in the false sense in which it is understood by her enemies. A miserable demagogue alleges that she is anti-democratic ; an inconsiderate Catholic, full at once of Catholic and democratic zeal, undertakes to prove the contrary ; not perceiving, that, by entertaining such an objection, he raises politics above religion, and subjects, in principle, the Church to the state. Another asserts that the Church does not favor the movements for Social Reform. Forthwith Catholics come out and propose *an alliance* between the Church and Socialism, that is, an alliance of the Church with the peculiar heresy of the age, — a heresy which is the *résumé* of all the heresies which have been from the time of Cerinthus down to our time. All these blunders we have seen during the last four years in Catholic publications at home and abroad, and the consequences may be read in the treatment the Church now receives in every European country. The universal persecution of which the Church is now the object is all owing to Catholics who failed to detect and denounce the heresy when it first began to creep in, and to stand firm to the principles of their own holy religion. Their own cowardice and shameful compromise with error have brought down upon them the chastisements of Almighty God. If Catholics in England had not been steeped in worldliness and been rank cowards, Henry the Eighth could never have

involved them in schism, and Elizabeth could never have founded the present Anglican Church. To find the proof of it, we need but look to Ireland, to Irish Catholics, who, while they feared God, feared nothing else. There is no sense or propriety in declaiming against those outside of the Church. They are of their father, the Devil, and his works they will do. What else should we expect? The fault to be deplored and remedied is in Catholics themselves. If they abuse the gifts of Heaven, they must expect them to be withdrawn.

Socialism, the legitimate consequence, not of republicanism as understood by our American fathers and incorporated into our American constitutions, but of modern *progressive*, philosophical, or radical democracy, such as has led to the French Revolution, such as is seeking to triumph in Germany, is the great question of the day, and a question in the discussion of which Catholics in this country, as well as elsewhere, must take part. It has found its way here; it is playing an important part in our politics; it is undermining our free institutions; and there is no power on earth but Catholicity that can arrest it. Nothing else furnishes the principles from which it can be logically refuted. The whole uncatholic world would embrace it, if it had only the courage to be consistent, as we proved, over and over again, when we had the misfortune, the sin, and shame of being ourselves a Socialist. Many denounced us then, but no man not a Catholic did or could refute us. No advocate of the late French Revolution approaches to a refutation of the doctrines of the Red Republicans and the Socialists of France. A thousand voices denounce MM. Cabet and Proudhon, but not one refutes them. They only draw the conclusion for which the moderate Republicans provide the premises. It is only from the high stand-point of Catholicity that any man has or can have a word to say against that terrible Socialism which sweeps away the Church, the state, the family, property, and reduces all men to a dead level, and a level with the beasts that perish. On Catholics in Europe and on Catholics in America is devolved the task of resisting and overcoming, by the grace of God, this monster. Opposition to it from any other quarter is an inconsequence, a fallacy. Our Catholic press does not seem to us to have felt the full importance of this subject. Mere political changes are of comparative indifference; the Church can coexist with any form of government, but she cannot coexist with Socialism. The two forces are inherently antagonistical, and one can exist only by the destruction of the other. There can

be no *transaction*, no compromise between them. The one is Christ, the other is Antichrist.

We urge this point, because we feel that it is one on which Catholics, as well as others, need enlightening. Many of the questions which come up are new, and can be decided only in the light of general principles. The application of Catholic principles to social and political questions, in the new forms in which modern society brings them up, is hardly better understood by the great body of the Catholic laity than by non-Catholics themselves. They know that in all matters they are to act honestly, conscientiously ; but beyond this they have received very little, if any, direct instruction. But now, when all political and social affairs devolve on the people at large, this is not enough. Popular instruction must enlarge its sphere, and a portion of that knowledge which was formerly necessary only for teachers and rulers must now be diffused through the great body of the people ; and to do this seems to us to be peculiarly the province of the Catholic press. No doubt a clamor will be raised, no doubt all manner of charges will be made, and good timid souls will tremble, if the press venture to speak out distinctly, firmly, boldly, the truth as enlightened Catholics do and must hold it ; but what of that ? Who cares for clamors and false charges ? Who is a coward ? Who is afraid to live or die for Catholic truth ? Who so base as to take counsel of his fears ? Let the timid quake, let the false heart denounce, let wicked men and devils rage. What if they do ? Put on the whole armour of God, and fear nothing. If you are for God, is not God for you ? and who is so silly as to suppose, if God is for him, that any thing can be against him ? Out with the truth, out with the precise truth needed by this age, and shame the devils back to their den. Have ye not the old saints and martyrs for an example, and for advocates and protectors ? Had they heeded clamors, and outcries, and the fears of the timid, the terrors of the cowardly, think ye they would ever have conquered the world, and made the heathen the possession of their King ?

We know that the press cannot take its proper stand without loss of popularity, and that a press that wants popularity can receive but a feeble support. This is one of the evils to which the press is always exposed, and why it can never be so efficient an instrument for good as men suppose. The popularity of a paper is in an inverse ratio to its worth. It is popular by virtue of appealing to popular passion or prejudice,

by encouraging popular tendencies, falling in with the spirit of the people or the age, — the very things it should resist. We know this very well ; but still we believe that this evil is less among Catholics, or more easily overcome among them, than among others, for they have faith and conscience. And we also believe that there is already a body of Catholics in this country, of right feelings and views, numerous enough to sustain a truly Catholic press, adapted to the real wants of the times. Catholics are not strangers to deeds of charity, and there are many who have means, and who, we doubt not, have the will, to sustain a press beyond the subscription to a single copy for themselves individually. Let the journal take a high stand, be conducted with energy and ability, on true Catholic principles, and we will not believe that Catholics will suffer it to languish.

We know perfectly well that the press cannot with us assume its proper rank without much labor and sacrifice, and not at all, unless its support is looked upon as a religious duty, and men undertake to sustain it for God's sake. But in these times and in this country, we hazard nothing in saying that the support of the *Catholic* press is a religious duty, a duty to our God and to our neighbour. It is an act of spiritual charity, which, if we love God, we shall feel it not only our duty, but our pleasure, to perform. If the press has, as we have endeavoured to prove, become in these times an indispensable or even a useful instrument in the hands of Catholics for the defence of religion, the doctrines and rights of the Church, and even of social order and natural morality, it is the duty of Catholics to support it to the full extent of its wants and their means. Suppose this Catholic may not want this or that journal for himself personally. What then ? Has he means ? can he afford to take it and pay for it ? Let him do it, then. It will help sustain the journal for those who do need it, and perhaps his own family may find an advantage in it, if not to-day, at least to-morrow. The volumes of *The Catholic Magazine* or of our *Quarterly Review* will have a value next year as well as this, and we may say nearly as much of even any weekly journal, well conducted, on truly Catholic principles, like *The Freeman's Journal*, *The Pittsburg Catholic*, or the *Propagateur Catholique*, to mention no more. It is of great importance to us as Catholics, as American citizens, that we have such journals in the country. We want a quarterly review, for the more elaborate and scientific discussion of the great questions which come up ; we want also a monthly magazine, for that

class of readers who have not the leisure to master the elaborate discussions of the quarterly, — supposing the quarterly to be properly conducted, — and who yet want something more solid and of more permanent interest than the weekly journal ; we want the weekly journals in all parts of the country, for the whole body of the Catholic community, to keep them informed of what is passing at home and abroad, and to direct them in forming their judgments of passing events. These three classes of publications, each in its sphere, are all wanted, and one as much as another. The only rivalry there can be between them is as to which shall most efficiently serve the cause of Catholicity. Catholics should feel that it is a religious duty to support them all, and even when they do not always see the soundness of the views on various questions which one or another of them may from time to time put forth. No editor of a *Catholic* journal speaks out of his own head, but, if not a doctor himself, takes care to submit to the supervision and direction of one who is. If his journal puts forth an unpopular doctrine, the Catholic reader may in general be sure that it has been done not inconsiderately, but only because it is Catholic doctrine, or implied by Catholic doctrine, and cannot be lost sight of without detriment to Catholic life. If you ever distrust a Catholic journal at all, if published with the approbation of the ordinary, distrust it when you find it falling in with the popular doctrines of the day, and confirming the public in their prejudices or their fallacies. We make no personal complaints ; we have been treated by the Catholic public with a kindness, an indulgence, which goes to our heart, and makes us feel how unworthy we are to fill the post we occupy ; but we cannot help thinking that Catholics do not generally feel as they should the importance, nay, the obligation, to support a *Catholic* press, and all the more earnestly and perseveringly, the more indisposed it is to appeal to popular prejudices, and to flatter popular passions.

The press may itself do not a little to promote right views and feelings in the Catholic population on this point. The principle of the Catholic press must always be different from that of the Protestant or infidel press. The non-Catholic press proceeds on the principle, that the people are the jury, and that editors are simply advocates addressing them. It seeks simply to obtain from the people a verdict in favor of its client. The Catholic press proceeds on the principle, that it has nothing to do but to make known to the people the judgment of the court, that is, of the Church, to explain it to the people, and to in-

duce them to accept and conform to it. The Catholic press is and should be simply the organ of authority, and never is and never can be the organ of the people, — a popular tribune. A socialist like Horace Greeley of New York may call his journal *The Tribune*; it is in character, for the people are his church, and Humanity is his god; but a *Catholic Tribune* would be a contradiction in terms. Catholic editors never lose sight of this, and, since they must always make it a point to speak under instruction, save on those points where authority leaves them free, they should labor to form their public accordingly, and to correct that tendency, everywhere so strong, to reject as unsound whatever is unpopular, that is, to substitute the judgment of the taught for the judgment of the teacher.

The press must also strengthen itself and extend its influence by its unanimity. In matters expressly of faith, all our journals of course agree; but in other matters it cannot be denied that there has been neither that unanimity nor that mutual good feeling which is so necessary to be maintained. Nearly all our journals are sufficiently courteous towards "our separated brethren," but some of them show a singular want of courtesy, when they have occasion to express their differences from one another. There is no necessity for this. There is no wisdom or piety in vituperation, in personal abuse, in one editor calling another hard names, or in saying things which must wound his feelings. If one journal falls into an error, another has, no doubt, the right to expose it; or if one advances something which another judges to be wrong, the latter may give his views in opposition, freely, and with all the strength of argument he can command; but this he may do, and ought to do, without passion, without personal abuse, and with perfect courtesy and respect towards the journal judged to be in error. Generally speaking, we have ourselves received nothing but praise from the Catholic press, but only one instance has come to our knowledge in which a Catholic, or a nominally Catholic, paper has expressed a dissent from our views on a given subject in a courteous tone, or without a sneer. Now this is wrong. If the error is not of sufficient importance to deserve a grave and candid refutation, it deserves no notice at all. Cobbett's style of writing is hardly the one to be cultivated by Catholic editors, even when carrying on a controversy with those without, — certainly not when carrying on one with those within. In replying to those out of the Church more latitude is of course allowable, for their good faith is never to be presumed; but in contro-

verting a Catholic editor's statement we must always presume good faith, and that he is ready to correct any error into which he may have fallen the moment it is clearly and distinctly pointed out to him. We have enemies enough elsewhere, without making enemies of one another. We do not hold ourselves infallible, and we recognize the perfect right of others to differ from us ; but we do insist that the journal that arraigns what we publish is bound to give its reasons. Simply to object to an article, to say it is *captious*, or not sound, without pointing out what is regarded as captious or unsound, and wherefore it is so regarded, is a want of editorial justice. No professedly Catholic paper should be *cried down* until it has given conclusive evidence that it is hostile to religion, and will not amend its errors ; till then, we are free only to *reason* it down.

We have dwelt on this point because it is important, and because the several Catholic journals, embarked as they are in the same cause, should have a good mutual understanding, and, if they must occasionally rebuke one another, should do it in a truly fraternal spirit, so as to lead to the correction of the error, without any loss of mutual good feeling and affection. There need be and should be no jealousy one of another. There is ample room for all the journals we have ; all are wanted ; not one of them can be spared ; and instead of one interfering with another, they may all be serviceable each to the others. None of them, we trust, have pecuniary gain, or the fame of their editors, for their primary object. They are all established for the good of the Catholic cause, and no one has or can have any other ambition than to serve it as effectually as may be in its power. Let each rejoice, then, in the others' prosperity, and do what it can to promote it.

It is clear from what we have said that the Catholic press has to make its way against the popular current, and must often take unpopular views of the great questions which come up. It is highly necessary that we all understand this, and that, when one journal does this, the others should be ready to second it, and never leave it to fight its battles single-handed. The instant and hearty coöperation of the whole press adds greatly to its power and efficiency. But this is a point on which we need not enlarge, because, in the main, on this head there is not much ground of complaint. And, indeed, excepting the want of personal courtesy and kind feeling between editors who chance to differ on certain questions, in stating what the Catholic press should be, we are only stating what the Catholic

press proper, excluding the papers excluded some pages back, has already become, or, as rapidly as circumstances permit, is already becoming. *The Catholic Magazine* is an excellent periodical, and fills its place well; *The Pittsburg Catholic* is a journal conducted with great energy and ability, with true Catholic courage, and with a full appreciation of the age and country; and we may say the same of the New York *Freeman's Journal*, which bids fair to become the model of a Catholic newspaper, and which is already superior, in our judgment, to *The London Tablet*, — at least in the fact that it keeps within its legitimate sphere, and does not assume a sort of episcopacy over the Pope, bishops, and clergy, as if it devolved on it to see that they discharged their duties properly.

The class of papers which we have not included in the Catholic press may also do great service. They are devoted chiefly to Irish interests, but that is a recommendation; for nothing that can be done here can more effectually serve Ireland than the elevation and independence of our Irish population. These papers, if judiciously conducted, may be of immense service, not only to the Irish population, but to the whole people of the United States. The fault we find with these papers is, that they take their political and social principles from the age, instead of Catholicity, and, directly or indirectly, favor the socialistic or radical tendencies of our times. Espartero, Ledru Rollin, Mazzini, and Herr Hecker have found defenders or eulogists in the columns of *The Boston Pilot*. It is not the Irish feeling or devotion to Irish interests of these papers that offends us, for we will go as far to serve Ireland as will the Irish themselves, but their radical or socialistic tendency, of which their conductors seem to be wholly unconscious. Their editors accept and follow that spirit of the age which the Church does and must resist, for it is antichristian. No doubt, they believe that they are following no spirit not perfectly compatible with their religion. No doubt, they suppose that their religion leaves them free to adopt any views of man and society in regard to this world they please. We do not believe that one of them would knowingly, intentionally, do aught to injure the cause of religion; but they do not know what spirit they are of; they do not see that the spirit they are following is the spirit of the world, — that spirit which places the earthly above the heavenly, — and that the principles they adopt, and which they find everywhere taken for granted in the books and journals they read, if carried out, would overthrow all relig-

ion, all morality, all society. They are popular writers, full of noble and generous impulses, and well fitted in these times to draw the multitude after them. Let them but defer to authority, let them take their politics from the approved doctors of the Church, and their views of society from Catholic theology, study their religion in its relations to society, and remember that our condition in this world can be really ameliorated only in proportion as we seek heaven and live for God, and they will render an essential service to their countrymen and ours. They would then be a noble auxiliary to the Catholic press, and would exert a salutary influence where that does not and cannot penetrate. We want a secular press. We want just such journals as these might be, just as much as we want any others. May we not hope that the developments of the revolutionary and socialistic spirit in Europe, the terrible evils to religion they bring in their train, the present situation of the Church, — opposed everywhere, her rights disregarded and trampled on, the liberty of teaching denied her, her religious driven from their homes, her priests assassinated, her bishops exiled, imprisoned, or hung, and all the sympathy of the world, even in nations professedly Catholic, if we except Ireland, given to the party that persecutes her, — will not be without effect on these secular editors, induce them to review their principles, to reëxamine them in the light of the true Catholic doctrine, and finally bring them into line with the Catholic press, to do valiant battle on the same side, against the same enemies, and for the same glorious but unpopular cause? In these times, all that is true-hearted and chivalric should rush to the defence of the Church, without which there is no salvation, no moral or social well-being. Can any one who calls the blessed old Church of God his mother fail to see that his place is on the side of authority against the anarchical doctrines of the day, and that there is no hope for any country but in the freedom and independence of the Church, and through her ministry?

But we have spun out our remarks to a far greater extent than we intended. We have spoken as one of the editorial corps to our brethren, to interchange our views with them, not to dictate to them the course they ought to pursue, for we have no disposition and no right to dictate. We have only thrown out our views, and endeavoured to justify them by solid reasons. We have spoken not for our brethren of the press so much as for the public, who seem to us not to appreciate properly the importance of the Catholic press, nor to understand precisely

the difficulties it has to contend with, what they ought to expect from it, or what is their duty in reference to it. They seem to us too remiss in supporting it, and too ready to find fault with it whenever it does not happen to countenance their momentary crotchets. To our brethren of the Catholic press we return our cordial thanks for the kindness they have shown us, and beg them to pardon us if in any respect we have violated in their regard the principles we have insisted upon in the present article. It is not every one who "recks his own rede," or practises what he preaches, and we are not exempt from the common infirmities of our race. We mean never to disfigure our pages with any other severity than that of reason, and if we ever do, it is unintentionally and unconsciously.

We have insisted earnestly upon the importance of the press, but we have wished to be understood as insisting upon its importance only in its sphere, and as controlled and used by the Church as an auxiliary to her other modes of operation. We want the press free, independent, as it regards the people and secular authority; but as regards the Church, free only to do her bidding. We do not want it to exist as an independent institution, a sort of lay episcopacy. Doing the bidding of the Church, it can do no harm, but may do much good. Nevertheless, let us never forget that the great work itself we want done is, after all, done not by men, but by God himself, using or not using men, as seems to him good, and therefore that always our most effectual working will be prayer to him that he will be pleased himself to work. A single prayer offered in secret to Almighty God, by some devout soul, unknown to the world, shall effect more than our most elaborate articles or brilliant and stirring editorials. God loves the simple and humble, and will do any thing for them. The times are fearful; the dangers are thick and threatening. Let us, therefore, betake ourselves to prayer, as the surest and speediest remedy.

ART. II. — *Hawkstone: a Tale of and for England in 184—*. Fifth American Edition. New York. 1848. 2 vols.

THIS is an Anglican novel, which was published in England early in 1845, and which has passed through five editions in

this country since 1847. We are told that it produced no slight sensation among the English, and we presume it has been well received among ourselves by that class of our community who are fond of saying, "We are Catholics, but not *Roman* Catholics." The author's name we do not know, or, if we ever knew, have forgotten. He is said to be a distinguished member of the Oxford school, and he is evidently a man of some cultivation and fair natural ability. He has a satirical vein and a heartiness in his hatred, which, in the absence of nobler qualities, impart occasionally an interest to his pages ; but as a writer he wants simplicity, ease, sprightliness, and grace. In a few instances he produces a tolerable melodramatic effect, but his power over the human heart does not appear to be great. He seldom touches the springs of deep and genuine feeling. His characters strike us as drawn from preceding works of fiction, and they want originality, life, and naturalness, — are, in general, monsters, blocks, or mere shadows. He might, perhaps, write a passable essay or article for a magazine in favor of Oxfordism, and against Romanism, or Evangelicalism, but he is ill fitted to write a novel pleasing to such as do not happen to be chiefly interested in the religious controversies he carries on.

Hawkstone belongs to the class of novels termed religious, and was principally designed to arrest the tendency to Catholicity so apparent in the Oxford movement for several years prior to the happy conversion of Mr. Newman and a large number of his distinguished friends. We suppose every body has heard of the Oxford movement, of Tractarianism, or Puseyism, but it is possible that every body has not perfectly comprehended it. Many Protestants were frightened out of their propriety by it, and many Catholics thought they saw in it the indication that the day of England's return to the faith and unity of the Church drew near ; but both Catholics and Protestants seem to have beheld it through a magnifying medium. It was in no sense the result of a Catholic tendency among Anglicans ; its motive was not, as some have thought, to Catholicize the Establishment, and prepare the way for its return to our communion ; and England's conversion, we fear, is still a far distant event. England will never return to the Church till she is humbled, till her English pride is broken, and she feels and is willing to acknowledge her own insufficiency for herself. She must be severely chastised, and suffer terrible reverses and calamities, before she will seek the God on whom in her pride and wantonness she turned her back. Nevertheless, the Oxford move-

ment was more important than we ourselves considered it, and Almighty God in his mercy has brought a good out of it which we did not anticipate.

The motive of the Oxford movement was, not to revive Catholicity in England, but to resist its revival, to guard against the consequences of its revival, and to save the Anglican Establishment, whose very existence was threatened by the well-known Act of Catholic Emancipation. That act, passed in 1829, went farther than to relieve Catholics of their political and civil disabilities ; it involved a change, not merely in the policy of the English government, but in the constitution of the English state. The constitution of England, as modified by Protestantism, made the English state and the English Church commensurate one with the other. The sovereign people was restricted to the members of the church established by law. Catholics and Dissenters might or might not be tolerated, but, as such, they were excluded from the state, and could have no representation in the government. The state was Protestant Episcopal, and existed only for Protestant Episcopalians. But when Dissenters, and especially Catholics, were freed from their disabilities, and admitted into the state, as constituent elements of the political body, all this was changed ; the state ceased to have a profession of faith, to be Protestant Episcopal, and, as the state, had no longer any religion at all, except Christianity in that vague sense in which it includes alike all professedly Christian denominations. Its subjects were free to adopt any religion they pleased, and the several religions they might adopt, if nominally Christian, were all equal before it.

From that moment the Anglican Establishment became an anomaly in the British constitution, and one which the ordinary course of events must inevitably sweep away. It ceased to be the *national* religion, the religion of the sovereign people, and there was a manifest inconsistency, to say the least, in requiring the sovereign people to support it. As long as it was the religion of the state, the state might sustain it ; but when it was no longer such religion, the state could not support it as a state religion, without being guilty of a practical lie. Moreover, where would be found in the state the disposition or the power to support it ? Dissenters hated it, and were doing their best to destroy it. Could men be expected as members of the state to sustain an establishment to which as individuals they were conscientiously opposed, and on which they were con-

tinually making war? Would Catholics legislate for the preservation of an Establishment which they believed to be schismatical and heretical, which had persecuted their ancestors, slaughtered their priests, and which was plethoric with the wealth robbed from their Church? If, combined with Dissenters, they had already become strong enough to compel the state, in spite of the Established Church, to admit them into the bosom of the sovereign or ruling people, how long would it be before they would be able to compel it to abolish the Establishment itself? *

Nor was this all. The state had the legal right to abolish the Establishment. It could refuse to support it, on the ground that it was no longer the Church of England, that is, of the new political England, created by the Act of Catholic Emancipation. But it could also do it on the ground that it was its own creation, and therefore subject to its authority. The civil power had created it, and given it its commission, and was therefore competent to revoke its commission, and to unmake as it had made it. For the civil government to destroy it, to blot it out entirely, required the assumption of no principle not necessarily admitted by the Establishment itself, — the violation of no principle either of the old or the new constitution, whether political or ecclesiastical. Of this the government seemed to be perfectly well aware. When, therefore, a reforming government, on the heels of Catholic emancipation, proposed the suppression of certain Irish sees, the friends of the Establishment felt that their worst fears were about to be realized. The

* In this we see the far-reaching foresight of the illustrious O'Connell, and the claims he has to the lasting gratitude of his countrymen. The Catholic Emancipation Act, which was more due to him than to any other man, is the great political event of modern times. It must prove in its operation the destruction of the Anglican Establishment, and the liberation of Ireland. Irish patriots have gained by it the means of working out the freedom of their country. Let them now follow the recommendation of the Holy Father, establish an Irish Catholic university worthy the name, raise up an army of thoroughly disciplined scholars and statesmen, and throw into Parliament a hundred members every way a match for any other hundred members of Parliament, and they will not long have to seek in vain justice to Ireland. We cannot but admire the political sagacity of O'Connell, and, whatever may be our views of his Repeal Movement, we cannot believe it easy to overrate his services to his countrymen. There is great lack of wisdom, as well as base ingratitude, in speaking of him in the disparaging terms adopted of late, by some young patriots, who are no more in comparison with him than a farthing candle is to the luminary of the heavens.

suppression of certain Irish sees might be only the prelude to the suppression of the entire Establishment in Ireland, and its entire suppression in Ireland only a prelude to its entire suppression in England and the Colonies. All this became tolerably clear to Oxford men. It was a moment of peril. What was to be done? The aim of the Oxford movement was to meet the danger here implied.

Two facts were certain:—1. The English Church was bound hand and foot by the state; and, 2. No inconsiderable number of her nominal members had little regard for her as an establishment, and no belief in her necessity as the medium of salvation. To arrest the policy threatened by the government, and to save the English Church, two things, then, were clearly necessary:—1. To emancipate her from her thralldom to the temporal power; and, 2. To stir up the zeal and augment the fervor of her members. But the former was possible only by asserting the Apostolical origin and commission of the Church, and the latter only by reviving the forgotten doctrine of the Sacraments, which makes them indispensable to salvation;—two undeniably Catholic doctrines, always held and insisted upon by the Catholic Church. The Oxford men, therefore, accepted these two doctrines, and labored to bring out and establish them as genuine Anglican doctrines. But they soon saw that these doctrines could not be asserted without condemning the principles of the Protestant Reformation, and that the principles of the Reformation could not be condemned without exonerating the Roman Catholic Church from the charges the Reformers had brought against her. But if that Church was exonerated from those charges, and the Reformation was condemned in its principles, it was clear that the English Church was in schism, perhaps in heresy, and no Christian Church at all. Here was an unlooked-for conclusion,—a discovery which disconcerted them, and threatened to defeat them altogether. What was to be done with it? Here was a new and most serious difficulty.

The Oxford men, on making this discovery, divided into three classes:—1. Those who were and would be Protestants, let come what might; 2. Those who would save the Establishment at all hazards; and, 3. Those who would save the Establishment, if possible, but yet not at the expense of truth and consistency. The first of these, seeing very clearly where the movement was tending, and regarding Dissent as a less evil than Catholicity, abandoned the movement altogether, and lapsed

into Low Churchism, Evangelicalism, or Rationalism ; the second, caring little for logical consistency, and having great confidence in the ignorance, the prejudice, and the unreason of the people, boldly asserted, in spite of the obvious fact, that a distinction between Catholicity and Romanism is tenable, and stoutly maintained that they might stand where they were ; but the third class, having a deeper sense of religion, and more logical sequence of thought than usual with Oxford men, unable to accept this distinction, believing what was called Romanism was better than Evangelicalism or Rationalism, and seeing no other alternative, preferred marching towards Rome, and giving up entirely the glorious Protestant Reformation, with the whole catalogue of Protestant saints. But they still wished and hoped to save the Establishment. They saw that they must go to Rome, but they would carry the Establishment with them. Hence they devoted themselves with great zeal and energy to bringing out and popularizing in the Establishment "all Roman doctrine," according to the expression of the time, or so much of it as they understood, with the ulterior view, though not distinctly avowed, of uniting their communion with the Roman. Hence the decided Catholic tendency which the Oxford movement appeared for a time to be following, and which so alarmed Protestants and so encouraged Catholics.

The work before us was written in 1844, just as the third class of Oxford men we have described were rapidly coming to the conclusion, that they must abandon the Establishment, and go to Rome, not as a corporate body, but as simple individuals, yet before many of them had actually become reconciled to the Church. The author is an Oxford man of the second class enumerated. His precise object is to induce the other two classes of Oxford men to continue on in the course they at first marked out for themselves, and to arrest the tendency to abandon it in favor either of Evangelicalism or of Catholicity. He wishes and is determined to save the Church of England ; and in order to do so, he sees that he must defend it against three classes of enemies, — the state, the Evangelicals, and the Catholics. To defend it from the state, or to assert its independence of the state, he must assert it to be the Church of Christ, and the Church of England only because the Church of Christ, and thus abandon the old ground, that it is the Church of Christ because it is the Church of England ; to defend it against the Evangelicals, he must assert its catholicity, its Apostolical origin and commission, and revive the Catholic doctrine.

of the Sacraments ; and to defend it against the Catholics, he must make it a national church, the Church of England, and the Church of Christ because the Church of England, and conclude the Catholic Church a false church because it differs from it, and does not recognize its mission. He is an Englishman, at least writes in the character of an Englishman. He must, then, have an English God, an English Church, an English faith, an English worship, in a word, an English religion, suitable to an English gentleman. He must, in order to meet this demand, make his church catholic yet national, universal yet insular ; — catholic, that he may assert its independence of the state and condemn Evangelicals ; national, that he may confine it to England, and keep it under the control of Englishmen, or rather, of Oxford men ; — universal, that he may emancipate it from the state and save its revenues ; insular, that he may save it from the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff. If national merely, it is subject to the national will, and at the mercy of the state ; if insular merely, it has no authority as a church, is not essential as a medium of salvation, and nothing can be said in its favor against Evangelicalism or Rationalism ; if catholic, it is subject to the Pope, and Oxford men are not the supreme ecclesiastical authority, and can have no commission but as they receive it from Rome. To emancipate the Church from the state in favor of Rome is to come under another authority equally fatal to them ; to emancipate it from the state in favor of Evangelicalism or Rationalism is to lose its revenues ; and what would it be worth without its revenues ? Therefore, it must be asserted as catholic and not catholic, insular and not insular, and the author must boldly maintain that of contraries both may be true.

The author is an Oxford man, and we are, therefore, not to expect any clear and distinct statement of his problems, or any scientific solutions of them. The Oxford man does not usually deal in science, and there is a sort of haze about his understanding that prevents him from seeing things clearly or distinctly. Indeed, were it otherwise, the Oxford man would not be an Oxford man ; he would be a Catholic, or develop into a downright Rationalist. The author leaves his problems to be divined by his readers, and undertakes to solve them by way of examples, — yet not by examples taken from real life, but imagined by him or his predecessors for the occasion. The discussions are carried on by way of dialogue between certain imaginary Anglicans and Catholics, who have no prototypes

either in the Church or the Establishment, and for the most part behind the scene, — the author only occasionally coming forward and reporting, not the arguments, but the result. We are told Mr. Beattie convinced Mr. Villiers of this or of that, that this same Mr. Beattie satisfied Lady Eleanor as to this or that difficulty; but of the process we are left to judge mainly from the imaginary conduct of the imaginary *dramatis personæ*. There is, no doubt, great convenience in this method of managing a controversy; for the author has only to assert that the party intended to be defeated is defeated, then to make him act as if defeated, and his cause is won. There is some ingenuity in an Oxford man, after all.

The most serious difficulty the author encounters is, how to dispose of the Catholic Church. He can get along tolerably well with Evangelicals and that sort of rabble, for he can assert Catholic doctrine and use Catholic arguments against them; but how to dispose of the Catholic Church, how to silence Rome, is the real difficulty. This he must do before he can proceed a single step in defence of his Oxford movement, for an impression has gone abroad that the Oxford movement has a Romanizing tendency; and he must do it, too, without offending those members of the Establishment who really begin to crave something approaching Catholicity. The Catholic Church is in possession. There she stands, to confound every sect and schism. Men out of her communion may talk as they please, but they have a strange, uncomfortable feeling every time they look at her, and would feel altogether more confidence in their own schemes, parties, or associations, and repose much more quietly in their own inventions, if she was not there, always before them, and giving in her calm and majestic tones the lie to their assertions. The Oxford man seems to be really troubled at her presence, and feels that he should breathe much freer, if she were only out of the way. His first care, as his first necessity, is to remove her. He has half gained his cause, if he has dispossessed her. He must invalidate her titles. But how is he to do this? Scientifically he of course is well aware that he cannot do it. But he has discovered a most ingenious and facile method of doing it. He has only to suppose the principal Catholic doctrines, and call them Anglican, then imagine the most absurd and wicked thing he can, and call it Romanism. Having done this, he has only to imagine the two in operation, and by their imaginary effects judge which must be and which cannot be the Church of God. An ingenious device.

Now this is precisely the author's method of disposing of the Church. The Anglicanism of his book he himself confesses, and his American editor confesses for him, has no actual existence, is not the Anglican Church which is or ever has been, but simply what he imagines, perhaps believes, the present Church of England is capable of becoming. It is only an imaginary or ideal Anglicanism. This, in the very outset, concedes that the Church of England is not Catholic. To be Catholic, it must be Catholic in time as well as in space, and must be equally complete and entire at all times. The most the author can say for his Church is, that he believes it is capable of being developed into the Catholic Church. But this can avail him nothing ; for he goes expressly against the doctrine of Development, and devotes several pages of his book to its formal refutation. Indeed, one of his most formidable objections to what he calls Romanism is, that it seeks to defend itself by appealing to the principle of development. If he denies development, he must take his church as it is ; and if he confesses, as he virtually does, that, considered in its actual state, it is not Catholic, he gives up his cause before entering upon his defence. This, we suppose, must be the Oxford way of defending Anglicanism.

On the other hand, his Romanism, if intended to be taken as the doctrine and practice of the Church in communion with the see of Rome, is as imaginary as his Anglo-Catholicism. It may have some reality in Protestantism, but it is a pure fiction when affirmed of Catholics, or, to please the author, of Papists or Jesuits. To prove that *this* Romanism is not Catholicity is not a difficult matter ; but to do so is nothing to his purpose. Both he and his American editor virtually confess that they do not find it actually existing, and that it is only their ideal of Romanism, — that is, what Romanism might become, if logically carried out. But the Roman Catholic Church, her principles and practice, are facts, and must be taken as they actually are, and refuted as such, or not at all. She is no ideal church. She has existed for centuries ; she has been actualized in the world's history, and it is as so actualized that she must be judged, approved, acquitted, or condemned. We have nothing to do with an ideal Catholic Church, with effects which *might* follow, with characters in which her system *might* issue. The question is, What does she actually teach ? What have actually been her effects ? In what characters has her system actually issued ? A church which has subsisted eigh-

teen hundred, or even three hundred years, cannot be judged by what may be imagined to be her legitimate consequences. She has made her experiment, and must be tried by the results actually obtained, not by results which it is believed or imagined, hoped or apprehended, may be obtained. If the Church, as you concede, never has produced the effects you allege, if she never has given birth to such characters as you imagine, then you are estopped. Fact overrides speculation, and even imagination. Your only rational conclusion is, that you have either reasoned illogically, or misapprehended the system itself, — have either assigned it principles which it repudiates, or failed to recognize in it certain principles which it contains, and which limit and modify the action of those you do recognize.

The author's method of testing what he calls Romanism is by exhibiting its effects on character ; and, imagining its effects to be bad, he concludes, at once, against the Catholic Church. He is in this guilty of what logicians term *transitio a genere ad genus*, for his Romanism differs generically from the Roman Catholic Church ; and, moreover, he adopts a principle of reasoning which is rarely safe, and which must at all times be applied with great caution. The Church is not responsible for the abuses of her system. It is always necessary to prove in the outset that the character to be judged has been formed by her system, not in spite of it, and is its legitimate consequence. Doubtless, there are bad men in the Church, as black-hearted villains as you need look for ; but that is nothing to the purpose. Are they the fruits of Catholicity ? Are they obedient sons of the Church ? Do they believe and obey her teaching ? Do they conform to her spirit, and strictly and conscientiously perform their Catholic duties ? If not, she is not responsible for their character. When the author produces a real personage who lives as the Church directs, who really follows out her system in his daily life, and is, nevertheless, a bad man, or not, in an elevated sense, a good man, we will listen to him and agree that he has adduced an argument against our Church which needs a reply. But this he has not done, — has not even attempted to do. The characters by which he attempts to determine the effects of Catholicity, or, as he calls it, the Papal system, are not real, but imaginary, not drawn from history, but from the author's imagination, and are avowedly formed to express merely his views of its logical consequences. What proves that his views are correct ? The facts and presumptions are against him ; for, if correct, he could have found in real

life characters already formed to his hand. It is certainly a singular way to refute a system, this of imagining something which is not it, then imagining characters to express that which is imagined, and finally, from the unseemliness of these imaginary characters, to conclude the wickedness and falsity of the system itself. Such a refutation can, at best, be only *imaginary*.

That the author draws on his imagination for his Romanism, or that of his predecessors, we need not undertake to prove. A bare statement of it will suffice to prove it, for all who are qualified to form an opinion on the subject. According to him, the Catholic system held by us is throughout a system of fraud and chicanery. The Pope, the cardinals, the bishops, the clergy, especially the Jesuits, are leagued together in upholding and extending a gigantic imposition for the sake of attaining universal temporal dominion. They are constantly engaged in contriving and hatching plots and conspiracies against the liberties of nations and the common rights of mankind. Just now, the whole energy of Rome and her minions is directed to the recovery of England, wrested from her tyrannical grasp by those comely saints, Henry VIII. and his daughter Elizabeth. For this, Catholics pour out exhaustless wealth like water. Innumerable emissaries from the Papal court — men of all grades, and of all characters, fit for deeds of lofty virtue and of the most damning villany — swarm over the nation, penetrate into every society, into every nook and corner of the land, worm their way into the confidence of the unsuspecting, cajole the great, terrify the little, and, through the confessional, master the secrets of all, and use them in furtherance of their hellish purpose. No Englishman is safe. There is a universal conspiracy against him. His steps are dogged, his motions are watched and noted; his most secret thoughts are ascertained, and transmitted to the Pope or to the General of the Jesuits. Artful spies surround him; he is besieged with arguments and blandishments; appeals to his senses, his passions, his intellect, his tastes, his imagination; smooth-faced and liberal priests cajole or threaten him; high-toned and crafty Jesuits, whose nights are spent in vigils, prayers, and studies, whose minds are stored with the literature and science of all ages and nations, make themselves his companions, win his heart, and seek to entrap him into Romanism. Worse than all this; if he remains obstinate, the agents employed are punished for their failure, even assassinated before his very eyes,

by order of their master or masters ; he becomes the object of Papal vengeance ; invisible agents swarm around him ; his plans are defeated, his hopes are deceived, his affections severed, his children stolen from him, and brought up in profanity and vice, prepared, at the first opportunity, to cut his throat. Poor man ! there is no safety for him. Let him not dream that he can escape the vengeance of Rome. Artful, designing, learned, accomplished Jesuits, with no principle but obedience to their superiors, ready to pray or to murder, according to the order given, are ever on his track, and, in one disguise or another, lurking near him. Does he go to Italy to display his magnificence, or to enjoy the sunny clime and the treasures of Italian art ? A Jesuit disguised becomes his body-servant, and soon his factotum ; — by his artfulness, his address, his faculty of making himself agreeable and useful, gets the command over him, finds out his secrets, and then refuses to spare him, unless he turns Papist, and bequeathes his estates to the Jesuits.

Not individuals only, but the state, is beleaguered. Emissaries from Rome are in every department. Every Jesuit, every priest, every Irish laborer, is in the conspiracy. Is there a riot or an outbreak in some mining or manufacturing district, — it is the work of the disguised Jesuit, done in obedience to orders from Rome, for the purpose of bringing about a change of ministry. Is some provincial bank, which has been insolvent for years, obliged to stop business, to the ruin of hundreds of honest people, — the same ubiquitous Jesuit is at the bottom, and has done it in order to secure the return of a Liberal and infidel member of Parliament. Is there a change of ministry, a rise or a fall in the stocks, — it is the work of Rome, through her agents, for the embarrassment of the British government.

With a few rare exceptions, these emissaries and agents are all in the secret, understand the purposes of their masters, and are themselves without faith, without conscience, without principle, and utterly reckless. Nevertheless, they keep their oath, are faithful to their trusts, practise the most exact obedience, submit to the severest mortifications, and make the most painful self-sacrifices ; and all to uphold a system of sheer fraud, a mere imposition, which they know to be a mere imposition, and which among themselves they ridicule and despise. What binds them to their superiors ? What insures their fidelity ? What compels them to make these sacrifices ? They are caught and cannot escape. They find themselves leagued with

a band of robbers, and cannot break away without running the most fearful risks. There would be no living for them in Catholic countries, and Protestants, alas ! have no houses of refuge to receive them. Let them falter in their duty, let them in their secret chambers, in the solitude of their own private thoughts, but dream of swerving from their fidelity, and the muffled assassin's dagger shall speedily find its way to their heart. By a system of universal fraud, intrigue, and espionage, the Church establishes her power, and by a system of universal terror she contrives to preserve and even to extend it.

We say nothing which is not warranted by the book before us, and had we space, we could justify by citations every statement we make. This is Romanism, or the Papal system, according to the author of *Hawkstone* ; and this horrible system, he would have his readers understand, is the system which we Catholics embrace and exert ourselves to uphold and extend ! Does he believe this ? Why should he not ? It is, with slight variation, as far as it goes, the old story which Protestants in general, and English Protestants in particular, have been repeating for these three hundred years, and substantially what we may read in any Antipopery book, tract, or newspaper we can take up. It may seem incredible to those who have been always Catholics from their infancy, that any Protestant can believe any thing so absurd ; but Protestants have a liberal share of credulity, and can believe any thing — but the truth.

The whole of this theory of what they call Romanism, the Papal system, or the Jesuitical system, Protestants rest on two assumptions :— 1. The Church holds that the end justifies the means ; and, 2. That by means of the confessional she obtains possession of the secrets of all hearts, and can use them for her own purposes. The Church exists in spite of all opposition ; that is a fact there is no denying. She persists through all the mutations which go on around her, and retains, and from day to day even extends, her influence. As a matter of course, she is a gigantic imposition. Otherwise, Protestantism would be false and criminal. But if an imposition, if a mere human institution, she can extend or even preserve her influence only by human means, — by craft, artifice, and consummate human skill and address. She must be wise, crafty, subtle, and unscrupulous in the selection and employment of her means and agents. This view of the Church the Protestant must take, or concede that she is the Church of God, and thus condemn himself.

The Church certainly subsists, and it is a fact that the counsels of her enemies are often frustrated, and that nations which have disowned her often feel her influence, and unintentionally promote her interests, in a way which to them is strange and incomprehensible. But this theory of her consummate human policy, her craft and address, is far from being borne out by the facts of history. Humanly speaking, her ministers have not always been good ecclesiastical politicians, and have not seldom committed what in the eyes of men are gross blunders. We have been struck, in reading history, with this fact. If ignorance, weakness, false policy, and blunders on the part of Churchmen could have ruined the Church, she would have been ruined and ceased to exist long ages ago. Her whole history proves that she subsists in spite of human policy, and therefore that she is upheld, not by the arm of man, but by the arm of God. But let this pass. We cannot expect Protestants to recognize the facts of history, or to make in view of them the proper induction. Let it be that she is a mere human institution, and therefore a gigantic imposition; still, the means on which she is supposed to depend are altogether inadequate to the acknowledged effect.

The assumption, that the Church holds that the end justifies the means, is unwarranted, a pure, unmitigated falsehood; but let that pass; even if it were not so, it would not meet the exigencies of the case. The principle itself presupposes that the end is good, at least believed to be good, and it is only on that condition that it can have place, or operate. But if our author is to be believed, the Church does not even propose a good end. He, indeed, represents his imaginary Catholics as justifying their conduct on the ground that it is for the good of the *cause*; but, at the same time, he represents them as perfectly aware that the cause itself is bad. They must, then, act, not on the principle that a good end sanctifies the *means*, — the principle supposed, — but on the principle that a *bad* end sanctifies bad means, — that, however detestable the means, if the end is bad, they are justifiable!

Not only is this the representation given of the inferior agents, but of the superiors, of the Pope, and of his supposed master, the General of the Jesuits. If the system be what it is alleged, it has and can have no good end. What good end, indeed, can you suppose? The salvation of men? No, for the Church believes in no salvation, and its ministers are nothing but a set of baptized infidels, without faith and without con-

science. They know their system to be an imposition, and ridicule its pretensions. Of course, then, they cannot believe its maintenance essential or at all necessary for any religious purpose, — certainly not as the medium of salvation ; for, in order to believe that, they must really believe their Church to be the Church of God, which they cannot do, if they know it to be a mere human institution, a mere imposition. What, then, is the good end proposed ? The monopolizing of power ? But this is not an end ; it is only a means to an end. For what end monopolize power ? For mere selfish gratification ? But that is not a good end. Supposing the Church, then, to be what is alleged, supposing her to adopt the principle, that the end justifies the means, that principle cannot avail her ; for, false as that principle is, it can operate only with men who have some faith and some conscience, and where there is an end proposed which is really or apparently good, neither of which is the fact in the case supposed. The Church has, according to the author, only a vicious end, which she seeks by unscrupulous agents who know it to be vicious. Will he explain to us how the larger part of the civilized world can be made to submit to a system vicious both in its ends and in its means, — a system which they do not believe, and which deprives them of all their rights as men ? or how a system so utterly rotten in all its parts can be sustained, by agents still more rotten, in the face of day, and in spite of all the opposition it undeniably encounters ? Is the Oxford man deeply read in philosophy ? Is he remarkably well versed in the secrets of human nature ? False systems may, undoubtedly, be sustained, but only when they propose an end which commends itself to the human heart, and in whose favor conscience can be enlisted ; and only while the adherents retain some persuasion that the systems, though they may be imperfect, are nevertheless, in the main, true and necessary. Satan must disguise himself as an angel of light, nay, must seat himself on the throne of God as God, must deceive, must delude, in order to induce any considerable number of persons to hearken to him or to worship him as God.

The second assumption is no better. It is false to suppose that the secrets of the confessional are or can be disclosed or used as pretended. The confessor, even if permitted to reveal the secrets of the confessional, or to make use of them out of the confessional, which is strictly forbidden, could do it only to a feeble extent, and on rare occasions. How in the world can a confessor who hears ninety or a hundred different confessions

in a single afternoon, and of persons the majority of whom he does not know even by sight or by name, remember each one's confession, and set it down to the proper penitent? When could he find time to record these confessions? And supposing he could do this, and should transmit the records to Rome, who is there in that city to read them all, to make a digest of them,—reduce them to such a compass, that it would be possible, in any practicable length of time, for the Pope or the General of the Jesuits to form even a general idea of their contents? Neither the Pope nor the General can devote more than a certain number of hours a day to mastering the secrets of these confessions from all parts of the globe; and by what conceivable process will you contrive to enable either, in these few hours, to master the daily secrets of the whole world? Yet the hypothesis requires, not only that the priests collect all these secrets, not only that they write them out, and transmit them to Rome, but that the Pope or the General of the Jesuits—the author does not tell us explicitly which—is actually to become acquainted with them, and to shape his policy according to the information he thus acquires. Who but a Protestant could believe this possible, without one of the most stupendous miracles ever recorded?

But pass over this. The confessional does not afford the means of collecting all the secrets of all the world. Protestants and persons not Catholics do not confess to Catholic priests, and therefore nothing more can be known of their secrets with than without the confessional. If Catholics should happen to become acquainted with their secrets, they could not reveal them in the confessional; for they are forbidden to confess any one's secrets, even if they know them, but their own. If they are conscientious, they will not do it; if they are not conscientious, they will not go to confession. The agents and emissaries supposed have neither faith nor conscience, and therefore will not seek the confessional, or, if they should, they would take care to confess nothing seriously to their own disadvantage. Consequently, supposing the worst, it is not possible through the confessional to get at that knowledge of the secrets of mankind, or of the emissaries and agents employed, which is essential to the maintenance of the system of universal terror by which it is pretended Rome is able to keep up her power, and secure the fidelity of her servants.

The author of *Hawkstone* reasons as if every body confessed to Catholic priests, — whereas none but Catholics do it; also,

as if all who pass for Catholics, although they have neither faith nor conscience, go to confession, and that each one not only goes to confession, but even makes a good confession, — whereas none but good Catholics go to confession, for nothing but faith and conscience can carry them there ; or if something else should induce them to go, nothing else could induce them to make a clean breast, that is, what Catholics term a good confession. Evidently, then, supposing the Church to be as bad as our author pretends, the means he alleges are altogether inadequate to give and preserve her power. The causes assumed are inadequate to the effects which are seen and cannot be denied. The Protestant has, no doubt, all the malice requisite to imagine bad causes for these effects, but he suffers his malice to get the better of his discernment. When he takes it upon him to invent a Romanism for us, he should take care to invent causes adequate to its explanation. If Romanism were what he supposes, and dependent for its support on the means he imagines, it could not subsist twenty-four hours. It would instantly be exposed ; nay, *Hawkstone* alone would suffice to annihilate it for ever. Yet *our* Romanism survives, and, we doubt not, will survive for some time to come.

But having in his imaginary way disposed of his imaginary Romanism, or Papal system, the author imagines that he has cleared the field for his Oxfordism, or imaginary Anglicanism. This is the first step. If now he can establish his Oxfordism with as much success as he has had in dispossessing Romanism, he imagines he shall be able to shout his imaginary triumph. His work is now to prove the English Church Catholic. In order to do this, he begins by conceding, nay, proving to our full conviction, that, in its actual state, at least going back ten years from the date of his story, it wants nearly every element of the Church of Christ. It is enslaved to the secular power, and has no faculties of its own ; it has been robbed of its rights and has refused to reclaim them ; it has lost sight of its glorious privileges, its high prerogatives as the Church of God, and suffered them to be denied without a protest ; it has failed to assert the Catholic system, and left by the way large portions of Catholic doctrine ; it has failed to discharge its most obvious and imperious duties as a Christian church, and suffered to grow up under its ministration the most ignorant, vicious, criminal, degraded, and squalidly wretched population to be found in any nation, fostering in the very heart of the empire and threatening its total destruction, without making even an

effort to arrest the terrible evil ; its bishops and priests, though meaning well, perhaps, with rare exceptions, neither understand nor perform their duties as Christian pastors, and as doctors fall into mischievous errors and damnable heresies. We do not doubt it.

But this is nothing against the Church of England. It is rather a proof of her being the true Catholic Church, as distinguished from the Papal Church.

“ ‘And yet,’ said Villiers, ‘the Church of England ten years since was at the point of death.’

“ ‘So,’ replied Beattie, ‘it seemed to us. Threatened by the people, treacherously protected and corrupted by the state, robbed of her revenues, mutilated in her bishoprics, disorganized and enfeebled in those collegiate bodies which ought to form her greatest strength, her authority neither asserted by herself nor recognized by others, her testimony set aside and supplanted by an empty rationalism, her education emptied of every thing which could give it life and power, her churches deserted, her children running off without a warning voice into every kind of dissent, and the population swelling like a running tide around her, and menacing to swallow her up, like those fabled springs destined to overflow and drown the mortals who forgot to keep them under cover and confined within their proper bounds,—such was the condition of the Church. Who would have dared at that time to prophesy that it should, within ten years, simply by the assertion of its own principles, be more deeply rooted than ever in the affections of its children, more feared than ever by its enemies, more able than ever to take its stand as the guardian of this empire, and to spread out its arm to the most distant continents as the converter of the heathen? Yet surely this is now true.’

“ ‘And yet,’ said Villiers, ‘there must have been some malformation, some secret mischief, which had reduced her to her previous state. Without some radical defect, no church could so have fallen.’

“ ‘My dear Villiers,’ said Beattie, after a pause, and placing his hands on his friend’s shoulders, ‘will you endeavour to remain for five minutes in this position, standing upright without moving a single muscle?’

“ Villiers stopped (for they were now walking on the terrace in the college gardens), and endeavoured to do so, but found it impossible.

“ ‘Or,’ continued Beattie, ‘will you try and walk up to that plane-tree yonder in one straight line without a single divergence?’

“ Villiers shook his head.

“ ‘No,’ said Beattie, ‘it would be impossible ; for *the law of*
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progression, as in human minds, and in individuals as in societies, is a law of continual oscillation. We bend from side to side, wavering at every step ; if weak, falling wholly, not to rise again ; if strong, recovering ourselves by some great effort, and advancing at each fresh struggle with more directness, but never upon this earth without a tendency to vary from the central line. Do not, therefore, measure the weakness of societies by their oscillations, or even by their falls (*for they are human and cannot escape them*), but by their recoveries, — recoveries through their own internal strength, when to common eyes they seemed wholly lost. Look round on all the churches in the world, on all civil societies which history presents, and search if you can find an instance of any human polity recovering itself from oscillations so fearful as those by which the English Church has been shaken at times from her centre. Think what a tremendous shock to all opinions and all institutions was given by the stroke which severed her from the tyranny of Rome. And yet, though she bent for a time beyond her equilibrium, she righted and recovered in her doctrine both the principle of authority and the talisman of an hereditary Catholicism, without which she would long since have been fractured to atoms, like the Protestant communions in Germany. *She was saved here by the arm of the civil power*, which grasped her (roughly, indeed, and tyrannically) when she had shaken off her hold upon the Papacy ; but yet rescued her from falling wholly into that worst anarchy, the government of self-will. That arm itself was then fractured ; and the Church fell to the ground, and to human eyes was utterly destroyed. And yet suffering, and persecution, and martyrdom, only purified and strengthened it ; and it came out of the convulsions of the rebellion stronger than before, — the monarchy supported by the Church, and the Church supported by the monarchy. The Revolution came ; and the monarchy was split from top to bottom. It stood, indeed, and a superficial view might not detect the flaw. But the principle of popular election, however disguised and disclaimed, was admitted into the constitution. And since then the Church has been placed to contend against it, breaking out as it has done in a thousand different forms. She has contended with it under the most difficult circumstances ; her hands tied, her movements restricted, her principles corrupted, her resources curtailed, her operations betrayed by the necessity of recognizing a nominal monarchy, which, in reality, was a democracy. If the monarchy had wholly disappeared, her course would have been plain and her opposition unfettered. But she has fought like a woman defending her house and husband against robbers ; her husband himself being all the time one of their accomplices, and endeavouring to silence and corrupt her. We measure strength,' continued Beattie, 'not by mere exertion, but by exertion against resistance, and under dis-

advantages. Think, in this point of view, on the very existence of the Church of England at this day as all but a miracle.' — Vol. i. pp. 288–291.

Our readers will do well to reperuse this extract, and to take notice that the defence of the Church of England is here expressly based on the assumption, — not concession merely, — that it is a *human* institution, and subject to the law of human progression. Her oscillations are only those of the human mind itself, and it is not possible for her to walk without a tendency to vary from the central line of truth. This we have no doubt is true. But if a human and a variable institution, how can she be the Church of God, the reflex on earth of his own eternal truth and immutability? To assume the Church of England to be human is to deny its divinity, and therefore that it is the Catholic Church. Who but an Oxford man, after this, would attempt to prove her the Church of Christ?

Nevertheless, the author, after having thus conceded away and disproved, in the most satisfactory manner, the Catholicity of his Church, and reduced her to a purely human society, proceeds to prove that she is truly Catholic, and that Anglicans, though not Romanists, are genuine Catholics. But how? What is the Catholic Church? How is it identified with the English Church? Why, the modern Church of Rome is the Catholic Church *plus* the Papacy; consequently the modern Church of Rome *minus* the Papacy is the true Catholic Church. Abstract from the modern Church of Rome the Papacy, the remainder will be the answer to the question, what is the Catholic Church. Now it is certain that the Church of England during one thousand years prior to the Reformation was this same Catholic Church *plus* the Papacy. But the Reformation intended only to throw off the Papacy. Consequently the Church it left, as the present Church of England, was this same Church, *minus* the Papacy, which is the true Catholic Church, and therefore the present Church of England is the true Catholic Church. Q. E. D. It is true, however, that the Reformation in point of fact exceeded its intention, that the Reformers tore away a part of the Catholic system itself; but as the Church of England *intended* to throw off only the Papacy, she is not responsible for what went beyond that intention, and has therefore the right to claim, *minus* the Papacy, the whole Catholic system as her own. She is then, undeniably, the Catholic Church *de jure*, and the moment she revives the whole Catholic system and conforms to it in her practical

teaching, discipline, and worship, she will be it *de facto*. Who, then, dare deny the Catholicity of the Church of England?

This, if we understand it, is the Oxford theory. It is ingenious, profound, and beautiful, and highly creditable to its authors. It settles with great ease the questions which might arise as to what is the true Catholic Church. Rome answers those questions for them, and her authority is good, except so far as she asserts the Papacy. After all, then, Rome serves an important purpose. She keeps the Catholic Church in its integrity, though unhappily obscured by her own additions. Still, as under her additions remains intact the entire Catholic Church, we can learn from her what it is, which we could not do from the Church of England, for she, unhappily, has mutilated it, and lost the greater part of it. The author, therefore, takes frequent occasion to rap his Evangelical brethren over the knuckles, for their vulgar prejudices against Rome, and also, notwithstanding all he says against her, to show her immense superiority over the Anglican Church. It is clear, in his view, that, *minus* the Papacy, Anglicanism wants all that Romanism has, and that Romanism has all that Anglicanism wants. Let England borrow from Rome all that Rome has, *minus* the Papacy, and England will once more be Catholic. Rome, then, unless she undertakes by her own authority to plant her system in England, in derogation of the mission of Anglicanism, is to be respected, and held to be a living branch of the Catholic Church. Really, Oxford men are liberal as well as ingenious, and not at all squeamish, if not themselves interfered with! They have no difficulty in recognizing the Catholicity, out of England, of the very Church which they denounce as a gigantic imposition upon mankind, and which, according to them, is sustained only by a system of universal fraud and terror!

This theory, too, enables the Oxford men to dispose of certain troublesome matters connected with the interference of Henry and Elizabeth in ecclesiastical matters at the time of the separation of their Church from the rest of Christendom. The Church of England does not derive from either Henry or Elizabeth; it is the old Catholic Church of England, the primitive Church, *minus* the Papacy, which had been the Church of England from the time of St. Austin, perhaps from the time of St. Paul. Henry and his daughter Elizabeth were only instruments, — rude instruments, it is true, but such as the times afforded, — in the hands of God, for freeing her from foreign domination and Roman corruption. The Reformers may not

have been saintly men ; they may have had bad motives, and erroneous principles and doctrines. But what then ? Bad Churchmen do not make the Church false or wicked. They had nothing to do with founding the Church of England, or settling its constitution, doctrines, or liturgy. They only disencumbered her of the Papacy, cut away the excrescences or accretions which threatened her existence, in order to enable her to stand forth in her native freedom, purity, simplicity, and majesty, as the Church of God, which she was, and had always been. This was their work. They gave nothing to her ; they simply removed what was not hers, and which was only a let and a hindrance to her. They may, indeed, in their ignorance, their zeal, their error, their rashness, have laid a rude hand on the Church herself, taken away more than they should have done, mutilated, wounded, and left her half dead ; but is she to blame for that ? Is she to be censured because she was so cruelly treated ? Is she to be denied her own because she was unjustly deprived of it ? The Reformers in their rude grasp exceeded their powers, and she cannot be bound by their lawless acts. She has, therefore, the right to disavow them, and to reclaim her own.

All this is no doubt very clever, but we do not precisely understand how the Church of England can be Catholic at all, if not Catholic in fact, — Catholic in her actual character. A Church Catholic *de jure*, and not Catholic *de facto*, passes our understanding. We should suppose a Church ceasing to be Catholic in fact had forfeited whatever rights it once had, and become a schismatical or an heretical body. A man once Catholic, but lapsed into schism or heresy, retains, no doubt, with the blessing of God, the power of becoming a Catholic again, but he can hardly for that be called a Catholic, unless he actually becomes so. As long as the power remains a mere virtuality, unreduced to act, he is no more of a Catholic than if he had it not. Grant that the Church of England was once Catholic, that is nothing, if she is not Catholic now ; grant, also, that she has the power of becoming Catholic once more, and — what we deny — that by reducing to practice principles which she actually holds ; that does not make her Catholic, and she cannot be Catholic, unless she so reduces them, and actualizes that power. As long as she remains as she is, she is only what she is *in actu*, and not being *in actu* Catholic, we should suppose that she cannot be regarded as Catholic at all.

That the Church of England before the Reformation was

Catholic, by virtue of her communion with the centre of unity, we concede, and if she is now identically that same Church, she is Catholic now, we also concede ; but if the identity asserted does not exist, the fact that the old Church in England was Catholic does not make the present Anglican Church Catholic, but the reverse. That identity does not exist, if there is an essential difference between the Church that is and the one that was. That such difference does exist is proved by the admitted fact, that the Anglican Church was mutilated by the Reformers, that she has been subjected to the civil power, has practically rejected large portions of the Catholic system, has neglected essential Catholic doctrines, has embraced doctrinal errors, and sanctioned, tacitly at least, mischievous practices ; nothing of which, in the same sense, can be affirmed of the Church before the Reformation. Under any view of the nature and office of the Church which even Oxford men will take, this must imply an essential difference, and therefore destroy the identity asserted ; and then, confessedly, the Catholicity both *de jure* and *de facto* of the present Anglican Church.

That the Anglican Church, since the change effected by the Reformers, and in spite of it, retains certain principles which imply and demand the Catholic Church for their logical development and practical operation, we do not deny. There is no heresy of which we cannot say as much. Even the Unitarian has principles, which, if logically carried out and reduced to practice, would compel him to seek admission into the Catholic communion ; but he is not, therefore, a Catholic : for he does not so carry out and reduce them, and because he has other principles which he obeys and which are opposed to them and utterly inconsistent with Catholicity. The Church of England may retain in her Book of Common Prayer and other formularies principles which logically imply the Church ; but they give her no title to Catholicity, if they are not logically developed, and made the principles of her actual life, or if along with them she holds and practises another set of principles inconsistent with or diverse from them. To be Catholic she must not only retain all Catholic principles, but she must have no other principles, and she must not only possess the Catholic principles and them only, but she must live them, that is, realize them in her actual life. But it is conceded by the Oxford men themselves, that she does not realize the Catholic principles in her actual life, for they are laboring with all their

might to induce her to do it. Either, then, she realizes no principles, and therefore is only a dead church, living no life at all, or she realizes other than Catholic principles, and is therefore a false church. In either case she is not Catholic.

But giving the Church of England the benefit of development, which our author repudiates, and granting that she retains, as far as they can be retained in formularies, all Catholic principles and Catholic principles only, she is not Catholic, unless she is united in the one Catholic communion, for Catholicity is inconceivable without unity. It is conceded by Oxford men, that valid and legitimate sacraments are essential to the Catholic communion, and their purpose requires them to maintain that their Church is indispensable to salvation, at least in England, because she has valid and legitimate sacraments, and no one else has them. In order to maintain this, they must maintain her Apostolic origin and commission, that is, **ORDERS** and **JURISDICTION**. If, in the change which took place in the convulsions of the sixteenth century, the Church of England lost these, or either of them, she is not, and, without going out of herself, cannot become, Catholic. If she lost orders, that is, valid ordination, she is no church at all, but a mere human society, as our author in fact assumes her to be; if she has lost jurisdiction, she is at best only a schismatical church.

That the Anglican Church, so called, has no valid orders is morally certain, and under the circumstances of the case the negative is to be concluded if the affirmative is not proved, because the perpetual *visibility* of the Church must be asserted. She certainly has none, unless she has received them through Matthew Parker, Queen Elizabeth's Archbishop of Canterbury; and she has not received them through him, unless he himself had been validly consecrated. That he had been was denied by the Catholics at the time, who must have known of his consecration, if he had been consecrated, and who had no interest, as Catholics, in denying it, but rather an interest in affirming it. It was virtually conceded even by members of the Establishment, who certainly would not have failed to assert and prove it, had they been able. The uneasiness of many Anglicans became so great, that the civil authority was obliged to interpose, and attempt to establish it, not by adducing proofs of the fact, but by the royal prerogative, and making it a penal offence to deny it. This was very extraordinary. The queen was a lay person, and had no authority to consecrate or to supply defects; and the fact, that her supposed authority to supply defects was

invoked in the case, is itself a proof of the invalidity of the consecration. If Parker had been consecrated at all, it must have been by her order, and the evidences of the fact must have been within her reach. Why, then, did she not silence the gainsayers, and calm the uneasiness of her subjects, by producing them, instead of attempting to do it by royal proclamation or act of Parliament? Who will believe, that, if the consecration had taken place, and by her order, she had no means of proving it?

There is no evidence that any valid act of consecration took place, but the Lambeth Register, unknown, at least never produced, till some fifty or sixty years after the pretended event it professes to record, and which, though Dr. Liggard thinks it is genuine, is in all probability, to say the least, a forged document. It is too minute, enters too much into detail, and, as one may say, is too perfect to be genuine. Its not being produced, when needed to repel Bonner's plea that Horn was no bishop, is unexplained. If it existed, its existence must have been known, or could have been ascertained, by those who had an interest in producing it. The fact that they did not produce it is conclusive evidence, either that it did not exist at the time, or was known to be worthless.

But given the genuineness of the Lambeth Register, still there was no valid consecration, unless Barlow, who is said to have been the consecrating bishop, had himself been validly consecrated. That he had been, there is not a particle of evidence, and there is as strong evidence as the nature of the case admits that he had not been. That he had been a bishop elect is conceded, that he had been consecrated is not proved, cannot be proved, and is disproved to a moral certainty.

But passing over this, even conceding Barlow had been validly consecrated, there still was no valid consecration of Parker; for, if consecrated at all, it is conceded that it was according to the Ordinal of Edward VI., which was defective, and obviously did not consecrate to the office of bishop at all, as Anglicans themselves virtually admitted, a hundred years after, by amending it. These facts prove conclusively that Anglicans have no valid orders; therefore that their Establishment has no sacraments; therefore that it is no church at all, and that its pretension to Apostolic succession is imaginary. The Oxford man is, therefore, fully justified in placing it in the category of *human societies*, and assuming it to be subject to the law of human progression.

But granting Anglicans *valid* orders, they have no *legal* orders. They have no mission, no jurisdiction. That their Church has no jurisdiction but what it receives from the civil authority is a well-known and undeniable historical fact, which has been legally established in the recent case of Dr. Hampden, raised to the see of Hereford. But the civil authority cannot give spiritual jurisdiction, for the Church derives her mission from God, not from the state, as the Oxford men themselves assert and must assert, for they seek to emancipate the Church from the state. Consequently, supposing the Church of England to have valid orders, even orthodox doctrine and usages, she is only a schismatical body, and as such diverse from the Catholic Church, and under its anathema.

To us these are serious difficulties in the way of the Oxford theory. The Oxford men are obliged to concede, nay, they assume, that in her actuality their Church is not Catholic, and they assert her Catholicity only on the strength of certain latent principles which they say she retains, in spite of the changes effected by the Reformers, and which they hold can be developed into actual Catholicity. But suppose the principles, suppose them developed, — if she wants valid orders, she is no catholic church; she is, if you will, a body moulded after the Catholic fashion, but a dead body, a mere carcass, without vitality or reproductive energy. And even if she have valid orders, and all Catholic principles and usages, since it is undeniable that she has no jurisdiction, she is only a schismatical church, differing *per genus* from the Catholic, and no more capable of being developed into it than a monkey is of being developed into a man.

But this is not all. The Oxford men tell us that their Church is the identical old Church of England which existed prior to the rise of Protestantism. On this ground and this only do they assert her Catholicity; and they agree that if she is not that identical Church, that if she was instituted by the Reformers, or contemporaneously with them, she is not Catholic. This identity, we have seen, does not exist; but suppose it. The essential attributes of the Church of England must, then, be identical, both before and since the rise of Protestantism. The Oxford men tell us, that, among other things, it is an essential attribute or function of the Catholic Church to teach, and that, in teaching, her authority, under God, is ultimate, supreme. Hence, they repeat, "Hear the Church," and assert the absolute obligation to believe what she teaches. But it is a

well-known fact, historically provable, denied by no one, and conceded by the Anglican Church herself, in her present official teaching, that prior to the Reformation, for a long series of ages at least, the Church of England held and taught that the Papacy is an integral, an essential element of the Catholic system. On what authority, then, do Oxford men exclude the Papacy from that system, and how can they exclude it and still believe the teachings of what they call the Church of England?

Do they reply, that their Church now denies the Papacy, and that they must believe her present instead of her past teaching? Be it so. But if they say this, they must say it on the ground that the authoritative teaching of the Church is always her present teaching, and then they deny to themselves their pretended right of appeal from the modern Church to the primitive, — their only method of even appearing to justify their rejection of the Church of Rome. Moreover, if they give this reply, they concede that their Church teaches at one time one doctrine, and its contradictory doctrine at another. Both doctrines cannot be true. Either, then, their Church taught a false doctrine on the Papacy before the rise of Protestantism, or she teaches a false doctrine now. If she teaches a false doctrine now, the Papacy is included in the Catholic system, and the Oxford men are heretical in rejecting it. If she taught a false doctrine then, as they must hold, she was then a false church, and therefore not Catholic. If not Catholic then, she, by their own confession, is not now, unless a church identically not Catholic is Catholic. If the present is identically the Church of England before the rise of Protestantism, she has undeniably erred, for she has taught contradictory doctrines, and therefore is not Catholic. The Catholic Church cannot err, for she is God's Church, and what she teaches he commands us to believe, — as Oxford men themselves assert, in asserting her authority to teach, — and he cannot command us to believe a false doctrine, since that would be to lie himself, which, if we may credit St. Paul, or even the natural light of reason, is impossible. No church that errs or can err is, then, the Catholic Church; as Anglicans maintain, for they attempt to disprove the Catholicity of our Church by proving that she has erred. The Oxford men, by their own confession, cannot assert the present Catholicity of their Church, unless they assert her identity with the Church in England before the Reformers; and they cannot assert it, if they contend for that identity, for then they must concede that she has erred, either in teaching the Papacy

or in denying it. In no case, then, can they assert that their Church is Catholic, without making God a liar. If not Catholic, she has no authority, and cannot authorize the rejection of the Papacy.

The Anglican Church, assuming the only ground on which Oxford men attempt to defend her Catholicity, has both affirmed and denied the Papacy. Her authority, then, neutralizes itself, is placed in the centre of indifference, and, at best, stands at zero. It can, then, count for nothing. On what authority, then, do the Oxford men assert that the Papacy is no part of the Catholic system? They must, according to their own principles, do it on the authority of the Catholic Church, because they acknowledge that she has authority to teach, and we are to learn from her what we are to believe. Thus, our author expressly maintains, in his attempt to pervert the poor simpleton, Lady Eleanor, to Anglicanism, that we are to hear the Church, and to take our faith from her, and on her authority. The Church is the teacher, and teaches us, instead of our teaching her. Then we must learn what is or is not the Catholic system from her. We cannot assume the Catholic system, and from that conclude the Catholic Church, but must first ascertain the Catholic Church, and then from her conclude the Catholic system. That is, we must take the doctrine from the Church, not the Church from the doctrine. Now, as the Anglican Church, not being Catholic, or having nullified herself by her contradictions, has, as we have seen, no authority, what is, we repeat, the Catholic authority on which the Oxford men exclude the Papacy? The primitive Church, or the Church in primitive ages? No; because they are obliged, as we have seen, in order not to be bound by the teaching of the Church in England before the rise of Protestantism, to maintain that the present teaching of the Catholic Church is always her authoritative teaching, and must be taken as the authoritative declaration of her teaching in all past ages. If they appeal to the Church in primitive times, they condemn themselves, in crediting their Church in what she teaches now, rather than in what they concede she taught before the Reformers.

Again; the primitive Church to which Oxford men appeal either was the Catholic Church or it was not. If it was not, it had no authority to teach, and they gain nothing by the appeal. If it was, it either subsists still, or it does not. If it does not, the Catholic Church has failed, is dead, and its authority has died with it. The authority of a dead

church is only a dead authority, and a dead authority is as no authority at all, and therefore cannot authorize. Consequently, if the Catholic Church is dead, the Oxford men have not and cannot have her authority for saying what is or is not the Catholic system. But if the Catholic Church still subsists, she subsists the identical Church she was in the primitive ages, with the same identical authority, and the same identical doctrine she then had. We say *the same identical doctrine* ; for Oxford men deny, as we do, development, and maintain that identity of doctrine is essential to the identity of the Church. Is it not on this ground that they attempt to unchurch the Roman communion? Do they not deny her Catholicity because, as they allege, she has varied her doctrines and corrupted the faith? If, then, the identical Church of the primitive ages, the Catholic Church must teach to-day the identical doctrine she taught then. Then, to appeal from the Catholic Church in the present, supposing her to exist, to the Catholic Church in the past is, — 1. *useless*, for there can be no difference between her present and her past teaching, and he who has her present doctrine has already her primitive doctrine, on the same authority on which the primitive believers had it; 2. *inadmissible*, because the present teaching of the Church is the only possible *Catholic* authority on which we can take her primitive teaching, and to appeal to her past teaching is to appeal from the Church to history, the only authority aside from her own to tell us what was her primitive teaching, which cannot be admitted, for it is agreed that the Catholic system must be taken on the authority of the Church, not on the authority of history; 3. *absurd*, for it denies the authority of the Church and asserts it in the same breath; since the Church appealed from is identically the Church appealed to, and to appeal from the Church is to deny her authority, while to appeal to the Church is to assert it.

Oxford men must either assert the Catholic Church as a fact, or deny it. If they assert it as a fact, if they acknowledge that there ever was a Catholic Church at all, they must concede her continuous existence in time, and therefore her present existence. Catholicity is inconceivable without unity, and Catholic unity is inconceivable without uninterrupted chronic continuance, or unity in time. The Church must be one and identical in time and space, or it is not and cannot be Catholic. It is agreed that an essential attribute of the Church is to teach, and to teach with supreme authority. Then at every moment

of time, from the first down to us, she must have *in actu* the supreme authority to teach. Then at every moment the paramount obligation to hear her and to believe what she teaches at that moment does and must subsist. On no other condition can a Catholic Church with supreme authority to teach be conceived. Appeals from her present to her past teaching, then, can never be allowed, because her present authority is supreme, and the obligation to believe her present teaching paramount. We may appeal to history, to the records of her past teaching, *against* those who allege that she has changed her doctrines, or does not maintain identity of doctrine, but never from her present teaching, in order to remind her of what she ought to teach, or to ascertain for ourselves what we are to believe; for this would deny her present authority, and therefore her past authority and existence. The Oxford men must, then, abandon their appeal to the primitive Church, and take the Catholic system from the present Catholic Church, or deny that there is or ever was a Catholic Church. But if they do the latter, they then give up all their pretensions to be Catholics. If there is no Catholic Church, there is no Catholic system to be received or rejected, to be revived or retained. Here, then, they are. If they deny the Catholic Church, all their talk about Catholicity is nonsense; if they assert her existence, they must take the Catholic system from her as she now teaches it, and hold, that, as she now teaches it, she has always taught it, and will teach it, till the consummation of the world.

But not being allowed to appeal from the Catholic Church in the present to the Catholic Church in the past, on what authority, we ask once more, do the Oxford men exclude the Papacy, and declare it repugnant to the Catholic system? On the authority of the Greek Church? No; because the Greek Church is in the predicament of their own, she having in the course of her history both received the Papacy and rejected it. On the authority of the Church of Rome? No; for she asserts the Papacy as an essential element of the Catholic system, and it is for this reason that they condemn her. On the authority of the Holy Scriptures? No; for they reject private interpretation, and maintain that the Holy Scriptures are to be understood as interpreted by the Catholic Church. On the authority of self-will? No; for that they hold is the principle of Dissent, and they have no mercy for Dissenters. On the authority of the state? No; for they seek to free the Church from her dependence on the

state, which they could not consistently do, if they held that the state has authority to define her doctrines. On what authority, then? On none? How know they, then, that in rejecting the Papacy they are not rejecting Catholicity, — the Catholic system itself? Poor men! they must be Catholics, and they will not be Romanists. To be Catholics, they must have the Catholic system, and on Catholic authority, and if they reject Rome, there is no Catholic authority to tell them what it is or is not. They cannot know what it is, unless taught by the Catholic Church, and till they know what it is, they cannot by their method tell what church is Catholic.

Yet, serious as these difficulties are, the Oxford man is not disturbed by them. He is an Oxford man and has extraordinary privileges. He has the privilege of asserting both the affirmative and the negative of the same proposition, and of substituting his own simple assertion wherever evidence or authority fails him. When he wishes to excuse the oscillations from the truth and the manifest errors of his Church, he calls her a human society, and alleges that to err is human; when he would defend her against the state, save her revenues from the attacks of politicians, and silence Dissenters, he asserts her Catholicity, and demands obedience to her as the Church of God; and when he would justify her rejection of the Papacy, and her isolation as the Church of England, he can deny again her Catholicity, and assert the independence of national churches, and the right of the temporal authority to interpose to free the national church from foreign domination and to purge her of her corruptions. And why not? May not a man blow hot breath from his mouth when he would warm his fingers, and cold when he would cool his broth? Do you allege that the several doctrines he is obliged to oppose to the several classes of objectors do not stand well together, and that they are absolutely inconsistent one with another? Be it so. If they are mutually inconsistent and contradictory, that is their affair, not his. He is not, therefore, inconsistent with himself, unless in urging them he acts inconsistently with the nature of an Oxford man, which we are sure very few are so ignorant or so uncandid as to pretend.

That the Church of England has no claim to Catholicity, that she cannot aspire to the honor of being even a schismatical or an heretical church, is evident enough from what we have said, and is clearly evinced from the general tone and spirit of the work before us. The things which the author contends for,

and which, if practised by her, would in his opinion make her Catholic, all exist in our Church in their perfection, and have always existed there, but have been unknown in the Church of England since the Protestant Reformation. His Anglo-Catholicism, as far below genuine Catholicity as it actually is, is an innovation in his Establishment ; it is a novelty to its members, and his imaginary Anglo-Catholics feel that it is something entirely foreign to their habitual modes of thinking and acting. They appear like a rustic who has for the first time put on a court dress. He does not know how to wear it, how to dispose of himself in it, is tickled half to death with its finery, and struts about with a mighty high opinion of himself, feeling that he must be a great man since he has such a fine suit of clothes to his back.

We have been greatly amused with the portions of the author's work in which he describes the pious practices of his Anglo-Catholics. Things which no Catholic would think of mentioning, because it would never occur to him that any Christian could be ignorant of them, are dwelt upon at great length, and described with painful minuteness, — not because essential to the action of the piece, but because the author feels that it is necessary to instruct his Church in regard to them. Nothing falls in incidentally, nothing is given by way of simple allusion, or left to be inferred from the turn of a sentence, as in Catholic writers. The hero Villiers appears before a burning house to rescue a boy who is within. He makes his way through the crowd, kneels down, crosses himself, says a short prayer, ascends a ladder, rushes through the flames, seizes the boy, descends with him, nearly suffocated, and drops on his knees, crosses himself again, returns thanks, and vanishes, to the great wonder of Anglicans at the novelty, who are sure that he must be a Papist. If the writer had been a Catholic, he would have said nothing about the crossing, praying, or thanksgiving, for he would have supposed his readers would have taken such things for granted ; and if he had been describing a Catholic hero in such a case, very likely he would have said nothing about dropping on the knees, presuming that his hero would be saying his prayer while ascending the ladder, and returning thanks while descending it. The Catholic, too, though he would have prayed, would have been less attentive to the attitude in which he prayed. You would never find him laying such stress upon mere forms. Writers lay great stress upon forms only where they are neglected, or are

generally unknown, or where they have nothing but forms. It is evident to the Catholic reader that the author's Anglo-Catholics have made what is to them a recent discovery. They dwell upon the simplest things with an intense interest which alternates from the tragic to the comic, and from the comic to the tragic. They are all the time praying or talking about prayer, and wondering if they really are or are not excessively happy in their new way of life. All this shows that the things which in the author's view are essential to the Catholic system are novelties in Anglicanism, and are imitated from abroad; whence we may readily conclude that the Anglicanism of the Oxford men is only an imaginary Anglicanism, drawn not from life, displaying not the Anglican Church as she is and must be, but as they wish her to be, and are trying to make her. But, dear Oxford friends, can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?

The hopes of the author for Anglo-Catholicism depended on its state four or five years ago. During the previous ten years he thinks much had been done to raise poor Anglicanism from her dying state. Alas! things have changed since. The hue which he took to be the hue of returning health was only the hectic flush which indicates to the skilful approaching dissolution, which raises the hopes of sympathizing friends for a moment only to dash them with deeper despair. Anglo-Catholicism is now a byword, is seldom referred to, save "to point a moral or adorn a tale." The sincere and earnest part of the Oxford men, the men who gave their movement its character, and almost sanctified it, have abandoned it, and found repose in a Church already made to their hands, and which needs nothing of human tinkering to keep it from falling to ruin, or to restore it to a forgotten Catholicity. They live and labor in no imaginary *Béguinage*. But they who have remained behind are forced to weep over abortive reforms. They mistook the nature of Anglicanism. She is Protestant to the core, and will follow her nature. Their efforts to change her direction have only made her Protestant soul, or rather gizzard, for soul she has none, the more apparent. The day of bright hopes for them has gone by, and a day of gloom and sullen discontent succeeds. We see it in our old friend of the *New York Churchman*. The conversion of Newman, Faber, Oakley, Ward, and others has discouraged him, and he grows pettish and ill-natured. Things have not gone to his mind in England, nor even here at home; and his hopes of bringing Rome to

terms, and of being able, through some concessions on her part, — such as the permission of the clergy to marry, — to unite his communion with hers, without being obliged to confess to heresy and schism, are blasted; and he stands before the world a disappointed man, craving Catholicity, and yet too proud to embrace it, unless with the appearance of retaining his Anglicanism.

After all, the perusal of *Hawkstone* has made us sad, very sad. We cannot without sadness see men wasting so much thought, and energy, and even right feeling, in vain endeavours to fill their souls with emptiness. Half the labor they expend in fruitless efforts to grasp the shadow would give them the substance. Their complete success in their attempts would give them only the empty forms of Catholicity, without the most distant approach to the reality. Let them succeed in all they undertake, and their Anglicanism would be only the ghastly and grinning skeleton decked out, as at Egyptian feasts, in festive robes, and crowned with wreaths of flowers. The author takes us, in the course of his work, frequently to his Oxford chapel. Alas! how cold and desolate we found it! The semblance of an altar was there, but no sacrifice, — the victim was wanting. The appearance of the tabernacle was there, but our Lord in his Humanity as well as in his Divinity was not there to speak to us, and to bless us. His Glory did not fill the temple; it was no temple, it was but a Jewish synagogue since the Dispersion. We listened to the reading of the Communion Service, and saw bread and wine distributed, and we thought of the poor prodigal who had wasted his substance, sent by his master to feed swine, and craving a share of the husks with which he fed them; and we thought, too, of our Father's house, where there is bread enough and to spare, the bread of angels, whereof if a man eat, he shall never die, never hunger, never thirst. O, would they could but see themselves as we see them, and see in the blessed old Church of God what we have found there! In her exists all they have not and all they need, and in a profusion, in a perfection, which exceeds their power of conception. Why seek they in this empty chapel what they can find only with us, and receive only from the hands of our pastors? Why stay they here kneeling before this painted wood and polished marble, endeavouring in vain to live by the food that perisheth? Their fathers have made this chapel desolate; they feel and bewail it. Why, then, not go to the House that was never desolate, that can never be

desolate ? for behold our God (*Ego sum vobiscum*) has declared that it shall be his habitation unto the consummation of the world. They are ill at ease, anxious, doubting, hoping, despairing, trying to make something out of nothing, and perpetually failing ; why not seek repose in the pavilion of the Almighty, and in the arms of a loving Father ? So we thought within ourselves as we stood in that Oxford chapel ; but the poor worshippers continued to make their genuflections to painted wood and polished marble, and we turned away, saying to ourselves, " Ephraim is joined to his idols ; let him alone."

ART. III. — *Shandy M'Guire, or Tricks upon Travellers : a Story of the North of Ireland.* By PAUL PEPPERGRASS, Esq. New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1848. 12mo. pp. 354.

WE have no respect for the ordinary run of novels, whether written by Catholics, Protestants, or infidels ; but we have never thought of opposing all works of fiction, nor, indeed, all works whose principal aim is to amuse. " All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy." Relaxation is one of the necessities of life, and innocent amusement, moderately indulged, contributes to the health of the mind as well as to that of the body. We object to novels in general, because they are sentimental, and make the interest of their readers centre in a story of the rise, progress, and termination of the affection or passion of love. Sentimental tales, whatever the natural sentiment they are intended to illustrate, are seldom unobjectionable ; for they almost inevitably tend to destroy all vigor and robustness of character, and to render their readers weak and sickly. But even if intrusted with the censorship, we should never think of placing such works as *Shandy M'Guire* on the Index. We are, indeed, far from regarding it as faultless, either in style or matter, but we recognize in its author a robust and healthy mind, true manliness of thought and feeling, and genius of a high order. It is brilliant, full of wit and humor, and genuine tenderness and pathos. It is evidently the production of a scholar, a Catholic, and a patriot, and we trust is but the harbinger of many more works like it, which are to be welcomed from the same source. With his rare genius, uncommon

abilities, rich cultivation, brilliant yet chaste imagination, warmth of heart, mirthfulness, poetic fancy, artistic skill, and dramatic power, the author cannot fail, if he chooses, to attain to the highest excellence in the species of literature he has selected. *to fail*

Shandy M'Guire is the production of an Irishman, and a genuine Irish story. None but an Irishman, and a Catholic Irishman, could have written it. It is a tale, or rather a gallery of pictures, of the North of Ireland, in which the Irishman is presented to us as he is and as he ought to be. It gives us a lively and correct view of the actual state of things in that part of the island, — of the actually existing relations between the Catholics and Protestants, the landlords and their tenantry, — the tyranny and intrigues practised by the former and their cold-blooded agents, and the oppressions, wrongs, and insults endured by the latter. It enables us to see all for ourselves, and to take nothing on mere hearsay. It sets us down in the county Donegal, and permits us to judge for ourselves. It makes us feel the insults heaped upon the unoffending and powerless people. We grow indignant at slandered innocence, as we see the poor and the virtuous oppressed, driven out to perish of famine in the fields and highways, and we inwardly swear we will strike for Ireland, and never desist till the tyrant is humbled and Irishmen have their rights again. This, no doubt, is the effect which the author has wished to produce on his readers. His work is full of fun and frolic, but it has been written with a serious and a lofty purpose. The author has wished to arouse his countrymen to the assertion of their rights and their national freedom. We honor him for this, and we are pleased to find that he aims to do it chiefly by appeals to their reverence for their religion, and to their sense of their rights and dignity as men. In a few instances he is on the point of forgetting — perhaps does forget — the Christian and the man in the *Irishman*; but, in general, he appeals to his countrymen as men and Christians, and places their cause on the broad ground of justice and humanity, on which men not Irishmen may take it up and defend it as their own. He is a true patriot, but he repels us by no morbid nationality of his own, and demands justice to his countrymen without demanding injustice to others. He does not merely excite pity for Ireland, but he makes us respect the Irish character; and we are sorry to add, that his is almost the only work of a recent Irish patriot that we have seen of which we can say this, — almost the only work it will do

to read, if one would think better of Ireland and the Irish. It is well adapted to place the Irish in a true light, and will go far to redeem their character with our countrymen from the ridicule and contempt thrown upon it by the injudicious attempts of ignorant and conceited editors, lecturers, and historians to exalt it. We thank the author warmly for its influence upon our own feelings. The Irish papers and histories which we had been reading for years had had their influence upon us, and we were fast losing our early partiality for the Irish people. It has restored us to the love and respect for them which we had imbibed with our mother's milk, and which we hope we shall always be able to retain and ready to cherish.

Unhappily for Ireland, it has long been her fate to find her worst enemies in her own children, and to suffer more from those who would defend than from those who would traduce her. She has rarely, if ever, spoken for herself. Her best and soundest men have remained silent. Her character has been left to the mercy of her Protestant enemies, or, what is even worse, to her own conceited and moonstruck patriots. The work before us leads us to hope that a new era in her history is about to dawn ; that the time has come when we may hear the genuine Irish voice, — not the melodious wail of Moore, exciting compassion, but killing respect, — not the voice of bombastic orators and ignorant editors, turning even Irish virtue and nobility into ridicule, — but the voice of enlightened patriotism, of manly feeling, sound sense, and practical judgment. Now that the ill-judged attempt of Smith O'Brien and his Young Irelanders to get up an insurrection, which could only involve the country in all the horrors of civil war without gaining any thing for national freedom, has failed, men who are true Irishmen, who represent the sober sense, the enlightened judgment, the faith and piety, the reasonable hopes and practical tendencies of the Irish nation, may come forward and speak without having their voices drowned in the vociferations of a maddened crowd, wrought up to the verge of insanity by unprincipled demagogues and fiery agitators ; and the moment they do come forward, the moment they are able to command attention and place themselves at the head of affairs, the world will change its judgment of Ireland, the nation will respond to them with heart and soul, and the more serious of her grievances will be speedily redressed. Ireland has such men, — large numbers of them, — but they have hitherto stood back, and the world has judged her only

by the forth-putting youths, or inflated patriots, whom they saw on every occasion taking the lead. What wonder, then, that the world, while it has pitied her misfortunes, and wept over the tale of her sufferings, has refused to respect her national character, or to believe her deserving any thing better than subjection to England?

The Irish patriots, even those whom under many relations we love and honor, seem to us to have studied to make a favorable impression on their own countrymen rather than on Englishmen or Americans. The speeches of O'Connell, the political letters of several eminent prelates, and the bold and daring editorials of *The Nation*, as well fitted to operate upon the Irish mind, and really able and eloquent, as they unquestionably are, do not always move our Anglo-Saxon mind in the direction intended. They do not win our confidence, convince our reason, or enlist our feelings. We see their effect on the Irish mind and heart, and ask, Why is it that they have so little effect on Englishmen and Anglo-Americans? Is it that Irish human nature is essentially diverse from Anglo-Saxon human nature? It cannot be; for God has made of one blood all the nations of the earth. Is it that Anglo-Saxons have no human feelings, no sense of justice, no generosity, no chivalric sentiments? We scorn the insinuation. Is it that we have so long listened to the calumniators of Ireland that we cannot hear without prejudice any thing in her favor? It is false, for the calumnies of her enemies often do more to awaken our sympathies for her than the eulogiums of her friends. There is nothing in Anglo-Americans, and we do not believe even in the great body of the English themselves, of that deep and inveterate prejudice against the Irish which some Irishmen imagine. Burke was an Irishman, an Irish patriot, and yet we cannot read a page of his writings on Irish affairs without surrendering to him at discretion. He instantly enlists all our sympathies in favor of his countrymen, and we feel sure, as we read on, that the wrongs which England has inflicted on Ireland have not yet been told, and that the sufferings of the Irish people are greater than have been represented, greater than language can represent. Here is a proof, that, Anglo-Saxon as we are, we are not prejudiced against the Irish, and that it is not true that we credit only her enemies.

Why is it that we so readily yield to Burke what we refuse to these speeches, letters, and editorials? Is it not that Burke writes for the Anglo-Saxon mind, while these are written for the

Irish mind ? Burke appeals to the broad sense of justice and humanity common to all men ; these appeal to Irish nationality, which only Irishmen can feel in its full force. To respond to them heartily, we must not only recognize the justice of the complaints of the Irish, but we must, in some sort, abjure our own race, our own nation, our own identity, and make ourselves Irishmen ; he keeps the distinction of races out of sight, and offends us neither by his mistimed praise of the Celtic, nor by his mistimed denunciation of the Saxon. He places before us the tyrant and his victim, and arms us in defence of the victim against the tyrant, without exciting any pride or prejudice of race ; they keep before us always the fact, that the tyrant is a Saxon and the victim a Celt, and even when their authors have no intention, and are actually unconscious, of doing it. They strike us as the outpourings of the hoarded wrath of centuries, sinking us and our race to hell. Even their Catholicity has occasionally a Celtic accent, and we half feel, as we read, that hatred of the Saxon and desire of vengeance upon his guilty head are all but essential to one's Christian character.

Now all this is very well, if the aim is simply to operate on the Celtic population, to fire their patriotism, and to rouse them to efforts for their country's liberation ; but very unwise, if the authors wish to enlist the sympathies and energies of Englishmen and Anglo-Americans in the cause of Ireland. It provokes the wrath or contempt of these, — wrath, if they regard the Irish as strong, — contempt, if they look upon them as weak, and only giving utterance to mortified national vanity or wounded sensibility. It tends to isolate the Irish, and to make them enemies where they might easily gain friends. It tends to convert what should be a war against oppression for common justice into a war of races, in which the Irish must lose more than they can gain. The Celtic may be the nobler, the more deserving race, but it cannot be denied that the Anglo-Saxon is, at present, the more powerful. It would seem, therefore, to be the true policy of Irish patriots to keep, as far as possible, the distinction of races out of the question, and to be careful not to bring the pride of the one race into conflict with the pride of the other. In a struggle for Irish liberty on the simple ground of justice, half of England would remain neutral or side with Ireland ; in a war of races, all England to a man would arm against her. In the former case, Ireland could command the moral influence of the world, and the phys-

ical force of as many chivalric lances as she would need ; in the latter, she would be thrown entirely on her own resources, and left to struggle single-handed. We love and honor the Irish people, and hold their rights as dear as our own, — not, however, because they are Irish, the descendants of Mileg or Milesius, of whom we know nothing, but because they share our common humanity, — are our neighbours and our brethren, whom we are commanded to love as ourselves. They have fallen into the hands of robbers, who have stripped and wounded them, and left them half dead. We would pour the oil and wine into their wounds, and restore them to their health and possessions. But if they should insist, that, before doing this, we must abjure our Anglo-Saxon blood, and make ourselves Celts, we should feel ourselves free to leave them as we found them, with simple pity for their weakness or intolerant nationality. We are willing to leave them their identity, but they must leave us ours, if they expect us to work with them or for them.

We are well aware that many of the Irish patriots really seek to avoid the contest of races, and labor to effect in Ireland a union of all Irishmen, without distinction of race or creed, for the liberty of their common country. But we like this no better than the cry of “Death to the Saxon,” for the union is practicable only on conditions which would extinguish the old Celtic race and civilization, which we are anxious to preserve. The Anglo-Saxons in Ireland — those, we mean, who retain their distinctive character, and have not become absorbed in the original Celtic population — are the party which oppresses Ireland, and renders an effort for freedom necessary. It is not England out of Ireland, but England in Ireland, that causes the mischief. To call upon England in Ireland to make common cause with the patriots for the freedom of Ireland is only to call upon the tyrant to make common cause with his victim.

The fact, that the union of parties has to be sought, to be labored for, is a proof that the two parties have not the same interest, and that the liberty wanted by the one is not the liberty wanted by the other. If the interests of both parties were the same, their union would come of itself, as a matter of course. As the case stands, it can be effected only by a compromise, and that compromise must be all on one side, — a concession on the part of the patriots of all that they are struggling for. The Celtic Irish, in order to effect it, must be able to make it for the interest of the Anglo-Irish to cut themselves loose from England, which they can do only by consenting to become

more completely their slaves than they now are. The Anglo-Irish have no country but England, and they regard Ireland as their country only in so far as it is inseparably united to England, and under the British government. They cannot, then, be made to join the patriots from love of country. To make them abjure England, and adopt Ireland separated from England, you must give them something more than they can get by union with England. And what have you to give them? They are now the ruling caste, and are sustained in their dominion by their connection with the English government. How will you make them believe it is for their interest to sever that connection, and to make common cause with you against England, which sustains them in power over you, unless you give them sufficient guaranties, in some shape, of a more extended and complete dominion over you than they now have, or can have, if the connection with England continues?

The union of races in Ireland, it is clear, is possible only on the condition that the Celt consents to be swallowed up in the Saxon. The Saxon must be continued as the ruling race, and for Celtic Ireland we should have a Saxon Ireland. The original population of the island, the oldest people now known, retaining, perhaps, the earliest civilization of which any traces have been preserved, would become gradually extinguished through slavery, or lost in the dominant race. No friend to Ireland can wish this. We wish to see *Celtic* Ireland preserved. We would not see the old Irish nationality destroyed, or even weakened. We respect it, and should regret to see the old Celtic civilization give way to the Anglo-Saxon. We may not like to have the Irishman perpetually thrusting his nationality into our faces, telling us, when he is pleased with us, that we have a great deal of the Irishman in us, and cursing us as a Saxon dog when we are so unfortunate as to displease him, but we would not see him less of an Irishman than he is. We are Saxon, and intend to remain so; for we are not yet convinced that we cannot be Catholic without being Celtic; but we know few things more ridiculous than the Irishman who disowns his own order of civilization, and undertakes to pass for a Yankee. A *Yankeefied* Irishman is a sorry sight. He has abandoned the good qualities of his own race, without adopting the good qualities of ours, and is merely a compound of the bad qualities of each. No: let the Irishman remain an Irishman, and the Anglo-Saxon remain an Anglo-Saxon; and while they study to love and respect each other as brothers, let neither attempt or sup-

pose that either ought to be the other. Each has his peculiar excellences, and each his peculiar defects, and it is not necessary to undertake to strike the balance between them. We would have neither swallowed up in the other. In our day-dreams for Ireland, we have pictured her rising from her thralldom, after ages of oppression and misery, to her proper rank among the nations of the earth, a genuine Celtic kingdom, retaining and transmitting the virtues and the glories of the old Celtic race. The union of Saxon and Celt on the soil of Ireland for such an end is impossible, and any end for which it could be effected would be opposed to it, and necessarily tend to defeat it.

For the same reason, we are opposed to the call for a union without distinction of creed. Celtic Ireland is at heart Catholic, and can be nothing else. Its essential character is gone, if it ceases to be Catholic. Protestant Ireland is English, and depends for its existence on the connection with England. Sever that connection, give the power to the national party, and it would soon melt away before Catholic Ireland. Protestant Ireland knows this. On what conditions, then, will it make common cause with Catholic Ireland? On the condition that Catholic Ireland is to rule? Not at all. It will demand a guaranty that Catholic Ireland shall either cease to be Catholic, or be subject to Protestant Ireland. The Protestant coöperation can be purchased on no other condition, unless we suppose the Protestants are prepared to sign their own death-warrant as Protestants; and this guaranty must be given in the shape of democracy, or in that of indifferentism, for it can be given in no other. If the patriots waive their Catholicity, put their Church out of the question, and make politics the paramount affair, the Protestant may consent to unite with them, if he is to run no great pecuniary hazard; for he knows very well, that, when Catholics suffer any interest to take precedence of their religion, or when they become willing to forsake it for a temporal object, however laudable in itself, there is very little to be feared from it. Indifferentism is sure to follow, and then in religious matters the Protestant can have every thing his own way. Democracy, which in a country like Ireland must be Jacobinism, will afford him an equal guaranty, and therefore in a Jacobinical revolution he might not be unwilling to engage; for he cannot but see that a democracy in Ireland would throw the whole power of the state into the Protestant party, who are the principal owners of the soil. The natural tendency of a

democracy is to throw the power of the state into the hands of the property-holders by the voluntary action of the party without property, and to engross a whole people with their material interests. A people ruled by the representatives of money, and engrossed with material interests, make but sorry Catholics, — such Catholics as Protestants would have nothing to fear from. But a democratic, or rather Jacobinical, Ireland under the rule of Protestant proprietors and indifferent demagogues, bent only on material interests, would be any thing but Celtic Ireland, and do any thing but preserve the old Celtic civilization and the primitive virtues of the Milesian race.

The call for a union of parties in Ireland without distinction of race or creed proceeds on what we regard as a false assumption, namely, that the real enemy of Ireland is the England out of Ireland. That enemy is England in Ireland, and an enemy that would be too strong for the Celtic population, even if it had no connection with England out of Ireland. Ireland is lost, if she severs her connection with Great Britain before she has subdued the England on her own soil. What seems to us, then, Ireland's true policy is, to detach the England out of Ireland from the Anglo-Irish, and gain its support for the national party. We would use the connection for the benefit of Celtic Ireland, instead of seeking to get rid of it. England has no real interest in supporting at the expense of the Celto-Irish the Anglo-Saxon party in Ireland, and she does it only because she believes that it is through their means, and theirs only, that she has been able to keep the crown of Ireland united with her own. They were her garrison in the country. She was obliged to support them, or lose the crown of Ireland. Let Celtic Ireland make her peace with England out of Ireland, and she can easily use the power of the imperial government to protect her against the England in Ireland, from whom she suffers her principal grievances. This may require time for its full accomplishment ; but it is not impracticable. Let the case be presented to the British government on its merits, as a question of justice and sound policy, without any vexing questions as to race or to bygone times, without any thing to humble the pride of either party, or to revive old animosities, and we are sure that the government could be induced to take the side of the Irish people, and to redress their grievances, as far as it is in the power of government to redress them.

The gifted author of the work before us, while his book shows clearly that the real enemy of Ireland is on her own soil,

seems to think that the true policy for the patriots is the reverse of this. He appears to think that the landlords — the real oppressors of Ireland — would soon be brought to terms, if they no longer had England to back them. But he seems to us to forget that it is an axiom in political science, that they who hold the balance of the property of a nation are its masters. Man against money struggles in vain. We have never read or heard of a successful agrarian party, and in a war of the poor against the rich we have invariably found the poor defeated. Nineteen twentieths of the soil of Ireland, we are told, are held by the Anglo-Irish party, and the commercial and manufacturing capital of the national party is far from sufficient to overbalance this proportion of the landed property. Their combined wealth must fall far short of that of their enemies. Let the national party do their best, then, whatever their numbers, their personal skill or bravery, and they can gain, at most, only a transient success, as the experience of ages has proved. The victory, if gained, will slip from their grasp as soon as won.

We know it is said that these landlords may be dispossessed, their estates confiscated, and distributed among the members of the national party. That is very true, if you have already a strong national government firmly established which is disposed to do it ; but not otherwise. A mob can plunder and lay waste, but it cannot confiscate, for it has no fisc. The national party, supposing it to have succeeded, supposing it to have got the landlords in its power, could, undoubtedly, confiscate their estates ; but the difficulty is, that it cannot succeed until it has confiscated them. If it had on its own side men who would or could advance, on a pledge of the lands, the necessary funds for carrying on the war, this difficulty might be got over ; but it has not, and the scrip of the patriots issued on lands not in their possession, we apprehend, would be at a heavy discount in foreign markets. The contributions of Irish patriots out of Ireland would, no doubt, be something, but altogether inadequate to the struggle which the landlords would find means enough to protract.

We may be wrong, but we have no belief that the patriots, obliged to struggle single-handed against the landholders, let alone England, would be able to sustain themselves. In such struggles numbers alone are not enough, and even personal bravery is not much, as the whole history of the world proves. The first want of Ireland is some power to control the land-

lords and to compel them to do justice to their tenants ; and we cannot see where she is to get this power, but from the imperial government. The landlords themselves dread the appeal of the patriots to that government, and feel that their security is much more endangered by Irish loyalty than by Irish rebellion, as has been proved on more occasions than one ; and the very moment the imperial government shall undertake to restrain their excesses, and to compel them to treat their tenants with ordinary humanity, they will themselves turn patriots, and shout " Repeal ! " as loud as the loudest. Is not this evident from the fact, that they are constantly fomenting and exaggerating what they are pleased to term Irish disloyalty ? Is it not plain that what they most dread is that the patriots should supplant them at the English court ? And is not this precisely what they study to prevent ? How, then, can the Irish patriot mistake his true policy ?

The author seems to us, also, to proceed on the assumption, that the Irish owe no allegiance to the British crown. But in taking this ground, is he not playing into the hands of Ireland's worst enemies ? By what means do the landlords contrive to practise their oppression with impunity ? By what means do they contrive to secure the protection of the British government, while they starve their tenantry, or compel them to seek relief in exile, or from the hands of strangers ? Is it not by filling the ears of that government with tales of Irish disloyalty ? Is it not by making the government believe that the Irish regard the sway of the English as a usurpation, and themselves as free, at any moment the opportunity offers, to throw it off, and therefore that it must not treat them as loyal subjects, and must place no reliance on their professions of loyalty ? Was it not O'Connell's greatest difficulty to convince the government of his loyalty, and of that of the Repeal movement ? Has not England supported the landlords and their party almost solely on the pretence, if it be a pretence, that it is only through them that it can retain the crown of Ireland, and that to abandon them and to support the Celto-Irish would be only to give up the possession of Ireland altogether ? Is it wise, then, to proclaim a doctrine which, if really held by the Irish, would fully confirm what their enemies allege, and appear to go far towards justifying the Irish policy of the English government ?

Aside from the abominable measures adopted for the suppression of the Catholic religion, and which were adopted to a great extent in England herself as well as in Ireland, and which

the Act of Emancipation has now abolished in both countries, the English policy in the government of Ireland has evidently been founded on the assumption, that the Irish deny their allegiance to the crown, and hold themselves free, whenever the occasion offers, to throw it off. Supposing this to be true, supposing that England is to govern Ireland at all, it will be hard to prove that her policy has not been in the main just and necessary. If Ireland denies her allegiance, she may complain that England has attempted to govern her, but she cannot complain that England has governed her as a disloyal province, ready at any moment to break out into open revolt. No disloyal people has the right to complain of not being well governed ; you must acknowledge your allegiance to the crown before you have a right to its protection. If we are not mistaken, the Irish patriots have made the world resound with their complaints of England's misgovernment of Ireland ; will they explain to us on what grounds they have made these complaints, if they have never owed allegiance to the crown ? The only thing, if they take this ground, of which they can have any right to complain is, that England originally invaded Ireland, and has attempted to keep possession of her. After all, is it not in this view of the author that lies the secret of much of the misery which Ireland has been compelled to suffer for so many ages ? The Abbé MacGeoghegan, an Irish patriot, in his *History of Ireland Ancient and Modern* (pp. 255, 256), says, — “ The sway of the English in Ireland was considered by the natives as a violence, an injustice, and usurpation ; consequently, any engagement made with them was looked upon not to be binding. They did not think themselves bound by the law of nature, which forbids us either to take the goods of others or to do violence to their will. They therefore thought themselves dispensed with, from keeping their word with a people who observed no treaty with them, and whose only rule was the law of the strongest ; like a man who, having given his purse to save his life, thinks he has a right to reclaim it when the danger is over. These are the principles the Irish observed in their conduct towards the English.” Whether these principles are sound or unsound is not the question we raise ; but is not the fact, that the Irish originally acted on them, the secret of that distrust of the native Irish which the English government has so generally manifested ? Has not England chosen to assume that the Irish continue to act on these principles ? And if they do act on them, how can she trust them ?

What other course is left for her, than to plant her garrisons throughout the kingdom, to hold the natives down by the strong arm of power, and to lavish her favors upon her colonies settled among them ? It was the only condition on which she could keep possession of the island. Did the Irish suffer ? Were they oppressed ? What then ? It was their own fault ; it was owing to their determination to revolt, to resist her authority, whenever they could. Certainly, England has taken this view of the case, and this is the only reason that can be assigned why her Irish subjects have not been as well governed as her English subjects.

That the Irish have not been sufficiently careful to undeceive England on this point, and to place their loyalty beyond a question, and that many of those who have assumed to speak for them have from time to time used language which favors the view the British government has taken, may be true ; but that the great body of the Irish people have continued in a state of actual or virtual rebellion against British authority, from the time of Henry the Second down to our own day, we are loath to believe. We regard it as a mistake, in which the government has persevered through the influence of the anti-national party in Ireland. But be this as it may, we cannot doubt that the patriots should lose no time in removing the fact or the pretext on which the British government justifies or attempts to justify its Irish policy. The English government claims the crown of Ireland as inseparably united to her own, and she has exercised the lordship of Ireland for these seven hundred years. Whether its claim be valid or invalid, she will not voluntarily surrender it. She will hold on to it as long as she is able. Threats will not induce her to relax her grasp. If you make her feel that her possession is insecure, you make it her duty, in her view of her rights, to take that course which in her judgment will most effectually guard it against your attempts to wrest it from her ; and if you suffer in consequence, she will feel that the responsibility is yours, not hers.

Moreover, the declaration, No allegiance to the British crown, and that it is not treason to seek to overthrow its authority, places Ireland in a very unpleasant condition. It dissolves the Irish state, dissolves every civil and political institution which the patriots will acknowledge to be such, annihilates the entire body politic and corporate, and leaves the Irish without either civil rights or civil duties. Ireland has no national government aside from the English government ; and separate from Eng-

land, politically considered, there is no Irish people. The old Irish state subsisting at the Conquest has been destroyed ; the old native kings and chieftains have no longer any political existence in regard either to foreigners or to the natives. Severed from England, the inhabitants of Ireland are thrown back into a state of nature, and have not a single political or civil faculty. The case is not with her as it was with us when we declared our independence, as some of her patriots at home and in this country seem to imagine. We had local colonial governments, with their roots in the nation, and prevented only by the overshadowing of the British crown from being supreme governments. The removal of the crown did not dissolve them ; it left them standing in the plenitude of national sovereignty, and the allegiance we had given to the crown was naturally transferred to them, — if, indeed, it was not already due them, and due to the crown only through them. But in Ireland there is nothing of this. Her government is not a national government *under* the crown of Great Britain, but it derives from the British government, and is the British government itself, extended to Ireland as an integral part of the empire. To throw off the allegiance to the crown is not to transfer it to the local government, for the local government goes with the crown. It is not to transfer it to the present Irish nobility, because they are Irish nobles only by virtue of the connection with England. Consequently, the declaration would, as we say, annihilate political Ireland, and leave her without any political existence whatever, and without any nucleus or germ of reorganization. Would the patriots reduce their beautiful country to this deplorable condition ?

No people can live in such a deplorable condition, for no people can live where there is no government, no public authority, no law, no justice ; and no people reduced to such a condition can ever of themselves recover from it. The patriots may imagine, that, if severed from England, they could reconstitute the state, reestablish government, and provide for its wise and just administration ; but this is the dream of inexperience or enthusiasm. You may talk this to the disciples of a school that holds Providence to be superfluous, and regards man as his own sire ; but it is too late to talk it to Christians and statesmen. Constitutions are generated, not made ; they may be imposed upon a people by a competent authority, but can never be created by the people themselves. No people ever did, or ever can, give themselves a constitution ; for no

people can act as a people, till constituted. Moreover, there is no government where there is no loyalty, and loyalty to one's own creations is impossible and absurd. The Irish, even if so much, could only enter into a voluntary association, and form a sort of voluntary engagement with each other ; but such association is not a state, — has not a single element of a state, — and such engagement is no political constitution, and has and can have of itself no legal force or sanction. It can have no right to impose its acts as laws, or to exact and enforce obedience to them. Nothing is government that is not *over* the governed, *sovereign* (*super, supernus, superus*) ; and that is not *over* them which they themselves make and may unmake at will. Authority speaks always from above, not from below.

It is true that the Catholic Church in Ireland might remain, if the connection with England were severed, and, as the only surviving element of the old Celtic constitution, she would, no doubt, legally inherit the full sovereignty of the Irish state, and that, too, without claiming temporal dominion for the Church, *jure divino*. The people might then, indeed, rally under the authority of the Irish hierarchy, and reestablish through them a legal political order. But we cannot in these times expect them to do so. It would by no means suit the politicians, and we may be sure that they would never consent to it, unless on the condition that they themselves should govern the hierarchy ; which would involve the destruction of the Church in Ireland by making it their tool, and thus destroy again the very condition of temporal government.

Under whatever point of view we consider the subject, then, the denial of allegiance to the British crown, or rather to the Irish crown inseparably united with the British, seems to us, to say the least, bad policy. The patriots are ill prepared to take that ground ; and the consequences of taking it, in the present state of things, would prove ruinous to the national cause. It would place them and their followers out of the protection of the law, would, at best, establish belligerent relations between them and England, and give to England the right, as far as in her power, to rule Ireland by military law. Before attempting to resume the independence of the Irish crown, they should prepare an Irish head to wear it ; or, in other words, obtain for their country a national organization which can legally assume the exercise of national sovereignty the moment independence of England is declared.

We cannot, it is plain from this, sympathize with the movement of the Young Ireland party for the complete national independence of their country. Their movement, if not, as England holds it, treasonable, is at least premature and impolitic. They would find it a difficult matter to succeed even against the Anglo-Irish alone, and could have no reasonable prospect of success against them backed by the whole force of the empire. They could, in all human probability, count only on experiencing the defeats so often and so fatally experienced by their ancestors. Their attempt is undeniably rash, and therefore unlawful. They have no moral right to make it, and cannot with a safe conscience persuade others to join them in it. We know it is easy to sneer at the timid counsels of prudence, yet prudence is one of the cardinal virtues. He who engages in a rash enterprise is responsible for the consequences. He who induces men to rebel, even for a legitimate cause, when there is no reasonable prospect of success, is guilty of a mortal sin ; and if they are shot down in the battle he provokes, he is guilty of their blood. We say not this because we are a "moral force" man. We do not belong to the party of the Broadbrims, and have no wish to engraft Quakerism upon Catholicity. We believe in the lawfulness of resistance to tyranny, and, if need be, by physical as well as by moral force. Assure us that the cause is just, that physical force is necessary, that there is a reasonable chance of success, place us under the authority of one who has a legitimate right to lead us, and we have no scruple in resorting to arms, and committing the issue to the God of battles. But to resort to arms, or to induce others to do so, against an existing authority, without any probability of success, is a presuming on Providence, which by no casuistry we are acquainted with can be justified.

But even pass over this, and suppose success, the triumph in arms of the patriots, the chief difficulty remains. The patriots will not acknowledge, we may be sure, any temporal dominion in the Church ; for at home and abroad they proclaim the independence of the political order, thank God that the time when the Church guided politicians has passed away, and they will hardly allow her to pronounce on the *morality* of their acts. Suppose the Irish crown severed from the British, where is the Irish head to wear it ? No doubt, there are Irish heads enough worthy of a crown, both by descent and by personal qualifications ; but, unhappily, there are too many of

them, and no possible means of adjusting their rival claims. They will never be able to agree among themselves which shall wear it. The Anglo-Irish state dissolved, what is to take its place ? If you suppose the old chieftains and kings, you must suppose also the old intestine divisions and internal wars. If they are not supposed, the power must fall into the hands of the military chiefs who have led on the army to victory. These, having no legal sanction for their authority, can exercise it only despotically, and establish nothing but a military despotism. They will soon quarrel with one another, and renew and perpetuate in Ireland the state of things we have seen for the last thirty years in the once prosperous Spanish colony of Mexico, and which is worse, if possible, than even the present misrule and oppression under the Anglo-Irish faction.

But many of the reasons which bear against the movement for *national* independence bear equally against the policy of simple *legislative* independence. Mr. O'Connell acknowledged his allegiance to the United Crown, and sought only by repeal of the Act of Union to restore the Irish Parliament. His policy, as a future policy for Ireland, we certainly hold to be wise and just ; but it seems to us, like the Young Ireland movement which grew out of it, premature, and, in the present posture of affairs, not desirable. In attempting the melioration of Ireland, we should certainly look to Repeal, to legislative independence, to an Irish Parliament, as essential, but not as the *first* measure in the order of time. If Ireland were one and indivisible, if her population were homogeneous, marked only by the ordinary diversities of rank and condition, and if the real enemy to be overcome were not on her own soil, and likely to remain there notwithstanding Repeal, we certainly should regard it as essential, not only as a future, but also as a *present* measure. But this, unhappily, is not the fact. Unless we have been deceived in all the information we have been able to collect, there are two Irelands, one within the other, diverse in race, in character, in religion, and interest. The one is Celtic Ireland, the other is English Ireland. The former is oppressed, the latter is the oppressor. The most pressing evil of Ireland, as we understand it, is Anglo-Irish or Protestant LANDLORDISM, and the primary want is power to abolish, modify, or restrain it. The simple question then is, Would Repeal and the restoration of the Irish Parliament give to Celtic Ireland this power ? If not, nothing of any real value would be gained ; and Repeal would not give this power, unless it transferred

the government to the hands of the national party. Would it do this ?

We lay it down as an axiom in politics, that, in a representative government at least, power follows the balance of property, — is inevitably in the hands of the party which represents the majority of the wealth of the nation. That party wields the administration, and dictates its measures. The Anglo-Irish are at present, for Ireland, that party, and Repeal can be obtained only on condition that it respects their titles and confirms them in their possessions. What power over them, then, will the national party acquire by Repeal ? If you suppose Repeal, you must suppose an Irish government composed of the king, lords, and commons, each with a veto on the other. The king will be represented by a viceroy appointed by the British government, and removable by the crown. He will always represent English interest and influence. The lords will be composed, almost exclusively, of the obnoxious Protestant landholders, the present oppressors of Celtic Ireland. The commons will be composed of deputies chosen by the boroughs and counties, and will be divided, — a majority, perhaps, ordinarily of the Celtic or national party. Such will be the constitution and composition of the Irish government, and we demand, What measure, tending to restrain the excesses of the landlords and to redress the grievances of their tenantry, could be forced through it ? The viceregal court and the lords, both Anglo-Irish, Protestant, and of the same party, with the same interests, would naturally unite and act in concert ; and what could the commons, divided as they would be among themselves, — for the landlords would always be able to return a large minority, if not occasionally a majority, of the members, — be able to effect against them ?

Are we referred to the conquests made by the commons of England ? Be it so. But we challenge the friends of Repeal to point us to a single conquest effected by the commons of England of the kind needed for the redress of such grievances as now exist in Ireland. The law touching these grievances is no better in England than it is in Ireland. The English landlord has as much legal power to oppress his tenantry as has the Irish landlord ; and if the Irish tenantry are more oppressed than the English, it is owing to other than legal causes. The commons of England may have conquered certain *political* rights from the king, but they have never been able to retrench the privileges of the landlords, or to impose on them

additional burdens. Nay, the landlords have, during the struggle, been able to lighten their own burdens, to relieve themselves of knight-service, and to shift that burden — no light one — upon the non-landholders. In spite of all that the commons of England have been able to do, poverty, distress, and squalid wretchedness are rapidly becoming as great in England as in Ireland herself. It would be difficult to find a population more degraded, more utterly abandoned, than some portions of the English population. The conquests achieved by the perseverance of the English commons do not reach the seat of the evil, in either country, and therefore the appeal to them makes nothing in favor of the Irish Repealer, even setting aside the fact, that the Irish have already secured to them the fruits of those conquests. But even if it were otherwise, nothing could be concluded to the purpose ; for the English commons were a wealthy middle class, which has not its counterpart in Ireland. They represented a mass of wealth which the Irish commons do not and are not likely to represent. They are powerful at this moment, it is conceded ; for the aggregate wealth which, through the commercial and manufacturing classes, they are able to control, joined to their own landed possessions, surpasses that represented by the nobility. But in Ireland it is far otherwise. The commercial and manufacturing wealth of the country, the main reliance of the Irish commons, bears no proportion to the landed wealth which would be against them. They are comparatively poor, and whatever their patriotism, they must find themselves unable to hold out against the other two estates. Moreover, in proportion as they should increase in wealth, they would have less and less sympathy with their poorer countrymen, and be more and more attached to things as they are, and more and more unwilling to engage in a protracted contest against the nobles, with whose families they would have the ambition and the hope to ally themselves.

But an Irish Parliament, we are told, would stimulate industry, encourage commerce and manufactures, and develop the resources of the country. It would be Irish, and promote Irish interests. But would it be Irish ? That is precisely what we doubt. The probability, to say the least, is that it would be Anglo-Irish. But whence follows it that it would, even if Irish, stimulate industry and encourage commerce and manufactures ? Why is it that these languish in Ireland now ? Is it not owing to the want of Irish capital, and to the fact that

as much capital is already invested in commerce and manufactures in other parts of the empire as can be profitably so invested ? Will an Irish Parliament supply the want of Irish capital ? Will it withdraw the capital now invested elsewhere, and reinvest it in Ireland ? What inducements will English capitalists have for investing their capital in Ireland after Repeal is carried that they have not now ? The law now is as favorable to the investment of capital in Ireland as in England, and if capital does not now flow thither, we cannot see what is to make it flow thither then. Will the Irish government make laws more favorable to the capitalists than the present laws of England ? What, then, is to become of the poor laborer ? You can, by your laws, increase the profits of capital only by diminishing the profits of labor, and the profits of labor are low enough now, in all conscience.

Then, again, commerce and manufactures have their bounds, and cannot be pushed beyond certain limits without a ruinous revulsion. The great evil of our modern society lies precisely in the fact that commerce and manufactures are pushed too far. They are overdone. They call around them a larger population than they can feed. To secure to capital its returns, or to save the merchant and manufacturer from ruin, the laborers dependent on them must be thrown out of employment about a third or fourth part of their time, and left to steal, beg, or starve, and not unfrequently to all three. Hence the terrible misery of the laboring classes all through Europe in modern times ; and hence your Red Republicans and your socialistic insurrections and revolutions which within the last year have astonished and shaken the world. Any further extension of the modern industrial system, save as it comes in the natural course of things, is madness. Commerce lives only by agriculture and manufactures. The agriculture of Ireland will demand no extended commerce, and the manufacturing power now in operation, or ready to be put in operation at a moment's warning, elsewhere, is more than sufficient to glut and to keep glutted the markets of the world. The application of steam to navigation and production, the invention and adoption of labor-saving machinery, during the last half-century, have caused the power of production to exceed, in the existing economical systems of society, the power of consumption ; and you cannot, unless you can double the latter, extend the former, without a loss which must fall somewhere, and which, wherever it falls in the first instance, must inevitably, in the last, fall

on the laborer. In other words, the interests of agriculture and labor cannot, in the present state of the world, sustain a more extended system of commerce and manufactures than is now in operation. These have reached the highest proportion they will bear, and, if we do not misunderstand the late European revolutions, a far higher proportion than they will bear. Their continuance on their present scale must necessarily result, not in stimulating labor and developing the agricultural resources of nations, but in depressing agriculture and in reducing wages below the minimum of human subsistence, and therefore, ultimately, in their own ruin and that of the people. Their further growth, if healthy, in one country must be their decline in another ; and this further growth is more likely to be in this country than in any European country. The seat of empire is evidently passing from the Old World to the New, and the grand highway of trade is hereafter to be across this continent and the Pacific to the old Asiatic world, which may ere long in no small degree supplant the European.

A hasty glance at the British European empire is sufficient to show that its commercial and manufacturing power has reached, perhaps passed, its culminating point. It is now sustained only by encroaching on the interests of agriculture and the wages of labor. Up to a certain point, commerce and manufactures enhance the wages of labor and the profits of agriculture ; but pushed beyond that point, they have the opposite effect. That they have been pushed beyond that point in Great Britain seems to us evident from the depression experienced by the agricultural interests, the ruinous poor-rates assessed upon small farmers, and the inability of the laborers to find constant employment or sufficient wages for their comfortable subsistence. They now tax land and labor. Ireland, after Repeal as well as now, will be attached to the empire, and must, in some degree, share its prosperity and its adversity. It is certain that she cannot extend the aggregate capital now invested in the commerce and manufactures of the United Kingdom, without an injury to the empire which she herself will not be able altogether to escape. All she can hope to do is, to gain at the expense of England, — to transfer to herself a portion of the commerce and manufactures now confined to the sister island. That is, she can hope to make herself a huge manufacturing establishment and a vast *entrepôt* of commerce only by competing successfully with England, who already has the start of her, as many natural advantages as she has, and infinitely more

acquired advantages. She must transfer the manufacturing capital and establishments from England to herself, and coax the English ships from English harbours to her own. Now when somebody will tell us by what means this can be done, we will concede that a Parliament in College Green, Dublin, will do more for encouraging the commercial and manufacturing industry of Ireland, and the development of her natural resources, than the United Parliament in St. Stephen's, Westminster, but not till then.

But a national Parliament will put an end to absenteeism, compel the landlords to reside on their own estates, to look after the welfare of their tenantry, and to spend their revenues at home instead of a foreign country. That it will put an end to absenteeism is not so certain. Absenteeism is an old complaint, and we find that it existed before the Legislative Union, nay, before the Protestant Reformation, and that king after king exerted his power to compel the Irish landlords to reside at home on their estates, and look after their people, but always with indifferent success. What has been may be ; and if a national legislature did not formerly prevent absenteeism, we see not the certainty that it will hereafter prevent it. The royal court at London will always present attractions for the rich, the accomplished, the ambitious, the fashionable, the dissipated, the frivolous, the vain, superior to those of the viceroy's court at Dublin ; and as long as it does, absenteeism will continue. As long, also, as living on the Continent continues to be less expensive, and society more attractive, than in England or Ireland, men whose estates are embarrassed, and who are unable to keep up at home establishments suitable to their social rank, will seek longer or shorter residences abroad. This may or may not be an evil, but it is what an insular people must always be more or less exposed to.

Then it is far from certain that the home residence of the absentee landlords would cure all the evils, or any considerable portion of the evils, of which the Irish people complain. One of the great evils to which they are exposed, if we may believe Paul Peppergrass, Esq., is the constant annoyance experienced from the efforts of Protestant landlords to pervert them to Protestantism. Colonel Templeton is to some extent a resident landlord, and when he is, he is constantly annoying his tenantry by his proselyting zeal, and his agent takes advantage of this zeal to cover his worst villanies. These landlords are nearly all Protestants, and their residence at home would only

increase this evil. They would want some employment, and they would be driven to the work of proselyting by the necessity of filling up their vacant hours. As to spending their money at home, we cannot see, if there is any truth in the doctrine of free trade, of which, we believe, Mr. O'Connell was an advocate, that it makes any difference to the tenant where his landlord spends his income, unless, indeed, by spending it we understand giving it away. The greatest advantage we can see that would be gained by the home residence is, that it might diminish the importance and the iniquity of the middlemen ; but Colonel Templeton's agent, Archibald Cantwell, is hardly to be preferred to a middleman ; and it is certain, if Paul Peppergrass, Esq., has given us a true picture of society in Ireland, that the end of absenteeism would not be the end of the evils experienced ; for all the evils he depicts take place, if we remember aright, under resident landlords.

When through the imperial government the Irish landlords are shorn of their power to oppress, the Irish have improved their material condition, and there are no longer any special causes of hostility between the two Irelands, legislative independence will become a wise and useful measure, and may be easily obtained. It may then be a step towards national independence, because then the Irish Parliament may become the depositary of the sovereignty after the rejection of the English crown, and enable the Irish to separate from England without dissolving the state and annihilating the body politic. But till then, so far as we can judge at this distance and from all the information we have been able to collect, the true policy of the Irish patriot is, to hold on to the connection with England, and to labor to turn it to the advantage of his countrymen.

The first step, it seems to us, should be, to supplant the Anglo-Irish party at the English court and in the imperial Parliament, and thus secure the protection of the government for the national party, — induce England to govern Ireland through the Celtic Irish instead of the Anglo-Irish. Surely this can be done. The patriots assuredly will not contend that they are inferior in any respect to their opponents, that the Celt must, in any sphere, pale before the Saxon. Assuredly, it must be far easier for them to supplant the landlords by their talents, learning, eloquence, and statesmanship, than to conquer them, and England into the bargain, by force of arms.

Ireland has one hundred and five members of Parliament. Let her first care be to elect, not only patriotic members, but

members who will do her credit, who will be more than a match for a like number of the English members in learning and talent, in their genius for business, and their clear and comprehensive views. Let them be men of character, men whose support a ministry would seek, and whose opposition it would dread. She of course has such men, and can elect them ; or else how would she prosper, were she to set up on her own account? Let her throw a body of one hundred and five members, or even one half of that number, into Parliament, who are not men of theories, not men thrown off their balance by their memories, or their recollections of Tara's Halls or Brian Boru, but men who, while they love their country, while they are true to Irish interests, love also the empire, know its interests, and are ready to promote them, and she will have a weight in Parliament, and therefore with the crown, that will secure her a hearing and a redress of her grievances. Let her not feel that she is robbed of her crown. Her crown remains and is hers, as much as ever it was, only it is united with the British crown ; Victoria is her queen as well as England's queen, and the union need imply no more subjection in the one country than in the other. Let her assert her independence, not of the crown, but as a free member of the United Kingdom, and compel England to divide with her, as she has already been compelled to divide with Scotland, the power and glory of the empire. Let her, by a representation fully chosen, enter with a free and a bold heart the Parliamentary lists, and in her collected wisdom, practical sense, firm speech, and dignified bearing, contend for the rights and well-being of her children as British subjects, and on the broader ground of justice and humanity, and no son of hers can fear that she will come off second best.

But whatever the policy the patriotic Irish may agree upon, we hope they will hesitate long before they revive the late system of agitation. If we have not misinterpreted the views of the able author of the work before us, he has no great confidence in that system, and does not regard it as likely to effect much for Ireland. For ourselves, we would not say that it has utterly failed, or that it has effected nothing ; for Catholic Ireland certainly holds to-day a much more important place in the estimation of the British ministry than she did before Mr. O'Connell commenced his agitation for Repeal, and the government would now hardly venture to treat the Catholic Irish with the cool contempt or indifference of former times.

Nevertheless, this may be due in the main to Catholic emancipation, and might, perhaps, have been effected by other modes of operation less expensive than agitation. We are not ignorant of the immense popularity of what is called "peaceful agitation," even out of Ireland, and with others than Irishmen. A few months since, it was a word of great potency. It was pronounced with enthusiasm in every quarter of the globe, and fetched its echoes from Paris, and even from the Eternal City. The disaffected of all lands, reformers of all classes and grades, resorted to it as the grand lever by which to move the world ; and it seemed to be universally agreed that Mr. O'Connell, who was improperly regarded as its originator, for he only adopted it from the sectarian associations of the day, who in their turn only adopted it from the French Jacobins, had discovered and applied the secret of deposing kings, displacing dynasties, subverting governments, breaking up the constitutions of states, resolving nations into primeval chaos, reconstructing society, and regaining the terrestrial paradise, legally, constitutionally, peacefully, without violence, and without disorder. The split in Conciliation Hall, the recent violent revolutions in Europe, the unfurling of the Red Flag by the Parisian agitators, the madness of the mob of Germany and Austria, and the nefarious efforts of the Mamiani ministry to strip the Holy Father of his temporal dominions and to hold him a prisoner in his own capital, to say nothing of the abortive insurrection in Ireland, all legitimate fruits of what in its origin was *peaceful* agitation, have opened some people's eyes to the system itself, and made some persons suspect that its wisdom, its safety, and its efficacy have been not a little overrated. For ourselves, we have always distrusted the system, and we have opposed it in our writings for the last twenty years with what little power we had.

The system is essentially despotic ; it places reason at the service of passion, and seeks to crush the individual freedom of thought by the overwhelming force of combination and numbers. It begins by organizing, under the lead of self-appointed and irresponsible chiefs, an association for the accomplishment of a given object. Whatever of free thought, of deliberation, of calm reason is permitted must precede the organization of the association ; none can be allowed afterwards. When the association is formed, the work is to agitate, not to reason, — to overawe, not to discuss, — to crush opposition, not to convince. The only study then is to inflame the passions or the enthusiasm of the association, and to compel those who stand aloof from it,

as they value their reputations, their possibility of being on passable terms with their neighbours, to fall in and go on with it. If they do not fall in and go on with it, they are traitors to their country, to God, to humanity, to reason, to virtue ; and he who ventures to doubt the infallibility of the association, and to think and act for himself, whether the association be for Repeal as in Ireland, or whether it be for the abolition of slavery as in England and this country, the circulation of the Scriptures, the establishment of Fourierism, the spread of Protestantism, or the conversion of the Pope, — for they are all based on the same general principle, and differ only as to their respective ends, — must be denounced, and the whole force of the association must be brought to bear against him, to blast his reputation, to cripple his exertions, to crush him to the earth, and pulverize him beneath the trampling of its feet. O'Connell was a kind, liberal, generous-hearted man, a sincere Catholic, and remarkable for his tender piety ; but how often did he denounce and blast those of his fellow-laborers who attempted independent thought and action ! Yet it was not he that did it ; it was his system that compelled him to do it. Of what use his association, if divided within, if it did not speak one voice, and present a uniform front to the enemy ?

It is not to the agitation which arises from free and earnest discussion that we object ; nor the free and full discussion of all the great questions which are in their nature open to discussion. What we object to is agitation systematized and carried on through self-constituted and therefore irresponsible associations. These associations are the grand feature of our times, and they are of most dangerous tendency. In the hands of a great and good man, as was O'Connell, directed by his wisdom, loyalty, faith, and piety, they may, perhaps, be comparatively harmless ; but formed for social or political reforms, and placed in the hands of such men as Ledru Rollin, Blanqui, Raspail, Cabet, or Proudhon, or such men as are at the head of the Protestant Alliance or the various Antislavery societies, it is easy to see that they are powerful engines for mischief. They tend necessarily to swamp the individual in the crowd, and to establish a central despotism, which no freeman can endure. If, like the Church, they were Divinely constituted, and placed under the control of Divinely commissioned chiefs, who have from Almighty God the promise of infallibility, they of course would be compatible with the most perfect freedom, and their force would be really a moral force ; but as they are, — purely

human associations, self-formed, sanctioned by no regular authority, and under the control of self-appointed leaders, — they are pure despotisms, are a contrivance to do by force of combination and numbers what no one has any right to do, further than he can do it by individual thought and action. They are, to our way of thinking, far more fatal in the long run to a people than war itself. War slays the body and mangles the limbs, it is true ; the *moral* force of these associations kills reason, slays the soul itself. A people worthy of freedom will scorn them. Even in O'Connell's hands the system became intolerable ; its own children revolted against it, and he, heart-broken, went to die in a foreign land.

In a religious point of view, the system has a most deleterious effect. It destroys the freedom of the clergy, and enslaves religion. Its tendency is to concentrate the mind and the heart on a given object, and to keep out of sight every thing else. It agitates for that one object, makes it all in all, engrosses the mind and heart with it alone. That one object becomes the only thing seen, the only thing desired, the sole remedy of the numerous ills flesh is heir to. It absorbs all moral and all religious considerations in itself, and for the time being religion and morality are esteemed only as they are subsidiary to it. It itself is religion. Agitation for it, then, must spare no one who opposes it, — the clergy no more than the laity. It is supreme, and while it condescends to accept the services of the clergy, and to honor them as long as they serve it, it claims the right to sit in judgment on them and to denounce them, if they venture to arraign it. It has taken possession of the people, and become their guide and master. The clergy are no longer free ; they cannot resist it, without losing all influence with them, and all opportunity to exercise for them the functions of their sacred ministry ; and therefore, if they possibly can, they must, as the less of two evils, fall in with it, and do what they can to direct it, and to prevent it from effecting the complete spiritual ruin of its subjects. But if they fall in with it as the less of two evils, the agitators immediately claim that it has the support of the clergy ; then it is religious ; then its cause is the cause of God as well as of man ; and then no one with a safe conscience can oppose it.

Moreover, the notion, that this system of agitation can be carried on for any great length of time with undiminished enthusiasm and remain *peaceful*, is a fatal mistake. It certainly, when carried on for temporal objects, has never yet been long

continued without resulting in physical violence. It has led to lence in Rome and Italy, in France and Germany, and even Ireland. The Young Irelanders were legitimately begotten the Repeal agitation, and it is a mistake to regard them as eders. They were its natural and inevitable development. n had for seventeen years been promised Repeal ; had had ir attention directed to it, had been agitated and had agitated it ; had been told, and had believed, that Repeal was the ereign remedy for the intolerable evils under which they re suffering, — evils rendered doubly intolerable by the conal direction of their minds to them ; and yet Repeal did not ne, did not appear to be coming, — appeared, in fact, as far as ever. They could wait no longer. It was of no use to ach patience to them. Had you not been doing all in your ver for seventeen years to render them impatient ? Had i not painted their sufferings to them in the most vivid ors ? Had you not exhausted imagination and language in cribing the horrors of their condition ? Had you not exded all your force in arousing them to the most lively se of their wrongs ? Had you not inflamed them, and ked them up to the highest pitch of impatience ? And r this, could you suppose they would be calm and quiet, they would be *patient*, at your bidding ? It is not thus that have learned human nature. They saw that you had exsted your *peaceful* means, and gained nothing of what had led them to expect, and they said, " Since words , try what virtue there is in leaden balls and cold iron." human nature always speaks, or we have studied it to no pose.

When by agitation, by appeals to sentiment and passion, you e worked a people up to that degree of excitement necessary your purpose, they are no longer under your control, and must on with them or be crushed by them. It is idle for to imagine that you can hold them back. Your power over n is in your sympathy with them. No matter how loudly r cheered you yesterday. No matter how eagerly they g on your words, or run to do your slightest wish ; let the ipathetic cord be broken, let them once feel that you ao farther with them, or that you wish them to stop where r are, you are henceforth to them an enemy, a traitor, and, ead of thanking you for what you have done, they only crate you for what you withhold. Has not the Holy Father in the last year experienced the truth of this ? He did not

agitate his people ; he found them agitated, wrought up by others to a feverish state of excitement for political reforms. He placed himself in sympathy with them, gave them political reforms, and who ever saw a prince more beloved, a people more submissive, more ready to consult every wish of their sovereign ? A whole year was devoted to feasting and rejoicing in honor of the *Liberal* Pontiff, who loved his people, and knew how to march with the spirit of the age, and at its head. A new era had dawned. The Church had formed an alliance with liberty. Pius the Ninth had baptized Democracy, and placed himself at the head of the European Liberals. How did the welkin ring again with shouts of *Evviva Pio Nono !* Heretics and schismatics, Jews and infidels, refugees and apostates, all joined in the chorus. A few short months go by, and this Roman people, so devout, so loyal, so enthusiastically submissive to their sovereign, remind him gently that there is a little additional reform which would please them very much ; he, as an indulgent father, grants it. *Evviva Pio Nono !* — But, *Santo Padre*, here is one other little reform. It is conceded. *Evviva Pio Nono !* — Demand follows demand till the Holy Father has conceded to the last limit of possible concession, if he is to preserve government at all, and then what do these same people do ? They look quietly on, if nothing worse, and see him imprisoned in his own capital, and virtually stripped of all power as a temporal prince. Has any one been surprised ? Who, accustomed to study popular movements, did not expect, even foretell, as much, when the news of the far-famed *amnesty* reached him ? A short time since Gioberti, the O'Connell of Italy, was 'all-powerful with the Italian Liberals ; how is it with him now, since he has attempted to restrain their movement within practical bounds ? Alas ! he is in a fair way of being less esteemed by them than the very Jesuits whose expulsion from all Italy, to please them, he has effected. Nay, O'Connell had himself lost the control of the Irish movement, and had he even retained all his early vigor, he could not have continued the tremendous excitement of the Repeal year (1843) within its peaceful limits. His speeches even during that year became warlike, and we listened with breathless expectation to hear him give the command, " Sound to the charge ! " At that point neither he nor the people could remain. And who sees not that he could not use more moderate language, without either undoing all he had done, or placing himself in opposition to the people he had agitated,

and then ceasing to be their leader ? The latter is what actually happened. After 1843, Daniel O'Connell ceased to be the leader of Ireland, and the ceremony that took place in his honor, after his liberation from prison, was only the crowning of the victim for sacrifice.

One thing only has surprised us. The Smith O'Brien party was inevitable, and would have come, either under the lead of O'Connell or in spite of him, let him have done all that mortal man could do to prevent it ; but we were not prepared to find it so small, so insignificant ; and we must believe that the suspension of Repeal agitation in consequence of the arrest and imprisonment of O'Connell and his associates had in some measure abated the excitement of 1843, and that, in fact, the Irish people were far less inflamed than at this distance appeared. Nevertheless, their refusal to engage in the proposed insurrection, and the readiness with which they hearkened to their clergy, is what we did not expect, is, we believe, unexampled in the history of similar movements, and is in the highest degree creditable both to them and to their clergy. It proves that the clergy have not yet lost their influence over the mass of their people, and also that the people are cooler, are less inflammable, have more solid judgment, more prudence and practical good sense, than is commonly supposed. We have seen nothing in their history more noble than their conduct on that trying occasion, nothing that tended more to give us a high idea of their national character, or to inspire us with stronger hopes for their future redemption from slavery and oppression. They almost threw a doubt on the soundness of our doctrine of the dangerousness of the system of agitation, and would half falsify it, if we did not find the foiled agitators and their dupes throwing the fault of their miscarriage on the clergy. Till we saw the Irish refuse, at the direction of their spiritual guides, to embark in Smith O'Brien's insurrection, we had no hopes for Ireland ; now we have no fears for her. We see and appreciate her character more truly, and know that her friends often do her great injustice. We see, also, that St. Patrick still intercedes for his people, and that Almighty God has them in his especial keeping. As long as they are prompt to obey their spiritual guides, nothing can harm them.

But we are extending our remarks to an unreasonable length. The subject is one of great interest, and for us as well as for Irishmen. Indeed, it is an American as well as an Irish subject. Irish politics are discussed here as they are in Ire-

land. We have associations, confederations, and all the machinery for agitation adopted in the mother country. We have newspapers published among us devoted exclusively to Irish interests ; committees and directories are organized by Americans in our larger cities for the management of Irish affairs ; public meetings are held, speeches made, addresses delivered, funds solicited and collected, as if the country were Ireland herself, or, at least, a British colony ; our candidates for public office are interrogated, indirectly at least, as to their views and feelings in relation to Ireland ; and the reputation of Anglo-American Catholics depends with their religious brethren, in no small degree, on the views they take or do not take of Irish politics. It is thus that the question is made an American question, with important bearings on American politics and American social life. It is brought home to our very bosoms and business, and we cannot blink it with safety to ourselves, even if we would. And now, during the lull in Irish agitation, now that both moral force and physical force have failed, at least for the present, is the proper time for discussion, for taking a new observation, and determining the proper course to steer the vessel hereafter. With this view, we have taken up the subject, and thrown out such thoughts as have occurred to us in the course of our reading and reflection on it, for several years. We have thrown them out as suggestions, to go simply for what they are worth. If the friends of Ireland find nothing better, let them be accepted ; if they find and can agree on something better, let them be rejected, and the better adopted. All we want is the real welfare of Ireland, and we shall be satisfied, if that is secured, whether it be secured by means of our suggesting, or by means suggested by others who differ from us. Certain it is, that the great body of the real friends of Ireland cannot be rallied under either of the banners that have heretofore been unfurled, and that, to secure unanimity and concert, a policy somewhat different from O'Connell's and from Smith O'Brien's must now be adopted. We can, as at present informed, see nothing more promising than the course we have suggested. If others can, we shall be happy to surrender to their superior wisdom and better judgment.

But we have nearly lost sight, in following out our own speculations, of the admirable work before us. We intended to make several extracts from it, as specimens of its style and thought, but we have reserved no place for them, — which is the less to be regretted, because before this, we presume, it has

and its way to all our readers, and they have enjoyed it as well as we. The work is not faultless. We have signified, together with our reasons, our dissent from a few important points, which the author appears to us not to have duly considered. As a literary work, it has great merits. Its style is clear, rich, racy, flowing, but somewhat careless, and occasionally inexact ; the characters are, in general, well drawn, but the action is too hurried, and the events are too crowded. The effect is somewhat injured, also, by selecting, as representatives of Protestants, individuals, not worse, indeed, than can be found in actual life, but yet worse than the average of the class they are intended to represent. The faults which are ascribed to Protestants will ascribe to the individual, not to the system. Ellen O'Donnell is a noble, a high-spirited girl, but we should like her better, if she had more repose of manner, and a little more quiet dignity. The most touching scene to us, and the most true to nature, in the whole book, is the scene before her miserable hovel between Kathleen and Colonel Templeton. It is a scene drawn from nature by a genuine artist. We like Captain O'Brien, a man, a gentleman, and a patriot, but we wish he had been converted before his betrothal to Ellen. We wish the union of Catholic Ireland and Protestant Ireland, intended to be symbolized by the marriage of Ellen O'Donnell and Captain O'Brien, but only by the conversion of the latter, and we wish to make sure of the conversion before we propose the union. There occurs, too, a passage about the "plague spot," which we shall hope to see expunged in the second edition. But, upon the whole, we like *Shandy M'Guire* ; we like it for its fun, we like it for its genuine tenderness and deep pathos ; we like it for its bold and manly tone, its free and independent spirit, and above all, for its uncompromising catholicity, which will not abate a single genuflection to please the heretical kings in Christendom. Thank you, Paul Uppergrass, Esq., for that expression, which, though not to be taken nor intended to be taken to the strict letter, conveys the truly sentiment worthy of one who belongs to a church made and directed by God, and not by man. The work cannot fail to do good. It will tend to awaken more manly feelings and elicit a more manly bearing in the Irish themselves ; it can hardly fail to elevate the Irish character in the estimation of our community, and to create a more respectful and a more kindly feeling towards our Irish population. It will enable the

American people to account for many of those traits which offend them in the Irish character, and without discredit to the Irish ; it will make them feel that the Irish must be a wonderful people, and richly favored by Divine grace, or they could not be what they are, — could not have retained a single human virtue, a single noble or generous quality. All that malice backed by power and ingenuity could do to brutalize them, and obliterate every trace of the image of God to which they were created, has been done, and yet they remain human, and, in spite of all their faults, in spite of all the objectionable features of their national character, and they are many, they compare in all the nobler moral virtues and religious excellences more than favorably with any other people on the globe. Their worst side is their outside. What is objectionable in their character lies on the surface, and is seen at a glance. Their virtues lie deeper, and are known only after an intimate acquaintance, often are known at all only to Him for whose sake alone they are cultivated. Their vices are in a great measure the result of the condition in which they have been placed, the evasions they have been obliged to study in order to live, the cruelty and contempt with which they have been treated ; their virtues, through Divine grace, are their own, and place them first on the list of nations. They have so prospered spiritually under their temporal adversity, that we almost dread to see them exposed to the temptations of temporal prosperity. They are now fulfilling an important mission in evangelizing the world ; through them, we trust, the revolted Saxon will be reconquered to his allegiance, and great will be their reward in heaven. O, would that our own country enjoyed the riches possessed by Ireland, and could indulge the glorious hopes of her oppressed and earth-abandoned children ! Happy would it be for our boasted and loud-boasting republic ; for what doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul ?

ART. IV. — *England the Civilizer ; her History developed in its Principles ; with Reference to the Civilizational History of Modern Europe (America inclusive), and with a View to the Dénouement of the Difficulties of the Hour.* By a Woman. London. Simpkins, Marshall, & Co. January, 1848. 12mo. pp. 470.

THIS handsomely printed volume, written in a gibberish which is neither French nor English, has been sent us "from the author," and we can do no less than acknowledge its reception. It is filled with the wild speculations and demoralizing theories to be expected from "a Woman" who has cast off religion, and, as a necessary consequence, the modesty and delicacy of her sex. In a literary point of view, it is beneath criticism, but it bears the marks of some reading, and even of hard, though ill-directed, thinking. Nature has treated the authoress liberally, and she will have much to answer for. The work could have proceeded only from a strong mind and a corrupt heart.

The work itself pertains to the Socialistic school, and, substantially, to the Fourieristic section of that school. According to it, the human race began its career in ignorance and weakness, and established a false system of civilization. Modern society, dating from the fall of the Western Roman empire, has been engaged in a continual struggle to throw off that system, and to establish a true system in its place. It has been engaged, thus far, in the work of demolition, which it has finally terminated. It has prepared the ground for true civilization, and the human race now stand waiting, or did stand waiting on the first of last January, the signal to introduce it, and to put an end for ever to all evils, moral, social, and physical.

The old civilization, now effete, committed the capital error of recognizing religion, — in the language of the authoress, *superstition*, — government, property, and "the ascendancy of the male sex," or family, — for the family cannot subsist without that ascendancy ; — the new civilization will correct this error, and for religion substitute science ; for government, federation ; for law, instinct ; for property, communal wealth ; for family, love ; and for the ascendancy of the male sex, the administration of women. Consequently, the new civilization is to be a petticoat civilization, in which we must include the human race in those genera which are named after the female, as cows, geese, ducks, hens, &c.

Into the details of this new civilization, or the means by which it is to be introduced and preserved, we need not enter. Some things may be assumed to be settled; if not, the human race can settle nothing, and it is idle to examine the claims of a new theory. If any thing can be settled, it is that the man is the head of the woman, — that she is for him, not he for her; and that religion, government, family, property, are essential elements of all civilization. Without them man must sink below the savage, for in the lowest savage state we find, at least, some reminiscences of them. Any system which proposes their abolition or essential modification is by that fact alone condemned, and proved to deserve no examination. We do the Socialists too much honor when we consent to hear and refute their dreams. We have not at this late day to resettle the basis of society, to seek for unknown truth in religion or politics, in relation to public or domestic, private or social life; we have no new discoveries to make, no important changes to introduce; and all that we need attempt is to ascertain the truth which has been known from the beginning, and to conform ourselves to it.

Nevertheless, the work before us is a pregnant sign of the times, and may afford food for much useful reflection to those prepared to digest it. People who attend to their own business, tread the routine their fathers trod, and attempt to discharge in peace and quiet the practical duties of their state, little suspect what is fermenting in the heated brains of this nineteenth century. They know next to nothing of what is going on around them. They look upon the doctrines contained in works like the one before us as the speculations of a few insane dreamers, and are sure that the good sense of mankind will prevent them from spreading, and confine their mischief to the misguided individuals who put them forth. They regard them as too ridiculous, as too absurd, to be believed. They can do no harm, and we need not trouble our heads about them. This is certainly a plausible view of the subject, but, unhappily, there is nothing too ridiculous or too absurd to be believed, if demanded by the dominant spirit or sentiment of an age or country; for what is seen to be demanded by that spirit or sentiment never appears ridiculous or absurd to those who are under its influence.

Nothing, to a rightly instructed mind, is more ridiculous or absurd than the infidelity which so extensively prevailed in the last century, and which under another form prevails equally in this. Yet when the philosophy which necessarily implied it

made its appearance, few comparatively took the alarm, even learned and sound Churchmen were unable to persuade themselves that there was any serious danger to be apprehended.

When the philosophers and literary men went farther, developing that philosophy, actually made free with the scriptures, and even the mysteries of faith, the majority of those who should have seen what was coming paid little attention to them, jested at the incipient incredulity with great good humor, felt sure that no considerable number of persons would proceed so far as to deny not only the Church, but the very existence of God, and flattered themselves that the infidelity which was manifest would prove only a temporary fashion, a momentary caprice, which would soon become weary of itself, and evaporate. Nevertheless, all the while, the age was virtually deluged, and thousands of those who had persisted in believing there was no danger were themselves but shortly after driven into exile, or brought to the guillotine by its representatives. The same thing occurs now in regard to Socialism. The vast body of those who have faith and sound principles look on it as the dream of a few isolated individuals, as undeserving a moment's attention, and think it a waste of time and breath even to caution the public against it. Yet in one form or other it has already taken possession of the age, has armed itself for battle, made the streets of Paris, Berlin, Frankfort, Vienna, and other cities, run with blood, and convulsed nearly the whole civilized world. It is organized all through Europe and the United States; scarcely a book, a tract, or a newspaper is issued from a constantly teeming press, that does not favor it, and there is scarcely any thing else going that can raise a shout of applause from the people; and yet we are told, even by wise men, that it is a matter which need excite no apprehension.

Nor is this the worst aspect of the case. Not a few of those who shrink with horror from Socialism, as drawn out and set forth by its avowed advocates, do themselves, unconsciously, adopt and defend the very principles of which it is only the logical development; nay, not only adopt and defend those principles, but denounce, as behind their age, as the enemies of the people, those who call them in question. Have we not ourselves been so denounced? If you doubt it, read the criticisms of *The Boston Pilot* on our review of Padre Ventura's *Oration*, or *The New York Commercial Advertiser's* notice of our censure of the Italian Liberals for their persecution of the

Jesuits. Of course, these papers have no authority of their own, but they echo public opinion, and tell, as well as straws, which way the wind blows. If the public condemned in so measured terms the "horrible doctrines" we a few years since put forth in an *Essay on the Laboring Classes*, it has not condemned, but through some of its leading organs commended, an article on *The Distribution of Property*, published in *The North American Review* for last July, — the most conservative periodical, except our own, in the country, — which defends at length, and with more ability than we ordinarily expect in that Journal, the very principles from which we logically derived them. We hold in utter detestation the doctrines of the *Essay* referred to, and which raised a terrible clamor against us throughout the country; but we proved, in our defence, and no one has yet, to our knowledge, ventured to maintain the contrary, that those doctrines were only legitimate conclusions from the Protestant and democratic premises held by the great body of our countrymen, and by what they do and must regard as the more enlightened portion of mankind. In fact, a very common objection to us was, that we were ahead of the age, that is, drew the conclusions before the people were ready to receive them. We did but reason logically from the principles we had imbibed from public opinion, from general literature, and the practical teachings of those we had been accustomed from our childhood to hear mentioned with honor, and had been required to revere, — principles which we had never heard questioned, and never thought of questioning, till we undertook to explain to ourselves the universal outcry which had been raised against us. As we found our countrymen saying two and two, we thought we might innocently add, two and two make four, and complete the proposition. We were wrong, not in our logic, but in our principles. We had trusted the age; we had confided in its maxims, and received them as axioms. As the mists cleared away, as the gloss of novelty wore off, and the excitement of self-defence subsided, we saw the horrible nature of the doctrines we had put forth, and recoiled, not only from them, but from the principles of which they were the necessary logical development. But the age has not followed our example. The great body of the people continue to adhere to those principles, and will not suffer them to be questioned.

No doubt, the majority of numbers are as yet unprepared to adopt Socialism as developed by Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simon,

Cabet, Proudhon, or by "A Woman" in the work before us ; but no man who has studied the age can, if he have any tolerable powers of generalization, doubt that Socialistic principles are those now all but universally adopted. They are at the bottom of nearly all hearts, and at work in nearly all minds ; and just in proportion as men acquire courage enough to say not only two and two, two and two, but that two and two *make four*, the age rushes to their practical realization, — accepts their logical developments, however horrible, however impious. There is an invincible logic in society which pushes it to the realization of the last consequences of its principles. In vain do moderate men cry out against carrying matters to extremes ; in vain do practical men appeal to common sense ; in vain do brave men rush before the movement and with their bodies attempt to interpose a barrier to its onward progress. Society no more — nay, less — than individuals recoils from the conclusions which follow logically from premises it holds to be sound and well established. It draws practically those conclusions, with a terrible earnestness, and a despotism that scorns every limitation. On it moves, heedless of what or of whom it may crush beneath the wheels of its ponderous car. Woe to him who seeks to stay its movement ! Social evils grow as it advances, and these it lays to the charge of those who would hold it back, and maintains result only from the fact that it has not yet reached its goal. The reform is not carried far enough. Put on more steam, carry it farther, carry it farther, is the loud cry it raises.

We see this in the Protestant Reformation. The Reformers did not fulfil their promises, did not secure to the people the good they had led them to expect. Everybody saw this, everybody felt it ; for everybody found himself distracted and unsatisfied. What was the inference drawn ? That the Reformers had erred in principle, and that the Reformation could not secure the good promised ? By no means. The people had accepted its principle. The Reform, said they, is good, is just and true ; but it has not been carried far enough ; the Reformers were only half reformed ; they stopped short of the mark. The Reform must not stop with Luther and Calvin ; we must carry it farther. This is what the children of the Reformation said, as we all know ; and they have been from the first struggling to carry it farther and farther, and have at length carried it to the borders, if not into the regions, of nihilism. The evils remain, nay, every day increase, and each day a new party

rises up in the bosom of the most advanced sect, and demands a further advance.

In the political world we see the same thing. Revolution has followed revolution, and no political reform goes far enough to satisfy its friends. In the last century, revolutions were *political*, and had for their object the establishment of political equality, or democracy. It was soon seen that political equality answers no purpose where there is *social* inequality. A writer, who could speak with as much authority on this subject as any of our contemporaries, thus expressed himself in 1841:—

“ But democracy as a form of government, *political* democracy, as we call it, could not be the term of popular aspiration. Regarded in itself, without reference to any thing ulterior, it is no better than the aristocratic form of government, or even the monarchical. Universal suffrage and eligibility, the expression of perfect equality before the state, and which with us are nearly realized, unless viewed as means to an end, are not worth contending for. What avails it, that all men are equal before the state, if they must stop there? If under a democracy, aside from mere politics, men may be as unequal in their social condition as under other forms of government, wherein consist the boasted advantages of your democracy? Is all possible good summed up in suffrage and eligibility? Is the millennium realized, when every man may vote and be voted for? Yet this is all that political democracy, reduced to its simplest elements, proposes. Political democracy, then, can never satisfy the popular mind. This democracy is only one step—a necessary step—in its progress. Having realized equality before the state, the popular mind passes naturally to equality before society. It seeks and accepts *political* democracy only as a means to *social* democracy; and it cannot fail to attempt to realize equality in men's social condition, when it has once realized equality in their political condition.” — *The Boston Quarterly Review*, January, 1841, pp. 113, 114.

Political democracy leaves the principal social evils unredressed, and the causes which led the reform thus far remain in all their force to carry it still farther. Hence we see in the present century the same party which in the last demanded political democracy attempting throughout nearly the whole civilized world a series of revolutions in favor of social democracy. The leaders in the late French Revolution tell you that it was a social revolution they sought, and that it was this fact which distinguished it from the Revolution of 1789. In Italy and Germany two revolutions are going on at once, a political revolu-

ion and a social revolution. Young Italy is Socialistic ; so is Young Germany ; and it was its socialistic character that gave to the movement of Ronge and his associates its significance and its moderate success. The race, modern philosophers tell us, is progressive, and in a certain sense we concede it. It tends invariably to reach the end implied in the principles it adopts or the impulse it has received, and that tendency is never self-arrested. Its progress towards that end is irresistible ; and when it happens to be downward, as at present, it is fearfully rapid, and becomes more fearfully rapid in proportion to the distance it descends.

The only possible remedy is, not declamation against the horrible results, the pernicious conclusions, at which the popular mind arrives, — the resource of weak men, — but the correction of the popular premises and recalling the people to sound first principles. Once concede that even political equality is a good, an object worth seeking, you must concede that social equality is also a good ; and social equality is necessarily the annihilation of religion, government, property, and family. The same principle which would justify the Moderate Republicans of France in dethroning the king would justify M. Proudhon in making war on property, declaring every rich man a robber, and seeking to exterminate the *Bourgeoisie*, as these have already exterminated the nobility. There is no stopping-place between legitimacy — whether monarchical or republican legitimacy — and the most ultra Socialism. Once in the career of political reform, — we say *political*, not *administrative*, reform, — we are pledged to pursue it to its last results. We are miserable cowards, or worse, if we shrink from the legitimate deductions from our own premises. There is not a meaner sin than the sin of in consequence, — a sin against our own rational nature which distinguishes us from the mere animal world. If we adopt the Socialistic premises, we must go on with the Socialists in their career of destruction ; nay, we shall be compelled to do so, or strew the battle-field with our dead bodies. If we recoil from the Socialistic conclusions, we must reëxamine our own premises, and reject distinctly, unreservedly, and heroically every Socialistic principle we may have unwittingly adopted, every Socialistic tendency we may have unintentionally cherished.

The people, it is well known, do not discriminate, do not perceive, until it is too late, the real nature and tendency of their principles. They mix up truth and falsehood, and can

hardly ever be made to distinguish the one from the other. They adopt principles which appear to them sound and wholesome, and which under a certain aspect are so, and, unconscious of aiming at what is destructive, they place no confidence in any who tell them they expose themselves to danger. They see no connection between their principles and the conclusions against which we warn them, and which they at present, as well as we, perhaps view with horror ; they therefore conclude that the connection we assert is purely imaginary, that we ourselves are deceived, or have some sinister purpose in asserting it ; that we are wedded to the past, in love with old abuses, because, perhaps, we profit, or hope to profit, by them ; that we do not understand our age, are narrow and contracted in our views, with no love or respect for the poorest and most numerous class. In a word, they set us down as rank conservatives or aristocrats. No age ever comprehends itself, and the people, following its dominant spirit, can never give an account of their own principles. They never trace them out to their last results, and are unable to follow the chain of reasoning by which horrible consequences are linked to premises which appear to them innocent. They never see whither they are going. Democratic philosophers themselves tell us as much, and defend their doctrine on the ground that the people are directed by divine instincts, and obey a wisdom which is not their own. To this effect we may quote the writer already cited, and who, on this point, was among the more moderate of his class. In an article on *Philosophy and Common Sense*, which had the honor to be commended by Victor Cousin, he says : —

“ Philosophy is not needed by the masses : but they who separate themselves from the masses, and who believe that the masses are entirely dependent on them for truth and virtue, need it, in order to bring them back and bind them again to universal Humanity. And they need it now, and in this country, perhaps, as much as ever. The world is filled with commotions. The masses are heaving and rolling, like a mighty river, swollen with recent rains, and snows dissolving on the mountains, onward to a distant and unknown ocean. There are those among us, who stand awe-struck, who stand amazed. What means this heaving and onward rolling ? Whither tend these mighty masses of human beings ? Will they sweep away every fixture, every house and barn, every mark of civilization ? Where will they end ? In what will they end ? Shall we rush before them and attempt to stay their progress ? Or shall we fall into their ranks and on with them to their goal ? ‘ Fall into their ranks ; be not afraid ; be not startled ; a *divine instinct*

*guides and moves onward that heaving and rolling mass ; and lawless and destructive as it may seem to you, ye onlookers, it is normal and holy, pursuing a straight and harmless direction on to the union of Man with God.' So answers philosophy, and this is its glory. The friends of Humanity need philosophy, as the means of legitimating the cause of the people, of proving that it is the right, and the duty, of every man to bind himself to that cause, and to maintain it in good report and in evil report, in life and in death. They need it, that they may prove to these conservatives, who are frightened almost out of their wits at the movements of the masses, and who are denouncing them in no measured terms, that these movements are from God, and that they who war against them are warring against truth, duty, God, and Humanity. They need it, that they may no longer be obliged to make apologies for their devotion to the masses, their democratic sympathies and tendencies. They who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, who are loaded with reproach for their fidelity to truth and duty, who are all but cast out of the pale of Humanity, because they see, love, and pursue Humanity's true interests, — they need it, that they may comprehend the cause of the opposition they meet, forgive their enemies, silence the gainsayer, and give to him that asks it a reason for the hope that is in them. The friends of progress, here and everywhere, need it, that, having vindicated, legitimated progress, as philosophers, they may go into the saloons, the universities, the halls of legislation, the pulpit, and abroad among the people, and preach it, with the dignity and the authority of the prophet." — *The Boston Quarterly Review*, January, 1838, pp. 104, 105.*

It is necessary to take this ground, or give up democracy, which Mr. Bancroft defines "Eternal Justice ruling through the people," as wholly indefensible ; for it cannot be denied that popular movements are blind, and that in them the people are borne onward whither they see not, and by a force they comprehend not. Hence it is easy to understand, that, retaining in their memories traces of former instructions, they may recoil with horror from the last consequences of Socialism, and yet be intent only on developing Socialistic tendencies, and crushing all opposition to them.

Socialism is, moreover, presented in a form admirably adapted to deceive the people, and to secure their support. It comes in a Christian guise, and seeks to express itself in the language of the Gospel. Men whom this age delights to honor have called our blessed Lord "the Father of Democracy," and not few or insignificant are those who tell us that he was "the first Socialist." In this country, the late Dr. Channing took the

lead in reducing the Gospel to Socialism ; and in France, the now fallen Abbé de la Mennais, condemned by Gregory the Sixteenth, of immortal memory, was the first, we believe, who labored to establish the identity of Socialism and Christianity. We gave in another place, in 1840, a brief notice of his views on this point, which it may not be uninteresting to reproduce.

“ The most remarkable feature in the Abbé de la Mennais’s doctrine of liberty is its connection with religion. It is well known, that for some time the friends of freedom in Europe have been opposed to the Church, and in general to all religion. The privileged orders have also taken great pains to make it widely believed, that religion requires the support of existing abuses, and that no one can contend for social meliorations without falling into infidelity. This has created a false issue, one which M. de la Mennais rejects. He has endeavoured, and with signal success, to show that there is no discrepancy between religion and liberty ; nay, more, that Christianity offers a solid foundation for the broadest freedom, and that, in order to be true to its spirit, its friends must labor with all their might to restore to the people their rights, and to correct all social abuses. He proves that all men are equal before God, and therefore equal one to another. All men have one Father, and are therefore brethren, and ought to treat one another as brothers. This is the Christian law. This law is violated, whenever distinction of races is recognized ; whenever one man is clothed with authority over his equals ; whenever one man, or a number of men, are invested with certain privileges, which are not shared equally by the whole. As this is the case everywhere, everywhere therefore is the Christian law violated. Everywhere therefore is there suffering, lamentation. The people everywhere groan and travail in pain, sighing to be delivered from their bondage into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. To this deliverance the people have a right. For it every Christian should contend ; and they wrong their brethren, deny Christianity, and blaspheme God, who oppose it.

This is a new doctrine in France. It is something new since the days of the *philosophes*, to undertake to show that Christianity is the religion which favors not kings and privileged orders, but the people, the poor and needy, the wronged and downtrodden. Hitherto the few have made the many submit to the grievous burdens under which they groaned, by representing it as irreligious to attempt to remove them. They have enlisted the clergy on their side, and made religion, the very essence of which is justice and love, contribute to the support of oppression. They have deterred the pious from seeking to better their condition, by denouncing all who seek the melioration of society as infidels. But the Abbé has put a stop to this unhallowed proceeding. He has nobly vindicated

gion and the people. He has turned the tables upon the people's sters, and denounced their masters, not the people, as infidels. has enlisted religion on the side of freedom; recalled that long gotten Gospel, which was glad tidings to the poor, and dared ow the example of Jesus, whom the common people heard dly, and whom the people's masters crucified between two ves. He speaks out for freedom, the broadest freedom, not in tones of the infidel scoffer, but in the name of God, Christ, and n, and with the authority of a prophet. His 'Words of a liever' has had no parallel since the days of Jeremiah. It is at e a prophecy, a curse, a hymn, fraught with deep, terrible, and ful meaning. It is the doom of the tyrant, and the jubilee-shout the oppressed. We know of no work in which the true spirit of ristianity is more faithfully represented. It proclaims, 'Blessed the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven'; and woe unto rich oppressor, the royal spoiler, the scribes and Pharisees, pocrites, who bind heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulrs, while they themselves will not move them with one of their gers."—*The Boston Quarterly Review*, January, 1840, pp. 7–119.

It may not be amiss to place by the side of this bold commendation of the *Words of a Believer*, the judgment pronounced on that book and its doctrines by the Sovereign Pontiff, in his Encyclical Letter, dated June, 1834, which we find in a *Pièces Justificatives* published by M. de la Mennais at the d of his volume entitled *Affaires de Rome*, Bruxelles, 1837.

"Horruimus sane, venerabiles Fratres, vel ex primo oculorum tutu, auctorisque cæcitatem miserati intelleximus, quonam scientia orumpat, quæ non secundum Deum sit, sed secundum mundi elementa. Enimvero contra fidem sua illa declaratione solemniter tam, captiosissimis ipse ut plurimum verborum, fictionumque volucris oppugnandam, evertendamque suscepit catholicam doctrinam, quam memoratis nostris litteris,* tum de debita erga postates subjectione, tum de arcenda a populis exitiosa *indifferenmi* contagione, deque frenis injiciendis evaganti opinionum rmonumque licentiæ, tum demum de damnanda omnimodo nscientiæ libertate, teterrimaque societatum, vel ex cujuscumque lsæ religionis cultoribus, in sacræ et publicæ rei perniciem contrarum conspiratione, pro auctoritate humilitati nostræ tradita finivimus.

"Refugit sane animus ea perlegere, quibus ibidem auctor vincum quodlibet fidelitatis subjectionisque erga principes dirumpere natur, face undequaque perduellionis immissa, qua publici ordinis

* *Epistola Encyclica*, August 15, 1833.

clades, magistratuum contemptus, legum infractio grassetur, omniaque, et sacræ, et civilis potestatis elementa convellantur. Hinc novo et iniquo commento potestatem principum, veluti divinæ legi infestam, imo *opus peccati* et *Satanæ potestatem* in calumniæ portentum traducit, præsidibusque sacrorum easdem, ac imperantibus turpitudinis notas inurit ob criminum molitionumque fœdus, quò eos somniat inter se adversus populorum jura conjunctos. Neque tanto hoc ausu contentus omnigenam insuper opinionum, sermonum, conscientiæque libertatem obtrudit, militibusque ad eam a *tyrannide*, ut ait, liberandam dimicaturis fausta omnia ac felicia comprecatur, cœtus ac consociationes furiali æstu ex universo qua patet Orbe advocat, et in tam nefaria consilia urgens atque instans compellit, ut eo etiam ex capite monita præscriptaque nostra proculcata ab ipso sentiamus.

“Piget cuncta hic recensere, quæ pessimo hoc impietatis et audaciæ fœtu ad divina humanaque omnia perturbanda congeruntur. Sed illud præsertim indignationem excitat, religionique plane intolerandum est, divinas præscriptiones tantis erroribus adserendis ab auctore afferri, et incautis venditari, eumque ad populos lege obedientiæ solvendos, perindè ac si a Deo missus et inspiratus esset, postquam in sacratissimo Trinitatis augustæ nomine præfatus est, Sacras Scripturas ubique obtendere, ipsarumque verba, quæ verba Dei sunt, ad prava hujuscemodi deliramenta inculcanda callide audacterque detorquere, quo fidentius, uti inquebat S. Bernardus, *pro luce tenebras offundat, et pro melle vel potius in melle venenum propinet, novum cudens populis Evangelium, aliudque ponens fundamentum præter id quod positum est.*

“Verùm tantam hanc sanæ doctrinæ illatam perniciem silentio dissimulare ab eo vetamur, qui speculatores nos posuit in Israel, ut de errore illos moneamus, quos Auctor et consummator fidei Jesus nostræ curæ concredidit.

“Quare auditis nonnullis ex venerabilibus fratribus nostris S. R. E. cardinalibus, motu proprio, et ex certâ scientia, deque Apostolicæ potestatis plenitudine memoratum librum, cui titulus : *Paroles d'un Croyant*, quo per impium Verbi Dei abusum populi corrumpuntur ad omnis ordinis publici vincula dissolvenda, ad utramque auctoritatem, labefactandam, ad seditiones in imperiis, tumultus, rebellionesque excitandas, fovendas, roborandas, librum idèd propositiones respective falsas, calumniosas, temerarias, inducentes in anarchiam, contrarias Verbo Dei, impias, scandalosas, erroneas jam ab Ecclesia præsertim in Valdensibus, Wiclefitis, Hussitis, aliisque id generis hæreticis damnatas continentem, reprobamus, damnamus, ac pro reprobo et damnato in perpetuum haberi volumus, atque decernimus.

“Vestrum nunc erit, venerabiles Fratres, nostris hisce mandatis, quæ rei et sacræ et civilis salus et incolumitas, necessario efflagitat,

ini contentioni obsecundare, ne scriptum istius modi e latebris aditum emissum eò fiat perniciosius, quo magis vesanæ novitatis idini velificatur, et latè ut cancer serpit in populis. Muneris stris sit, urgere sanam de tanto hoc negotio doctrinam, vafritiam-e novatorum patefacere, acriusque pro Christiani Gregis custodia gilare, ut studium religionis, pietas actionum, pax publica floreant augeantur feliciter. Id sane a vestra fide, et ab impensa vestra communi bono instantia fidenter operimur, ut, eo juvante qui ter est luminum, gratulemur (dicimus cum S. Cypriano) *fuisse collectum errorem, et retusum, et ideo prostratum, quia agnitum, pue detectum.*" — pp. 56 – 62.

We hope the judgment of the Holy Father will weigh as much with our readers as that of the Editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*. We had for a time the unenviable honor of being ranked ourselves among those who attempted here and elsewhere to translate Christianity into Socialism. There are, perhaps, yet living, persons who remember the zeal and perseverance with which we preached, in the name of the Gospel, the most damnable radicalism. We cite a few paragraphs from an essay entitled *Democracy of Christianity*, published in *The Boston Quarterly Review*, October, 1838.

"In a civil and political sense, we cannot discover that the Church regards Christianity in any other light than that of a curb, a bit, a strait, a means by which the people may be kept in order and in submission to their masters. The clergy, under this point of view, are a sort of constabulary force at the service of the police, and meeting-houses a substitute for police offices, houses of correction, and penitentiaries. Far be it from us to deny the great worth of Christianity in this respect. We acknowledge the virtues of the Church, as an agent of the police; but we hope we may be allowed to believe that Christianity requires the Church to possess other and higher virtues. It should not merely keep the people in subjection to an order of things which is, but fire them with the spirit and the energy to create a social order, to which it shall need no constabulary force, lay or clerical, to make the millions submissive.

"But if the Church, both here and in Europe, does not desert the cause of Absolutism, and make common cause with the people, its doom is sealed. Its union with the cause of Liberty is the only thing which can save it. The party of the people, the democracy throughout the civilized world, is every day increasing in numbers and in power. It is already too strong to be defeated. Popes may sue their bulls against it; bishops may denounce it; priests may slander its apostles, and appeal to the superstition of the multitude;

kings and nobilities may collect their forces and bribe or dragon; but in vain; IT IS TOO LATE. Democracy has become a power, and sweeps on resistless as one of the great agents of Nature. Absolute monarchs must be swept away before it. They will fail in their mad attempt to arrest the progress of the people, and to roll back the tide of civilization. They will be prostrated in the dust, and rise no more for ever. Whoever or whatever leagues with them must take their fate. If the Altar be supported on the Throne, and the Church joined to the Palace, both must fall together. Would the Church could see this in time to avert the sad catastrophe! It is a melancholy thing to reflect on the ruin of that majestic temple which has stood so long, over which so many ages have passed, on which so many storms have beaten, and in which so many human hearts have found shelter, solace, and heaven. It is melancholy to reflect on the condition of the people deprived of all forms of worship, and with no altar on which to offer the heart's incense to God the Father. Yet assuredly churchless, altarless, with no form or shadow of worship will the people be, if the Church continues its league with Absolutism. The people have sworn deep in their hearts, that they will be free. They pursue freedom as a Divinity, and freedom they will have, — with the Church if it may be, without the Church if it must be. God grant that they who profess to be his especial servants may be cured of their madness in season to save the Altar!

"The people almost universally identify Christianity with the Church. They cannot reject the Church without seeming to themselves to be rejecting Christianity, and therefore not without regarding themselves as infidels. Will the clergy consent to drive the people into infidelity? Can they not discern the signs of the times? Will they persist in maintaining social doctrines more abhorrent to the awakening instincts of the people than atheism itself? A people, regarding itself as infidel, is in the worst plight possible to pursue the work of social regeneration. It is then deprived of the hallowed and hallowing influence and guidance of the religious sentiment; and it can hardly fail to become disorderly in the pursuit of order, and to find license instead of liberty, and anarchy instead of a popular government. For its own sake, then, and for the sake of liberty also, the Church should break its league with the despots and join with the people, and give them its purifying and ennobling influence.

"The Church must do this or die. Already it is losing its hold on the hearts of the people. Everywhere is there complaint of men's want of interest in religion; everywhere is there need of most extraordinary efforts, and various and powerful machinery, to bring people into the Church, and few are brought in, save women and children. The pulpit has ceased to be a power. Its voice no

nger charms or kindles. It finds no echo in the universal heart. Sermons are thought to be dull and vapid; and when they call forth applause, it is the preacher that wins it, not the cause he pleads. Are we at any loss to account for this? The old doctrines, the old maxims, the old exhortations, the old topics of discussion, which the clergy judge it their duty to reproduce, are not those which most interest the people. The dominant sentiment of the people is not what it was. Once it was thought that the earth was smitten with a curse from God, and happiness was no more to be looked for *on* it than *from* it. Then all thoughts turned to another world, and the chief inquiry was, how to secure it. To save the soul from hell hereafter was then the one thing needful; and the preacher, who could show how that was to be done and heaven cured, was sure to be listened to. It is different now. Men think less of escaping hell, have less fear of the Devil, more faith in the possibility of improving their earthly condition, and are more earnest to extinguish the fires of that hell which has been burning here ever since the fall. The Church must conform to the new state of things. She cannot bring back the past. Yesterday never returns. If she would have her voice responded to, she must speak in tones that shall harmonize with the dominant sentiment of the age. *She must preach democracy*, and then will she make an echo in every heart, and call forth a response from the depths of the universal soul of Humanity. *She can speak with power only when she speaks to the dominant sentiment, and command respect and obedience only when she commands that which the people feel, for the time at least, to be the one thing needful.*

"In calling upon the Church, by which term we mean especially the clergy of all communions, to associate with the democracy, and labor for the realization of that equality towards which the people everywhere tending, we seem to ourselves to be merely recalling the Church to Christianity. We freely acknowledge the past services of the Church. She has done much, and done nobly. She has protected the friendless, fed the orphan, raised up the bowed-down, and delivered him who was ready to perish. She has tamed the ruthless barbarian, infused into his heart the sentiment of chaste love, and warmed him with admiration for the generous and humane; she has made kings and potentates, who trample on their brethren without remorse, and lord it without scruple over God's heritage, feel that there is a power above them, and that throne and diadem, sceptre and dominion, shall avail them naught in presence of the King of kings, before whom they must one day stand to be judged, as well as the meanest of their slaves; she has done thousand times over more good for the human race than we have space or ability to relate, and blessings on her memory! eternal attitude to God for that august assembly of saints, martyrs, and

heroes, which she has nourished in her bosom, and sent forth to teach the world, by their lives, the divinity there is in man, one day to be awakened and called forth in its infinite beauty and omnipotent energy!

"But while we say this, we feel that the Church now, in both its Catholic and Protestant divisions, is unconscious of its mission, and has become false to its great Founder. Jesus was, under a political and social aspect, *the prophet of the democracy*. He came to the poor and afflicted, to the wronged and the outraged, to the masses, the downtrodden millions; and he spoke to them as a brother, in the tones of an infinite love, an infinite compassion, while he thundered the rebukes of Heaven against their oppressors. 'Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers,' says he to the people's masters, 'how can ye escape the damnation of hell?' His word was with power. Ay, was it, because he spoke to the common soul, because he spoke out for outraged Humanity, and because he did not fear to speak to the great, the renowned, the rich, the boastingly religious, in terms of terrible plainness and severity. Before his piercing glance earth-born distinctions vanish, and kings and princes, scribes and Pharisees, chief priests and elders, sink down below the meanest fisherman, or the vilest slave, and become less worthy to enter the kingdom of heaven than publicans and harlots. Their robes and widened phylacteries, their loud pretensions, their wealth, rank, refinement, influence, do not deceive him. He sees the hollow heart within them, the whited sepulchres they are, full of dead men's bones and all manner of uncleanness, vessels merely washed on the outside, all filthy within, and he denounces them in terms too terrible to be repeated. Here was the secret of his power. The great, the honored, the respectable, the aristocracy, social or religious, beheld in him a fearful denouncer of their oppressions, a ruthless unveiler of their hidden deformity; while the poor, the 'common people,' saw in him a friend, an advocate, a protector, ay, an avenger.

"Jesus declared that the spirit of the Lord was upon him, because he was anointed to preach the Gospel to the poor; and he gave, when asked by the disciples of John, the fact, that the Gospel was preached to the poor, as one of the principal proofs of his Messiahship. He chose his disciples from the lowest ranks of his countrymen; and they were the common people who heard him gladly. Was he not a prophet from God to the masses? Was he a prophet to them merely because he prepared the way for their salvation hereafter? Say it not. The earth he came to bless; on the earth he came to establish a kingdom; and it was said of him that he should not fail nor be discouraged till he had set judgment, — justice, — in the earth and the isles waited for his law. He was to bring forth victory unto truth. In his days the earth was to be

lest; under his reign all the nations were to be at peace; the sword was to be beaten into the ploughshare and the spear into the pruning-hook; and war was to be no more. The wolf and the lamb were to lie down together, and they were not to hurt or destroy in all the holy mountain of the Lord. The wilderness was to rejoice and blossom as the rose, and the solitary place was to be glad. Every man was to sit under his *own* vine and fig-tree, with none to molest or to make afraid. On the earth was he to found a new order of things, to bring round the blissful ages, and to give to renovated man a foretaste of heaven. It was here, then, the millions were to be blessed with a heaven, as well as hereafter."* — p. 464 – 469.

Our readers, if they have perused this extract, will have no trouble to understand why we have, in our present journal, shown ourselves so sensitive to even the appearance of an alliance of the Church with the popular movements of the day. Such an alliance we found De la Mennais contending for, and had ourselves contended for with a distinctness and earnestness equal to his for many years prior to our conversion.

The general doctrine asserted in this last extract was not peculiar to the writer cited. He was never remarkable for his originality. He was remarkable, if for any thing, only for the care with which he studied the movement party of our times, seized its great principles, and abandoned himself to their direction. He accepted that party, and followed it, with a courage and a perseverance worthy of a better cause. The views he put forth were those of his party. They were not peculiar to him then, and they are far less so now. During the last

* The Christian reader will not fail to perceive that the writer here, in his blindness, takes precisely the view which was taken by the carnal Jews, for which they were cursed. Truly, there is nothing new under the sun. The old carnal Jews misinterpreted the prophecies; they expected in the Messiah that was to come a temporal prince, who was to found a temporal kingdom, for the temporal happiness of mankind. They rejected and crucified our Saviour, because he did not come as such a prince, because he proposed a spiritual kingdom, and the spiritual welfare of his subjects. The *Christian* Socialists do the same. They interpret the promises precisely as they were interpreted by the carnal Jews, — expect from our Lord, like them, a temporal kingdom, and precisely the same order of prosperity, — and reject the Church as antichristian, precisely because she, like her Master, proposes for her children the virtues and happiness of the spiritual order. So the progress of the age consists solely in bringing its master spirits round to the point of view of the carnal Jews, to join with them in crucifying their God between two thieves! The sects will generally be found to be wedded to the carnal just in proportion as they fancy they have become spiritual.

ten or twelve years they have made fearful progress, both at home and abroad. Affecting to be Christian, their advocates invoke the name of Jesus, and appeal to the Holy Scriptures, the texts of which, with a perverse ingenuity, they accommodate to their Socialistic purpose. May Almighty God forgive us the share we had in propagating what we called the *Democracy of Christianity*! We have nothing to palliate our offence or to hide our shame; for, if we knew no better at the time, we might have known better, and our ignorance was culpable. All we can say is, we followed the dominant sentiment of the age, which is a poor excuse for one who professed to be a preacher of the Gospel.

Veiling itself under Christian forms, attempting to distinguish between Christianity and the Church, claiming for itself the authority and immense popularity of the Gospel, denouncing Christianity in the name of Christianity, discarding the Bible in the name of the Bible, and defying God in the name of God, Socialism conceals from the indiscriminating multitude its true character, and, appealing to the dominant sentiment of the age and to some of our strongest natural inclinations and passions, it asserts itself with terrific power, and rolls on in its career of devastation and death with a force that human beings, in themselves, are impotent to resist. Men are assimilated to it by all the power of their own nature, and by all their reverence for religion. Their very faith and charity are perverted, and their noblest sympathies and their sublimest hopes are made subservient to their basest passions and their most grovelling propensities. Here is the secret of the strength of Socialism, and here, too, is the principal source of its danger.

The open denial of Christianity is not now to be dreaded; the incredulity of the last century is now in bad taste, and can work only under disguise. All the particular heresies which human pride or human perversity could invent are now effete or unfashionable. Every article in the Creed has been successively denied, and the work of denial can go no farther. The attempt to found a new sect on the denial of any particular article of faith would now only cover its authors with ridicule. The age laughs at Protestantism, and scorns sectarianism. The spirit that works in the children of disobedience must, therefore, affect to be Christian, more Christian than Christianity itself, and not only Christian, but *Catholic*. It can manifest itself now, and gain friends, only by acknowledging the Church and all Catholic symbols, and substituting for the divine and

heavenly sense in which they have hitherto been understood a human and earthly sense. Hence the religious character which socialism attempts to wear. It rejects in name no Catholic symbol; it only rejects the Catholic sense. If it finds fault with the actual Church, it is because she is not truly Catholic, does not understand herself, does not comprehend the profound sense of her own doctrines, fails to seize and expound the true Christian idea as it lay in the mind of Jesus, and as this enlightened age is prepared to receive it. The Christian symbol needs a new and a more Catholic interpretation, adapted to our age in universal progress. Where the old interpretation uses the words God, Church, and Heaven, you must understand humanity, Society, and Earth; you will then have the true Christian idea, and bring the Gospel down to the order of nature and within the scope of human reason. But while you put the human and earthly sense upon the old Catholic words, be careful and retain the words themselves. By taking care to do this, you can secure the support of the adherents of Christianity, who, if they meet their old familiar terms, will not miss their old, familiar ideas; and thus you will be able to reconcile the old Catholic world and the new, and to go on with Humanity in her triumphant progress through the ages.

Since it professes to be Christian, and really denies the faith, socialism is a heresy; and since by its interpretation it eviscerates the Catholic system of its entire meaning, it is the *résumé* of all the particular heresies which ever have been or can be. The ingenuity of men, aided by the great Enemy of souls, can invent no further heresy. All possible heresies are here summed up and actualized in one universal heresy, on which the age is proceeding with all possible haste to erect a counterfeit Catholicity for the reception and worship of Antichrist as soon as he shall appear in person.

"Descend," says De la Mennais, "to the bottom of things, and disengage from the wavering thoughts, vain and fleeting opinions, accidentally mingled with it, the powerful principle which, without interruption, ferments in the bosom of society, and what find you at Christianity itself? What is it the people wish, what is it they claim, with a perseverance that never tires, and an ardor that nothing can damp? Is it not the abolition of the reign of force, in order to substitute that of intelligence and right? Is it not the effective recognition and social realization of equality, inseparable from liberty, the necessary condition and essential form of which, in the organization of the state, is election, the first basis of the Christian community?"

"What, again, do the people wish? what do they demand? The amelioration of the lot of the masses, everywhere so full of suffering; laws for the protection of labor, whence may result a more equitable distribution of the general wealth; that the few shall no longer exercise an exclusive influence for their own profit in the administration of the interests of all; that a legislation which has no bounds, the everlasting refuge of privilege, which it in vain attempts to disguise under lying names, shall no longer, on every side, drive the poor back into their misery; that the goods, destined by the Heavenly Father for all his children, shall become accessible to all; that human fraternity shall cease to be a mockery, and a word without meaning. In short, suscitated by God to pronounce the final judgment upon the old social order, they have summoned it to appear, and recalling the ages which have crumbled away, they have said to it, 'I was hungry, and ye gave me not to eat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me not to drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me not in; naked, and ye clothed me not; sick and in prison, and ye did not visit me.' I interrogate you on the law. Respond. And the old social order was silent, for it had nothing to answer; and it raised its hand against the people whom God has appointed to judge it. But what can it do against the people, and against God? Its doom is registered on high, and it will not be able to efface it with the blood which, for a brief period, it is permitted to shed.

"We cannot, then, but recognize in what is passing under our eyes the action of the *Christian principle*, which, having for long ages presided almost exclusively over individual life, seeks now to produce itself under a more general and perfect form, to incarnate itself, so to speak, in social institutions, — the second phase of its development, of which only the first labor as yet appears. *Something instinctive and irresistible pushes the people in this direction.* The few have taken possession of the earth; they have taken possession of it by wresting from all others even the smallest part of the common heritage; and the people will that men live as brothers according to the Divine commandment. They battle for justice and charity; they battle for the doctrine which Jesus Christ has come to preach to the world, and which will save it in spite of the powers of the world." — *Affaires de Rome*, pp. 319 – 321.

This is as artful as it is bold. It wears a pious aspect, it has divine words on its lips, and almost unction in its speech. It is not easy for the unlearned to detect its fallacy, and the great body of the people are prepared to receive it as Christian truth. We cannot deny it without seeming to them to be warring against the true interests of society, and also against the Gospel of our Lord. Never was heresy more subtle, more adroit, better fitted for success. How skilfully it flatters the

people ! It is said, the saints shall judge the world. By the hange of a word, the people are transformed into saints, and invested with the saintly character and office. How adroitly, too, it appeals to the people's envy and hatred of their superiors, and to their love of the world, without shocking their orthodoxy or wounding their piety ! Surely Satan has here, in Socialism, done his best, almost outdone himself, and would, if it were possible, deceive the very elect, so that no flesh should be saved.

What we have said will suffice to show the subtle and dangerous character of Socialism, and how, although the majority may recoil from it at present, if logically drawn out by its bolder and more consistent advocates, the age may nevertheless be really and thoroughly Socialistic. We know that the age seeks with all its energy, as the greatest want of mankind, political and social reforms. Of this there is and can be no doubt. Analyze these reforms and the principles and motives which lead to them, which induce the people in our days to struggle for them, and you will find at the bottom of them all the assumption, that *our good lies in the natural order, and is not attainable by individual effort*. All we see, all we hear, all we read, from whatever quarter it comes, serves to prove that this is the deep and settled conviction of the age. If it were not, these revolutions in France, Italy, Germany, and elsewhere, would have no meaning, no principle, no aim, and would be as insignificant as drunken rows in the streets of our cities.

But the essence of Socialism is in this very assumption, that our good lies in the natural order, and is unattainable by individual effort. Socialism bids us follow nature, instead of saying with the Gospel, Resist nature. Placing our good in the natural order, it necessarily restricts it to temporal goods, the only good the order of nature can give. For it, then, evil is to want temporal goods, and good is to possess them. But, in this sense, evil is not remediable or good attainable by individual effort. We depend on nature, which may resist us, and on the conduct of others, which escapes our control. Hence the necessity of social organization, in order to harmonize the interests of all with the interest of each, and to enable each by the union of all to compel Nature to yield him up the good she has in store for him. But all men are equal before God, and, since he is just, he is equal in regard to all. Then all have equal rights,—an equal right to exemption from evil, and an equal right to the possession of good. Hence the social organization must be

such as to avert equal evil from all, and to secure to each an equal share of temporal goods. Here is Socialism in a nutshell, following as a strictly logical consequence from the principles or assumptions which the age adopts, and on which it everywhere acts. The systems drawn out by Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simon, Cabet, Proudhon, or others, are mere attempts to realize Socialism, and may or may not be ridiculous and absurd ; but that is nothing to the purpose, if you concede their principle. These men have done the best they could, and you have no right to censure them, as long as you agree with them in principle, unless you propose something better.

Now we agree with De la Mennais, that Christianity has a political and social character, and with the editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, that Christianity seeks the good of man in this life as well as in the life to come. We say with all our heart, "On the earth was he [our Lord] to found a new order of things, to bring round the blissful ages, and to give to renovated man a foretaste of heaven. It was here the millions were to be blessed with a heaven, as well as hereafter." No doubt of it. But in the new order and by it, — not out of it and independently of it. Out of the new order and independently of it, the millions are, to say the least, no better off than if it did not exist, and have no right to any portion of its blessings. The Socialists, when they attempt to press Christianity into their service, are bad logicians. They are right when they tell us that our Lord came to found a new order of things, for he certainly did come for that purpose ; they are right when they tell us that it is Christian to seek a heaven on earth for the millions, for there is a Christian heaven here for all men, if they choose to accept it ; but when they say this, they are bound to add that this heaven is in the new order established, and is to be sought in it, and by obedience to its principles. It is Christian to seek that order of happiness which Christianity proposes, by the means it prescribes ; but to seek another order of happiness, and by other means, is not *therefore* necessarily Christian, and may even be antichristian. Here is the point they overlook, and which vitiates all their reasoning.

Let no one say that we allege that man must forego any good while in this world in order to gain heaven hereafter. It would be no great hardship, even if it were so ; but our God deals much more liberally with us, and requires us to give up, in order to secure heaven hereafter, only what makes our misery here. The Socialist is right in saying that there is good for us even

this world ; his error lies in placing that good in the natural order, and in making it unattainable by individual effort. Our good lies not in the natural order, but in the supernatural order, in that new order which our Lord came to establish. In that order there is all the good we can conceive, and attainable by simple voluntary efforts. Out of that order there is no good attainable either by the efforts of individuals or by association, and out of it there is no good at all. Temporal goods, even in the term the fullest possible sense, are not good, and, sought for themselves, are productive only of evil. Here lies the first error of the Socialists. No evil is removable, no good is attainable, as long as any earthly or merely natural end is held to be, for its own sake, a legitimate object of pursuit. There is and can be good for no one, here or hereafter, save by seeking, *exclusively*, the end for which Almighty God has created us, and by the means and in the way he himself has appointed. Now this end is neither in this world nor of this world, neither in nature nor of nature, and therefore can be neither attained, can be promoted, by no natural effort, by no natural means, — neither by political changes nor by social changes, neither by political democracy nor by social democracy. These things have and can have no necessary connection with

It is a mistake, then, to regard them, in themselves, as either in any degree desirable.

The Socialists are right when they say that the Christian law is the law of liberty, but not therefore necessarily right when they term the movements of the people for what they call liberty Christian movements, originating in Christian principle. Undoubtedly, the Christian law is the law of liberty. Our Saviour came to free us from bondage, and whom he makes free is free indeed. In the order he establishes, our highest good, our only good, whether for time or eternity, is entirely dependent of the world. Nothing in the universe can hinder, against our will, from attaining to it. We have only to will, and it is ours, and we are always and everywhere free to will. No one depends on nature or other men for the power to fulfil his destiny, — to gain the end for which he was intended. Here is the Christian doctrine of liberty, the glorious liberty which our religion reveals, and which we know by divine truth is no deception. But the liberty the Socialists commend, and which the people are seeking, is not Christian liberty, for it is not liberty at all. Socialism, by its very principle, enslaves us to nature and society, and subjects us to all the fluctuations

of time and sense. According to it, man can attain to true good, can gain the end for which he was made, only in a certain political and social order, which it depends on the millions, whom the individual cannot control, to construct, and which, when constructed, may prove to be inconvenient and inadequate, and require to be pulled down and built up again. The individual, it teaches us, can make no advance towards his destiny but in proportion as he secures the coöperation of his race. All men must be brought down or brought up to the same level before I can go to the end for which my God made me; each man's true good is unattainable, till all men are prepared to take "a pull, a strong pull, a long pull, and a pull altogether," to attain theirs! This is slavery, not liberty. Nay, it denies the possibility of liberty, and makes slavery the necessary condition of all men. Is not he a slave who is chained to nature for his good, or to a social organization which does not exist, and which depends on the wisdom, the folly, the passions or instincts, the whims or caprices of other men to create or to destroy? Who can deny it? He only is free, he only knows what freedom is, who tramples the world beneath his feet, who is independent of all the accidents of time and space, of all created beings, and who has but to will and all heaven is his, and remains his, though the entire universe fall in ruins around him.

Undoubtedly, Christianity requires us to remove all evil, and in seeking to remove evil we follow the Christian principle; but what the Socialists call evil, and the people in revolt are seeking to remove, is not evil. Nothing is evil but that which turns a man away from his end, or interposes a barrier to his advance towards it. Nothing but one's own sin can do that. Nothing, then, but sin is or can be evil, and that is evil only to him who commits it. Take all these things which Socialists declaim against,—monarchy, aristocracy, inequalities of rank, inequalities of riches, poverty, want, distress, hunger, starvation even,—not one of them, in itself considered, is necessarily evil; not one of them, nor all of them combined, can harm the just man, or prevent, except by his own will, any one from the fulfilment of his destiny. If one is prepared to die, he may as well die in a hovel as a palace, of hunger as a fever. Nothing can harm us that does not separate or tend to separate us from God. Nothing but our own internal malice can so separate us, and it is always in our power, through grace, which is never withheld, to remove that at will.

Undoubtedly, also, Christianity requires us to seek not only

remove evil, but to promote good, and good in this world. Good is the object of the will, and we are always to propose it. It is the things the people in their insurrectionary movements are seeking after, and which Socialists commend, are not necessarily good. As there is no evil to the just, so is there no good to the sinner, while he continues in his sinful state. If Socialists could secure to all men every thing they promise to dream of, they would secure them nothing to their advantage. Advance every man at the highest social level that you can conceive ; give him the most finished education you can devise ; rush on him in profusion this world's goods ; lodge him in the most splendid palace that genius can construct, furnished in the most tasteful and luxurious manner ; let him be surrounded by the most beautiful scenes of nature and the choicest specimens of art ; and let him have ample leisure and opportunity for travel, for social intercourse, and for the fullest and most harmonious development of all his natural faculties ;—you advance him not the millionth part of a hair's-breadth towards his destiny, avert from him no evil, secure him no conceivable good. It will be no consolation to the damned to recollect, that, while here, they were clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day ; and your rich men, your great and renowned men, your fine gentlemen and ladies, with their polished manners and fashionable dresses, their soft complexions and gentle speech, your accomplished artists, your brilliant poets, your eloquent orators, your learned scholars, your profound and subtle philosophers, as well as coarse artisans, ragged beggars, cross-grained old hags, and country bumpkins, will be damned, eternally damned, if they die without the grace of God ; and that grace is as likely to find its way to the hovel as to the palace, to dwell beneath the beggar's gabardine as the embroidered mantle of the rich and refined. The bulk of the strong-minded and thrifty citizens of this republic, with all their political franchises, social advantages, universities, academies, common schools, meeting-houses, external decorum, and material prosperity, are infinitely more destitute than those Neapolitan lazzaroni whose lot they deplore, and are in no rational sense one whit better off than the miserable miners and degraded populace of Great Britain. Their possessions will add nothing to the fulness of their joy, if, by a miracle of mercy, they gain heaven, and will only render fiercer the flames of their torment, if they are doomed to hell, as they have every reason to fear will be the case.

The Socialists fall into the fallacy of passing, in their reason-

ing, from one species to another. Nothing they call evil is evil; nothing they call good is good; and hence, because Christianity commands us to remove evil and seek good, it does not follow that we must associate with the disaffected populations to bring about political and social reforms. All that is in any sense good or worth having the individual can always, under any political or social order, secure by a simple effort of his will. Forms of government and forms of social organization, then, are at best indifferent; Socialism is a folly, and Socialists fools. The Creator is good, and Providence is wise and just. All external events take place by the express appointment of God. If, then, a single event were evil or the occasion of evil to a single individual, save through that individual's own fault, the goodness of the Creator would be denied, and the wisdom and justice of Providence could not be asserted. No doubt, there is evil in the world, far more heart-rending, far more terrific, than Socialists depict, or even conceive; but to no man is there or can there be evil, but his own sin, which is purely his own creation. Since no man is obliged or compelled to sin, since sufficient grace is given unto every man to enable him to break off from sin and to become just, every man can, as far as himself is concerned, put an end to all evil, and secure all good, even the supreme good itself, at any moment he pleases. Nothing, then, is more idle than to pretend that political and social reforms — touching the organization of the state or of society, we mean, not those which touch administration — are or ever can be necessary as the condition of averting any evil or procuring any good.

We agree, as we have said, that our Lord came to found a new order of things, — new in relation to that which obtained among the heathen, — and that he contemplated the good of the millions here as well as hereafter; we agree, nay, we hold, that he did propose the amelioration of the lot of man even while in this world, — and not of one class only, but of all classes. But how? By his new order, or, irrespective of it, merely by calling upon the people themselves to do it through political and social organization? If you say the latter, you place him in the old order, and class him with the old heathen philosophers. If he asserts simply man's dependence on nature and social organization, he founds no new order, for this dependence was the precise basis of the old order. Mankind always had nature and social organization, and to tell them to look to these for their good was to tell them nothing new; for this was precisely

that they had done, and were doing. The evil which oppresses the millions was in this very dependence, and what was needed was deliverance from it, — some method, so to speak, attaining our true good in spite of nature and of social organization. If, then, he retains that dependence, and does not propose this method, what did he do, or what can he do, which an Athenian philosopher might not have done? and wherein is what you call the Christian order different from Heathenism? You say, he came to found a new order for the amelioration of mankind; but how can you say this, if you are to look for the amelioration, which you say he authorizes you to seek, not from any new order, but from nature and social organization, which precisely what the heathen themselves did?

If you say, on the other hand, as you must, if you assert the new order at all, that our Lord ameliorates the lot of mankind by this new order, then you must concede that it is only in and through that order that the amelioration is to be effected. Then you are to look for it only as you come into and conform to that order. Now, according to that order, the millions are to be blessed, are to find their true happiness, not in following nature, not in resisting it, — not in possessing temporal goods, but in renouncing them, — not in pride and luxury, but in humility, poverty, and mortification, — not in being solicitous for what we shall eat, or what we shall drink, or wherewith we shall be clothed, “for after all these things do the heathen seek” (St. Matt. 6. 31–34), — in a word, not in seeking any of these things, but in seeking first, that is, as the end of all seeking, the kingdom of God, and his justice, and then “all these things shall be added unto us.” This is the order which our Lord has established. He gives us all needed grace to come into this order and to comply with all its demands, and, if we come in and so comply, he promises us all good, a hundred fold in this world, and everlasting life in the world to come.

Now, as you concede that our Lord came to establish a new order of things, and must concede, that, if he blesses the millions at all, it must be in and by this new order, you are bound to admit that it is only by complying with its requisitions and placing ourselves under its influence, that our good in this world, as well as in the next, is attainable. Then all your efforts by political and social changes, which imply a recurrence to the old order, a reliance on the principles of the heathen world, can only remove you farther and farther from your true God. The only way to attain that good must be to begin by an act of

renunciation, the renunciation of heathenism, of the world, of self, or, what is the same thing, an act of unconditional surrender of ourselves to God. This, if you admit Christianity at all, is the indispensable condition of all good. The heathen sought their good from nature and social organization, and found only evil. We are to seek not even our own good, that is, for the reason that it is *our* good, but God himself, and God alone, and then we shall find our good in Him who is the sovereign good itself. No doubt, this complete renunciation of self is any thing but pleasing to self; but we are never required to do it in our own strength. God always gives us grace to make it easy, if we will accept it. Moreover, we are required, in this, to do, at least, no more for God than he has done for us. We are required to give up all for him. But he gave up all for us. He made himself man, took upon himself the form of a servant, became poor, and obedient unto death, even unto the death of the cross, for us; and can we not, therefore, give up ourselves for him, especially when what we give up it were an injury to us to hold back? If we give ourselves to him, he gives himself to us. He can give no more than himself, and can we ask or expect more than an infinite God can give? Here is the condition, and it is only, under the order God has established, by complying with this condition that there is good for us here or hereafter; and we know, also, that, by complying, all evil is removed, and all conceivable and more than all conceivable good is obtained. The true course to be taken, then, is perfectly plain, and may be taken without hesitation; for He who has promised is able to fulfil, and will keep his word.

Of course we do not pretend, that, by conforming to the Christian order, the political and social equality contended for will be obtained; we do not pretend that there will be no more pain, no more sorrow, no more poverty, no more hunger or thirst. These things will remain, no doubt, as facts; but we have shown that they are not necessarily evils, and that their removal is not necessarily a good. These things have their uses in this world, or they would not be suffered to exist. To the just they are mercies, salutary penance, or occasions of merit, — purging the soul from the stains of past transgressions, or giving it an occasion to rise to higher sanctity and a higher reward. To the sinner they may be the occasion of evil; but, if so, only because he does not receive them in a proper disposition, and because by his malice he refuses to profit by them. But even to him they are no more hurtful than their opposites, — often

so hurtful. By conforming to the Christian order, all so-called temporal evils, in so far as evil, are removed, and all so-called temporal goods, in so far as good, are secured ; and this is all that can be asked.

But we are told, this is all, no doubt, very well, very true, very pious ; but the age does not believe it, the people will not live it. The people demand political and social reforms ; we must conform ourselves to their state of mind, or we have no influence with them. Let the Church sanction them in their movements for liberty, equality, and brotherhood, then they will listen to her teaching, and profit by it.

If there is any truth in this, it proves what we have all along been endeavouring to establish ; — that the age is Socialistic, and that Socialism is unchristian, nay, antichristian. Those, then, who urge the Church to make an alliance with the people in their movements, to baptize Socialism, and even give it Holy Communion, or who suppose they can without detriment to reason sympathize with these movements, we leave to defend themselves, as best they may. We have no skill to frame an apology for them, unless it be that they cherish the spirit of the age instead of the spirit of the Church, which is only a condemnation.

But suppose the sanction involved no violation of principle, I suppose the Church should make common cause with the so-called movement party, and enable it to effect the reforms it demands, — what would be gained ? These reforms, if effected, would content nobody, and a new series of reforms would be demanded, in their turn to be found equally unsatisfactory, and so on *in infinitum*, — reforms giving birth to new reforms, bringing no relief, producing and perpetuating endless confusion, to the contentment, the satisfaction of nobody, but the eternal enemy of mankind.

The Church is not of this world, and her principles are not those which govern the princes or the people of this world. She is the Spouse of God in this world, the mother of the faithful, the teacher of truth, and the dispenser of the Bread of Life to all who will receive it. They who are nursed with the milk from her bosom, who receive the Bread of Life from her hands and eat thereof, shall never hunger or thirst, shall never die, but shall live for ever. All she asks of governments and social institutions is that they leave her free, that is, violate in their administration no law of God. If the people grow discontented with the material order they find existing, she ex-

pounds to them the law; if in violation of the law, as she expounds it, they still persevere, and introduce a new order, be it what it may, she does not desert them; she continues to present herself in her divine character before them, and to discharge for them her sacred mission. She has truly a maternal heart, and seeks always and everywhere the true good of the people for time and for eternity; but she knows that Almighty God has made their good possible only on one condition, and therefore on that one condition she must insist. She explains it to the people, she exhorts and entreats them with divine tenderness to comply with it; but if they regard themselves as wiser than she, refuse to comply with the indispensable condition proposed, and will return to the old heathen order and seek their good from nature and human society, instead of seeking it from God and his Church, she grieves over them as our Lord grieved over Jerusalem devoted to destruction, but she can do no more. Their sin is on their own head, and they must reap the fruit of their own sowing. Themselves they may destroy, — her they cannot harm.

Here the discussion of our subject properly closes; but we fear that without additional remarks we may be misapprehended. These are times of jealousy, suspicion, and great uncharitableness, when men's passions are inflamed, and their heads more than ordinarily confused. What we say on one subject we are in danger of having understood of another; and because we oppose certain popular tendencies, they who cherish them will allege that we are the enemies of the people, opposed to political and social amelioration, and solicitous only to maintain the reign of injustice and brute force, — than which nothing is or can be farther from the truth. Because we assert that our good lies solely in the Christian order and is always and every where attainable at will, and therefore deny the necessity or the utility of political and social changes as a means of bettering our condition, the same persons will endeavour to bring us into conflict with the Holy Father, who, according to them, is a *Liberal* Pontiff, a sort of Socialistic Pope, opposed to monarchy, in favor of popular institutions, taking the side of the people against their rulers, and sanctioning the principle of their movements, by granting a constitutional government to his immediate temporal subjects. A few words to clear up this matter will not be unnecessary.

We have no occasion to make a profession of our respect

for the Papal authority ; for the doctrine of this journal on that subject is well known. If that authority is in any instance against us, it is sufficient to convince us that we are wrong ; and it is against us in the present instance, if the view given of Pius the Ninth be the just one. But that view has no authority, except the childish fears of one party and the unballed wishes of another. Pius the Ninth is a noble-minded and generous-hearted man, an enlightened prince, an humble and devout Christian, an uncompromising Catholic, a tender and vigilant shepherd, the spiritual Father of Christendom, the visible Head of the Church, the Vicegerent of God on earth ; and he can be no Liberal, no Socialist, no political and social reformer, in the sense of this age, — no prince to deserve the sympathy of a De la Mennais or a Horace Greeley, any more than of a Ledru Rollin or a Proudhon. We know beforehand that he cannot sanction what we have presented as the principles and motives of the popular movements of the day ; for the Church in General Council and through her Sovereign Pontiffs has repeatedly and unequivocally condemned them ; and he himself has condemned them, in condemning *Communism*, only another name for Socialism, and in enjoining respect and obedience to princes, — as any one may see who will read his *Epistola Encyclica* copied into this journal for April, 1847, or the several Allocutions in which he has explained his policy.

No man has been more grossly misrepresented by pretended friends and real enemies than Pius the Ninth. The admirers of the old order, — few in number, however, — alarmed at the magnitude of his proposed changes in the government and administration of his temporal dominions, perhaps offended because he did not ask or follow their advice, very naturally opposed him and sought to make him appear to be carried away by the spirit of the age, and pursuing a policy which must carry the world into the abyss of Radicalism ; on the other hand, Radicals, Socialists, Freemasons, and Carbonari claimed him as one of themselves, because they wished to use the authority of his name and position to stir up the Catholic populations to rebellion, and to cover their own revolutionary and archiepiscopal purposes. We share neither in the alarm of the former nor in the wish of the latter. We form our judgment of Pius the Ninth neither from Greeley's *Tribune*, nor from the Roman correspondence of the London *Morning News* ; but from well-known Catholic principles, his obvious position, and from official documents. Interpreted by these, he has only

followed, with singular fidelity and firmness, the policy uniformly pursued by his predecessors.

As to his having sanctioned the principles and motives of the popular movements of the day, there is nothing in it. The thing, *in hac providentia*, is simply impossible. The Church, it is certain and undeniable, is wedded to no particular form of government or of social organization. She stakes her existence neither on imperialism nor on feudalism, neither on monarchy nor on democracy. To no one or other of them does she commit herself, and she declares each of them to be a legitimate form of government when and where it exists with no legal claimant against it. But the principle of these movements is exclusive democracy ; — not that democracy is a legitimate form of government, which is true ; not that in these times, the views of the age being what they are, it is, with some restrictions, the best form of government, which we do not deny ; but that the democratic is the *only* legitimate form of government, that all other forms are illegitimate, usurpations, tyrannies, to which the people owe no allegiance, and which they may, when they please, or believe it will be for their interest, conspire to overthrow. This is the principle implied in these movements, and which the Liberals pretend that Pius the Ninth has sanctioned. But he has done no such thing. The Church cannot accept this principle, because it would bind her to democracy, as her enemies a few years ago alleged that she was bound to monarchy, and compel her to declare all other forms of government illegal, and their acts null and void from the beginning. It would erect democracy into a dogma of faith. If the people now establishing democracies should hereafter become tired of them, and wish to reëstablish monarchy, — not an impossible supposition, — they would be obliged to renounce their religion before they could do it. The Church could make no concession to them, and would be compelled, by the invariable nature of faith, to command them to return to democracy, on pain of losing their souls. She would then not only be herself enslaved to democracy, but would be obliged to enslave the people to it also, and to prohibit them under any circumstances and in every country from ever adopting any other form, how much soever they might desire it. Forms of government, like all things human, are changeable, and it is impossible to keep the people always and everywhere satisfied with any one form. What more unreasonable and more impolitic, then, than to bind them by religion always and everywhere to one and the same specific form ?

We are opposing, we are advocating, no particular form of government. In themselves considered, forms of government are matters of indifference. The wise and just administration of government is always a matter of moment, — the form, abstractly considered, never. Man's true good is as attainable under one form of government or social organization as another ; for it is obtained, if obtained at all, from a source wholly independent of the temporal order. That good the Church does and must seek, and its necessary condition is true liberty. To assume, as these social movements do, that this liberty is possible only under a given form of government and social organization would be to maintain that the Church can discharge her mission only where that particular form of government and social organization exists. The first thing her missionaries to a country where that form does not exist must attempt would then be to revolutionize the state and reorganize society. The American people, to a very considerable extent, suppose this to be the fact ; and, supposing monarchy to be the favorite form, maintain that the spread of Catholicity here must essentially destroy our popular form of government, and introduce forms similar to those which the people in the Old World are now laboring to throw off. Substitute democracy for monarchy, and the doctrine we oppose is precisely that which our adversaries allege against us. Are we to adopt it ? Are we to believe that Pius the Ninth adopts it, and requires us to understand that all but democratic nations are out of the way of salvation, placed out of the condition of attaining to any good here or hereafter ?

Since we hold that forms of government are indifferent, that there is evil only in sin, and that our good comes exclusively from the Christian order, we deny the necessity of political and social changes ; and since, to seek our good from them is to seek it from the temporal order instead of the spiritual, which is in principle a rejection of Christianity and a return to heathenism, we censure them. But the minds of the people may be perverted and their hearts corrupted, and we, in consequence, unable to make them see where their true good lies, or to induce them even to give us their attention while we point out to them. They may be intent on certain political changes, mad for them, and have ears, eyes, hearts, and hands for nothing else. We may condemn their state of mind, the moral disposition in which we find them, but it is a fact we have to meet, and deal with as a fact. In such cases, if the concession of the changes demanded involves no departure from faith or

morals, it is wise to make it, in some sense, necessary, as a means of removing the *prohibens*, as we use logic with an unbeliever in order to remove the obstacles he finds in his mind to the reception of the faith. When political or social changes for this purpose become necessary, it is never the part of wisdom to resist them; authority should always be free to concede them; and that it may be is one reason why it cannot and should not be bound to any particular form of government or social organization.

Pius the Ninth has evidently acted on the principle we here commend. He found, on his accession to the pontifical throne, his own immediate temporal subjects and the European populations generally mad for popular institutions, and not to be satisfied with any thing else. They were ripe for revolt, and prepared to attempt the acquisition of popular government in some form, at all hazards, — if necessary, by insurrection, violent and bloody revolution. They had lost all respect for their rulers, and would no longer listen to the voice of their pastors, — would listen to nothing, in fact, that was opposed to their dominant passion. What was to be done? There were but two alternatives possible. Authority must either repress them by the strong arm of physical force, or attempt to tranquillize them and save them from civil war and anarchy by the concession of popular institutions. The former had been adopted, had been tried, was in actual operation, and it was evident to the casual observer that it only aggravated the evil, only alienated still more and more the hearts of the people from their sovereigns, and from the Church, in consequence of her supposed sympathy with monarchy, and it was clear that it could not last much longer. Nothing was left that could be tried with any hopes of a favorable issue, but the latter alternative. Pius the Ninth saw this, — indeed, most statesmen saw it, — and, anxious for the peace and order of his dominions, and to remove from the minds of all whatever accidental obstacles there might be to their listening to the lessons of religion, he resolved to adopt it; and accordingly proceeded to give his subjects a constitutional government, and, by his example at least, recommended to the European sovereigns to do as much for theirs, and to do it cheerfully, ungrudgingly, and in good faith. The policy came, indeed, too late to effect all the good that was hoped, and to avert all the evil that was threatened; yet that, under the circumstances, it was wise and prudent, nay, even necessary, there really seems to us no room to doubt. We may have regretted the circumstances which called for it, but we have

never for a moment doubted, or thought of doubting, its wisdom or its necessity, although from the first we apprehended the consequences which have followed, and that it would hasten the outbreak of the European populations, which we knew the ill-disposed were preparing; and we have never believed its immediate effect in pacifying the excited multitudes would be as great as some of our friends, whose confidence in the people is greater than ours, expected it would be.

The adoption of this policy, the policy of concession to the exigencies of the times, implies no sanction by the Holy Father of the principles and motives of those popular movements and demands which made it necessary or advisable, nor of the political and social changes we have spoken against. We have been addressing the people and endeavouring to show them what is proper for them to seek, not attempting to point out to authority what it should do; for we have no vocation to instruct authority in its duties. We are of the people, and we only point out what our religion enjoins upon them and us. It may be very just, very wise, nay, very necessary, at times, for authority to concede what it is very wrong, very foolish, on the part of the people to demand. The children of Israel, in the time of Samuel, afford us a case in point. They demanded of the Lord a king, that they might be like other nations. The Lord rebuked them, told them they knew not what they asked, and unrolled before them the oppressions to which a compliance with their request would subject them. Nevertheless, he complied with it, and gave them a king. The question before thus the Ninth was not the question we have been discussing. The movements existed, the people demanded popular institutions, and were resolved, come what might, to attempt them. The simple question for him was, How shall this state of things be treated? He said to the princes in answer, "Give the people what they ask." This he was free to do, because the Church is wedded to no political or social order, to monarchy no more than to democracy, is as independent of the throne as of the tribune, and can be as much at home in a republic as anywhere else.

If any of our readers suppose that we have any partiality to the old monarchical governments of Europe, as such, they entirely misapprehend us. Have we not said, over and over again, that forms of government are indifferent? Those old monarchies have but ill discharged their obligations to the people; they have sins enough on their heads to sink them; let them sink to rise no more for ever. We have no tears

to shed over them on their own account. They deserve their fate, for their corruption, for the injustice they have practised, for the war they have made on the Church, and their sacrilegious attempts to chain up the word of God. If, on the other hand, our readers suppose it is the establishment of popular government that we would arrest, they also entirely misapprehend us. How can we oppose popular government, when we hold forms of government to be indifferent? What we insist on is not monarchy or democracy, but *loyalty* on the part of the people; and what we condemn is not the destruction of monarchy, or the establishment of popular government, but the irreligiousness and worldly-mindedness of the people, the principles and motives which lead them to believe that popular institutions are essential to their happiness, and that they have a right to introduce them by casting off their allegiance to existing legal governments. And we do this, because the people, while governed by these principles and motives, are out of the condition to receive any good, and because they will be as ready to overthrow republicanism, when once they have got it, as they are now to overthrow monarchy. The Church can coexist with popular institutions as well as with any other, but she cannot coexist with the principles and motives which now lead the people to demand them, and to rise in rebellion to obtain them.

What is to be the result of the movements of the day we know not. The old monarchies may be swept away, or they may partially recover, and linger on for ages to come; but that does not disturb us. Old Imperial Rome and old Roman civilization were broken down by the irruption of the Northern barbarians, and the world was deluged with barbarism, but the Church remained standing, and did not become barbarian; the feudalism of the Middle Ages, a system, as somebody has said, too perfect for its time, fell beneath the combined attacks of kings and people, but the Church survived, and beheld undismayed its funeral pile; modern monarchy may follow, and all the world become democratic, still the Church will survive, and remain in all her integrity, shorn of none of her glory, and deprived of none of her resources. Over no changes of this sort do we weep. We have no fears for the Church; we fear only for men. If we saw the people making war on the old political system in consequence of its wars on religion, and struggling for popular institutions in order to rescue the Church from her bondage, and to secure her an open field and fair play for the future, we should hear the volleys of musketry and the roar of cannon, and witness the charge, the siege and

sack of cities, with tolerable composure ; for then the war would be one of vengeance on the old governments for the insults they have offered to the Immaculate Spouse of God, and for the freedom of worship, the only war in which real glory ever is or can be acquired. But, alas ! we see nothing of all this. These enraged populations are moved by no regard for religion, they are to a fearful extent the bitter enemies of religious freedom, and governed by a malignant hatred of the Church. They are seeking only an earthly end, and they loathe the Christian order. Here is the source of our anxiety, the ground of our fears, — not for the Church, not for ourselves, but for them. They threaten to be more violent enemies to religion than any kings have been since the persecuting emperors of pagan Rome ; and the conduct of the Swiss radicals, the imprisonment of the noble Bishop of Lausanne and Geneva in the castle of Chillon, and the persecution of the children of St. Alphonsus by the people of Vienna, reveal but too plainly the spirit which animates them, and tell us but too distinctly what, at least for a time, we are to expect from the triumph of the popular party. Nevertheless, a wise and just Providence rules, and these things are permitted only as mercies or judgments upon the nations. It is ours to humble ourselves and adore ; and always have we this consolation, that no evil can befall us against our will, and that always and everywhere may we secure every good by unreserved submission to God in his Church.

ART. V. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *The Validity of Anglican Ordinations and Anglican Claims to Apostolical Succession examined.* By PETER RICHARD KENRICK, Archbishop of St. Louis. *Second Edition, revised and augmented ; in which are inserted Replies to "Essays on Anglican Ordinations, by a Layman" ; and "Anglican Ordinations Valid."* By JOHN FULLER RUSSELL, B. C. L., Incumbent of St. James's, Enfield. Philadelphia: Eugene Cummiskey. 1848. 8vo. pp. 342.

OUR readers will find in this work a full and satisfactory view of the question of Anglican ordinations and Anglican claims to apostolical succession, and in detail all the evidence requisite to sustain the positions we have assumed in reference to the subject in

a foregoing article on *Hawkstone, or Oxfordism*, which we had written before we received it. A work from the learned Archbishop of St. Louis can stand in no need of our commendation, and for us, as laymen, to say we are highly pleased with it would be only a piece of impertinence. The work is one of great learning and ability, the argument is conducted with great fairness and skill, and must be conclusive to every reader who is not incapable of perceiving that two and two make four. It exhausts the erudition of the subject, and leaves us nothing to be desired. It drives Anglicans from every ground they assume or can assume, and leaves them a chance not even to cavil. If they read it, it can be only by downright dishonesty or judicial blindness that they ever after venture even to pretend to have either orders or jurisdiction. The Archbishop completely unchurches them, and proves beyond the possibility of a rational doubt that they have nothing but a lay-ministry, that they have not so much as even heretical or schismatical bishops, and that the emphasis with which, in addressing Presbyterians and Congregationalists, they call themselves *the Church* is saved from being ridiculous only by its impudence. We commend the work to the serious study of Episcopalians generally, and of our friend of *The New York Churchman* in particular. The Low Churchmen, as little sympathy as we can have with them, we must believe are far truer to the real interests of Anglicanism than the High Churchmen.

We are far less interested in denying the validity of Anglican ordinations than is commonly supposed; in fact, we wish we could establish their validity; for, if Anglicans had valid orders, one obstacle to their return to Catholic unity would be removed. Hence it is that some Catholics have gone even farther than the evidence warrants in their concessions. Towards the Episcopalians as a body external to the Church we have no special hostility, and we would not represent them as more destitute than they really are. As a church, they are no better than Socinians; but inasmuch as they assert the necessity of orders and Apostolic succession, they fight our battles with the other Protestant sects of the day, and in reality serve us against Protestantism in general. We would therefore, under this point of view, strengthen rather than weaken them, if we could. But their pretensions are so utterly unfounded, that we are forced, even against our will, to expose them. This Dr. Kenrick has done, and done effectually. However earnestly they may hereafter assert the necessity of Apostolic succession, and exclaim, "No bishop, no church," they must concede that their doctrine condemns no sect more surely or more severely than their own.

This is the second edition of Dr. Kenrick's work. How far it differs from the first, or how extensive are the additions he has made, we are unable to say; for we have never read the first

edition. It was published before the question it discusses had acquired an interest for us, and since that time it has never fallen in our way but for a few moments. We can only say it was highly esteemed by Catholics, and gave Anglicans great uneasiness. The present edition, we cannot doubt, is much superior to it, and it happily supplies an important gap in our controversial literature. Taken in connection with the *Primacy of the Apostolic See*, by the author's brother, the eminent prelate who presides with so much success over the Diocese of Philadelphia, it leaves nothing to be desired on the controversy with Anglicanism. It adds another to the important contributions for which our Catholic literature is indebted to Irishmen in general, and to the learned brothers Kenrick in particular. Happily, our religion is Catholic, and knows no national boundaries or geographical lines, or we might feel mortified, as an American, that nearly all the really valuable contributions to our Catholic literature are made by scholars born and educated abroad. But his is as it should be. It is in the order of Divine Providence. The nations that have the faith carry it to those who have it not. The first teachers of the Gentiles were Jews, and the first missionaries of the Gospel in any country have rarely, perhaps never, been natives of that country. No matter; all are fellow-citizens in the commonwealth of Christ, all are brothers in the unity of the spirit. Deep is the debt of gratitude we as Americans owe to foreign countries, and especially to Ireland; and how silly are they who cherish a feeling of narrow nationality! We despise the fraternity of the Socialists, we love that of the Gospel; and whoso loves and honors the blessed old Church of God, our venerable father, is our countryman, our kinsman, our brother, nourished at the same breast with us, — wherever he was born or brought up, or whatever the idiom he speaks. Catholicity, and it alone, gives true brotherhood, melting all nations, all families, and all hearts into one, with one Father, one Mother, one love. There are no Irish, French, German, or American Catholics; for, the moment we become Catholics, all those distinctions vanish, and we have but one country, one *patria*, — heaven, — and but one wish, one hope, — to dwell in it for ever.

— *Poems*. By WM. T. BACON. Cambridge: George Nichols. 1848. 16mo. pp. 275.

WE have acquired the reputation of being a narrow-minded and bigoted critic, unable to see any thing beautiful or meritorious in any work that does not happen to square with our own philosophical and religious principles. This reputation, except as to the bigotry and narrow-mindedness predicated of it, is merited, and the one, so far

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as we seek reputation at all, we wish to secure. The first thing to be exacted in any literary work is truth, and we know not what other standard of truth a man can have than his philosophical and religious principles. A work faulty as to its principles and in error as to its doctrines cannot be commendable, whatever the genius, talent, or taste of its author. Art simply as art is indifferent to good or evil, and becomes the one or the other according to the thought or sentiment it expresses; and the standard by which to test whether that thought or sentiment be the one or the other is always and everywhere Christian faith and morals.

The greater part of the popular literature of the day, whether poetry or prose, proceeds on the assumption, that man is morally perfect and perfectible, which is self-contradictory, and false in both its parts. Proceeding on this assumption, all it seeks in its expression is truth to man, to human nature. Now this truth is never enough, and may often be an objection. Moore's *Loves of the Angels* and Byron's *Don Juan* are true to human nature, and the truest in the very parts which are the most objectionable. The obscene is as natural as the pure, the indelicate as the delicate, the immoral as the moral. All nature is not to be expressed; all natural sentiments, even though pure in themselves, are not proper to be appealed to. Our nature is fallen, is corrupt, rotten, and can never be safely trusted to its own guidance. Any book which appeals to sentiments and feelings, though natural to the human heart and experienced by all men at times, which Christian morals require us to control, mortify, or subdue, is a bad book, and, however hearty the response it finds in our own bosoms, however exquisite it may be under the relation of art, must be condemned, and should be read by nobody. How, then, can we praise it? Wherefore should we waive its moral tendency, and enlarge upon the genius, the skill, and the taste of its author? Dress is important, — but it is for the man, not he for it. Shall we waive the man, and pay all our attention to his clothes?

As a critic we wish to be liberal, and we know we are good-natured, but we cannot lose sight of principle; we cannot sacrifice truth in the matter to beauty in the form, — the thought to the expression. Literary works are sent us by our Protestant friends to be reviewed. The fact that they are written by Protestants, in itself considered, weighs nothing. We can relish a good book, if a good book, written by a Protestant, as well as one written by a Catholic. But the fact is, Protestants do not and cannot write good books, that is, good in the estimation of Catholics. Not that they want genius, not that they lack cultivation, learning, artistic skill, or a true appreciation of certain orders of beauty. In what regards the literary form, the style, the expression, we would that our Catholic writers were not so far below them as they too often

are. Here, at least in our own language, we cheerfully acknowledge their excellence, and confess our own inferiority. They dress better than we do. But when we come to that which they dress, — the important thing, — we are thrown all aback; we have no word of commendation to offer. We understand what they write. We can easily place ourselves in their position, and appreciate what they present from their point of view; but that point of view is false, is one from which the truth in its normal relations cannot be seen. They see the universe, so to speak, on its back side, not in front, and can no more judge of its real order and beauty than a stranger could judge of the beauty and order of the houses on one of the streets of our city by looking at them only from the rear. The universe can be seen in its order and harmony, or its contents in their real relations and due proportions, only from the point of view of Catholicity. From any other point of view, here and there an isolated object, a tree, a palace, a star, or a flower may appear beautiful, and please the taste; but as a whole it has no form or comeliness, — is huge, broken, confused, thrown together by chance, without plan, rule, or measure, — and the only orderly and symmetrical universe the beholder can look upon is the one he more or less successfully projects from himself. Now how can we, who are placed by our religion in a position to see the universe from the point of view of its Creator, to behold the world through the design of God himself, clothed with the reality, the order, the harmony, the proportion, the beauty and grandeur, it receives from his Divine mind, content ourselves to gaze on that mimic universe, pale and insecure, lying in the debatable region between something and nothing, which man projects from his own soul? Shall we take a human, when we already have the Divine? — feed on husks like swine, when we have the food of angels?

The reader can easily understand, then, why we cannot speak as highly of this beautifully printed volume of poems before us, as its ample literary merits might seem to demand. The author has a good ear, and in general the rhythm and flow of his verses are unexceptionable. He has a reflective cast of mind, much poetic feeling, and, though not a perfectly chaste fancy, yet a quick eye for ample beauty. He is too diffuse as a writer, wants terseness and force of expression, and affects a warmth and an energy that are foreign to his nature. He dilates too much on external nature, and seems not to be aware that material objects are never poetical, save as informed by the soul of the poet. Poetry, like all art, comes from within, and not from without, and nothing without is poetical except as made so by an inward sentiment which the poet projects into it, — a truth which Wordsworth and his school do not appear to have learned.

On a moral point of view, from the stand-point of the age, these

poems are unexceptionable. They never rise above, and rarely fall below, ordinary Protestant morality, that is, heathenism. They betray now and then the doubt which begins to reveal itself in Euripides, and becomes marked in the philosophers; but it seeks to hide itself under the flimsy guise of sentiment. The poet, when he reflects, doubts; but when he abandons himself to sentiment, he cherishes the hope of a "sunnier sphere."

"Is the glow of life dead? — shall it never wake again?
Is its joy all departed, and comes it not here?
Nay, we cannot thus deem man is left to complain,
But we must still believe there 's a sunnier sphere."

Yet this is only the heathen's immortality, the hope of Elysium, not of the Christian heaven. We have found here and there a Christian doctrine recognized in the volume, but the thought and sentiment throughout are heathen, save in classic beauty and force of expression. Nevertheless, Mr. Bacon is not alone in this. We can find Christian doctrines in Wordsworth, but the sentiment is usually heathen, though heathen sentiment in its more respectable form. What we say of Wordsworth we may say *a fortiori* of Protestant poets in general. The age is heathen, and wherefore should not its literature be heathen? Our Protestant readers, however, may find in Mr. Bacon's poems much to please them, and they will find nothing to harm them. They will not find him a poet in the full sense of the word, but yet they will find in him one who is at times visited with genuine poetic inspiration. His lighter poems are pleasant; his graver attempts do not appear to us equally successful. He, however, has made commendable progress since we greeted him in the *Boston Quarterly Review* some eleven years ago, and if we were what we were then, we should give him a warmer welcome than we then gave him, for many of his poems would serve well to while away the cheerless hours of one whose brightest anticipations are the Elysian fields or the Islands of the Blest.

3. *European Agriculture and Rural Economy, from Personal Observation.* By HENRY COLMAN. Vol. II. Parts IX. and X. Boston: A. D. Phelps. 1848. 8vo.

THESE two Parts complete Mr. Colman's Report on European Agriculture and Rural Economy. We have read the work, for the most part, with pleasure and instruction. It contains a great amount of useful and interesting information, nowhere else, to our knowledge, so easily accessible. Mr. Colman is an enthusiast in the cause of agriculture, and in some preliminary observations to his

completed work makes some suggestions, the full value of which, we are inclined to think, even he does not appreciate. In an economical point of view, or under the relation of material well-being, society generally never presented so gloomy an aspect as at the present moment. Wonderful improvements have been made in the productive arts, and the wealth of the world would seem to have been greatly augmented; but it cannot be denied that there is a mass of poverty and pauperism in the most civilized wealthy nations never before witnessed, and, what is worse, frightfully on the increase. Even the temperate, the able-bodied, and the industrious by thousands and thousands are reduced to beggary or to subsist by public charity, solely because they can find no employment. Hence the cry we hear, of the "right to work," that is, the right of the laborer to an employment by which he can obtain, at least, a physical subsistence, — a cry which, in the present state of things, with men's tempers as they are, will not be soon or easily stifled, however mad may be the attempts of the laboring classes to better their condition.

Mr. Colman seems to us to approach the cause of this state of things, when he states that the land has been deserted, and the people have flocked into cities and towns. The real cause is to be found in the immoderate extent to which, by means of banking and an artificial credit system, we have pushed trade and manufactures, by which we have substituted, so to speak, large industries for small. The capital employed in trade and manufactures is able to impose a tax on that employed in agriculture and domestic industry. As long as the trader and manufacturer, industrial and commercial, instead of agricultural, capital, rule the state, and make or inspire its laws, whether directly or indirectly, the terrible state of things now existing will not only remain, but will every day continue to grow worse. Nothing but a return to agriculture, and to domestic industry as it existed before your huge factories were heard of, can correct it. How shocking it is to see a country, like Ireland, with one third of her soil uncultivated, and her people dying of starvation! How easily, if the landlords only understood their duty, or even their worldly interests, could they remedy the evil! If, instead of wasting their income in gambling, debauchery, vice, and crime, and sucking their tenantry to death, they would devote only a small portion of it to furnishing employment to labor in improving the cultivation of their estates and reclaiming waste lands, these heartless landlords could easily remove the vast amount of physical suffering which now exists in Ireland, take away the occasion of no small portion of that vice and crime which they now harp upon, and save themselves from those curses of the poor they oppress or neglect, which must sink them to the lowest hell. But this is a subject to which we must return at our earliest convenience; for if we preach

submission to the people, and condemn their attempts to better their condition by revolutions, it is from no sympathy with the system or the tyrants of which they are the victims. Men may submit to wrong, and, if they do it in the spirit of penance, they will find their account in it; but no man has a right to inflict wrong, and whoever does it, especially whoever inflicts it upon the helpless and unoffending, or, having the power to better their condition, refuses to do it, deserves the reprobation of mankind, as he will not fail to receive that of Almighty God. We owe all to God, and, because we can give him nothing, he puts our neighbour in his place, and what we owe to God bids us give to him.

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4. *Hewet's Edition of the Pictorial Catholic New Testament, under the Editorial Supervision of the RIGHT REVEREND JOHN HUGHES, Bishop of New York. To be embellished with Numerous Engravings executed in the Best Style of the Art.* New York: Hewet & Spooner. 1848. Nos. 1 and 2.

THE name of the Right Reverend the Bishop of New York is a sufficient guaranty of the accuracy of the text, and Catholics may without scruple purchase this edition of the New Testament. The illustrations are copied from the works of distinguished masters, and are very well executed; but the assertion of the publishers on the cover, that "it is the most beautifully illustrated book of the day," can be regarded only as a bookseller's puff, which we are sorry to see in so close connection with the Holy Scriptures. The letter-press is creditable.

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5. *The Catholic Almanac for 1849.* Baltimore: F. Lucas, jr. 32mo. pp. 32.

WE have no occasion to recommend this useful and interesting annual. It might, however, be much improved by a little more editorial labor, and by suppressing a portion of the reading matter, and enlarging the statistical department. The present is, nevertheless, superior to any of the preceding numbers which we have seen.

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6. *The American Almanac and Repository of Useful Knowledge for the Year 1849.* Boston: Little & Brown. 16mo. pp. 369.

THIS is the twentieth volume of the American Almanac, and the tenth of the new series. It is truly a "Repository of Useful

Knowledge," and we can cheerfully recommend it to all our readers. It is the best volume of the *American Almanac*, as far as we can judge, which has yet appeared.

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7. *Ralphton: the Young Carolinian of 1776. A Romance on the Philosophy of Politics.* By A. H. BRISBANE. Charleston: Burgess & James, Printers. 1848. 12mo. pp. 242.

THE author of this book, which is execrably printed, is not A. Brisbane of New York, the well-known Fourierist, although he may be his kinsman. From his general professions, we should infer that he claims to be a Catholic. He is evidently a man of very considerable ability, strong philanthropic feelings, and unbounded enthusiasm. What we think of his work our readers may collect from our well-known views of Socialism, and of conforming to the spirit of the age. We glory in being a Catholic of "the Dark Ages," and in shutting our eyes to the *new light* of the nineteenth century. What we object to in *Ralphton*, however, is its philosophy. The new industrial arrangements the author proposes, separated from that philosophy, and regarded merely as economical arrangements, may or may not, for aught we know, be worthy of adoption.

Wild Flowers, Sacred Poetry. By the ABBÉ ADRIAN ROQUETTE. New Orleans: O'Donnell. 1848. 12mo. pp. 72.

THIS *brochure* is got up in the true Parisian style, with great purity and elegance. The poems are marked by much sweetness, and full of tender and devout feeling, and are fair specimens of what they profess to be. The author tells us that he sings in a language which he does not know, but he manages it as if it were his mother tongue.

* * This number commences the third volume of the new series, and offers to our friends a favorable opportunity to use their exertions to extend the circulation of the work. The first series of the work can no longer be supplied, but we have several copies of the new series on hand, beginning with the year 1847. The new series is not connected with the first, and those who commence with 1847 virtually take the work from its beginning. New subscribers should therefore do well to take the two back volumes, which

will enable them to have the work complete. To subscribers who will transmit us seven dollars in current money, free of expense to us, we will send one copy of the work for the years 1847, 1848, and 1849, which is, as they will perceive, a very liberal discount.

Our readers will perceive from this number that we are proposing to give our Review a more popular character, of entering more largely into the discussion of the great practical questions of the day, and are aiming to adapt it to the interests of a wider class of readers. We cannot, as Catholics, blink the great political and social questions which are now agitating the public mind both at home and abroad, and these questions will receive more attention from us hereafter than we have heretofore given them. It is of great importance to our community that these questions should be freely and boldly discussed in the light of Catholic faith and morals, and we are sure that a Catholic journal that shall so discuss them will, if it finds here and there an enemy, never want friends. The time has come when Catholics must begin to make their principles tell on the public sentiment of the country. Heretofore we have taken our politics from one or another of the parties which divide the country, and have suffered the enemies of our religion to impose their political doctrines on us; but it is time for us to begin to teach the country itself those moral and political doctrines which flow from the teachings of our own Church. We are at home here, wherever we may have been born; this is our country, and as it is to become thoroughly Catholic, we have a deeper interest in public affairs than any other class of our fellow-citizens. The sects are only for a day; the Church is for ever. We care little how the elections go, for that is a small affair; but we can never, as Catholics, be indifferent to the moral principles which enter into the laws and shape the public policy of the country.

We enter now upon the fifth year of our Catholic life; we have, through the grace of God, falsified the predictions of our friends that we should turn back to Protestantism in six months, and rendered it idle for people to repeat their old nonsense about "changing with every moon." Since we left Protestantism, we have escaped the lunar influences to which we were formerly subjected, and come under those of the Sun of Justice, which are not liable to vary. We have had no wish to return to what we have abjured, are satisfied where we are, and wish, from our heart, all our old and new friends
A HAPPY NEW YEAR.

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dence ; but he must live long, and enjoy advantages of study which neither Kentucky nor Massachusetts affords, before he rivals them in any thing else, or can do much else than travesty them. Not that we regard either of them as a safe guide. Guizot is eclectic and humanitarian ; and Schlegel is too mystical, and too ambitious, to reduce within a theory matters which by their very nature transcend any theory the human mind can form or comprehend. Mr. Nourse has, if you will, extraordinary natural abilities, an honest and ingenuous disposition ; but he has not yet begun to master the present, far less the whole past. He has a vague recognition of religion, concedes some influence to Christianity in civilizing the world ; but he is without faith, and has yet to learn the very rudiments of the Christian creed. We doubt, also, whether he is able to give even the outlines of a single historical period, or of a single people or institution, with sufficient accuracy to enable them to serve as the basis of a single sound induction. One should know the *facts* of history before proceeding to construct its *philosophy*. He will forgive us, therefore, if we tell him that we do regard him as not a little presumptuous in attempting a work for which he has in reality not a single qualification. He writes, indeed, with earnestness ; his style, though somewhat cramped, and deficient in freedom and ease, is dignified, simple, clear, and terse, occasionally rich and beautiful ; but this cannot atone for the general incorrectness of his statements, or the crudeness and unsoundness of his speculations.

With sound premises and freed from the prejudices of his education, we doubt not, Mr. Nourse might arrive at passable conclusions ; but he is ruined by his love of theorizing, his false philosophy, and his unsound theology. He may have philanthropic impulses and generous sentiments ; he may mean to be a Christian, and actually believe that he is a Christian believer ; but, whether he knows it or not, the order of thought which he seeks to develop and propagate is neither more nor less than the old Alexandrian Syncretism, as obtained through German Mysticism, French Eclecticism, and Boston Transcendentalism. Radically considered, his system, if system it can be called, is the old Alexandrian system, which sprang up in the third century of our era, as the rival of the Christian Church, ascended the throne of the Cæsars with Julian the Apostate, and fled to Persia in the sixth century, when Justinian closed the last schools of philosophy at Athens. This system was an attempted fusion of all the particular forms of

Gentilism, moulded into a shape as nearly like Christianity as it might be, and intended to dispute with it the empire of the world. It borrowed largely from Christianity, — copied the forms of its hierarchy, and many of its dogmas ; which has led some in more recent times, who never consult chronology, to charge the Church with having herself copied her hierarchy, her ritual, and her principal doctrines from it. It made no direct war on the Christian Symbol ; it simply denied or derided the sources whence it was obtained, and the authority which Christian faith always presupposes. It called itself *Philosophy*, and its pretension was to raise philosophy to the dignity of religion, and to do by it what Christianity professes to do by faith and an external and supernaturally accredited revelation. It was, therefore, Gentile Rationalism, and, in fact, Gentile Rationalism carried to its last degree of perfection. It is this Rationalism, met and refuted by the great Fathers of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, that lies at the bottom of our author's thought, and which he labors to reproduce with a zeal — we cannot say ability — not unworthy of a disciple of Plotinus, Proclus, and Porphyrius.

This should not surprise us. There is nothing new under the sun. The old Gentile world exhausted human reason ; and it is not possible, even with a full knowledge of all the Church teaches, taking human reason alone as the basis of our system, to surpass the old Alexandrian Syncretism, or Neoplatonism, as it is sometimes called. In constructing it, the human mind had resorted to it, as materials, all the labors and traditions of Gentilism in all ages and nations, and also all the teachings and traditions of Jews and Christians, as well as of the Jewish and early Christian sects ; and it was, from the point of view of Rationalism, the *résumé* of the whole. It was the last word of heathendom. In it Gentilism, collecting and combining all that was not the Christian Church, exerted all her forces and all her energies in a last desperate battle against the Nazarene, the triumph of the Cross. Catholicity or Rationalism is, as every one knows, may know, the only alternative that remains to us since the teaching of the Gospel. Impossible, then, is it to depart from Catholicity without falling back on Rationalism, and, if a true profound and consistent, upon Neoplatonism, as Rationalism in its fulness and integrity. All heresies are simply attempts to turn to this Rationalism, and in it they find their complement, may be historically as well as logically established. All your modern philosophies are regarded as profound and complete

only as they approach it. Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin, Leroux, De Lamennais, Hermes, Schleiermacher, Carlyle, Emerson, Parker, all belong to the Alexandrian school, and only reproduce, more or less successfully, its teachings, and to the best of their ability renew the war it waged against the Christian Church.

It is no objection to what we assert, that the sects and many of the modern philosophies retain some or even the greater part of the Christian dogmas. Neoplatonism did as much. We must not forget that Neoplatonism is subsequent to the Christian Church ; that it took its rise in the school of Ammonius Saccas, in the beginning of the third century of our era ; that it received its form and development from Plotinus, who flourished about the year of our Lord 260 ; and that it proposed itself as the rival rather than the antagonist of Christianity. Its aim was to satisfy the ever recurring and indestructible religious wants of the human soul, without recognizing the Christian Church, or bowing to the authority of the Nazarene. It was not the Christian doctrines, abstracted from the Christian Church, and received as philosophy on the authority of reason or even private inspirations, instead of the authority of our Lord and his supernaturally commissioned teachers, that it opposed. It was willing to accept Christianity as a philosophy, or a part of philosophy ; but not as a religion, far less as a religion complete in itself and excluding all others. Hence, it, as well as the Church, taught one Supreme God existing as a Trinity in Unity, the immortality of the soul, the fall of man and the corruption of human nature, the necessity of redemption, self-denial and the practice of austere virtue ; that we are bound to worship God, must live for him, and can attain to supreme felicity only in attaining to an ineffable union with him. In the simple province of philosophy it was often profound and just. In many things it and Christianity ran parallel one with the other. Not unfrequently do the Alexandrian philosophers talk like Christian Fathers, and Christian Fathers talk like Alexandrian philosophers. There is Neoplatonism in St. Gregory Nazianzen, in St. Basil, and St. Austin. The most renowned of the Fathers studied in its schools, as distinguished Doctors now study in the schools of the philosophers of France and Germany. But Neoplatonism was at bottom a philosophy, and whatever it held from Christianity, it held as philosophy, as resting on a human, not a Divine basis. The philosophers transformed Christianity, so far as they accepted it, into a philosophy ; while

the Fathers made Neoplatonism, so far as they did not reject it, subservient to Christianity, to the statement and explication of Christian theology to the human understanding, keeping it always within the province of reason, and never allowing it to become the arbiter of the dogmas of faith, or to supersede or interfere with the Divine authority on which alone they were to be meekly and submissively received. The Fathers, therefore, were not less Christian for the philosophy they did not reject, nor the Alexandrians the less Gentile Rationalists for the Christian doctrines they borrowed. One may embrace, avowedly, all Christian doctrine, without approaching the Christian order, if, as Hermes proposed, he embraces it as philosophy, or on the authority of reason ; for the Christian, to be a Christian believer, must believe God, and therefore Christianity, because it is his supernatural word, not because it is the word of human reason or human sentiment, as contend our modern Liberal Christians.

It would be interesting to show historically the resemblance of the whole modern un-Catholic world to the old Alexandrian world represented by Plotinus, Jamblicus, Porphyrius, Proclus, and Julian the Apostate ;— how each heresiarch and each modern philosopher only reproduces what the old Christian Fathers fought against and defeated, — how each progress in this boasted age of progress only tends to bring us back to the system which the Gregories, the Basils, and their associates combated from the Christian pulpit and the Episcopal chair ; but we have neither the space nor the learning to do it as it should be done. Yet no one who has studied with tolerable care the learned Gentilism of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries of our era, and is passably well acquainted with the modern Rationalism of France and Germany, and the movements of the various heretical sects in our day, can doubt that our own nineteenth century is distinguished for its return to Gentilism, and has nearly reproduced it under its most perfect form. The various forms of heathenism had become effete ; no one of them any longer satisfied the minds or the hearts of its adherents. An age of skepticism and indifference had intervened, attended by a licentiousness of manners and public and private corruption which threatened the universal dissolution of society. Individuals rose who saw it, and felt the necessity of a general reform, and that a general reform was impossible without religion. But they would not, on the one hand, accept the Church, and could not, on the other, hope any thing

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from any of the old forms of heathenism. The world must have a religion, and could not get on without it. But how get a religion, when all religions were discarded, when all forms of religion were treated with general neglect or contempt ?

The Reformers saw that they must have a religion, and, since none existed which was satisfactory, none which was powerful enough to meet the exigency of the times, they must make one for themselves ; — that is, form one to their purpose out of the old particular religions no longer heeded. Alexandria was their proper workshop, for there were collected or lying about in glorious confusion all the necessary materials. They began with the assumption, that all religions are at bottom equally true, and that the error of each is in its exclusiveness, in its claiming to be the whole of religion, and the only true religion. Take, then, the elements of each, mould them together into a complete and harmonious whole, and you will have the true religion, a religion which will meet the wants of all minds and hearts, rally the human race around it, and be “ The Church of the Future.” Hence arose the Alexandrian Syncretism, combining in one systematic whole, as far as reason could combine them, all the known religions of the world, which, under the name of philosophy, but which became a veritable superstition, disputed the empire of the world with Christianity for full three hundred years.

What is the movement of our day, but an attempt of the same sort ? By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the various forms of heresy, in which the Protestant spirit had developed itself, and which had attempted to reproduce Gentilism without forfeiting their title to Christianity, had exhausted their moral force, and the age began to lapse again into the old license and corruption. Never in its worst days was there grosser immorality and corruption in the Roman Empire than prevailed in England during the earlier half of the last century, under the reigns of George the First and George the Second. Deism was rife in the court, in the schools, in the church, among the nobility and the people. Germany was hardly better, if so good ; and of France under the regency of the profligate Duke of Orleans, or under Louis the Fifteenth with his *parc au cerfs*, we need not speak. Literature was infidel throughout, and atheism became fashionable. To the rabid infidel propagandism, begun by the English deists, and carried on by Voltaire and his associates, under the motto, *Écrasez l'infame*, soon succeeded, as of old, profound skepticism and indifference. Neither false re-

ligion nor no religion could rouse the mind from the torpidity into which it sank. Exclusive heresy, or, as we may say, sectarianism, born from the Protestant Reformation, though producing its effects far beyond the limits of the so-called Protestant world, had caused all forms of religion, about the beginning of this century, to be treated as equally false and contemptible.

But, once more, individuals started up frightened at the prospect they beheld. They felt and owned the eternal truth, *Man cannot be an atheist*. They saw the necessity of a general reform, and that a general reform could be effected only by religion. But, disdaining the Church as did the old Alexandrians, and seeing clearly that all the particular forms of Protestantism were worn out, they felt that they must have a new religion, and to have it they must make it for themselves, or reconstruct it out of such materials as the old religions supplied. The principle on which they proceed is precisely the Alexandrian. To them all religions are equally true or equally false, — true as parts of a whole, false when regarded each as a whole in itself. Take, then, the several religions which have been and are, mould them into a complete, uniform, and systematic whole, and you will have what the Editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, and Chevalier Bunsen after him, call “The Church of the Future,” and Dr. Bushnell and his friends call “Comprehensive Christianity,” — what Saint-Simon denominated *Nouveau Christianisme*, and M. Victor Cousin brilliantly advocates under the name of Eclecticism, borrowed avowedly from the Neoplatonists.

In perfect harmony with this, you see everywhere attempts to amalgamate sects, to form the un-Catholic world into one body, with a common creed, a common worship, and a common purpose. While the philosophers elaborate the bases of the union, statesmen and ministers attempt its practical realization. This is what we see in “Evangelical Alliances” and “World Conventions,” in the formation of “The Evangelical Church” in Prussia, and the union of Prussia and England in establishing the bishopric of Jerusalem. The aim is everywhere the same that it was with the Alexandrians, the principles of proceeding the same, and the result, if obtained, must be similar. The movement of the un-Catholic world now, how much soever it may borrow from Christianity, however near it may approach the Catholic model, can be regarded, by those who understand it, only as a conscious or unconscious effort to reproduce the Gentile Rationalism of the old Alexandrian school.

The identity of the two movements might be established even down to minute details. The most fanciful dreams of our Transcendentalists may be found among the Alexandrians, — either with those who disavowed Christianity, or the sects, professing to retain it, allied to them. The very principle of Transcendentalism, namely, an element or activity in the human soul above reason, by which man is placed in immediate communion with the Divine mind, is nothing but the *Ecstasy* or *Trance* of the Neoplatonists, or their *fifth* source of science; and the Alexandrian theurgy and magic are reproduced in your Swedenborgianism and Mesmerism. Moreover, the Protestant Reformation itself not only involved as its legitimate consequence a return to the Alexandrian Rationalism, but was in some measure the effect of such return. To be satisfied of this, we need but study the history of the Revival of Letters and the controversies of the schools in the fifteenth century. We say nothing of the Revival in so far as it was simply a revival of classical antiquity under the relation of art, or beauty of form, — under which relation it was in no sense censurable, but perhaps a progress. Christian piety and learning can coexist with barbarism in taste, and want of elegance and polish in manners, but do not demand them. The Revival, however, was, in fact, something more than this, and something far different from it. Those Greek scholars who escaped from Constantinople when it was taken by the Turks, and who spread themselves over Western Europe, did not bring with them merely the poets, orators, and historians of ancient Greece, nor merely more complete editions of Plato and Aristotle; they brought with them Proclus and Plotinus, and the old Alexandrian Rationalism, with its Oriental comprehensiveness and its Greek subtlety. They made no attacks on the Church, — they professed profound respect for Catholicity, and with Eastern suppleness readily submitted to her authority; but they deposited in the minds and hearts of their disciples the germs of a system the rival of hers, which weakened their attachment to her doctrines, disgusted them with the barbarous Latin and *un-Greek* taste of her Monks, and the rigid, sometimes frigid, Scholasticism of her Doctors. These germs were not slow in developing, and very soon gave us the Neoplatonists in philosophy, and the Humanists in literature, of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The former destroyed the authority of the Schoolmen; the latter, at the head of whom stood Erasmus, the Voltaire of his time, covered the clergy, especially the Monks, with ridicule, and

sowed the seeds of practical, as the others had of speculative, infidelity. Combined or operating to the same end, they prepared, and, favored by the politics of the period, produced, the Protestant Reformation. Not accidentally, then, has Protestantism from its birth manifested a Gentile spirit, misrepresented and ridiculed every thing distinctively Christian, or that it is now undeniably developing in pure Alexandrian Syncretism, gathering itself up as a grand and well-organized superstition to wage war once more on the old Alexandrian battleground, with the old Alexandrian forces and arms, against the Nazarene, as Julian the Apostate always terms our Lord. Was it by accident that Protestantism, wherever permitted to follow its instincts, began by pulling down, breaking, or defacing the Cross, the sacred symbol of Christianity?

The identity of the modern movement with that which resulted in Alexandrian Syncretism may be traced also in the pantheistic tendencies of the day. The Alexandrian school rejected none of the popular gods; it placed Apis and Jove, Isis and Hercules, and sometimes even Christ himself, in the same temple; but all under the shadow of the god Serapis, the symbol of unity, or rather of *THE WHOLE, THE ALL*, that is, of pure pantheism, in which all pure Rationalism is sure to end. To what does all modern philosophy tend, but to pantheism? Have we not seen Spinoza in our own day rehabilitated, and commented upon as the greatest of modern philosophers? Cousin's Eclecticism is undeniably pantheistic, and less cannot be said of Schellingism or Hegelism. Socialism, now so rife, is simply pantheism adapted to the apprehensions of the vulgar, refined and voluptuous with the Fourierists and Saint-Simonians, coarse and revolting with the Chartists and Red Republicans.

But we are pursuing this line of remark beyond our original purpose. We may return to it hereafter. In the mean time I invite those who have the requisite leisure and learning to take up the subject, and consider the relation of all the ancient and modern sects to Gentilism, the persistence of Gentilism in Christian nations down to our own times, in spite of the anathemas of the Church and the unwearied efforts of the Catholic clergy to exterminate it, and its all but avowed revival in our own day under the most comprehensive, scientific, erudite, subtle, and dangerous form it ever assumed. In doing this, particular attention should be paid to chronology; for *the* Gentilism with which it is the fashion among Protestants and unbelievers to compare Christianity, and from which it is pretended

the Church has largely borrowed, will be found to have been formed two centuries and a half after the birth of our Lord. That stupendous fabric, that systematic organization of Gentilism, which we find in the time of Julian the Apostate, and which fell with him, was not the model copied by the Church, but was itself modelled after the Christian hierarchy, and it is heathenism that has *Christianized*, not the Church that has *heathenized*. The Platonism of modern times, whether on the Continent or in England, is not the Platonism of Plato, but of the Alexandrians, as every one knows who has studied Plato himself in his own inimitable Dialogues, not merely in the speculations of Plotinus, or the commentaries of Proclus.

That our author, born and brought up in the Protestant world, and formed by its Gentile spirit and tendencies, should even unconsciously fall into the Alexandrian order of thought, and labor to reconstruct a system intended to rival the Christian, is nothing strange. In doing so, he only yields to the spirit of the age, and follows the lead of those whom the age owns and reverences as its chiefs. That his system is not Christian, although he would have us receive it as Christian, is evident enough from his *dictum* with regard to miracles. "The miracles ascribed to Christ and his Apostles," he says, (p. 61,) "however conclusive to those who witnessed them, are no evidence to us, until by *other means* we have established the truth of the writings which record them, — that is to say, *until we have proved all that we wish to prove*." There is a sophism in this, which, probably, the author does not perceive. If the writings are the *only* authority for the miracles as historical facts, that we must establish their historical *authenticity* before the miracles can be evidence to us, we concede ; but not their *truth*, that is, the truth of the mysteries they teach, the material object of faith, — therefore the matter we want proved. The miracles are not proofs of the mysteries, but simply motives of credibility. "Rabbi, we know that thou art come a teacher from God ; for no man could do these miracles which thou doest, unless God were with him." Ordinary historical testimony, though wholly inadequate to prove the mysteries, is sufficient to prove the miracles as facts, and, when so proved, they are evidence to us in the same manner and in the same degree that they were to those who witnessed them. It does not, therefore, follow that we must prove, without them, all we want proved, before they can be evidence to us.

But this by the way. The author in his *dictum* asserts ei-

ther that Christianity is not provable at all, or that it is provable without miracles ; but no Christian can assert either the one or the other. The former is absurd, if Christianity came from God and is intended for reasonable beings. God, as the author of reason, cannot require us to believe, and we as reasonable beings cannot believe, without reason, or authority sufficient to satisfy reason. The latter cannot be said without reducing Christianity to the mere order of nature ; for a supernatural religion is, in the nature of things, provable only by supernaturally accredited witnesses, and witnesses cannot be supernaturally accredited without miracles of some sort. To deny the necessity of miracles as motives of credibility, or to assert the provability of Christianity without them, is to deny the supernatural character of Christianity, and therefore to deny Christianity itself ; for Christianity is essentially and distinctively supernatural. Without the miracles, Christianity is provable only as a philosophy, and as a philosophy it must lie wholly within the order of nature ; since philosophy, by its very definition, is the science of principles cognizable by the light of natural reason. Rationalism turns for ever within the limits of nature, and, do its best, it can never overleap them. It can never rise to Christianity ; all it can do is, by rejecting or explaining away the mysteries, discarding all that transcends reason, to bring Christianity down to itself, — a fact we commend to the serious consideration of all who pretend that our religion, even to its loftiest mysteries, is rationally or philosophically demonstrable. The Christianity they can prove as a philosophy is no more the Christianity of the Gospel than the Neoplatonism of Proclus and Plotinus was the Christianity of the Gregories, the Basils, and the Austins.

The author also betrays the unchristian character of his order of thought in his third discourse, entitled *Spiritual Despotism and the Reformation*. He says, indeed, in this part of his work, some very handsome things — in his own estimation — of the Church ; but, as he says them from the humanitarian point of view, on the hypothesis that she is a purely human institution, and therefore a gigantic imposition upon mankind, we cannot take them as evidences of his Christian mode of thinking. The Church is what we hold her to be, these humanitarian compliments and apologies are impertinent ; and if what he holds her to be, they betray on his part a very unchristian laxity of moral principle. An infallible Church, the Church of God, needs no apologies ; man's Church, or the Synagogue of Satan,

deserves none. But, although the author maintains that the Church was very necessary from the fifth to the fifteenth century, — that she preserved our holy religion, and without her Christian faith and piety would have been lost, Christianity would have been unable to fulfil her mission, and the European nations would have remained uncivilized, ignorant, illiterate, ruthless barbarians,—he yet holds that she was a spiritual despotism, and the Protestant Reformation was inevitable and necessary to emancipate the human mind from her thralldom, and to prepare the way for mental and civil freedom.

According to the author, the spiritual despotism of the Church consisted in her claiming and exercising authority over faith and morals,—over the minds, the hearts, and the consciences of the faithful. If we catch his meaning, which does not appear to lie very clear or distinct even in his own mind, the despotism is in the authority itself, not simply in the fact that the Church claims and exercises it. It would be equally despotism, if claimed and exercised by any one else, because it is intrinsically hostile to the rights of the mind and to the principles of civil liberty. Consequently, he objects not merely to the *claimant*, but to the thing *claimed*, and rejects the authority, let who will claim it, or let it be vested where or in whom it may.

But this is obviously unchristian. If we suppose Christianity at all, we must suppose it as an external revelation from God, a definite and authoritative religion, given by the Supreme Lawgiver to all men as the Supreme Law, binding upon the whole man, against which no one has the right to think, speak, or act, and to which every one is bound to conform in thought, word, and deed. All this is implied in the very conception of Christianity, and must be admitted, if we admit the Christian religion at all. The authority objected to is therefore included in the fundamental conception of the Christian revelation, and consequently we cannot denominate it a spiritual despotism without denominating Christianity itself a spiritual despotism, which, we need not say, would be any thing but Christian.

The author's order of thought would carry him even farther. If the authority of the Church is a spiritual despotism for the reason he assigns, the authority of God is also a spiritual despotism. The principle on which he objects to the Church is, that the mind and the state are free, and that any authority over either is unjust. The essence of despotism is not that it is authority, but that it is authority without right, will without reason, power without justice. We cannot suppose the exist-

ence of God without supposing the precise authority over the mind and the state objected to. If this authority, claimed and exercised in his name by the Church, is despotism, it must be, then, because he has no right to it ; if no right to it, he is not sovereign ; if not sovereign, he does not exist. If God does not exist, there is no conscience, no law, no accountability, moral or civil. To this conclusion the author's notions of mental freedom and civil liberty, pushed to their logical consequences, necessarily lead.

Every Christian is obliged to recognize, in the abstract, to say the least, the precise authority claimed and exercised by the Church over faith and morals, over the intellect and the conscience, in spirituals and in temporals ; and it is a well-known fact, that all Christian sects, as long as they retain any thing distinctively Christian, do claim, and, as far as able, exercise it, and never practically abandon it, till they lapse into pure Rationalism, from which all that is distinctively Christian disappears. cannot be otherwise ; because Christianity is essentially law, and the Supreme Law, for the reason, the will, the conscience, for individuals and nations, for the subject and for the prince. If our author's order of thought were Christian, he could not object to the authority in itself ; he would feel himself obliged to assert and vindicate it somewhere for some one ; and if he objected to the Church at all, he would do so, not because of the authority, but because it is not rightfully hers, but another's, which would be a legitimate objection, and conclusive, if sustained, as of course it cannot be, by the facts in the case. His mere object on this ground is a proof that his thought is not Christian.

The author's notions of authority and liberty are not only not Christian, but exceedingly unphilosophical and confused. He has no just conception of either, and is evidently unable to draw any intelligible distinction between authority and despotism on the one hand, or between liberty and license on the other. He conceives of authority and liberty only as each is the antagonist or the limitation of the other ; he ingenuously confesses that he is unable to reconcile them, and presents their reconciliation as a problem that Protestantism has yet to solve. " To adjust the respective limits of these antagonists, — Liberty of thought and Ecclesiastical authority, — and bring about a lasting treaty of peace between them, is the yet unsolved problem of the Reformation. The Reformers attempted to solve it, and strove in vain to confine the torrent they had set in motion, within cer-

tain dikes of their own construction. The spring-tide of free inquiry, not yet perhaps at its flood, is sweeping away their barriers, and ages may elapse before it subsides into its proper channel, after cleansing the earth of a thousand follies and abuses." (p. 160.) All this proves that his order of thought is unchristian, and that his conceptions of authority and of liberty are not taken from the Gospel. No intelligent Christian, no sound philosopher even, ever conceives of authority and liberty as antagonists, as limiting one the other, or admits that their conciliation is an unsolved problem, or even a problem at all.

The Christian, even the philosopher, derives all from God, and nothing from man, and therefore escapes the difficulty felt by our author and the Reformers. He knows that authority is not authority, if limited, and liberty is not liberty, if bounded. Consequently, he never conceives of the two in the same sphere, but distributes them in separate spheres, where each may be supreme. God is the absolute, underived, and unlimited Sovereign and Proprietor of the universe. Here is the foundation of all authority, and also of all liberty. Before God we have no liberty. We are his, and not our own. We are what he creates us, have only what he gives us, and lie completely at his mercy. We hold all from him, even to the breath in our nostrils, and he has the sovereign right to dispose of us according to his own will and pleasure. In his presence, and in presence of his law, we have duties, but no rights, and our duty and his right is the full, entire, and unconditional submission of ourselves, soul and body, to his will. Here is authority, absolute, full, entire, and unbounded, — as must be all authority, in order to be authority.

In the presence of authority there is no liberty ; where, then, is liberty ? It is not before God, but it is between man and man, between man and society, and between society and society. The absolute and plenary sovereignty of God excludes all other sovereignty, and our absolute and unconditional subjection to him excludes all other subjection. Hence no liberty before God, and no subjection before man ; and therefore liberty is rightly defined, full and entire freedom from all authority but the authority of God. Here is liberty, liberty in the human sphere, and liberty full and entire, without restraint or limit in the sphere to which it pertains. Man is subjected to God, but to God only. No man, in his own right, has any, the least, authority over man ; no body or community of men, as such, has any rightful authority either in spirituals or temporals.

All merely human authorities are usurpations, and their acts are without obligation, null and void from the beginning. If the parent, the pastor, the prince has any right to command, it is as the vicar of God, and in that character alone ; if I am bound to obey my parents, my pastor, or my prince, it is because my God commands me to obey them, and because in obeying them I am obeying him. Here is the law of liberty, and here, too, is the law of authority. Understand now why religion must bound the state, why it is nonsense or blasphemy to talk of an alliance between religion and liberty, a reconciliation between authority and freedom. Both proceed from the same fountain, the absolute, underived, unlimited sovereignty of God, and can be no more opposed one to the other than God can be opposed to himself. Hence, absolute and unconditional subjection to God is absolute and unlimited freedom. Therefore says our Lord, " If the Son makes you free, you shall be free indeed."

The sovereignty of God does not oppose liberty ; it founds and guaranties it. Authority is not the antagonist of freedom ; it is its support, its vindicator. It is not religion, it is not Christianity, but infidelity, that places authority and liberty one over against the other, in battle array. It is not God who crushes liberty, robs us of our rights, and binds heavy burdens upon our shoulders, too grievous to be borne ; it is man, who at the same time that he robs us of our rights robs God of his. He who attacks our freedom attacks his sovereignty ; he who vindicates his sovereignty, the rights of God, vindicates the rights of man ; for all human rights are summed up in the one right to be governed by God and by him alone, in the duty of absolute subjection to him, and absolute freedom from all subjection to any other. Maintain, therefore, the rights of God, the supremacy in all departments of the Divine law, and you need not trouble your heads about the rights of man, freedom of thought, civil liberty ; for they are secured with all the guaranty of Divine sovereignty. The Divine sovereignty is, therefore, as indispensable to liberty as to authority.

We need not stop to show that the Divine sovereignty is itself a despotism. The essence of despotism, as we have seen, is not that it is authority, but that it is authority without law, will without reason, power without justice, which can never be said of God ; for his right to universal dominion is unquestionable, and in him will and reason, power and justice are never disjoined, are identical, are one and the same, and are indistinguishable save in our manner of conceiving them. His

sovereignty is rightful, his will is intrinsically, eternally, and immutably just will, his power just power. Absolute subjection to him is absolute subjection to eternal, immutable, and absolute justice. Hence, subjection to him alone is, on the one hand, subjection to absolute justice, and, on the other, freedom to be and to do all that absolute justice permits. Here is just authority as great as can be conceived, and true liberty as large as is possible this side of license ; and between the two there is and can be in the nature of things no clashing, no conflict, no antagonism. How mean and shallow is infidel philosophy !

Taking this view along with us, a view which is alike that of Christianity and of sound philosophy, we cannot fail to perceive that the objection urged against the Church is exceedingly ill-chosen. The Church, if what she professes to be, — and we have the right here to reason on the supposition that she is, — represents the Divine sovereignty, and is commissioned by God to teach and to govern in his name. Her authority, then, is his authority, and it is he that teaches and governs in her and through her ; so far, then, from being hostile to liberty in one department or another, she must be its support and safeguard in every department. The ground and condition of liberty is the presence of the Divine sovereignty, for in its presence there is no other sovereignty, no other authority, consequently no slavery. The objection, that the Church is a spiritual despotism, is grounded on the supposition that all authority is despotism and all liberty license, — that is, that liberty and authority are antagonist forces, — which would require us to deny both, for neither despotism nor license is defensible. Authority and liberty are only the two phases of one and the same principle ; suppose the absence of authority, you suppose the presence of license or despotism, which, again, are only the two phases of one and the same thing. To remove license or despotism, you must suppose the presence of legitimate authority. The Church being the representative of the Divine sovereignty on the earth, introduces legitimate authority, and by her presence necessarily displaces both despotism and license, that is, establishes both order and liberty.

The difficulty which Protestants and unbelievers suppose must exist in conforming reason, which is not always obedient to will, to the commands of authority, arises from their overlooking the nature of authority. The authority is not only an order to believe, but it is authority *for* believing. The author-

ity of reason in the natural order is derived from God, not from man ; and the obligation to believe the axioms of mathematics or the definitions of geometry arises solely from the fact, that reason, which declares them, does, thus far, speak by Divine authority. If it did not, reason would be no reason for believing or asserting them. The same Divine authority in a higher order, speaking through the Church, cannot be less authoritative, or a less authority for believing what the Church teaches. Hence the command of the Church is at once authority for the will and for the reason, an injunction to believe and a reason for believing. The absolute submission of reason to her commands is not, as some fancy, the abnegation of reason. Reason does not, in submitting, fold her hands, shut her eyes, and take a doze, like a fat alderman after dinner, but keeps wide awake, and exercises her highest powers, her most sacred rights, according to her own nature. What more reasonable reason for believing than the command of God ? — since, in the order of truth, his sovereignty is identically his veracity. To suppose a Catholic mind can have any difficulty in bringing reason to assent to the teachings of the Church, believed to be God's Church, is as absurd as to suppose that an American who has never been abroad can have any difficulty in believing that there is such a city as Paris, or that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte has recently been elected President of the French Republic ; or as to suppose that the logician finds a difficulty in bringing his reason to assent to the proposition that the same is the same, that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, or that two and two make four.

It is not the Church that establishes spiritual despotism ; it is she who saves us from it. Spiritual despotism is that which subjects us, in spiritual matters, to a human authority, whether our own or that of others, — for our own is as human as another's ; and the only redemption from it is in having in them a Divine authority. Protestants themselves acknowledge this, when they call out for the pure word of God. The Church teaches by Divine authority ; in submitting to her, we submit to God, and are freed from all human authority. She teaches infallibly ; therefore, in believing what she teaches, we believe the truth, which frees us from falsehood and error, to which all men without an infallible guide are subject, and subjection to which is the elemental principle of all spiritual despotism. Her authority admitted excludes all other authority, and therefore frees us from heresiarchs and sects, the very embodiment of spiritual

despotism in its most odious forms. Sectarianism is spiritual despotism itself ; and to know how far spiritual despotism and spiritual slavery may go, you have only to study the history of the various sects and false religions which have heretofore existed, or which now exist.

In the temporal order, again, the authority claimed and exercised by the Church is nothing but the assertion over the state of the Divine sovereignty, which she represents, or the subjection of the prince to the law of God, in his character of prince as well as in his character of man. That the prince or civil power is subject to the law of God, no man who admits Christianity at all dares question ; and, if the Church be the Divinely commissioned teacher and guardian of that law, as she certainly is, the same subjection to her must be conceded. But this, instead of being opposed to civil liberty, is its only possible condition. Civil liberty, like all liberty, is in being held to no obedience but obedience to God ; and obedience to the state can be compatible with liberty only on the condition that God commands it, or on the condition that he governs in the state, which he does not and cannot do, unless the state holds from his law and is subject to it. To deny, then, the supremacy of the Church in temporals is only to release the temporal order from its subjection to the Divine sovereignty, which, so far as regards the state, is to deny its authority, or its right to govern, and, so far as regards the subject, is to assert pure, unmitigated civil despotism. All authority divested of the Divine sanction is despotic, because it is authority without right, will unregulated by reason, power disjoined from justice. Withdraw the supremacy of the Church from the temporal order, and you deprive the state of that sanction, by asserting that it does not hold from God and is not amenable to his law ; you give the state simply a human basis, and have in it only a human authority, which has no right to govern, which I am not bound to obey, and which it is intolerable tyranny to compel me to obey. " Let every soul," says the blessed Apostle Paul, the Doctor of the Gentiles, " be subject to the higher powers ; for there is no power but from God ; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth power resisteth the ordinance of God. . . . Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, but for conscience' sake." (Rom. xiii. 1-5.) Here the obligation of obedience is grounded on the fact that the civil power is the ordinance of God, that is, as we say, holds from God. But, obviously, this, while it subjects the subject to

the state, equally subjects the state to the Divine sovereignty. Take away the subjection of the state to God, and you take away the reason of the subjection of the subject to the state ; and we need not tell you that to subject us to an authority which we are not bound to obey is tyranny. See, then, what you get by denying the supremacy of the Church in temporals !

The Church and the state, as administrations, are distinct bodies ; but they are not, as some modern politicians would persuade us, two coördinate and mutually independent authorities. The state holds under the law of nature, and has authority only within the limits of that law. As long as it confines itself within that law, and faithfully executes its provisions, it acts freely, without ecclesiastical restraint or interference. But the Church holds from God under the supernatural or revealed law, which includes, as integral in itself, the whole law of nature, and is therefore the teacher and guardian of the natural as well as of the revealed law. She is, under God, the supreme judge of both laws, which for her are but one law ; and hence she takes cognizance, in her tribunals, of the breaches of the natural law as well as of the revealed, and has the right to take cognizance of its breaches by nations as well as of its breaches by individuals, by the prince as well as by the subject, for it is the supreme law for both. The state is, therefore, only an inferior court, bound to receive the law from the supreme court, and liable to have its decisions reversed on appeal.

This must be asserted, if we assert the supremacy of the Christian law, and hold the Church to be its teacher and judge ; for no man will deny that Christianity includes the natural as well as the supernatural law. Who, with any just conceptions, or any conceptions at all, of the Christian religion, will pretend that one can fulfil the Christian law and yet violate the natural law ? — that one is a good Christian, if he keeps the precepts of the Church, though he break every precept of the Decalogue ? — or that Christianity remits the catechumen to the state to learn the law of nature, or what we term natural morality ? Grace presupposes nature. The supernatural ordinances of God's law presuppose the natural, and the Church, which is the teacher and guardian of faith and morals, can no more be so without plenary authority with regard to the latter than the former. Who, again, dares pretend that the moral law is not as obligatory on emperors, kings, princes, commonwealths, as upon private individuals ? — upon politicians, as upon priests or simple believers ? Unless, then, you exempt the state from all obligation

even to the law of nature, you must make it amenable to the moral law as expounded by the Church, Divinely commissioned to teach and declare it.

Deny this, and assert the independence of the political order, and declare the state in its own right, without accountability to the Christian law, of which it is not the teacher or guardian, supreme in temporals, and you gain, instead of civil liberty, simply, in principle at least, civil despotism. If you deny that the Church is the teacher and guardian of the law of God, you must either claim the authority you deny her for the state, or you must deny it altogether. If you claim it for the state, you, on your own principles, make the state a spiritual despotism, and on ours also ; for the state obviously has not received that authority, is incompetent in spirituals, is no teacher of morals, or director of consciences. If you deny it altogether, you make the state independent of the moral order, independent of the Divine sovereignty, the only real sovereignty, and establish pure, unmitigated *civil* despotism.

There is no escaping this conclusion ; and hence we see the folly and madness of those who assert in the name of liberty the independence of the political order, and exclaim, in a tone of mock heroism, " Neither priest nor bishop shall interfere with my political opinions as long as I am able to resist him ! " Bravo ! my young Liberal ; but did you know what you are doing, you would see that you are laying the foundation, not of liberty, but of despotism. Hence, too, we see that our author must be mistaken, when he asserts that the Protestant Reformation, in its essential principle, was " a revolt of free spirits against profligate despotism. " It was no such thing. Its objections to the Church, reduced to their substance, were simply, the Church is a spiritual despotism because she claims supremacy over reason, conscience, and the state ; and it objected to her, not because it was she who claimed that supremacy, but because it rejected the supremacy itself, let it be claimed by whom it might. This our author himself concedes, contends, and proves. Its argument was, the Church claims to be the Church of God, and no Church of God can claim supremacy over reason, conscience, and the state. But the Church does claim this supremacy, therefore she cannot be the Church of God. The principle of the argument is, that God could not delegate the authority to any Church. But if he could not, it must have been because he himself did not possess it. Therefore the essential principle of the Reformation, in the last analysis, was

the denial, on the one hand, of the sovereignty of God over reason, conscience, and the state, and, on the other, the assertion of the absolute independence of man, and of the temporal order, which is either pure license or pure despotism, according to the light in which you choose to consider it. The real character of the Reformation was the substitution of human sovereignty for the Divine ; and hence, in its developments, wherever it is free to follow its own law, we see it result either in pure humanitarianism or pure pantheism, as it does or does not combine with religious sentiment. And either is the denial of both authority and liberty ; for all authority is in the Divine sovereignty, and all liberty in being bound to it alone, that is, in freedom from all human government resting merely on a humanitarian basis, whether ourselves, the one, the few, or the many, as every one would see, if it were understood that authority over myself, emanating from myself, is as human and therefore as illegitimate, as much of the essence of despotism, as authority over me emanating from other men. Is it not said in all languages that a man may be the slave of himself, of his own passions, his own ignorance, or his own prejudices ? Under Protestantism we may have civil and spiritual despotism, or civil and spiritual license, the only two things that man can found, without a Divine commission and subjection to the Divine law ; but authority and liberty are possible and can be practically secured only under the Divine order represented by the Church, or an institution precisely similar to what she professes to be, the Divinely commissioned teacher and guardian of both the natural and the revealed law.

That this conclusion will be acceptable to our politicians, young or old, we are not quite so simple as to suppose ; but we are not aware that it is necessary to consult their pleasure. They have in these, as they had in other times, the physical power to do with us as seems to them good. They can decry us, they can pull out our tongue, cut off our right hand, and at need burn our body, or cast it to the wild beasts ; but this will not alter the nature of things, make wrong right, or right wrong. Civil and spiritual despotism is not the less despotism because practised by them, and in the name of humanity and the people. We desire to have all due respect for them ; but we must confess that we have not yet seen their title-deeds, the papers which prove them to have a chartered right from Almighty God to be the sole governors of mankind. We have no authority for pronouncing them infallible or impeccable ; we have

seen no reason for supposing their ascendancy, freed from the restraints of the Divine law, is either honorable to God or serviceable to man ; we have not found them always exempt from the common infirmities of our nature ; and we think we have seen, at least heard of, politicians who were ambitious, selfish, intriguing, greedy of power, place, emolument even. In a word, we have no reason to believe that they monopolize all the wisdom, the virtue, the generosity and disinterestedness of the community, or that they never need looking after, and therefore never need a power above them, under the immediate and supernatural protection of Almighty God, to look after them, and to compel them to keep within their own province, to respect religion, and to refrain from inflicting irreparable injuries upon society. Even should they, then, clamor against us, or do worse, it would not greatly move us, and would tend to confirm us in the truth of our doctrine, rather than lead us to distrust its soundness or its necessity.

We need hardly say that we advocate no amalgamation of the civil and ecclesiastical administrations. They are in their nature, as we have said, distinct, and the supremacy of the Church which we assert is by no means the supremacy of the clergy as politicians. We have no more respect for clergymen turned politicians than we have for any other class of politicians of equal worth, perhaps not quite so much ; for we cannot forget that they, in becoming politicians, descend from their sacerdotal rank, as a judge descending from the bench to play the part of an advocate. We have had political priests ever since there was a Christian state, and many of them have made sad work of both politics and religion. We have nothing to say of them, but that they were politicians, and their censurable acts were performed in their character of politicians, not in their character of priests. The principle we assert does not exact that the Church should turn politician, and thus from the Church become the state, or that the clergy should turn politicians ; it exacts that both she and they should not. The clergy as politicians fall into the category of all politicians, and their supremacy as politicians would still be the supremacy of the state, not of the Church. The state is supreme, if politicians as such be supreme, let them be selected from what class of the community they may. The principle exacts, indeed, the supremacy of the clergy, but solely as the Church, in their sacerdotal and pastoral character as teachers, guardians, and judges of the law of God, natural and revealed, supreme for individuals and

nations, for prince and subject, king and commonwealth, noble and plebeian, rich and poor, great and small, wise and simple ; not as politicians, in which character they have and can have no preëminence over politicians selected from the laity, and must stand on the same level with them. We do not advocate — far from it — the notion that the Church must administer the civil government ; what we advocate is her supremacy as the teacher and guardian of the law of God, — as the supreme court, which must be recognized and submitted to as such by the state, and whose decisions cannot be disregarded, whose prerogatives cannot be abridged or usurped by any power on earth, without rebellion against the Divine majesty, and robbing man of his rights. As Christians, we must insist on this supremacy ; as Catholics, it is not only our duty, but our glorious privilege, to assert it, and to understand and practise our religion as God himself, through his own chosen organ, promulgates and expounds it.

We know how hateful this doctrine is to politicians, to the world, and to the devil, who seek always to find a rival in the state to the kingdom of God. We know that the representatives of the state in nearly all ages of Christendom, and in nearly all nations, have resisted it, and been encouraged, sustained, in their resistance, by ambitious priests and courtly prelates. We know that it is now resisted by every civil government on earth, that the kings of the earth stand up, the princes conspire together, the nations rage, and the people imagine vain things, against the Lord and against his Christ, saying, Let us break their bonds asunder, let us cast away their yoke from us ; but we cannot help that. We know the truth, and dare assert it ; we know the rights of God, and dare not betray them. We cannot be false, because others are, — shrink from proclaiming the supremacy of the moral order, because now more than ever it is necessary to proclaim it. We do not understand the heroism that goes always with the popular party, or the loyalty that deserts to the enemy the moment that his forces appear to be the most numerous. We know the moral order is supreme, and shall we fear to say it, lest sinners tremble, the wicked gnash their teeth, and the multitude threaten ? We know our Church is God's Church ; that she is the judge of God's law, and has the right to denounce, as from the judgment-seat of the Almighty, whoever violates it, and to place king or peasant under her anathema, who refuses to obey it. She has the right, the Divine right, to denounce moral wrong, spiritual wrong, political wrong, tyranny

and oppression, wheresoever or by whomsoever they are practised, and to vindicate the rights of God, and, in so doing, the rights of man, let who will dare threaten or invade them. We are subject to God, but to him only; and are we afraid to assert the fact? Are we not free before all men?

The Church is the Divinely appointed guardian of truth, virtue, liberty, because she is the representative of the Divine sovereignty on earth. Kings and potentates, commonwealths and mobs, may rise up, as they have often risen up, against her; politicians may murmur or denounce, the timid may quake, the saint-hearted may fail, the cowardly shrink away, and the disloyal join her persecutors; but that can neither justify them, nor unmake her rights, nor depose her from her sovereignty under God,—make it not true that she represents the moral order, and that the moral order is supreme. That supremacy is a fact in God's universe, an eternal and primal truth; and let no man dare deny it, who would not be branded on his forehead traitor to God, and therefore to man; and let him who fears to assert it in the hour of thickest danger be branded poltroon. It is the glory of the Church that she has always asserted it. She asserted it in that noble answer of her inspired Apostles to the magistrates, — “We must obey God rather than men”; she asserted it in her glorious army of martyrs, who chose rather to die at the stake, in the amphitheatre, under the most cruel and lingering tortures, than to offer incense to Jupiter or to the statue of Cæsar; she asserted it by the mouth of holy Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan, when he forbade the emperor Theodosius the Great to enter the Church till he had done public penance for his tyrannical treatment of his subjects, and drove him from the sanctuary, and bade him take his place with the laity, where he belonged; she asserted it in the person of her sovereign Pontiff, St. Gregory the Seventh, when he made the tyrant and brutal Henry the Fourth of Germany wait for three days shivering with cold and hunger at his door, before he would grant him absolution, and when he finally smote him with the sword of Peter and Paul for his violation of his oaths, his wars against religion, and his oppression of his subjects; and she asserted it, again, in the person of her glorious Pontiff, Gregory the Sixteenth, who, standing with one foot in the grave, confronted the tyrant of the North, and made the Autocrat of all the Russias tremble and weep as a child. Never for one moment has she ceased to assert it in face of crowned and uncrowned heads,—Jew, Pagan, Arian, Barbarian, Saracen,

testant, Infidel, Monarchist, Aristocrat, Democrat ; and riously is she asserting it now in her noble confessor, the hop of Lausanne and Geneva, and in her exiled Pius the th.

You talk of religious liberty. Know you what the word means ? Know ye that religious liberty is all and entire in the remacy of the moral order ? The Church is a spiritual potism, is she ? Bold blasphemer, miserable apologist for unts and tyranny, go trace her track through eighteen hundred years, and see it marked with the blood of her free and le-hearted children, whom God loves and honors, shed in ence of religious liberty. From the first moment of her ex-nce has she fought, ay, fought as no other power can fight, liberty of religion. Every land has been reddened with the od and whitened with the bones of her martyrs, in that sad cause ; and now, rash upstart, you dare in the face of day claim her the friend of despotism ! Alas ! my brother, may d forgive you, for you know not what you do.

But we have said enough to show the unchristian as well as unphilosophical character of our author's thought, which we willing to believe he does not fully comprehend, and from logical consequences of which, were he to see them, we anxious to believe he is prepared to recoil with horror. thought is unphilosophical, because it conceives authority liberty as antagonists ; it is unchristian, because it reduces istianity to mere Rationalism, and revives Alexandrian Gen-n ; because it denies the Divine sovereignty, and the su-racy in all things of the spiritual or moral order ; because nies moral accountability, and involves unmitigated despot-or unbounded license as the inevitable doom of the human . As a philosopher, we hold his work in contempt ; as an rian, we deny its authenticity ; as a Christian, we abhor it ; friend of liberty, civil and religious, we denounce its prin-s, as fit only for despots or libertines.

here are matters of detail in the work to which we serious-ject, but, as we have shown the unsoundness of the book : principles, it is not worth while to waste time or argument posing them. The author has expended no inconsiderable ght and labor in constructing his work, but, like all the s which rank under the head of *philosophy of history*, it is ow, vague, confused, worthless. The writers of philoso-f history may have great natural talents, they may have d and extensive learning, but they start wrong, they attempt

what is impossible, and never go to the bottom of things or rise to their first principles. They never reach the ultimate ; they never attain to science ; and only amuse or bewilder us with vague generalities, crude speculations, or unmeaning verbiage. There is an order of thought of which they have no conception, infinitely more profound than theirs, which, when once attained to, makes all their views appear heterogeneous, confused, weak, and childish.

We have no disposition to treat our young Kentuckian rudely, or to discourage him by an unkind reception. We know him only through his book. His book is bad, but we every day receive works which are far worse. We do not believe that he means to be a Pagan ; we do not believe that he even means to be a Rationalist ; we are sure that he does not mean to deny the moral order ; and this is much for him personally, but it is nothing for his book. In judging the man, we look to his intention ; in judging the author, we look only to the principles he inculcates. If these are unsound or dangerous, we have no mercy for the author, though we may abound in charity for the man. Mr. Nourse does not understand his own principles ; he has not seen them in all their relations, and does not suspect their logical consequences. He has undertaken, without other guide than a few books which, themselves unsafe guides, he has read, but not digested, to do, after the study of a few months, what no mortal man could accomplish with all the libraries in the world, were he to live longer than the world has stood. How could he expect to succeed ? We hold him accountable for his rashness in undertaking such a task, not for having failed in its accomplishment.

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- ART. II. — 1. *The Will of Stephen Girard, with a Short Biography.* Philadelphia, 1848. *Final Report of the Building Committee of the Girard College.* Philadelphia, 1848. *Arguments of the Defendants' Counsel and Judgment of the Supreme Court, U. S., in the case of Vidal versus The Mayor, &c., of Philadelphia.* Philadelphia, 1848.
2. *Reports of Cases argued and adjudged in the Supreme Court, January Term, 1844.*

SEVENTEEN years have elapsed since the death of Stephen Girard, the Philadelphia banker, who, having left France, his

native country, in the humble capacity of a cabin-boy, succeeded, by his industry, enterprise, and good fortune, during a long life, in amassing many millions of dollars. It is very generally believed that deposits made by his countrymen, the white inhabitants of St. Domingo, in the intention of emigrating to the United States, which the subsequent massacre prevented them from reclaiming, formed a considerable part of his capital. His wealth, however it may have been acquired, gave him influence and importance in society, which generally estimates merit by the success which crowns exertion.

Quandoquidem inter nos sanctissima divitiarum
Majestas : etsi funesta pecunia templo
Nondum habitas, nullas nummorum ereximus aras.

Banks were unknown in the days of Juvenal : else he could not have affirmed that money was without temple or altars. Of the modern worshippers of this divinity, Girard was one of the most devout. He was ever at her shrine, which he would not abandon even on the Lord's day, to kneel at the altars of the Eternal. Yet he never formally renounced the Catholic religion, in which he had been baptized, and, as we must suppose, instructed in his early years ; he occasionally professed, with a Frenchman's pride in a national inheritance, *Je suis Catholique* ; and although his death-bed was attended by no priest, and he departed unshriven and unabsolved, his friends sought and obtained for his mortal remains the privilege of interment in a Catholic cemetery. It is due to those concerned to state that the interment was not accompanied by any religious ceremonies.

We are not disposed to deny Mr. Girard any praise which is due him, although we believe he was not at all remarkable for amiability of character, or the general charities of life. It is certain, however, that, during the prevalence of the yellow fever in Philadelphia in the year 1793, he united with other citizens in the adoption of measures for the relief of the sufferers, and he is believed to have distinguished himself by his activity in their behalf, even at the risk of his own health. He also distributed from time to time alms to the poor, although not with a liberality proportioned to his wealth. The disposition of his property which he has made in his will is indicative of a humane feeling for the sick, and for distressed widows, but above all, for orphans. He was not distinguished by tender attachment to his relatives, to whom he left but a fraction of his immense estate ; giving almost the entire sum to the city authorities for the im-

provement of certain localities, and especially for the erection of a college for poor orphans, and bequeathing no less than three hundred thousand dollars to the State on condition of the enactment of laws for the execution of his designs. The directions which his will contains for the better order of the city police, and for certain changes to be made in Water Street and on the wharves, are specimens of his peculiarity of mind. The details of the College buildings show his confidence in his own judgment, and his unwillingness to leave any thing to the discretion of others, if he could possibly arrange it by his own foresight. The result has been in one instance no way creditable to his science, since the vast College halls, which he directed to be built with groined ceilings, are utterly useless for the purposes for which he designed them. "The reverberation of sound in these rooms, in consequence of their magnitude and their arch-formed ceilings, renders them wholly unfit for use; and unless a level ceiling is thrown in at the top of the cornices, or some other means adopted to destroy the reverberation, they can never be used for the purpose of school or recitation rooms." Such is the report of the architect who raised this splendid edifice. It is remarkable that the city councils, whilst thus scrupulously exact in following out the plan, although advised of the defect, availed themselves of some loose words of the will, which gave them a certain discretion in points not deemed by the testator capable of specification, to surround the building with a magnificent portico, the columns of which added immensely to the cost of the structure. Hence the two millions, which Mr. Girard left for the erection of the building and for the support of the College, have been almost entirely absorbed in its erection; and the residuary estate, which he allowed to be used in case of deficiency, becomes the sole resource for the support of the institution.

Although the mental capacity of Mr. Girard was chiefly manifested in the closeness of his commercial dealings, and his foresight and sagacity in money concerns, we cannot deny him the praise of having conceived a project of a noble and benevolent character, which, if unalloyed, would have deserved general admiration. He designed to erect a home for three hundred orphans, and furnished funds from which that number could be at all times supported. To this princely munificence, to use a European phrase, he added a provision for their instruction in practical science, so as to qualify them for the various stations which might be allotted to them in society. The restrictions,

with which he accompanied this generous bequest, take from it much of its grandeur, and give it the character of an experiment to train youth independently of religious influence. The obnoxious clause is couched in these terms : " I enjoin and require that no ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said College ; nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a visitor, within the premises appropriated to the purposes of the said College. In making this restriction, I do not mean to cast any reflection upon any sect or person whatsoever ; but, as there is such a multitude of sects, and such a diversity of opinion amongst them, I desire to keep the tender minds of the orphans, who are to derive advantage from this bequest, free from the excitement which clashing doctrines and sectarian controversy are so apt to produce ; my desire is, that all the instructors and teachers in the College shall take pains to instill into the minds of the scholars the purest principles of morality, so that, on their entrance into active life, they may from inclination and habit evince benevolence towards their fellow-creatures, and a love of truth, sobriety, and industry, adopting at the same time such religious tenets as their matured reason may enable them to prefer."

There can be no difficulty in ascertaining the meaning and intent of Mr. Girard. He wished the orphans to remain strangers to religious controversy until their entrance into society. He professed no desire that they should be educated in a spirit hostile to revelation, which would dispose them to reject for ever revealed doctrines ; on the contrary, he supposed that they would adopt them, and only desired that their choice should be freely and maturely made, after their departure from the College. Within its precincts he wished no doctrinal teaching, but the purest moral discipline. By what standard this was to be regulated, and by what sanction it was to be enforced, he neglected to state. He seems not to have thought that the moral law, in its practical details, abounds with matters of controversy ; and that a law without a sanction, in the shape of a penalty to be incurred by the transgressors, is nugatory. He neglected to state whether the code of morals was to be determined by the unassisted instincts of reason, or by the *dicta* of philosophers, or by the decalogue and other precepts of the Mosaic dispensation, or by the maxims of Christ as recorded in the New Testament. He forgot to say whether the highest rewards, with which its observance should be recommended,

should be the approbation of the superiors of the institution, marks of distinction and privileges, with the hopes of a favorable position on going forth from College ; or whether the glory of heaven should be painted to the orphan's imagination to stimulate him to virtue. He did not perceive that the future punishment of sinners is a subject of vehement controversy, and that the harmony of sentiment which he wished to exist might be disturbed as well by a discussion as to the eternity of torments as by adverse discourses on the Trinity or Transubstantiation.

We may appear unjust to the memory of Mr. Girard in charging him with an antichristian design, especially as the highest legal authority has decided that such a construction of his will is inadmissible ; but we are not here concerned with the legal interpretation ; we speak of its plain common sense meaning. For the sake of our country, its institutions and laws, we are glad that the provisions and injunctions of the testator can all be literally observed in a way to defeat his professed object, and that Christianity is still recognized as the basis of our common law so far as to authorize the infusion of some portion of its vivifying spirit into an institution which was meant to exclude its influence. The orphans for whom Mr. Girard designed his College were to be chosen between the ages of six and ten, and were to remain in it until between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, to be trained in the mean time in morality, but kept free from doctrinal bias, so that after their entrance into society they might embrace such religious tenets as their matured judgment might prefer. Before this period their education was manifestly to be unchristian.

The heirs of Mr. Girard were led to believe that the bequest was assailable on many grounds, but especially from its apparent opposition to the Christian religion, which is the basis of the common law as received in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, a suit was instituted in the District Court of that State in the name of Vidal and others against the city corporation ; but the decision was adverse to the pretensions of the claimants. The case was brought by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, and was ably argued by Messrs. Jones and Webster on the part of the appellants, and by Messrs. Binney and Sergeant, as counsel for the city corporation. We regret that we did not preserve the papers which contained the arguments of the learned counsel, since those urged by the appellants are omitted in the report published by the Trustees of the College. We re-

collect well the impression produced on the public mind at the time by the eloquent tribute paid by Mr. Webster to Christianity, as the guiding star of youth, and the bond of society. Had it been shown that the will was antichristian, not merely in its spirit and design, but also in its positive injunctions, the objection might have proved fatal, unless indeed the Court, borrowing the principle of the civil law, should regard the irreligious restrictions as null, and maintain the bequest stripped of these odious appendages ; but the counsel for the corporation contended that the object of the testator was not to exclude Christian influence from education, and at all events that the provisions of the will could be literally complied with, without such exclusion. This latter position was adopted by the Court, which also countenanced the benign interpretation of the intent of the testator. In the absence of the Catholic Chief Justice, who was suffering from sickness, the eminent constitutional jurist, Mr. Justice Story, delivered the unanimous judgment of the Court, by which the validity of the bequest to the city is irrevocably settled.

In the motives of the decision, it is explicitly stated that religious instruction may be given by laymen employed in this institution, and that the Bible and other religious books may be used for that purpose. “ The testator does not say that Christianity shall not be taught in the College. But the objection itself assumes the proposition, that Christianity is not to be taught, because ecclesiastics are not to be instructors or officers. But this is by no means a necessary or legitimate inference from the premises. Why may not laymen instruct in the general principles of Christianity as well as ecclesiastics ? There is no restriction as to the religious opinions of the instructors and officers. Why may not the Bible, and especially the New Testament, without note or comment, be read and taught as a Divine revelation in the College, — its general precepts expounded, its evidences explained, and its glorious principles of morality inculcated ? What is there to prevent a work, not sectarian, upon the general evidences of Christianity, from being read and taught in the College by lay teachers ? Certainly there is nothing in the will, that proscribes such studies.” Having quoted the injunction of Mr. Girard, that pure morals should be inculcated, the learned Judge continues : “ Now, it may well be asked, what is there in all this, which is positively enjoined, inconsistent with the spirit or truths of Christianity ? Are not these truths all taught by Christianity, although it teaches much

more ? Where can the purest principles of morality be learned so clearly or so perfectly as from the New Testament ?” This legal interpretation of the will defeats the manifest intentions of the testator. If the Bible become a class-book, as is in fact already the case, it is impossible to restrict the inquiries of the pupils as to the doctrines which it contains, and religious opinions will necessarily be formed long before their minds are matured, as Mr. Girard expresses it. If laymen may instruct in the general evidences of Christianity, they may unconsciously bias their pupils in favor of special doctrines. Is it possible to inculcate the moral maxims of Christ, without indicating to the pupil his authority, whether he was a sage who drank deeply at the fount of reason, or a messenger from God to men, or a Divine person incarnate ? The doctrines which He taught will be inquired into by those who respect His moral maxims, and the conflicts of opinion may be great, notwithstanding the absence of authorized instructors. But we rejoice that such is the legal construction of the will, and that the light of Christian truth, as well as the pure influences of Christian morals, may penetrate the walls of the College, despite of all the restrictions of the testator. In this sense we understand Mr. Joseph R. Chandler, President of the Board, who, in an eloquent address, pronounced on the occasion of placing the crowning stone on the main building, August 29, 1846, ventured to offer a solution of the difficulty, which, however, is far from being satisfactory : “ But is religious instruction, then, to be excluded ? Is the pupil of the Girard College, an institution directed by the councils of Philadelphia, to be kept in ignorance of a God ? of his duties towards his earthly companions, and his Heavenly Father ? God forbid ! I trust that a spirit of vital piety will pervade every lesson that falls upon the ear and the heart of the pupil, and that all the atmosphere of the place will be impregnated with the spirit of religious truth ; so that, if not the invigorating streams of Christian instruction, by the ministers of heavenly doctrine, at least the refreshing dews of grace, may be hoped for, from the constantly instructive precepts and examples of those to whose plastic influences shall be committed the minds of the orphans, to be fashioned to the means of individual usefulness, public benefit, and eternal happiness.” This splendid verbiage can mean only that the light and grace of God can penetrate the walls of an institution from which His ministers are excluded. It offers no apology for the intolerant proscription ; it suggests no means by which the provisions of the will may be reconciled with the necessity of religious minis-

trations ; and is, on the whole, less creditable to the respected speaker than the significant silence of Mr. Nicholas Biddle, on occasion of laying the corner-stone.

The Bill of Rights in Pennsylvania says : " All men have a natural and unalienable right to worship God according to the dictates of their own conscience and understanding." Judge Story remarked : " It is said, and truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania ; yet it is so in this qualified sense, that its Divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers, or the injury of the public." With these principles before the Court, we are somewhat surprised that the provision of the will which prevents the exercise of the duties of the Christian ministry within the College premises should not be deemed a nullity. According to the almost universal belief of all sects, the ministry is of Divine institution, and some acts are so peculiar to it that they can be performed by persons of no other class ; there are also duties to be practised by believers which require ministerial aid. We can easily understand how ministers may be excluded from all offices in the institution, and may be denied the privilege of preaching within its walls ; but we do not conceive it compatible with the Bill of Rights to deny orphans the spiritual aid of the ministry in any circumstance when their conscience dictates to them that it is necessary.

There are duties of religion to be performed by youth as well as by those of advanced age ; and it should not be supposed that Mr. Girard meant to prohibit their performance, when dictated by conscientious conviction, for he has expressly enjoined that the orphans be impressed with a sacred regard for the rights of conscience. " I desire," he says, " that by every proper means a pure attachment to our republican institutions, and to the sacred rights of conscience as guaranteed by our happy constitutions, shall be formed and fostered in the minds of the scholars." Among these is to assist on the Lord's day at the public worship of God celebrated by an authorized minister of religion. Mr. Binney, the other counsel of the corporation, remarks that Mr. Girard " has not prohibited the trustees from sending the pupils to their respective churches, if they or their friends have any, without the walls." If this be done, much of the objectionable character of the institution would be removed. But if this privilege be denied the orphans who may demand it,

how can it be pretended that the rights of conscience are respected ?

In order to bring the institution into harmony with the public policy of Pennsylvania, and the spirit of our constitutions and of our age, and to harmonize the provisions of the will, it is not sufficient that a vague system of Christian ethics be taught in the College ; freedom of religious belief and practice must be admitted. Did we hope that our words could have any influence, we would respectfully suggest to the directors of this institution, that, to secure the rights of conscience, the religious profession of the surviving parent of the orphan, or of other nearest relative, should be marked on the College-books, and entire liberty allowed to such relative to place in the orphan's hands a catechism, or other doctrinal or devotional book, and to procure for him at suitable times religious instruction, outside of the College precincts. Mr. Sergeant, in his able argument before the Supreme Court, observed : " The Bible may be used, and so may all devotional and religious exercises which pious laymen think conducive to the welfare of youth." Doctrinal discussions, either by teachers, or between the pupils, may be prohibited ; but how can the rights of conscience be said to be respected, if the orphans be prevented from seeking instruction in the faith which they may prefer ? By denying to the parent, or relative, the privilege of providing for the religious instruction of the orphan, even in the imperfect manner now indicated, every one who sets value on the Christian doctrines, as professed in the society to which he belongs, is debarred from the advantages of the benefaction of Mr. Girard, which he can enjoy only on sacrificing his religious predilections. The bounty is proffered on the condition of consigning the orphan to those who will studiously conceal from him the Christian tenets, however earnestly they may inculcate a system of morality derived from the Gospel. Thus all conscientious professors, who hold the necessity in order to salvation of believing any revealed doctrines beyond the existence of God, are denied the benefit of this charity. Catholics especially, who cling with so much tenacity to faith, and consider it the most precious treasure they can leave to their children, are placed in the necessity of foregoing any participation in an institution founded by one who was nominally a member of their communion. Is this the respect for the rights of conscience which the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights demands, and which Mr. Girard insists shall be inculcated by the teachers in his College ?

Notwithstanding the protestation of Mr. Girard that he meant no disrespect, the exclusion of clergymen, even as visitors, from the premises appropriated to the purposes of the College, indicates that he cherished a horror of all who appeared in a sacred garb, and repelled them as profane intruders from the favored seat of his power :

Procul, O ! procul este profani,
Et toto discedite luco.

Yet here, in behalf of the orphans, and of all connected with the institution, we would invoke the application of the rule which determines the meaning of a particular clause by reference to the whole context and object. His design was to prevent doctrinal contentions, for which purpose he would have no clerical professors or visitors. Visits with a view to inculcate religious opinions by occasional addresses on religious topics are plainly forbidden ; but did the founder mean that clergymen should be denied the mere gratification of treading the grounds attached to the institution ? The general principle, that enactments of a painful and odious nature are to be reduced to the narrowest possible compass, — *odia sunt restringenda*, — should be here applied ; and the term *visitors* taken in its technical signification, as official superintendents, or occasional instructors. Even if the words appear too definite to be explained away, they are so inconsistent with the spirit of our country that they should not be reduced to practice. Is it fit that any class of citizens be excluded from any public institution by a general ban ? Every American, surely, must feel mortified when he is repelled from one of the institutions of his country, merely because he is a minister of Christ. We know of a recent instance, in which an American gentleman, who had left the bar for the altar, presented himself in company with some ladies to visit the Girard College. One of the Trustees — a most liberal gentleman — met him at the gate, and told him that duty compelled him to exclude him, whilst the ladies whom he accompanied were admissible. A French clergyman, who with some strangers went merely to see the buildings, met with a similar repulse a short time before, and could not penetrate into the vast mansion which the munificence of his countryman had erected. Was this truly the will of Mr. Girard ? If it was, it is too intolerant to be reduced to practice. The brother of the President of the College is, we are informed, a Presbyterian minister. Must he be denied the privilege of visiting his brother ? In sickness and in death must

the President be restricted in his intercourse with so near a relative ? No high-minded man would purchase the office at such a sacrifice. Will the directors risk any thing by forbearing to inquire into the profession of their visitors whilst they do not attempt to preach, teach, or otherwise disturb the harmony of the institution ? This proscription is felt most in regard to the sick and dying, who may desire the consolation, advice, and aid of a minister of religion. Not only the orphans, but all the inmates of the institution, will be deprived of religious succour in death, if the literal interpretation of the term be strictly insisted on. In the name of liberty of conscience we enter our protest against it. In Scotland, so long distinguished for its intolerant spirit, a Catholic clergyman, as well as any other, can now penetrate wherever his ministry is sought, and can call on the public authority to support him in the exercise of his functions. In the vicinity of the city of Penn, no clergyman is allowed to pass within the precincts of the Girard College, even although his ministry is called for by the dying. This should not be. If the orphans have forfeited their religious rights, on receiving the bounty of the founder, the President and officers of the institution, and even the domestics, have rights which must be respected. The Trustees will deserve the thanks of all the friends of liberty of conscience by restricting the meaning of *visitors* to those who come to instruct in doctrine, and leaving the silent exercise of religion, as well as the intercourse of life, unrestrained. If they do otherwise, it is mockery to speak of the rights of conscience.

The ingenuity of Mr. Binney suggested a device for meeting this formidable objection. "The power of the Trustees, for the accommodation of the pupils, to erect an infirmary without the walls, is left by the will without restraint, either express or implied." Is there any probability, we would ask, that this power will be exercised ? Is it not cruel to leave so great a number of orphans in a state in which, if any of them be attacked by sickness, he cannot receive the aid of a minister of religion, even for rites which the vast majority of Christians deem of imperative necessity ? The infirmary outside the walls has not been erected, and the suggestion of Mr. Binney, having served its purpose, is not likely to be attended to. With all deference to the high legal knowledge of the learned counsel, we would suggest that clergymen might be admitted to an infirmary within the walls, as long as no other exists, on the principle that the rights of conscience must be respected. Whatever power

Mr. Girard could exercise in regard to teachers or visitors, he had no right to interfere with the necessary offices of religion. The minister of Christ may penetrate into the deepest dungeon to give to the most abandoned culprit religious consolation, and may accompany him to the scaffold, to impart to him in death the pardon which human justice denies him. Shall the College walls be more impenetrable than the prison gates, and the dying orphan less comforted than the expiring criminal? If Christianity be, even in the most qualified sense, the basis of the law and policy of Pennsylvania, what spot in this free State can there be on which the exercise of the Christian ministry, in the imminent danger of death, is wholly prohibited? Let the Bill of Rights, and the injunction of Mr. Girard of pure attachment to the rights of conscience, be present to the minds of the directors of this institution, and they will find no motive for hesitation, when the dying orphan calls for the minister of religion.

It is a principle of the civil law, that immoral and impossible conditions in marriage contracts and wills should be disregarded. If this were applied to the will of Mr. Girard, the charitable object would be attained, without inflicting on the orphans the calamity of an unchristian education. Understanding the testator as directing that they should be trained in moral principles without any doctrinal bias, — that is to say, that they should be taught to be just, pure, temperate, and beneficent, without any instruction in the revealed mysteries as believed by any portion of the Christian world, — we hold the prescription to be essentially immoral. In inculcating morality, it saps its foundation; it leaves it to rest on mere reason, without any supernatural sanction; it gives no standard by which it may be ascertained; it points to no means by which it may be practised. Whilst professing zeal for morals, it levels a deadly blow at them, by depriving them of the support of religion, which alone can declare with certainty what is lawful and what is forbidden, and furnish aid to fulfil that which is beyond the natural strength of fallen man. It may be contended that Mr. Girard did not mean to exclude religion from the home of the orphans, but sought only to prevent strife and contradiction. His words clearly show that he wished them to remain free from religious predilections until they should enter into society. It is plainly immoral to leave youth without religious guidance and aid until such an age, since the passions will necessarily become excited, as the human body acquires strength and develops itself, and the untaught youth may ask himself to no purpose how he can

repress the tumults in his veins. Besides, the injunction is impossible to be executed. In order to prevent the doctrinal collisions which shocked his imagination, it was not enough to exclude religious instructors, whose office binds them to inculcate doctrinal views ; all the professors and inmates of the institution should be rigorously bound to observe the strictest silence on all differences in doctrine ; the Bible, which is the great field of controversial strife, should have been excluded from the schools ; and all books treating of doctrine, whether incidentally or professedly, should have been kept out of the hands of the orphans. In whatever way they may become acquainted with the varieties of Christian sects and opinions, they may form their own views, and enter into society with prejudices as strong as those of persons familiar with the discordant sounds of the professed ministers of the Gospel. There is only one way of preserving the minds of youth from doctrinal collisions : it is by instructing them in the truth as it is in Christ, — as taught by the Church, which is the pillar and ground of the truth.

We are far from seeking to introduce the Catholic religion into this College as a general standard ; but we have a right to demand that its professor be not virtually excluded by the restrictions put on the practice of religious duty. Catholic orphans should not be denied admission, unless they consent to peril their faith, and forego the exercise of their religion. Catholics should not be deprived of a share in the offices attached to it, unless they consent to run the risk of dying without benefit of clergy. We ask no liberty to teach or propagate our doctrines within the College, although we cannot understand how the Divine commission to preach the Gospel to every creature can be restricted by the will of a wealthy banker. We do not seek to erect our altars on the unhallowed spot which he desired should be trodden by no minister of God ; but it is our duty to give the Christian sacraments to those who seek them at our hands, as they have a right to demand them. To restrict them, or us, in the peaceable exercise of these Christian rites, is to trample on the manifest rights of conscience.

We have written this article from a sense of the injustice done to Catholics especially, by the construction practically put on the will of Mr. Girard. The directors of the College have adopted the Protestant version of the Bible, and have thus virtually made it a Protestant institution. Protestants feel little difficulty in placing their children there, because their latitude of sentiment contents them generally with a vague doctrinal sys-

tem, particularly when it is united with good living, that is, with all those earthly comforts which are needed for our bodily well-being. Protestants eagerly seek and cheerfully accept office in it, since they are not generally under a strong feeling of conscientious duty to avail themselves of the aid of the ministry in life or death. Faith alone — reliance on Christ — will, they believe, save them, without ministerial interposition. The institution was designed to be unchristian ; it is now Protestant. There are, indeed, in it some few children of Catholic parents, whose surviving parent or relatives have not paused to reflect on the guilt of abandoning the orphan to infidelity or Protestantism, for the sake of some worldly advantages. There is one Catholic among the teachers of a secondary rank, and perhaps some others in inferior employment, who most probably have not calculated on their being denied the last rites of religion, if death should assail them within the walls of this establishment. It is right that the public should know these facts, and that the directors should be held responsible for the practical construction which they have given to the will, defeating without scruple the intentions of the testator, to the prejudice of that body of Christians to whom he should be supposed to have entertained no hostile feeling. It may seem that a review is not the most suitable medium to procure a remedy ; but it were lost labor to address the city councils, or the directors of the College, who, although all honorable men, cannot understand the conscientious scruples of their Catholic fellow-citizens on matters connected with education. The management of the public schools continues to be the same, notwithstanding the efforts made to obtain due consideration for the religious scruples of the children of Catholics. If there arise not among Protestants some generous man, whose rule is not self-interest, public prejudice, or momentary expediency, Catholics cannot hope for equal justice in any department, until their numbers may force the respectful consideration of their rights. Yet we do not despair that such an advocate will be found, whose talents will be employed to enlighten public opinion, and to obtain merely what we seek, — that conscience may be subject to no restraint, and that the child or the adult may, in no public institution, or in private, be compelled to do that which he conscientiously scruples, or be withheld from performing that which he feels bound, to perform.

ART. III. — *The Republic of the United States of America : its Duties to itself and its Responsible Relations to other Countries. Embracing also a Review of the Late War between the United States and Mexico ; its Causes and its Results ; and of those Measures of Government which have characterized the Democracy of the Union.* New York. 1848. 12mo. pp. 322.

As an electioneering document, this flimsy production with a pompous title might be suffered to pass without animadversion ; but regarded as a grave work, intended to instruct the American people in their political rights and duties, or to defend the late war with Mexico and the general policy of the Democratic party, the only merit we can award it, if indeed so much, is that which the author says is the only merit he claims, — namely, the purity of its motives. The author is neither a scholar nor a statesman. His philosophizing on history and the formation and growth of nations is borrowed from a bad school ; his statements are entitled to no credit ; his principles are unsound and pernicious ; and his reasoning is seldom logical or conclusive. The sum and substance of his work is : This is a great country ; we are a great people ; and the greatness of the country and of the people is all due to the *expansive* democracy.

We yield to no man in the interest we take in the real progress and welfare of the American people ; but we are thoroughly disgusted with the ignorance and inflated vanity of our pretended patriots. We have no sympathy with those who are continually saying, Isn't this a great country ? Are not we a great people ? Territorially considered, we *are* a great country ; and in our ceaseless activity and industrial enterprise, we *are* a great people ; but that we are great in any other sense does not yet appear. We have shown ourselves great neither in art nor science, neither in religion nor morals, neither in statesmanship nor general or special intelligence. We have, in fact, nothing whereof to boast ; and a rigid self-examination would convince us that we have made, instead of the most, the least of the advantages with which Providence has favored us.

Indeed, we are usually disposed to distrust the head or the heart of the American who makes loud pretensions to love of country. A man must have a country before he can love it, and it must have been for a long series of ages the home of his fathers before he can feel his bosom glow with genuine patriot-

ism. Our population is too recent, too floating, too little fixed to any particular locality, to feel that it has a country, — to be capable of that strong attachment to its native land, to the scenes and associations of home, without which patriotism does not and cannot exist. The grandfathers of comparatively few of us were born on the soil we inhabit. There are few homesteads in the country that have been held from father to son through three generations. We have no ancestral halls ; we have no ancestors ; but are, in some sense, ourselves our own sires. There are few spots in the country around which many memories can cluster, few shrines the pilgrim heart can visit, few materials for national poetry. Our poets cannot find a song without going abroad. We are only a huge trading town, in which business men from all parts of the world are temporarily congregated for purposes of gain or livelihood, each with his own local associations and attachments, and speaking his mother tongue, unknown to all but himself. The people of the United States, as a whole, have very little in common. They have not a common origin ; they have not even a common national name, or any common national associations. How, then, can they have genuine patriotism, — that deep, loyal, ineradicable attachment to one's natal soil which we are accustomed to express by that word ? We may have national vanity, national pride, and be ready to uphold the rights or the interests of our country against all others ; yet true love of country we have not, and it is rarely that without an effort we bring ourselves to say, *my country*.

We say not this by way of reproach. The thing was inevitable. It is no fault of the race or races which have taken possession of the country. The great bulk of our people are of English, German, and Irish descent, and no people are more remarkable for love of country than those from whom we have sprung. In their own respective countries they are patriots ; but, torn from their natal soil, and transplanted to a strange land, they cannot at once feel themselves at home ; they cannot transfer at once to this strange land those affections which fastened them to England, Germany, or Ireland, hallowed by the joys and sorrows, the fears and hopes, the loves and hates, the toils and struggles of their forefathers from time immemorial. How can we sing the songs of our fatherland in a strange country ? Time, no doubt, will correct the evil, and cure the defect. In time, we shall grow into a nation, be melted into one people, and find ourselves at home in this western world.

Then we shall have genuine patriotism, — that patriotism which springs from the heart. But now the less we say of patriotism, the more will it be to our credit. The less we boast, the less we affect the language, in speaking of the United States, which the people of other countries adopt in speaking of their native land, the more good sense and the better taste shall we exhibit. We must have a household before we can without affectation use household words. We wish our young authors who affect so much Americanism would bear this in mind, and talk of things which are, and not of things which are not.

We can sympathize with those who are struck with the greatness and magnificence, under a material point of view, of the United States, and even with those who indulge high hopes for the American people. That the American people have a destiny we do not doubt ; that they have a great and glorious destiny we would fain hope ; that they are on the road to such a destiny we have yet to be convinced. At any rate, writers like the one before us, whose highest ambition appears to be to court them, to strengthen their dangerous tendencies, and flatter their corrupt passions, are not likely to aid them in attaining it. There may be courtiers in a republic as well as in a monarchy, and their influence is no more to be deprecated in the latter than in the former. The principle on which the courtier acts is that the pleasure of the sovereign is the rule of right and wrong. His study is to find out and anticipate his sovereign's pleasure. It is the same in a democracy. Under a democracy, the people are held to be the sovereign, and the democratic courtiers make it their study to ascertain the popular instincts, wishes, or passions, and to provide as far as possible for their gratification. They hold, as a principle, that popular instincts and passions are infallible, and not only maintain that it is lawful for the people in all cases to follow them, but denounce all who assert the contrary as enemies to the people, as the friends of tyrants and tyranny, as deserving the reprobation of both God and men. They get the ear of the sovereign, and will let him hear no voice but theirs. They keep at a distance all those counsellors who would appeal, not to his passions, but to his good sense, and render unavailable whatever of practical wisdom and moral honesty the great body of the people may possess. They drive the people on to their ruin, and prevent all effectual interposition for their salvation.

We speak not lightly of the people ; we have no disposition to depreciate their intelligence or the general correctness of their

motives ; but they are almost always the dupes of unprincipled demagogues. If the good sense, if the practical wisdom, if the moral honesty of the people could always be rendered available, — if the appeal could always be made to their reason instead of their passions, to their judgments instead of their caprices,—our estimate of their capacity for self-government would be as favorable as that professed by our democratic friends. But we must always bear in mind that man has fallen, that his nature has been corrupted, and that, collectively as well as individually, the people are prone to evil, and that continually. When they resist their inclinations, silence the clamor of their appetites and passions, and listen only to the voice of reason, which, though obscured by the fall, yet survives in every man, they in general take correct views and come to safe conclusions ; but they listen far more readily to appetite and passion, and follow with far greater facility the suggestions of corrupt desires than the sober lessons of reason. To do evil demands no violence to natural inclination ; to practise virtue always demands an effort. This is true of every one of the people individually, and therefore must be true of the whole collectively. Hence it follows that the demagogues, though but small men themselves, have always more power with the people than have wise and virtuous statesmen, and all popular governments have a tendency to become the exponents of popular corruption instead of popular reason and virtue.

If, then, we hope for our country, it is always with fear and trembling. The chances are against its attaining that destiny which seems to have been promised it. It is certain that we started with many advantages. We had a new and virgin soil, of vast extent and boundless fertility ; we were far removed from the example and corruptions of the Old World ; we had, as much as a people can have, the shaping of our destiny in our own hands ; and yet we have already at least the germs of every vice and every evil to be deplored in old and worn-out nations. There is no denying this. We have adopted the European system of industry, and, with half a continent of unoccupied land, we experience the extreme of poverty. Poverty more than keeps pace with the increase of wealth ; public and private morals are daily deteriorating ; crime is on a rapid and startling increase ; law has lost its sanctity, and loyalty is extinct. Population, indeed, augments, new territory is acquired, and our external prosperity receives no check. But, internally, we do not prosper. The heart is rotten, and the people will

accept no remedy. Their minds and hearts are turned away from all that makes the true glory of a state, and they have neither the patience nor the cultivation requisite to their conversion. They who see this can do little towards correcting it, for their lessons can avail nothing unless they are considered; and who in these times will pause to consider? Fail to flatter the people, fail to encourage their tendencies, or to sympathize with them in their delusions, and, however much you may be commended by individuals, you will be pronounced unpopular, admission at court will be denied you, and your influence, though you speak with the eloquence of an angel, the love of a saint, and the wisdom of a sage, will be null. Your words will bring no echo but the derisive laugh of the brainless and heartless demagogues who are urging the people on in a career of individual and national ruin.

The evil here is greater than most people, even intelligent and well-disposed people, suspect. Every people, consciously or unconsciously, struggles with all its power to realize the last consequences of the principles it adopts. If those principles are unsound, the whole tendency, the whole labor, of the nation is to its own destruction. But in a popular government, it is next to impossible to correct unsound principles before the ruin comes. It is only in two ways that the destructive consequences can be seen before they are practically developed,—that is, either by the teachings of religion, or by philosophy. In a democracy, little reliance can be placed on the former. When the people are taught that they are sovereign, they will submit to no religious teaching that attempts to control them. Religion must be their subject, not their master,—serve, not govern them. Moreover, the people never do and can never be made to understand that religion ever does or ever can condemn any thing not directly opposed to her formal and express teachings. As long as they profess the creed and observe the prescribed form of worship, they will never believe that any principles they adopt and follow in the temporal order are irreligious, or matters concerning which religion has any thing to say.

The other method is not more effectual. The people are not philosophers. There are very few persons in any nation who can take up the national policy, reduce it to its principles, and show what, according to the ordinary course of history, are the logical consequences they necessarily involve. The great body of the people, even of the educated classes, cannot do it,—cannot even understand it when it is done. The few may do

it, may publish the result, and utter the solemn warning ; but to what end ? The people are blind to the one and deaf to the other ; they go on their way, heedless of both. If they could be made to pause, if they could be made to listen, and to comprehend what is said, the evil could be averted ; but in a democracy this is extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible. All is lost upon them, for no man has or can have influence over them, but in his sympathy with them. Hence it is, that, when they have once adopted mischievous principles, it is in vain to attempt to induce them to abandon them. You can never make them see the unsoundness of those principles, or believe them dangerous, and all you will gain by the attempt will be your own unpopularity.

Here is a point which our modern democrats appear to us to overlook, or at least one to which they attach far less importance than it deserves. They all, as far as we have seen, without a single exception, proceed on the assumption, that man retains his primitive innocency, and human nature its primitive integrity. If this assumption were allowable, the purely democratic form of government would be a safe, and, perhaps, the best, form of government. But, unhappily, this is not the fact. The philosopher no more than the Christian can deny that man has fallen. The evidences of the fall stare us in the face, let us go where or turn which way we will. We do not distrust the popular reason, even fallen as man is ; and if the people would follow their reason, we should find no fault with the democratic theory. But the people, collectively as well as individually, follow inclination, appetite, passion, which have been corrupted by the fall, and not reason, which has remained comparatively uncorrupted. Here is the fact, and here is the difficulty. Carried away by their appetites and passions, they will not pause long enough to hear the voice of reason, or to profit by the instructions of those who see their error, and the proper policy to be adopted. What they want is authority, which, itself enlightened and controlled by reason, shall hold them in check, and compel them, at times, to do violence to their own inclinations, and to act contrary to their own wills. This authority democracy cannot supply. Democracy can restrain individuals, whenever they violate the public sentiment ; but it has no power to punish even individuals for crimes which the public sentiment does not condemn, — far less has it power to restrain the people collectively ; for then the restrainer and the restrained, the governor and the governed, become in every respect identi-

cal. In fact, the democratic government is expressly devised, not to restrain the people in their collective action or public conduct, but to relieve them of all restraint, and to give them free scope to do whatever they please, to follow without let or hindrance whatever is the dominant passion or sentiment for the time being.

Unhappily, it is hardly safe in this country for a man who regards his reputation to utter these plain and commonplace truths, — which is an additional proof that they *are* truths, and important truths too. Within the last twenty-five years, it has become the fashion with a large portion of our community to regard our American institutions as purely democratic, and to denounce what is not democratic as anti-American. We say *within the last twenty-five years* ; for, prior to that time, unless for a brief period under the old Confederation, there was not and never had been in the country a party that even acknowledged itself to be purely democratic. The Republicans, as distinguished from the Federalists, though they may have had democratic tendencies, scorned the name of Democrat. To the charge brought against them by the Federalists of being Democrats, they were accustomed, even within our own memory, — and we are not very old, — to reply with great indignation, “No, I am not a Democrat, I’m a Republican.” In many parts of the country, they do not even now take the name of Democrat, but adhere to the name of Republican, which they bore in the time of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe. The name began to be used during the administration of John Quincy Adams, but became general only after the second election of Andrew Jackson. We owe the present popularity of democracy, in great measure, to the influx of English and Scotch radicals, at the head of whom were Frances Wright, Robert Dale Owen, and Robert L. Jennings, — to the writings of Amos Kendall, William Leggett, and George Bancroft, — to the administrations of Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, — and to the declamations, cant, and sentimentality of our abolitionists and philanthropists.

Prior to General Jackson’s administration, the institutions of this country had never received, except from a few individuals, a democratic interpretation. General Jackson was a great man ; the American people idolize his memory, and we have no wish to detract from his merits ; but he was, in the higher sense of the word, no statesman. He was a man of heroic impulses, of a strong mind, and an iron will ; but a man who had made no profound study of political science. No one doubts his integ-

rity, or his devotion to what he believed for the best good of the republic ; but like all strong-minded men, men of great natural parts and little science, he had a tendency to cut rather than untie the Gordian knot of statesmanship. He appears never to have understood that our government is a government *sui generis*, — not any one of the simple forms of government, but a peculiar combination of them all. Instead of seeking to preserve them all as nicely adjusted by the Convention of 1787, he sought to simplify the machine, and he gave an undue prominence to the monarchical element on the one hand, and to the democratic element on the other. He did more, perhaps, than any other President we have had for the external splendor of the republic ; but we are obliged to add, more also for the destruction of the Constitution and the corruption of public morals.

We speak not here for or against the measures supported or opposed by General Jackson's administration. In most of the measures of his administration, especially in regard to the United States Bank, we agreed with him, and have seen no reason to change our views. We are aware of no measure which he proposed that in itself tended to disturb the nicely adjusted balance of the Constitution. The evil was done, not by the measures he proposed, but by the principles on which he acted, and defended himself and his measures from the attacks of his enemies. He was, if we are not mistaken, the first of our Presidents who confounded the will of the people, expressed through caucuses and newspapers, with the will of the people expressed through legal and constitutional forms, — that is, who confounded the people as population with the people as the state ; thus preparing the way for the Rhode Island rebellion, generally justified by his party. In this one thing he inflicted, we fear, an irreparable injury upon his country ; for in this he unchained that very spirit of wild and lawless democracy which the Constitution was avowedly intended to repress. That he foresaw what he was doing, we do not pretend. He had a violent and powerful opposition to contend against, and he availed himself of such supports as were at hand, or as his sagacity assured him would be available. He cared little for forms. The people who rule through the Constitution are the same people who speak outside of it ; and what does it matter whether we follow the will expressed in the one form or the other ? The people are sovereign, and their will is the law. If we only get that will, what difference can it make how we get it ? None in the world, if the will, whatever the form in which it is col-

lected, is always sure to be the same will. But the presumption always is, that it will not be the same, otherwise constitutions would be insignificant. The presumption is, that the popular will expressed through legal and constitutional forms will be the popular will regulated by reason, while that expressed irrespective of such forms will be the popular will subjected to popular passion. The Constitution is intended to be a contrivance for collecting the popular reason separated from popular passion, and enabling that which is not corrupt in the people to govern without subjection to that which is corrupt. The voice of the people, speaking through legal and constitutional forms, is ordinarily the voice of reason, — perhaps as pure an expression of reason as with human infirmity we can obtain ; but the voice of the people outside is the voice of corrupt nature, of faction, of demagogues, disorderly passion, and selfish interests, to which it is always fatal to listen. This distinction appears to have escaped the observation of General Jackson and his friends, and the consequence has been the fashion of interpreting our institutions according to the principle of pure democracy, instead of so interpreting them as to restrict the sphere of the democratic element.

It having been made by General Jackson and his friends popular to regard our institutions as democratic, there is an almost universal tendency now to place our sole reliance for good government on the democratic element, which they unquestionably contain, and to bring out that element in greater prominence, and to provide, as far as possible, for its exclusive dominion. The demagogues, the party in power, and the party out of power, alike make their appeals to it alone. Philanthropists, radicals, advocates of equality, political or social, business men, friends of monopoly wishing to make the government a mere instrument in their hands for promoting their own private interests, — all appeal exclusively to democracy, and seek to sweep away every barrier erected by the wisdom of our fathers against popular caprice or popular passion. The Whig party, sometimes claiming to be conservative, is no less democratic than its opponent. Since 1838, when the *Boston Atlas*, with a questionable policy, denounced the aristocratic Whigs, and asserted the necessity of descending into the forum to take the people by the hand, the Whig party have had no distinctive principles, and both the great parties of the country have simply been striving to see which should, if the word may be allowed us, *out-Democrat* the other. Exception made of individual

Whigs, it is hard to say which of the two parties, the Whig or the Democratic, is the more conservative, and retains the most respect for the Constitution. Henry Clay, the embodiment of the worst democratic tendencies of the country, obtained more votes as a candidate for the Presidency in the Whig convention, held at Philadelphia last summer, than Daniel Webster, who is distinguished for his constitutionalism. It is the Whig party that would abolish the presidential veto, and by so doing throw the whole power into the hands of the majority for the time, and establish legislative despotism.

Nevertheless, since both parties claim to be democratic, neither can offer any effectual check upon the tendency of the country to pure democracy. Both parties are necessarily compelled to make democratic appeals, and to give, as far as possible, a democratic interpretation to the Federal and State Constitutions. Both, wherever there is opportunity, favor exclusive democracy. Take the alterations effected in several of the State Constitutions, whether by one party or the other, and they all tend to remove restraints on the popular will, to expose the government more immediately to every fluctuation of popular opinion. Their aim is, in all cases, to bring the government nearer to the people, and to give them a more direct voice in its administration. Such among others is the provision recently adopted in several of the States for electing the judges of the several courts immediately by the people; such also is the tendency favored in many of the States to alter, abridge, or abolish the common law. In New York, and a few other States, the democratic tendency has proved strong enough to invade even the sacred precincts of the family, and, under the pretence of protecting the wife against her husband, to prepare the virtual abolition of the marriage relations. If the tendency continues, it will not be many years before the notion that the husband is the head of the wife will be entirely exploded, and universal suffrage and eligibility be extended to women as well as to men. We already have Woman's Rights Associations; and we believe the women in the State of New York — a State as notorious for its practical transcendentalism as our city is for its theoretical — have already put forth a declaration of their independence of the tyrant, man. Whether they mean to support it by force of arms or by force of charms does not yet appear. But these are all signs, and pregnant signs, which deserve the serious attention of all who retain their senses or the least regard for social order and public virtue. On the

principles on which it has become fashionable to defend democracy, it is impossible to defend "the ascendancy of the male sex," to maintain that the husband is the head of the wife, or to vindicate the authority of the father over his children. Domestic government must soon go, and with it, of course, all government.

But, strong as the democratic tendency has become, severe as is the blow which our institutions have already received, we hope it is not too late to retrace our steps, and to return to the Constitution. Unquestionably, the democratic element enters largely into our political system, and the American statesman is never at liberty to neglect it, or to labor to suppress it; but it is not the only element, nor the generative principle of our institutions. The American system is complex in its origin, and to interpret it by any one principle is to mistake it. It contains other elements as sacred, as fundamental, as essential, as the democratic element itself; and the statesman is as much bound to consult and preserve them as he is to consult and preserve it,—perhaps, if there be any difference, even more so, because they were expressly intended as a counterpoise to democracy.

The Constitution is sacred and inviolable. It is the supreme law of the land, and binds the people both individually and collectively. Whence it derives its legitimacy and supremacy, we do not now inquire; for its legitimacy and supremacy must be conceded, or else we must maintain that we have no legal order, and are subject to mere arbitrary will, which, whether the will of one, of the few, or of the many, is the essence of despotism. But if the Constitution is legitimate and supreme, the people collectively and individually are under it, bound to obey it, and have and can have no power, directly or indirectly, to alter its fundamental or essential character,—consequently, are bound to the best of their ability to preserve it substantially as it is. The Constitution, or the instrument we call the Constitution, contains, indeed, a clause providing for its own amendment; but the Constitution can authorize amendments only in its own interest, such as tend to preserve its original type or idea, and to secure or facilitate its realization.

On this power to amend there is much loose and even wrong thinking among our politicians. When the civil society is once constituted, it is supreme, the political sovereignty vests in it, and there is and can be, in that society, no power over it. The powers of the convention called to amend the constitution, what-

ever their limit or extent, are derived from the civil society, and can be only such as it can delegate. It can delegate all the powers it possesses, saving its own existence and supremacy as civil society. It cannot part with its inherent sovereignty, nor dissolve itself. But civil society exists in its constitution. The constitution is the fundamental law of the state, that which *constitutes* civil society, or gives to society its entity as a political or civil individual. Suppose the constitution, you suppose civil society; take away the constitution, you destroy civil society. As the general has no existence without the particular, the constitution does not create civil society in general, but a particular civil society, and therefore must be itself a particular civil constitution. Hence the existence of any given political society depends always on its particular constitution. Any essential change of that constitution will, then, be the dissolution of that particular civil society. But, as no civil society can authorize its own dissolution, it follows that the convention can have no power, under the authority to amend the constitution, to touch, in any degree whatever, any of its essential principles, and is limited to such amendments as are perfectly compatible with the preservation of its fundamental and substantial character.

We are treating here of conventions held under civil society in pursuance of a constitutional provision. If we suppose the people in the state of nature, and a convention for constituting civil society, a different principle, no doubt, holds. If it be a fact,—which, however, we do not admit,—that the French Revolution of February, 1848, dissolved political France, annihilated the entire civil society, and reduced the French people to the state of nature, the National Assembly which was convened, or which came together, had, no doubt, plenary powers, and was free to give to the French nation any civil constitution, within the law of nature, it deemed advisable. But the constitution decided upon, if legitimate, the moment it was established, became the supreme law of the land, sacred and inviolable. Civil society, civil France, was then reconstituted, and henceforth French sovereignty vests in this civil France, and all bodies henceforth convoked, ordinary or extraordinary, depend on it for their powers. Hence there is always a radical difference between a convention to constitute civil society and a convention under civil society to amend the constitution. The former holds under the law of nature, and has all powers which that law does not forbid; the latter holds under the constitution, and has no powers but those which it confers.

The modern doctrine of democratic politicians on this head, that sovereignty vests, not in the people as civil society, but in the people back of it, or prior to it, is unsound. Back of civil society, or anterior to it, in what is called the state of nature, the people have no normal existence ; for civil society itself is coeval and coextensive with the human race. To ascend to its origin, you must ascend to the origin of man himself ; for he is essentially social, and society is impossible, inconceivable even, without government of some sort. In point of fact, civility is as essential to the conception of the normal man as is sociality itself. The so-called state of nature, save as a metaphysical abstraction, if ever found, is abnormal, exceptional, not prior, as an actual fact, to civil society, but subsequent thereto. It is never prudent to follow the speculations of the political theorists of the last century, who in nearly all cases, to use a homely expression, placed the cart before the horse. That a people may lose civil society and lapse into what is called the state of nature — that is, be reduced to the natural law alone — is conceivable, may sometimes happen ; and when so, they may, no doubt, come together in convention, and, if able, reconstitute civil society, reorganize the state, under any form they please, not repugnant to the law of nature ; not, however, in consequence of any inherent sovereignty vesting in them, not because they are the normal origin of all civil power, but from the necessity of the case, — the necessity of having civil government, and there being for them no other way of getting it. But rights founded in necessity cease with the necessity itself. The necessity ceases the moment the civil society or the state is reconstituted ; consequently, from that moment ceases the right or sovereignty of the unconstituted people, or people back of civil society, under the simple law of nature.

We cannot, therefore, accept the theory which places the convention assembled in pursuance of a constitutional provision on the same footing with the convention of the people prior to civil society, under the law of nature, — a theory which supposes the people antecedently to civil society inherently sovereign and the source of all the legitimate powers of the state. This theory of popular sovereignty we eschew, because it is repugnant to the fundamental idea of government. Civility and sovereignty are identical, or, at worst, inseparable, and one cannot be without the other. Suppose sovereignty, you suppose the state ; suppose the state, you suppose sovereignty. Suppose the people sovereign anterior to civil society, you suppose civil society

anterior to civil society ; that is, that the same thing can both be and not be at the same time ! The people are sovereign, we grant ; but as civil society, that is, as constituted, made a political person or individuality, — not the people as mere population, back of civil society and out of it, in which sense they never have a normal existence, and, where there is civil society, no existence at all.

The notion, therefore, that the clause authorizing a convention to amend the constitution is simply designed to establish an orderly or regular method of appealing to a power back of the constitution which originally made it, and therefore competent to unmake it, must be regarded as unsound ; for no such power exists, or can be conceived. We cannot suppose such power to survive the constitution of civil society without denying civil society itself, by converting it into a mere voluntary association, and making law a mere voluntary agreement. No statesman, if at all worthy of the name, will for a moment confound the state with a voluntary association. The state — what we mean by civil society — is something established (*status*), fixed, immovable ; but nothing is established, fixed, immovable, that depends on volition. A voluntary association has no coercive power, and voluntary agreements in the absence of law may or may not be observed, at the option of the parties. Government cannot be founded in compact. If the people back of the constitution, that is, back of the civil society, are the source of power, they have the power to change the constitution at will, — to alter, enlarge, contract, or revoke the powers they delegate to civil society, as seems to them good. Grant that they have agreed that they will do it only according to certain formalities, these formalities they impose upon themselves, and nothing hinders them from throwing them off at will. They are responsible for their observance only to themselves, and if they choose to dispense themselves, who is wronged, who has a right to complain ? If the people back of civil society are the origin of the state, the real, persisting sovereign, and if the state derives from them, *Dorrism* is true, and the late decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, condemning it, is indefensible. But *Dorrism* is subversive of all political order, for it asserts the constant presence in the community of a power competent to disregard the existing authorities, to annul the constitution, and substitute another in its place at will.

The error lies in supposing that the powers of civil society

are derived. The powers of civil society are inherent in it as civil society, and civil society itself is derived from no human source whatever ; for its office is not to obey men, but to rule them, both individually and collectively. Nothing can be more absurd than to suppose it derives from the very multitude it is to govern. Government dependent on the governed is no government at all. Civil society derives from God, the source of all power, (*non est enim potestas nisi a Deo,*) who immediately, as in the case of the Jews, — mediately, by the operations of his Providence, in other cases, — constitutes it, commissions it, defines its powers, and commands us to obey it for his sake. They are as miserable statesmen as Christians who preach political atheism, and suppose the state is conceivable with only a human basis. The nations, as well as the individuals, who forget God, shall be turned into hell. Neither the state nor the individual can withdraw from dependence on God, and live, “for in him we live, and move, and have our being,” — *in ipso vivimus, et movemur, et sumus.*

The true doctrine is, that, though the people are indeed sovereign, they are so only as civil society, in which the sovereignty, under God, inheres ; that is, the sovereignty vests in the *civility*, not in the *popularity*, and popularity must be civility, before the people are sovereign. Consequently, the convention assembled in pursuance of a constitutional provision is not an appeal to a power or sovereignty back of the state, or civil society, but a body under the state, and subject to it. Then it has no power over the state. Then, since the state is in the constitution, begins and ends with it, it cannot alter or touch the essential character of the constitution, and the power to amend is necessarily restricted to amendments in the proper and legal sense of the term, as we have defined in the beginning. What we mean is, that a constitution once established is fixed in right forever ; and there is, under God, no power in the state or outside of it, that can alter it fundamentally, or change its essential principles. Our Constitution is essentially republican, and federal republican, and can never be legally changed into a monarchy or into a consolidated republic. If in the written constitution there is a clause which appears to authorize such a change, it is nugatory, because repugnant to the organic constitution of the state.

We must always distinguish between the written constitution and the constitution of civil society, — what we call the organic constitution. This precedes the convention, and is its law.

The written constitution presupposes it, but does not create it, or even modify it. All it does is to provide for the wise and just administration of government under it and in accordance with it. Our politicians err not in assuming a power back of the written instrument, but in assuming that power to be the people back of civil society, and therefore concluding that the convention is competent to alter the fundamental constitution of the state. So far as the written instrument marks or declares the civil constitution, it is unalterable ; but so far as it merely provides for the administration of government in accordance with it, it is alterable, in the way and manner authorized by law.

Now it is clear to every man who has studied the subject at all, that the fundamental constitution of the American state, whether we speak of the Union, or of the several States, is not pure, simple democracy ; and therefore any direct or indirect attempts to render it purely democratic are unconstitutional, and forbidden by the supreme law of the land, in like manner as would be any direct or indirect attempts to render it a pure aristocracy, oligarchy, or monarchy. The original and fundamental idea of our institutions is sacred, inviolable, obligatory, for our whole people, both collectively and individually, whether in convention or out of it. This idea is not simple, but complex, and is, no doubt, far from being at all acceptable to political theorists of one school or of another ; but this, perhaps, is a merit. We cannot understand to what good use political theorists can be put, or under what obligation any statesman is to consult their pleasure. Speculators on government, next to speculators on religion, are the greatest public nuisance we are acquainted with. Thank God ! the early settlers of this country were, for the most part, plain, practical men, of strong good sense, and no political speculators. They were ardent lovers of liberty, no doubt, as are all true men, but without any conception of what in these days of infidel raving and flimsy sentimentalism passes under that sacred name. They were Englishmen, and they brought with them the institutions of their mother country, as far as these could be adapted to the circumstances in which they were to be placed in this new world. Their political system was fundamentally the English system. When the colonies attained to majority and set up for themselves, they retained the system, simply modified, again, to meet their new circumstances. It is in this system we are to seek the type of our Constitution, not in modern democratic theories.

Our Constitution is fundamentally the British Constitution, without the hereditary House of Lords and the hereditary monarchy. These are excluded, for the king and lords were not here ; and the essential difference of our Constitution from the British lies precisely in excluding these, and in the contrivances adopted to supply their absence.

The democratic doctrine of the sovereignty of the people back of civil society finds no place in the British system. The Commons are powerful ; but they are an estate, not the entire civil body ; and they derive their power in the administration from the civil constitution, not from the law of nature, and hold it as a franchise, not as a natural right. The state knows nothing of the "rights of man," in the sense of the notorious infidel and charlatan, Thomas Paine, the great political teacher, mediately or immediately, of a large proportion of the American youth ; it knows only the rights of Englishmen. Liberty with it is British liberty, and authority British authority. The same principle holds with us. The American people, politically considered, are the English Commons transported here ; and their rights derive, not from the law of nature, as dream our political theorists, but from civil society, which grants and guaranties them. Let no American believe in Thomas Paine, the Thetford weaver. Let no man believe any more in Mr. Bancroft's *History of the Colonization of the United States*, a brilliant work, nay, an able work, but whose author, like Gibbon, possesses the art of falsifying history without misstating facts, and who has written, not for the sake of giving the history of his country, but of promulgating his humanitarian theories of government and religion. Our liberty is not natural liberty, but American liberty ; we possess our rights, not because we are men, but because we are American citizens. The right of suffrage is not a natural, but a civil right, and in its nature is a civil trust ; the right of the majority in ordinary cases to rule, so important a feature in our system, derives from civil society, not from nature ; for under the natural law all men are equal, and each man is independent of all others.

The Declaration of Independence left a gap in our system, a serious defect, because the people representing the Commons were not the entire civil body. This defect the conventions and congresses of the time undertook to supply, and to supply out of such elements as American society afforded. But they, at first, did it only imperfectly ; they left too large a margin to the Commons, — ample space to develop into a pure democracy,

which would have been fatal to the American state. To prevent this result, and to provide more effectual checks against the democratic tendency, which soon became excessive, the Convention of 1787 was assembled to amend the Constitution. In this sense they could amend it, for amendments which supply defects and tend to preserve the essential idea of the Constitution, secure the more perfect realization of its original type, are lawful, as we have conceded. That the Convention was assembled for the purpose of more effectually supplying this defect which our separation from Great Britain left in our Constitution, and to provide stronger checks against the democratic tendency, is undeniable. Mr. Madison's reports of the debates in the Convention fully establish it. "The evils we experience," said Mr. Gerry, "flow from excessive democracy." * Mr. Randolph observed that "the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the United States labored; that, in tracing these evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy; that some check, therefore, was to be sought for against this tendency of our government." † Other distinguished members said as much; no one contradicted them, and the Convention evidently took it for granted that their chief mission was to guard against excessive democracy, and without introducing the hereditary elements which the Constitution excluded. It is also clear, from the same authority, as well as from other sources, that the Convention did not provide as strong checks against democracy as they wished, or believed to be necessary, for fear, if they did, they would be unable to get their amendments adopted by the people.

It is well known that General Washington, the Father of his country, and at least one of the soundest heads and purest patriots the country has ever produced, apprehended from the first that too much liberty was allowed to democracy; and so did Adams, Hamilton, and all the distinguished men of the old Federal party, — men who, though decried by Mr. Jefferson and the French Jacobins, were the great men of their times, and whose practical political views contrast favorably with the brilliant and fanciful theories of their opponents. The Federalists have passed away; their party is among the things that were; they may have had their faults, and have erred in particulars; but the stability of the government and its constitutional purity de-

* *The Madison Papers*, p. 753.

† *Ibid.* p. 758.

pend on a speedy return to their general principles. We may well say this, for we were reared in the doctrine that they were traitors to their country and the bitter enemies of liberty. But we have lived long enough to find that Liberty's best friends are seldom those who make the loudest professions of friendship and drink the deepest toasts in her honor. Mr. Jefferson was regarded as a great friend of liberty, but he, when President, knowingly, deliberately, as he himself confesses, violated the Constitution of his country, which he had sworn "to preserve, protect, and defend."

As the weak point in our Constitution is the too great strength of democracy, or the feebleness of the checks provided by the Convention of 1787 against it, the American statesman, in order to be faithful to the Constitution, must study to strengthen these checks as far as he can constitutionally, and to repress the tendency of democracy to become exclusive. This was, as is well known, the policy pursued by General Washington, in his administration, and also by his immediate successor, the elder Adams. Let politicians say what they will, it is due to the constitutional administrations of Washington and Adams, to the high-toned conservative principles on which they were conducted, and to the little deference that under them was paid to demagogues and radicals, that our government has not now to be numbered among the things that were. Washington and Adams identified the people with civil society, not civil society with the people; recognized the popularity in the civility, not the civility in the popularity; and placed the government on a legal and conservative basis, from which it required the iron will and immense energy of General Jackson to remove it, and from which even he could not entirely remove it. The effects of the wise and profoundly conservative policy of the administrations of Washington and Adams are still felt, and have given to the administrations which have succeeded them all that they have had worthy of commendation. It is only by a sincere and hearty return to that policy that we can hope to save the country from the curse of lawless and shameless democracy, — a democracy which can, if left to itself, develop only in anarchy, which must be the precursor of military despotism.

A favorable opportunity offers itself now for this return. General Cass — an able, in many respects a worthy, man, but the representative of the expansive or progressive democracy, of "the manifest destiny" principle — has been defeated, and the American people have elected to the chief magistracy,

an opposition to him, a man of great force of character, of firm will, a practical cast of mind, free from the rage of theorizing, brought up in the camp, and therefore accustomed both to obey and to be obeyed, unpledged to systems or parties, and of immense popularity. If he comprehends his position, and is equal to it, he has a glorious opportunity of proving himself a second father of his country, and of rivalling Washington in his civic wisdom and virtue, as he has already approached him in his brilliant military achievements. Never since Washington had a resident of these United States so fine a chance to distinguish himself by rendering important services to his country and to the world. Now is the *TIME* ; we hope General Taylor is the *MAN*. If the present time is not improved, it is all but in vain to hope for another. With the false doctrines of our popular politicians, with the strong democratic tendency of our people, with the fearful progress radicalism has already made, with these democratic and socialistic revolutions hourly occurring abroad, making the Old World to its centre, and reacting on us with a tremendous force, it is to be feared, that, if we do not now take measures to strengthen the barriers against the popular movement, and to secure the supremacy of the Constitution and the majesty of the state, it will henceforth be for ever too late. We hope in a good Providence that the new American administration will duly consider this matter, place the government once more, after so many years, on the conservative basis, and endeavour to consolidate order and liberty within the state, rather than to extend our territories, and captivate us with the false show of a delusive external splendor.

IT. IV. — 1. *Discourse on the Right Rev. John Dubois, D. D., Bishop of New York, Founder of Mount St. Mary's, and Superior of St. Joseph's.* Pronounced in Mount St. Mary's Church, January 24, 1843, on the Occasion of a Solemn Service for the Repose of his Soul, by REV. JOHN McCaffrey, Superior of the Seminary, and President of the College of Mount St. Mary's.

Discourse on the Right Rev. Samuel Gabriel Bruté, D. D., Bishop of Vincennes. Pronounced in Mount St. Mary's Church, August 19, 1839, on the Occasion of a Solemn Ser-

vice for the Repose of his Soul, by the REV. JOHN MCCAFFREY, Superior of the Seminary, and President of the College of Mount St. Mary's.

WE knew that we were going to College — to a *Catholic* College — somewhere among the mountains. We were — we speak personally, not editorially — too young to know its exact location, or to care much about it. It seems a century ago ; but we distinctly remember a dismal aversion to the black-gowned priests of Rome, who were soon to be our only guardians. It was a bright May morning ; and as we watched the graceful and ever-varying outlines of the Blue Ridge, we caught a glimpse of two white specks in the distance. "The College and the Church," cried the driver. We made no reply, but looked with the "fixed gaze" of Dante on Beatrice, as if, even then, we had a presentiment of the influence they were to exert on our after lives.

As we approached, those white specks became stately buildings. And then, after passing through an avenue of noble oak and chestnut trees, we stood upon a smooth terrace, where a band of youths were slowly pacing, muttering over strings of beads. A tall man in an ominous cassock offered to conduct us to the church. We ascended the hill, — and a blaze of beauty burst upon us, such as we had never seen before. We knew not which was lovelier, — the sunset skies above, or the broad, verdant, limitless plain beneath, that looked tranquillity. For a moment, home-sickness and childish apprehension vanished, and all was joy.

But we descended ; my companion left me, and I stood desolate and lone with the man in the cassock. He soothed me like a father, but he could not check my tears. That night — how well I remember it ! — I knelt by my little cot and prayed to the genie of Aladdin to transport me far away. And it was not without a hope of being heard ; for I had read the *Arabian Nights* until I half believed them. However, I woke exactly where I lay down, and rose a student of Mount Saint Mary's College, Maryland, doomed to a most matter-of-fact breakfast of dry bread and coffee.

The first day was, by prescription, dedicated to a ramble over the mountain. There were numerous flower-gardens — very small and very pretty — scattered at intervals along a shady ravine, through which a clear, cold stream, abounding in crawfish, went merrily trickling. And what surprised me most was

to find, in almost every nook, three small wooden crosses planted in beds of green moss bordered by round, white pebbles. All along the slope of the hill were neat and durable paths, some broad, some narrow, frequently intersecting each other, and many of them terminating in a time-worn grotto. I was told they were made by Mr. Bruté. I did not know that I was treading hallowed ground, and, for some time, regarded Mr. Bruté as a good old industrious day-laborer, who had been well paid for his work. I had yet to learn that his wages were not of this world.

The days went rapidly by, — home-sickness disappeared, — I went through all the *hustlings*, — was initiated into the mysteries of "Gunjers" and "The Jug," and expanded into a regular mountaineer. How the heart glows even *now*, to review our Thursday joys! — to recall the rapture with which we shouldered our guns, and from sunrise to sunset, through creek, and den, and swamp, pursued with unwearied foot the hapless bird and fated squirrel! or the ecstasy with which we cast the seine in the "Ram's Hole" or "Crabb's Dam," and dashed through the waters like hunted otters! And when evening came, those memorable debates in the Philomathian and the aspiring Philalethian! — who that has shared them can ever forget them? *Then*, it was an every-day feat to climb the mountain for two miles at a steady trot, and descend at a run with the captive rabbit, — bait the traps and all, — in less than an hour. There was no dyspepsia *then*. And the rag-balls, with "Friday" for the devil, — the concerts, with "Major's" eye flashing through Figaro, — the annual supper and the annual oyster, — Christmas, St. John's day, St. Cecilia's, and the Twenty-second, each graced with the quarterly turkey, and — but I could go on for ever.

I do not write for all; and the emotion that thrills me as I write may appear unwarranted and ridiculous. There are some who will see only an unmeaning jargon in the words that bring back to me and *others* the sweet, the balmy morning of life. But there are many, here and far away over the waters, — the gallant, unbroken band of *mountaineers*, who have adorned the sanctuary and the battle-field, whose hands are ever clasped wherever they meet, whose hearts still leap at the mention of their Alma Mater, — *they* will weep tears of joy when others sneer, and feel a meaning where others find none.

I speak of myself, but not for myself alone; it is a language that sounds from Maine to Louisiana, from Missouri to Florida,

— a language that is heard among the snows of Canada, amid the orange groves of Rio, and in the fair isles of the Caribbean Sea. Would that I could express more worthily this sacred voice of love and gratitude !

The years went by without a pang, except when idleness incurred the frown of love. The name of Mary, the Blessed Virgin Mother of Jesus, became familiar to me, and I could not resist an inclination to pray to her and become an idolater—to that extent. Soon I ventured to make the sign of the cross, and to respond to the litanies. And at last, by the mercy of God, I knelt before the chapel altar, — the waters of regeneration were poured upon my head, — and I rose, a Catholic.

Ever blessed moment !—not only for me, but for another who knelt beside me, and was received into the bosom of the Church.

Shall we be sneered at for remembering and repeating this ? for clinging to a past that was full of light and beauty ? They are shouting around us, — “ Begin to live ! — the realities of life are before you, — onward to riches, rank, and fame ! ” So cried Catiline. We plunged into the world and tried its maxims ; and we found, that, instead of beginning to live, we were *beginning to die*. We tried the realities of life and found them shadows, — Dead Sea fruits that turned to ashes on the lips. We tasted human applause, and felt, that, in setting our hearts on it, we had incurred the frown of God. We lifted the spangled veil from the face of riches, rank, and fame, and saw the cankered Mokanna beneath it. We tried the round of fashion, and detected its heartlessness, its hopelessness, its martyrdom.

No ! in that little chapel where we received Catholicity, we began to live and to pursue realities ; and the fulfilment of our baptismal promises is still our only reality. And as we look around us, and see the true-hearted and the strong-minded groping in darkness for the light we there received, — as we feel more keenly every hour, that Catholicity is our only anchor, our only solace in danger, in despondency, in joy, and in death, — who can wonder that we turn with overflowing hearts to Mount St. Mary's, where our life began, and speak of her with a tenderness that makes the worldling smile ?

Let him read a portion of her history, and he will learn to respect her. After studying the lives of Dubois and Bruté, he will see the meaning of that immortal line, —

“ The world knows nothing of its greatest men.”

John Dubois was born in Paris, on the 24th day of August, 1764, and was educated at the College of Louis le Grand, side by side with Camille des Moulins and Robespierre, — the cross Christ and the guillotine ! His parents designed him for the army, but Heaven called him to a better warfare : he entered the seminary of St. Magloire, and was ordained priest at the beginning of the Revolution. He did not quail before the storm ; he refused to acknowledge the miscreants who were desolating France, left Paris in disguise, and sailed for Norfolk, Virginia.

He was welcomed by James Monroe and Patrick Henry, celebrated mass in the capitol. Bishop Carroll soon discovered, that, in sheltering the fugitive, they were receiving an angel, and John Dubois became the pastor of all western Maryland and Virginia. Gifted with an iron constitution and indomitable energy, and filled with the Spirit of God, he allowed himself no idle moments, no respite from toil, or relaxation after duty. No matter how inclement the weather, or how long the day, this faithful shepherd never disappointed his flock. One day, on a Saturday afternoon, as, almost exhausted by fatigue, he was entering the confessional, a distant sick call came. During the usual preparations for the Sunday mass to be made, he mounted his horse, stopped not until he reached the death-bed, administered the consolations of religion, and, after a journey of fifty miles, and twice swimming the Monocacy at the close of his life, was again in the confessional at nine o'clock the next morning, without having broken his fast, sang mass and preached, with so little appearance of fatigue, that many of the congregation never suspected that he had stirred abroad in the world. Efforts nearly as great as this were often his great-happiness.

He made himself all to all, that he might win all to Christ ; though habituated to the elegant refinements of the most polished society in the world, he loved to mingle with the rude and illiterate. For " he was as an eye to the blind and a foot to the lame, and the father of the poor ; and he sat as a king with his army standing about him, and as a comforter of them who mourned."

With the bold and sanguine spirit that marks the leader, he conceived his plan of a Catholic church in Frederick, at a time when there was neither money to build, nor Catholics to fill it. He created both ; and, to the amazement of all, built it, paid for it, and filled it.

This was but the beginning of his mission. In a dense, miry, and almost inaccessible thicket at the foot of a mountain near Emmitsburg, this friendless foreigner, lisping an unknown language, saw a fountain of pure rock water, — that fountain which is now dearer than Helicon to many a heart ! — and he told the people, that *there* he meant to establish a College for the education of their children and the supply of the holy ministry. There were looks of surprise, smiles of incredulity ; many a laugh and jeer went round, and some privately pronounced him crazy. How human wisdom dwindles into littleness beside the bold, indefatigable, heaven-inspired servant of God !

But before proceeding with this great work, he selected a site of unrivalled beauty and grandeur, a stone's throw above the fountain, whence half of Maryland, a large part of Pennsylvania, and something of Virginia are seen, blended into one immense semicircle, and erected the church which still stands a monument of his energy and virtue.

A log building, with a narrow clearing in front, was the beginning of the College, or rather of the Seminary ; for the education of ecclesiastics was his primary object. He was soon surrounded by aspirants to the holy ministry, and the Queen of Sciences was enthroned at Mount St. Mary's.

This was the beginning. In a few years the scene had changed, as if by magic. The thicket was cleared, the stumps of trees were removed, the grounds inclosed and broken into terraces. The water, "taught a better course," flowed through artificial channels to the spot where it was needed ; a garden bloomed with flowers and the fruits of many climes, where but yesterday the fox and wolf were howling ; there were shady walks along the mountain-side, or on the margin of the murmuring brook ; scholars had gone forth to tell their friends what beautiful things were a-doing at the foot of the Blue Ridge. The Feast of Pentecost, 1824, saw a noble edifice on the point of completion, and a hundred youthful students ready to occupy it.

Yet this was the madness at which cool and calculating heads shook so very sagaciously. It was the wisdom of the world ; for how could an exile flying from the sword of persecution, a penniless priest, without one dollar of endowment or donation from the State, with no munificent grant, no rich bequest, with *nothing* but his own energies and the help of God to rely on, — how could *he* be expected to accomplish that to which the authority and treasures of Maryland were scarcely adequate ? "Verily, that which is foolish of God is wiser than men" !

The sun of Pentecost gilded the cross that crowned the cupola of that majestic structure : the next morning glittered in mockery over its ashes and ruins. Roused by cries of terror, at the dead of night, from the sweet sleep of the good man, John Dubois beheld at a glance the ruin of his hopes ; — that new and glorious edifice was on fire, and fierce flames were streaming from every window. Come ye who sicken over the loss of a few thousands which ye scarcely miss, — ye who droop and wither before the frown of beauty, — ye who blaspheme because your cook has spoiled some favorite morsel, — and ye who groan beneath real affliction, — come and take a lesson from this venerable old man ! Mark him, as he sees the harvest of years perishing before him, — mark him, as the ruthless fire that devours the child of his heart lights up his silvery hair and splendid features, — not tearful and heart-broken, as you may suppose, but deliberately arming himself with the sign of the cross, and exclaiming with Job, “ The Lord gave and the Lord taketh away ; blessed be the name of the Lord ! ” And come ye who go to Plutarch for your great sayings, — or to Roman history, — or to the American savage, — hear this servant of God, though the snows of sixty winters are whitening his head, exclaiming, as he calmly eyes the flaming edifice, which had exhausted his means and his hopes, “ There are some defects in the plan of this building, *which I'll remedy in the next.* ” Go, and contrast it with the reply which has just elected Zachary Taylor President of the United States : it will not suffer even by that contrast.

He kept his word ; — another and a better edifice began to rise, whilst the ashes of the first were smoking. Unscathed by fire and time, it still remains ; and Mount Saint Mary's College, pure as the fountain that gushes beside it, has never ceased, from that moment, to scatter blessings through the world.

To the Mother of God he dedicated his Church, his College, and his Seminary. The hill, the spring, the woods, and every thing around him, were sacred to Mary. And it was not long before the Virgin Queen of Heaven crowned his labors with success far exceeding his brightest hopes.

Yet all this is but the half of what John Dubois accomplished. From the platform of the mountain church may be seen, a mile or two distant in the verdant plain, a group of stately buildings, producing an effect superior to any thing on this side of the Atlantic, — St. Joseph's. When Mother Seaton and her little band of resolute associates left ease and rank behind them,

to feed the hungry, to rear the orphan, to nurse the sick, and, like tutelary angels, to throw themselves between pestilence and its victim, John Dubois gave them a home — when other they had none — on his own consecrated hill. There he consoled, encouraged, and sustained them amid trials and difficulties which would have shaken souls less devout than theirs, and, from the scanty stores of his own poverty, supplied them with bread, when, but for him, they had no alternative but to abandon their undertaking and disperse, or perish for want of food. There he initiated them into the practice of the rules laid down by St. Vincent, and instructed, trained, formed, and directed them all.

But the authority that forms the key-stone of the grand arch of Catholic unity called him from his dear mountain and beautiful valley, — from the spot which he found a wilderness and made a paradise ; and, in the autumn of 1826, he was consecrated to the See of New York. We shall not follow him there, through his unostentatious, but active and untiring, career of benevolence.

A few years ago, that man of God was permitted by Heaven to revisit the scene of his early labors, and to behold again the mansions of piety he had made for others in this life, ere he entered the abodes of bliss which angels were preparing for him in the life to come. He was weak with age and increasing infirmity, but his quick, commanding eye, even *then*, sparkled with energy and benevolence. We knew not what he thought, — he said but little, — he only looked and smiled, as the old and the young tottered or sprang for his blessing. It was the last he ever gave us on earth. At the foot of Blue Ridge, his epitaph is written in living characters that expand and deepen every year. *They* need not the chisel of Old Mortality to preserve them.

In all these labors, John Dubois was seconded by a brother priest from France, — a spirit akin to his own. Simon Gabriel Bruté was born at Rennes on the 20th of March, 1779. He soon gave evidences of superior talent and promise of a brilliant career. In the public schools of his native city, he was distinguished and eminently successful. At the age of twenty, we find him in the medical school of Paris, where, for three years, he attended the lessons of the first masters of the age. The professional chairs were then indeed “chairs of pestilence,” and impiety reigned among the licentious students. But the young Bruté was armed against this. His virtuous parents had brought him up in the fear and love of God ; and at the begin-

ning of the Revolution, when the prisons were crowded with those who were too noble-minded to conceal or abjure their faith, Simon Gabriel Bruté, then but a boy of tender years, might be seen, in the disguise of a baker's boy, penetrating the prison and supplying the victims of persecution, not only with that bread which nourishes the body, but with the bread of angels, — the food that gives life to the soul. Thus consecrated to heaven in his infancy, he was uninjured by the sneers and sophisms of La Marck and Fourcroy, and, like the children of Israel in the fiery furnace, passed unscathed through the midst of the flames ; “ for the angel of the Lord walked with him.” He defied infidelity, and, throwing down the gauntlet to his professors, came off conqueror, and secured the approbation of the First Consul.

Surrounded by infidel teachers and libertine fellow-students, with the echoes of irreligious sophistry and blasphemy incessantly tingling in his ears, — beset with the bustle and giddy dissipation of the gayest capital in the world, while the star of Napoleon was in the ascendant, and tidings of victory after victory flushed and almost maddened the youthful minds of France, — he thought only of storing his mind with knowledge and sanctifying his soul.

Medicine was not his only study : he excelled in mathematics, philosophy, and drawing. In 1803, he graduated as a doctor of medicine, with the highest honors of the school. It was then, in the budding of his triumph, he turned his thoughts from the cure of the human body to the cure of the immortal soul. After fervent prayer and mature reflection, he took the advice of a prudent director, and, obedient to the Divine voice within, entered the Seminary of St. Sulpitius, at Paris, a candidate for the holy priesthood. There he carried on his studies at the foot of the cross, and laid both deep and strong the foundations of his ecclesiastical learning, on which he reared that solid and magnificent edifice which so long commanded the admiration of all that beheld its towering height and fair proportions.

For five years he devoted the retirement of the Seminary to sacred study and pious exercises, respected and beloved by equals and superiors, and giving an example of humility, simplicity, and obedience. In this manner he went from virtue to virtue, having the word of God “ for a lamp to his feet and a light to his paths.”

A single incident will mark his fearless and disinterested generosity. A young friend of his, having incurred the suspicion

of the imperial government, was threatened with death. Convinced of his innocence, M. Bruté sought to have the case revised. But in vain. As a last resource, he prepared a memorial, hoping to deliver it as the emperor left the chapel. But, foiled by the rapidity of Bonaparte's motions, he pursued him so eagerly, that he was nearly bayoneted by the *gens d'armes* in attendance.

Soon after his ordination, in such estimation was he held, that he was offered the appointment of assistant chaplain to the emperor. Had he accepted it, this young ecclesiastic might have changed the history of the world. But, in obedience to his bishop, he declined the offer, and taught theology at Rennes, until appointed to the mission of the United States in the summer of 1810, when, bidding adieu to France, he set sail for America, and joined his brethren of the Sulpitian society at Baltimore.

His association with M. Dubois commenced in 1818, when he took charge of the Seminary at Mount St. Mary's College, and nurtured with pious solicitude and zeal the growing institution. If his genius and learning were conspicuous when he expatiated on theology and moral philosophy, they were not the less admirable when he descended to the humble task of teaching youth geography, or explaining the little catechism to children. In addition to his multiplied duties as teacher, he was also confessor to the Sisters of Charity, and for many years pastor of Emmitsburg. His labors were rewarded with the most abundant fruit. His cheerful piety, amiable manners, and lively interest in the welfare of his pupils were sure to win their hearts; while his eminent holiness of life secured their veneration. His exhortations to virtue and piety could scarcely fail of effect, because he recommended what he himself practised. No standard of Christian or priestly excellence to which he pointed could appear too high, since he was himself a living instance of its attainment. If, forgetful of this earth, he always pointed and allured to heaven, he also led the way.

Long before the morning dawn, this "blameless priest" arose to converse with God and give him the first fruits of the day; and when he approached the altar to offer up the holy sacrifice, his heart, full to overflowing, was always overpowered by mingled emotions of reverential awe, gratitude, and love, that often found relief in copious tears. When descending to the discharge of his ordinary duties, like Moses, he bore the marks of converse with his God, and the seraph seemed to have touched

his lips with living coals of fire. His time was divided between prayer and good works, and his recreation was but variety of labor. At one time, you could find him kneeling for hours before the blessed Sacrament, — at another, in his superb library, surrounded by the writings of the fathers and doctors of the Church, pursuing his elevated studies with intense application, — and again, plunging into the mountain torrent, and swimming amid masses of floating ice, to hear confessions on the opposite shore. Or, after a journey of fifty miles performed on foot in a single day, book in hand, praying and reading by turns, and scarcely stopping to take the simple refecton that nature required, you might see him meeting his friends in the evening with a freshness of spirits and gayety of conversation that could not be surpassed.

Often did he strip himself of the garments necessary to his own comfort, to bestow them on some shivering victim of poverty. The bigot, who drove him from his door by day, could not prevent him from bringing clothes and provisions to his needy family by night : ingratitude but inflamed his charity the more. When scandal arose, his soul burned within him until it was extinguished and the evil remedied. When neighbours were at enmity, cowering under the fury of a winter storm, and pelted with driving sleet and snow, he could be seen returning from the blessed work of reconciliation. And when he entered the pulpit, how those who understood him well loved to follow the eagle flights of his genius ! — how they felt their faith shaking off its heavy slumbers, as conscience, from the deep abysses of the heart, responded to his bold appeals, and the spark of charity grew to a consuming flame ! And even those who caught no meaning from his foreign accent went away deeply moved and edified, saying that he appeared to them as an angel speaking to their souls in the name and by the authority of God.

And amidst all these occupations, and others which are recorded only in heaven, Simon Gabriel Bruté and John Dubois, hand in hand, hovered like twin angel guardians over the tender plant, which is now the great, the beautiful Saint Joseph's.

But the time arrived when this " burning and shining light " was to be placed on the golden candlestick of the Apostles, and M. Bruté was appointed to the newly erected See of Vincennes. A splendid episcopacy he would undoubtedly have declined ; but to make new sacrifices, — to take up his lot in poverty and privation among strangers, — to go far from what-

ever was dear to him on earth, — to spread the glad tidings of salvation in the rising West, and use his influence in the mother country to secure missionaries for the land of his adoption, — these were temptations he could not resist. He therefore bowed his head to a thorny mitre, and, in the autumn of 1834, proceeded towards his distant diocese.

At Vincennes he found himself a stranger, poor, and alone. Around him were little more than the wrecks of the Catholic faith and discipline of the original settlers. Every thing was to be commenced, and all was to be effected by himself. In less than eight months, he had travelled more than a thousand miles on horseback over roads almost impracticable, visited every part of his extensive diocese, and was as familiar with the missions of the West in general as if his whole life had been devoted to them exclusively. He then proceeded to Europe for succour, — stood amid the ruins and resurrection of the Eternal City, — received the blessing of the common Father of the Christian world, — offered up the Victim of salvation in the eucharistic sacrifice on the tombs of the Apostles, — scanned with the eye of genius and cultivated taste the noble productions of ancient and modern art, — plunged into the labyrinths of Rome's greatest libraries, — and, by his enlightened curiosity, profound erudition, and virtuous simplicity of manners, won the admiration of Mai and Mezzofanti. At Vienna he was courted by the great, the learned, and the pious, and treated with marked respect by the imperial family. In his own beautiful France, he found himself encircled by relatives and friends, honored by the noble, the powerful, and admired by all. And then, with more than twenty missionaries, he hurried back to the wilds of Vincennes.

In a short time he opened a College, a free school for boys, which soon numbered eighty pupils, and an orphan asylum for girls, superintended by the Sisters of Charity. The enumeration of his labors and privations would fill a volume. Wasting away under an incurable consumption, he still proceeded on his errand of mercy, going about like his Divine Master, doing good to all. Difficulties that would have disheartened, and obstacles which might have been called insurmountable, but animated his zeal and charity. Once, having commenced a journey of four hundred miles, in such a state of bodily suffering that he could not sit upright on his horse, he nevertheless completed it, without the intermission of a single day. And shortly before his death, he left Vincennes to visit a distant mission, which he had already visited thrice within the year ; and, though so weak and

attenuated that he could scarcely support his tottering frame, he answered, in the absence of the pastor, three distant sick calls on the same day, and, almost dying, administered the consolations of religion to those who appeared no nearer to mortal dissolution than himself.

In 1834, he found one priest and three churches in his diocese : after five years, he left there twenty-three missionaries, and a temple to the living God in almost every town and many a country place.

To such a man death was no unwelcome visitor. As they wept around his death-bed, he murmured, as if to console them, "*I am going home. To-day with you, — to-morrow with God.*" And then, abandoning himself to prayer, he calmly and sweetly surrendered his soul into the hands of his Creator.

The mayor and civil authorities, with the learned societies of Vincennes, passed resolutions to attend his funeral. The whole population poured forth to accompany in solemn silence his honored remains to their last resting-place on earth. They were outnumbered by attendant angels.

In meditating upon the lives and deaths of these men of God, whilst filled with joy and hope for them, we return into ourselves with fear and trembling.

This imperfect narrative of Dubois and Bruté has been compiled exclusively from the discourses, noticed in the beginning, pronounced by the Rev. John McCaffrey, who knew and loved and witnessed many of the shining virtues of those he celebrates. There are no finer biographies in the language than those two noble orations, in which he has given to the world some knowledge of its truly great men. Every page breathes a tenderness and a sincerity which cannot be imitated ; for he wrote from a heart overflowing at the memories that every word suggested. I have not presumed to vary his exquisite language : I felt that it would be injustice to him and to the dead — and to the living. But if this mutilation of his eloquent discourses retains a particle of their beauty and piety, it must be acceptable to every genuine Catholic.

Instead of poring over histories hostile to the Church and inimical to Christianity, or of devouring novels whose insidious poison corrupts the very fountain of domestic peace, whose scenes of gilded guilt are dancing in the giddy brain of youth, and leading on, with siren music, millions of souls to eternal ruin, — instead of weeping for Consuelo or Fleur de Marie, or sobbing tenderly over the fate of Lara, or Hafed, or Selim, or

feeling a *generous* compassion for Milton's Lucifer, — would to heaven that all Catholics would read their Catholic literature, and learn to relish the trials and the triumphs of their saints, and feel with men whose souls are in heaven, instead of sympathizing with empty images shaped in hell ! And would to heaven that Catholic writers, instead of brewing us a stale decoction of Bulwer, James, and Eugene Sue, — instead of wedding theology to fiction and converting Protestants to — anything but Catholicity, — would content themselves with finding proper words for the preservation of the real labors of the real ornaments of our holy faith, instead of decking out their imaginary heroes and heroines in what is, after all, no very creditable costume. Eminent Catholic sanctity actually accomplishes more than most poets and authors can invent or imagine ; and fact is a far better panegyrist of the Church than fancy.

There is no theme more deserving, and more capable of developing true genius and poetry, than the labors of Catholic missionaries from China to California, from Norway to the Sandwich Islands. And what more elevated or praiseworthy occupation can there be than to hold up to the love of all the shining patterns of Catholic piety, and thus share the merits of their illustrious example by a faithful narrative of their virtues ?

We hope to see the Alumni of St. Mary's reproducing the splendid history of the noble and saintly Dubourg, and following that great man through his majestic career of good, from the time that he heard and confirmed the heroic resolution of Mother Seaton, until, in the name of Heaven, " he set out as a giant to run the way " and build up religion in the West. And when the writer is inspired by the memory of Dubourg, let him not forget the names of Nagot and Garnier.

It cannot be long before some master hand, which owes its grace to Georgetown College, will unfold the magnificent life of his Alma Mater, and point out a group of gems glittering almost unseen amid the glorious light that flashes from the crown of the Society of Jesus, — that immortal crown, bright with the blood of countless martyrs and the redemption of half the heathen world.

ART. V. — *The Christian Church and Social Reform. A Discourse delivered before the Religious Union of Associationists.* By WILLIAM HENRY CHANNING. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1848. 8vo. pp. 32.

THERE are few men outside the Church for whom we have a warmer personal affection, or a more sincere esteem, than we have for the author of this Discourse, — a nephew of the well-known and lamented William Ellery Channing, the warm-hearted philanthropist, and eloquent Unitarian minister. He is a man of singular purity of mind and sweetness of disposition, — earnest, self-denying, brave, — with more than his celebrated uncle's learning, and occasionally with more than that uncle's eloquence. We have known him for years ; and, before our conversion, we loved him as we loved few men, and hoped more from him, with a single exception, than from any other man with whom we were associated, or whom we were permitted to include in the number of our personal friends. We love him not less now, though our personal intercourse with him has been nearly interrupted, and we have ceased to have any sympathy with his views, plans, or movements.

We have great confidence in Mr. Channing's integrity, as well as in his ingenuousness and candor ; we believe him not unwilling to receive the truth ; and we are sure he would shrink from no sacrifices obedience to it might demand, were he once, through the grace of God, clearly and distinctly to behold it. He is a Socialist, avowedly a Socialist, and a Socialist with as extreme and as utterly objectionable views as any one of the Socialistic sect we are acquainted with ; but he really possesses much *religiosity*, so to speak, and wishes to retain and practise the Christian religion. Doubtless he has, as all men of his class have, a secret pride, which revolts at the humility of the cross, and obscures the spiritual vision ; but his errors, we must believe, spring rather from his intellect than his will, and are in no small degree due to the prejudices of his education, and the unfavorable influences to which for the most of his life he has been exposed. Educated in that negation of the Christian symbol called Unitarianism, — brought up, as are all Unitarian youth, without any real knowledge of Christianity, without imbibing any thing of the distinctively Christian spirit, and with his mind, his affections, and his hopes turned away from the Gospel, — it is not strange that he was early led into the mazes

of wild theories and vain philosophy. Unable to satisfy either the wants of his mind or of his heart with the negations of his sect, he early became unsettled and restless, asking in vain for something to believe, and still more earnestly for something to do ; careless of the salvation of his own soul, because without any belief in a future judgment, or in God as a remunerator, and confounding the human sentiment of philanthropy with the Christian virtue of charity, nothing in the world was more natural than that he should turn Socialist, and seek to find food for his intellect, his affections, and his activity, in efforts at Social Reform, or the realization of an earthly paradise.

With no infallible Church to direct him, with no external criterion of truth or of good, and recognizing no revelation but the subjective inspirations of the affections, or the Divinity manifesting itself in human instincts and tendencies, he was forced to take humanity, or human nature, as his authority, and the satisfaction of its cravings in time as his end. In a word, he has been obliged, in the absence of the religion of God, to supply its place with "the religion of humanity," as he expressly calls it. But in this he shows two things which we respect, and which give us hope. Even his religion of humanity, — a religion which puts man in the place of God, as beginning, motive, and end,—though a veritable idolatry, and excusable in no one, bears witness to his religiosity, and also to his logical consistency. It is a tribute to religion not without its value, and a proof that he does not shrink from pushing the Protestant movement which he accepts to its last consequences. May we not hope that he will soon see that the worship of humanity is as sad superstition as the worship of wood and stone, and that man falls as far below his dignity as below his duty whenever he worships any other than the infinite and eternal God ?

We have read Mr. Channing's Discourse with great attention, and with an earnest endeavour to ascertain and appreciate its meaning. Abler Socialistic discourses we may have read, but a more genuine or truthful statement of modern Socialism, under its least irreligious aspect, we have not read. It presents a synopsis of the whole teaching of the Socialistic school or sect, on God, nature, religion, the Church, man, society, association, reform, progress, economy, social and domestic. With a hope, not presumptuous we persuade ourselves, that our words may reach the author and receive from him respectful consideration, we venture to take it up somewhat in detail, and subject it to a close and even minute criticism. If, in doing so, we

ove ourselves severe, Mr. Channing, we are sure, will understand that our severity is for the author, not for the man, for whom we have begun by expressing our affection and esteem. In order not to give occasion to the author and his friends to accuse us of misapprehension and misstatement, and to enable our readers to judge of the bearing and appropriateness of our remarks, we shall copy, in its separate divisions, the entire Discourse, as far as we make it the subject of our comments. We begin with the beginning.

'In opening this winter's course of meetings, let us at once turn attention to the problem which this age has most at heart to solve ; let us, in order to do so, let us consider THE RELATIONS OF THE CHURCH TO SOCIALISM. For that the Christian Church is now the centre of spiritual life in Humanity there can be no reasonable doubt, and as it is that Social Reform is the characteristic political movement of this generation. "*Make religion practical, and practice religious,*" is the command of the Divine Spirit more clearly than ever before ; the *Law of harmonious coöperation* between these two extremes of human existence is the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds.

I. REALISM. — But, in attempting to survey the tendencies of the age into which we have been born, let us be sure, in the outset, to occupy the firm ground of Realism. By this it is meant, that we should start in our inquiry from the *life* amid which we consciously exist, rather than from absolute *principles* assumed by Idealism, or from partial *experiments* to which Empiricism trusts. If we could ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth, he would be absorbed in God ; and, by becoming immersed in the flood of transient circumstances, he loses himself in Nature. His appropriate sphere is mediate, between the Infinite One and the Finite Many. He lives by receiving and diffusing life, and grows by assimilating to his own person inspiration from above and experience from beneath. Motives are communicated which he must study to manifest in deeds ; by reflection on ends fulfilled, he gains capacity for new impulses ; and the medium by which, in him and through him, love and beauty are married and made fruitful, is wisdom. We move and have our being amidst a Divine Reality, whose persons are progressively revealed in societies, races, and heavens, solar systems are evolved from parent-suns ; and in proportion to our full communion with Him who is at once the centre and circumference of existence, is our real life. *This life we interchange with our fellow-men ; and we live well, just in degree as we conspire with our age, our nation, our neighbours, to embody in Acts the Ideas through which Good evermore flows in to reanimate mankind.* The first gazing on the vast sweeping forces of the universe, the en-

thusiast awaiting the accomplishment of the Almighty's plans, may be tempted to apathy or presumption. But the Realist, who recognizes the exact order of events, and yet hears himself summoned to coöperate with an unfolding creation, becomes a hero. He is at once pious, self-relying, and brave. His energies expand amidst the mighty powers which call him to be their peer. Serene and constant, neither exaggerating nor slighting his special function, assured of the guidance of One Sovereign Will, he bears the cross, he wears his crown, emulous only to discharge the duty which Humanity intrusts to his fidelity, and aspiring to be a pure medium of Divine disinterestedness. His aim is to be made a minister of Providence in his own time and land; calmly confiding, that thus he will be each day regenerate, and that the future will welcome him to ever-enlarging usefulness and joy." — pp. 3-5.

The problem, it will be seen from this, is the relation of the Church to Socialism, or to determine the law of harmonious coöperation between the Christian Church and Social Reform, "the two extremes of man's existence." The author should have defined his terms in the outset, and told us in what sense he uses the words *Christian*, *Church*, *Social*, and *Reform*; but let that pass; we shall find his definition of some of them at least, as we proceed. The first step is to fix the method of inquiry, or to determine the point of departure. This the author fixes in Realism, as distinguished, on the one hand, from Idealism, and, on the other, from Empiricism.

But what is this Realism? We really wish the author had been more clear and precise in his definition. He obviously does not mean by it the philosophical doctrine of a school well known in the history of philosophy, for that school asserted the reality of Ideas, which he denies, since he distinguishes Realism from Idealism. The real as distinguished from the ideal is precisely what is meant by the actual. His Realism, then, is Actualism; and that it is, we conclude from the fact that he identifies it, not with pure being, but with *life*, "the life amid which we consciously exist"; for life is pure being reduced to act, — or being actualized, existing, and performing its several functions.

But what is the meaning of starting with the actual as our point of departure? It must be the assumption of the justness and sufficiency of the actual; for if we declare the actual faulty or insufficient, we must draw either upon past experiments, and seek to complete it by reproducing what has been, or upon the absolute principles of Idealism, and seek to complete it by embodying new ideas in acts, — both of which the author

expressly excludes. But if the actual is just, is complete, satisfactory, what need of reform, social or individual? It strikes us that the author suppresses, in the very beginning, one of the two extremes between which he was to find, or establish, "the law of harmonious coöperation."

According to the author, man must remain below the absolute principles of Idealism and above the partial experiments of Empiricism, — that is, if we understand it, in the actual, — or lose his identity, that is, cease to exist. For, if he "could ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth, he would be reabsorbed in God, and, by becoming immersed in the flood of transient circumstances, he loses himself in Nature." Reabsorb is to absorb again; for, in this word, *re* is iterative, not simply intensive. Consequently, the author must hold that man was originally absorbed in God, and has been evolved from him. Evolution denies creation. The author, therefore, denies the Creative Deity, and, therefore, God himself; for the radical and fundamental conception of God is that of Creator, since we recognize his being only in the category of cause, as we apprehend the cause in the effect. What, then, can the author mean, when he talks of God, of the Divinity? and on what authority does he presume to deny God, and the fact of creation? Authority is as necessary to enable us to deny as to affirm. By absorption in God, the author must mean the loss of identity; for he makes it the opposite extreme from losing ourselves in Nature. Hence, the saints will be unable to enjoy the beatific vision, — for in that they are supposed to "ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth," — without losing their identity, and ceasing to exist. Hence, again, the author denies even the possibility of the immortality and heaven which our Lord and his Apostles taught, and which all Christians hope for. On what authority does he do this? How does he prove that man cannot dwell at the fountain-head of truth, without being absorbed in it, that is, becoming identically it?

Man's "appropriate sphere is mediate, between the Infinite One, and the Finite Many." Will the author tell us what that is which is mediate between God and Nature, between One and Many, between Infinite and Finite, — that is, which is neither the one nor the other, neither Infinite nor Finite? Is there any proportion between Infinite and Finite? If not, as there is not, will he explain to us how something can be mediate between them, below the one and above the other? We had supposed that all which is not Infinite is Finite, and all which is not Finite is Infinite.

Man "grows by assimilating into" — we should say *to*, not *into* — "his own person inspiration from above and experience from beneath." Does this mean that the inspiration is from God, and the experience from the devil? That would be no forced interpretation. If the inspiration is actually received, is it not experience? Why, then, may not experience be from above as well as from beneath? Does the author use the word *inspiration* in its ordinary theological sense? Then he teaches that all men are Divinely inspired. But what proof has he of this? How can there be Divine inspiration, if God is not? and if all men are Divinely inspired, what need of the University — for which, we shall soon see, the author contends — to instruct them, to mediate by intelligence between the Church and the State, the Divine element in man and the human? If he uses the word in a different sense, by what right does he do so, without defining expressly in what sense? Suppose man does grow by the means asserted, — how are we to know whether he grows good or bad, unless we know the character of the inspiration and experience which he assimilates? By what criterion determine that character? "By reflection on ends fulfilled, he gains capacity for larger impulses." Why on ends fulfilled, rather than on ends to be fulfilled? And what business has the author to recur to ends fulfilled, since they can have been only partial experiments, which his Realism excludes? What sort of impulses do we by reflection acquire a capacity for, — good or bad? Are we rendered impulsive by reflection? and are they, who reflect the most, the most impulsive in their character? Impulsive actions are not virtuous actions; for virtuous actions are voluntary, and performed with foresight of the end. The more subject to impulse we are, the less of virtue we have. Is it desirable to enlarge our impulses and diminish our virtues?

"The medium by which love and beauty are married, and made fruitful, is wisdom." What sort of love and beauty, spiritual or sensual, does wisdom unite in wedlock? What children are born to the wedded pair? What is the fruit of the union? Whence comes the wisdom which is its medium?

"We move and have our being amidst a Divine reality." The author evidently means here, by "Divine reality," what he has just called "the life amid which we consciously exist." Is the *life*, which we found to be the actual, the Divine reality? or is the Divine reality simply actuality, — the actual life we live, — the actual universe? Which is the author's meaning? If the former, we live true life, life according to the Divine reality;

and then what need of reform ? If the latter, all actuality is Divine reality : how, then, is reform possible ? Who ever dreamed of reforming the Divine reality ?

“ Whose perfections are progressively revealed in societies, races, and heavens, as solar systems are evolved from parent-suns.” How know we that there are any *solar* systems but our own ? or if there are, that they are *evolved* from suns ? How know we that our earth, for instance, has been evolved from our sun ? Are the conjectures of cosmogonists and astronomers a solid basis for *science* ? What is the author’s authority for saying that societies, races, heavens are evolved from the Divinity, instead of being created by Him ? How knows he that the Divine reality is *progressively* evolving societies, races, heavens ? We have great respect for the author, but we cannot believe matters of such vast moment as these on his word alone.

“ In proportion to our full communion with Him ” — God, the Divine reality — “ is our real life.” Full communion with God, with Divine reality, is the same as “ to dwell at the fountain-head of truth.” So our real life is in ceasing to live ; and in proportion as we attain to it, we lose it, by losing our identity ! We have read that “ he who will lose his life for Christ’s sake shall find it ” ; but we do not recollect having before read, that he who shall find his real life in God shall lose it. Our real life is, we agree, in full communion with God ; but what right the author has to say this, after having virtually affirmed that such communion would be the loss of our existence, and denied its possibility by virtually denying the existence of God, we are unable to comprehend. Of contraries, one must be false.

“ We live *well*, just in degree as we conspire with our age, our nation, our neighbours, to embody in Acts the Ideas through which Good evermore flows in to reanimate mankind.” Which ideas are those ? and what right has the author to recur to the ideal ? The plain English of this is, we live well, when we conspire with our age, our nation, and our neighbours, to do good. Is the *well-living* in the conspiring or striving to do good, or in conspiring with our age, our nation, and our neighbours ? If the former, the author merely utters a truism ; if the latter, he assumes that our age, our nation, our neighbours, that is, all men actually living, — for *neighbours*, as here used, must be taken universally, — are right, conspire to the right end, and live well. If so, what is the necessity for reform, social or individual ? All are right as they are, as already implied in your Realism ; and what more can you ask ? Surely, you would not reform right, truth, sanctity ?

“ But the Realist, who recognizes the exact order of events.” Who is he ? Who, less than omniscient, can recognize the exact order of events, or even that there is an exact order of events ? Who is able to say that the order of nature has never been or never can be interrupted by miracles, — miracles, whether of mercy or of judgment ? “ And yet hears himself summoned.” By whom ? On what authority ? “ To coöperate with an unfolding creation.” To do what ? How can one coöperate with creation, if there is no creation ? If there is a creation, the author’s doctrine of evolution is false. But to coöperate with an unfolding creation in doing what ? In unfolding creation ? But to unfold creation, if it is unfolded, is the part of the Creator, a portion of His work necessary to complete creation. Is man summoned to aid the Creator to create ? Or shall we say the creation develops itself, and man is summoned to take his share in the work of development ? But self-development is inconceivable, and certainly inadmissible by the Realist, who excludes the ideal ; for development is the actualization of the ideal, the fulfilment of the primitive type or idea. The development necessarily depends on the power on which its subject itself depends. If creation depends on God, He is the developer. If it develops itself, it depends on itself, that is, is independent, self-existent. But an independent, self-existent *creation* is a contradiction in terms. God is independent, self-existent, and therefore is, as the schoolmen say, *Actus purissimus*, and incapable of development. “ Becomes a hero.” If the first requisite is insisted on, no man can be a hero. If only the last, — since, if it means any thing, it can mean only coöperating with the actual in what the actual is actually doing, — any man can be a hero who swims with the current, and does not resist his age, country, or neighbours. Cheap heroism that !

“ Emulous only to discharge the duty which Humanity intrusts to his fidelity.” So man receives his duty from man, and not from God ! Man, then, is the subject of man ! Is this what Mr. Channing calls Liberty ? “ His aim is to be made a minister of Providence in his own time and land.” Does the author use *Providence* and *Humanity* as convertible terms ? If not, here is a mistake. The man is the minister of Him to whom he owes his duty, — from whom he receives his ministry. The author, then, unless for him God and man are identical, should say, in order to be consistent with himself, “ his aim is to be made a minister of” *man* “ in his own time and land.”

But we pass to consider “ CHRISTENDOM,” the second division of the Discourse.

'II. CHRISTENDOM. — Planted firmly on this ground of Realism, at once recognize that we are members of the fraternity of nations pervaded by one spiritual life, which is so rightly called Christendom. Let him who is prompted, from the basis of natural science or of arbitrary speculation, to break up, fuse anew, and remould modern civilization after his own image, attempt it. The race will be good, alike from his truths and his errors; and he will learn forgetfulness from seeing how easily the growing Tree of Life absorbs into its mighty trunk the litter of his theories and the soil of good sense. The Realist will strive only to aid the development of Christendom, by blending with it his best life. There is no question as to the quality or mode of the peculiar inspiration which creates a collective unity out of nations so various in blood, language, and race. It is enough for our present purpose, to acknowledge that the LIFE of Jesus has been the fertilizing germ of the institutions and manners, of the literature, philosophy, and art, of the West; and conscience, of our progenitors; enough to own, that the revelation of a DIVINE HUMANITY, manifested through Jesus, is yet vital, elevating the mind of this generation to an ever higher thought of the image of God, which man, collective and individual, was created to be, and prompting classes and nations to brotherhood by a never warmer consciousness of the unity of mankind; enough to reveal, that the promise of a HEAVEN UPON EARTH, which was the last and true word of Jesus, is in time to be realized, by the inward transformation of these nations to a piety and humanity like his own, and extension of their refining sway over the entire globe through the universality of peace. We are assured — are we not? — that some anointing of a DIVINE CHRISM anoints us to the work of redeeming the world from brutality by the miraculous power of good-will. The best tokens abound, that Providential agency impels Christendom as a whole, and in its several communities, to Integral Culture and Unlimited Diffusion of good. Shall we hesitate with grateful confidence to give ourselves up to this heavenly leading?" — pp.

Christendom is here rather vaguely defined "the fraternity of nations," though what nations we are left to conjecture. The author's Realism, we here see, enables him to assert that the life of nations is living is the "one spiritual life," and of course the true life, real life, the life they ought to live. This it can enable him to do only on the condition that it accepts as right and just all actual life. All actual life is right and just. But nations live an actual life. Therefore, their life is right and just. We must take *life* here in the concrete, as including facts as well as the principles of life; for the author's Realism, we have seen, excludes the ideal, and therefore the abstract.

stract. The author then plants himself firmly on the actual right and justice of the whole actual life of his fraternity of nations, and really asserts a universal Optimism. Whence, then, we repeat, the necessity of reform? If the actual is right and just, and may, as the author evidently maintains, be taken as the criterion of what is right and just, therefore true and good, we cannot understand his ceaseless and most urgent demand for Social Reform, and we wish he would explain it.

“The race will gain good, alike from his truths and his errors.” What advantage, then, of truth over error? and wherefore labor to correct error and disseminate truth? How long is it since error became profitable to the human race? The author holds that “to break up, fuse anew, and remould modern civilization” is an error, is uncalled for, and yet he says, let those undertake it who will; and although it cannot be seriously attempted, as every body knows, without infinite confusion and disorder, fierce wars, terrible crimes, and inconceivable suffering, it will be only a useful experiment! Modern philanthropists have queer hearts, and can contemplate crime and misery with a wonderfully serene brow and marvellously quiet nerves.

“The Realist will strive only to aid the *development* of Christendom, by blending with it his best life.” Here the author plainly tells us, that all that can be rightly demanded is development, and yet he demands reform. Reform and development are not the same, nor are they compatible one with the other. Development preserves the primitive type or idea, and seeks to fulfil or actualize it; Reform seeks to restore the primitive type, which has been lost, or to impress a new and different one. It *re-forms*, and necessarily presupposes the destruction of the old form; for the *materia formata* must be reduced to *materia informis* before it can receive a new form or a new impression of the primitive form, since there is no intercommunication of *species*. You must melt your wax anew, before you can give it a new impression of your old seal, or an impression of a new one. If, then, you demand reform, you oppose development; if you demand development, you oppose reform. If you are a reformer, you must “break up, fuse anew, and remould modern civilization,” and your place is with those who you say are in error; if you are a developmentist, you must stand opposed to them, and your success must be their defeat, and their success must be your defeat. How, then, can you regard their movements with indifference, — say, let them go on, — and pretend that the race will gain by their errors as well

as by your truths? Have you really no opposition to their erroneous method, — really no confidence in your own true method?

We are not indulging in mere verbal criticism. Mr. Channing and his friends avowedly demand Social Reform; and it is evident from their declamations against the past, from their condemnation of the whole present, and their untiring efforts to substitute a new order of society for the existing one, that, when they say reform, they mean reform. Yet when they philosophize, when they undertake to defend their movements, and fix the bases of their operations, they confound reform with development, and assert the continuous progressiveness and progress of man and society. But their logic is no better than their doctrine; for it refutes itself. If there has been the progress asserted, if man and society have been continually growing better and better, reform is uncalled for; if reform is called for, the doctrine of progress asserted is false, and the progress alleged has never taken place.

“The Realist will strive only to aid the development of Christendom, by *blending with it his best life*.” But the life, we have seen, is already the true spiritual life, and “the fraternity of nations” is actually all we can ask. What need, then, of further development? They live the true life; what more can you ask of them? And by what right do you, a Realist, planting yourself firmly on the actual, and excluding the absolute principles of Idealism, go to the ideal and demand its actualization? And, furthermore, have you considered that to actualize the ideal is the province of the actual that is above it, and not of the actual that is below it? The painter is above his picture, whether the picture in his idea, or the picture on his canvas. If there is a higher ideal for man and society than that already actualized, it is God, not we, who must actualize it. No man — as we often say — can lift himself by his own waistband.

We will not affect not to understand what the author means by blending his best life with that of the fraternity of nations; for he has told us that man interchanges his real life with his fellow-men, — which, with some important qualifications, we accept. But, if the life blended is not better than the life it is blended with, it cannot aid the development contended for. My life must be better than the actual life of these nations, or I cannot improve the quality of theirs by blending mine with it. Now will the author tell us where he gets a life better than the actual life he wishes to develop? We know he has said that our real life is just in degree to our full communion with the Divine

reality, and "this life we interchange with fellow-men." But his doctrine is, that we commune with this Divine reality only in its evolutions. This reality is in the centre of our race, and it is, if not only, yet principally, with God in man that we commune, — through the Divine Humanity that we reach Him and receive life from Him. That this is his doctrine, he will not deny. Consequently, we can receive no more Divine life than is in the life of the race, that is, than the race is actually living. The highest degree of this life actualized — and he is confined by his own principles to the actual — is the actual life of Christendom, or "the fraternity of nations," of which we are assumed to be members. Now we demand how the Realist, by communion with this life, which is for him the Divine reality itself, can get a life better than that life now is? If he can get no better life, what aid can he give to its development by blending with it his own best life? *Nemo dat, quod non habet*. If he has no better life, he can communicate no better life. If he can communicate no better life, he cannot improve the actual life of the fraternity of nations.

The author has been deceived by his silent assumption that the doctrines of the Church all symbolize great philosophic truths, or principles of the natural order. We, as members of the Church, are said to live a Divine life by communion with the Church, and by that communion only. This, Mr. Channing supposes, is merely a symbolical way of expressing a great natural fact, or truth of philosophy. The Church here symbolizes humanity in its relations to God, and life by communion with her means, when translated from the symbolical language of faith into the language of science, life by communion with God in man, or the communion of man with his race. When it is said the Christian derives Divine life from God through association with the Church, the scientific meaning is, that man derives Divine life from God through association with humanity. Hence the necessity of association as the mode or medium of Divine life. But were we to concede all this, it would avail the author nothing, *because no Christian ever dreams of deriving from his association with the Church a higher life than that which she has, or which she herself actually lives*. If we profess to derive from communion with her a supernatural life, it is because we believe her to be actually living a supernatural life. Grant, then, the symbolical character of the Church, grant that the interpretation of the symbol given is the true one, the author could, on the strength of the concession, only assert that by commu-

nion with our race we can derive such life as it is actually living, that is, its natural life ; not by any means a higher life, nor that the life we derive from it can react, and exalt its actual life.

Here is the mistake. The author evidently supposes that by communion with his race he can derive a life above the actual life of humanity, and that he can react on humanity, blend this higher life with hers, and thus assist her in actualizing a higher life for herself. But the symbolism on which he relies, even conceding it, does not bear him out. By communion with the Church we receive a higher than our natural life ; but she receives no life from us in return. We receive all from her, we return her nothing. Hence she remains without development. The life she lives was as perfect at first as it is now, and she had as high a life to impart to her children in the Apostolic age as she has in the nineteenth century. She is susceptible of no development from the recipients of her life, and can be developed, if at all, only by the direct and supernatural agency of her Founder. So if she symbolizes, as you pretend, the natural communion of humanity, you must concede, that, though individuals may receive from humanity through that communion such life as humanity has, they can give her back no life in exchange.

We beg Mr. Channing to meditate this point, for, to use a term which he will understand, it is *pivotal* in his system. He evidently supposes that the Divine reality actualizes or perfects itself by its evolutions, and that the evolutions, by a sort of reaction, perform a part in perfecting the evolver ; which is to suppose that the effect reacts on its cause, and develops it. But this is very bad philosophy ; for one might as well say the effect produces its own cause. But it is precisely in this supposition that lies the whole foundation of the modern doctrine of progress. It presupposes a mutual action and reaction of cause and effect, and that both, by this action and reaction, are developed and enlarged. The individual life is derived from humanity, and then reacts on and enlarges hers, which again reacts on and enlarges his ; and thus on *ad infinitum*. Hence, universal and eternal progress is the necessary law of all beings and of all being.

Mr. Channing speaks of "the Idea of a Divine Humanity manifested through Jesus," and assumes it to be yet vital in "the fraternity of nations" which he calls Christendom. But is it correct to speak of ideas as *vital*, that is, living ? Living ideas are ideas actualized, therefore no longer ideas. By the Idea of a Divine Humanity manifested through Jesus, he intends us to understand that the mystery of the Incarnation simply sym-

bolizes the Divinity of humanity, or the fact, as he holds it, that humanity, that is, man, — that is, again, human nature, — is Divine. But what proof has he that man is Divine, — that is, that the human and Divine are identical? What is his authority for asserting that the doctrine of the Incarnation implies any such thing? Who made him the interpreter of the Christian mysteries? Suppose man even to be Divine, whence follows it that that is the sense of the mystery? The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, as understood by Christians, — and they are, unquestionably, the proper judges of what it is that they believe, — is the reverse of what Mr. Channing supposes; for it asserts the distinction of the two natures in our Lord. The Divine nature is not mingled with or absorbed in the human, nor the human mingled with or absorbed in the Divine; and he only generalizes the doctrines condemned in the Eutychian and Monothelite heresies. He has, therefore, no right to set forth his doctrine under the name of Jesus, or as the hidden sense of the Christian mysteries. If he would avail himself of Christian authority, he must accept it in the Christian sense.

Mr. Channing asserts that "a heaven upon earth was the first and last word of Jesus." Suppose it was; what then? Does he admit the authority of Jesus? If he does, he should remember that Jesus said, "The poor ye have always with you." Yet Mr. Channing considers it perfectly practicable to remove all poverty. Jesus said, "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven." Yet Mr. Channing is busy with schemes for augmenting the wealth of the world, and for making all men rich. Jesus said, "Seek first the kingdom of God, and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." Mr. Channing says, seek these things first, and then the kingdom of God and his justice will follow. We do not, therefore, see what it can avail Mr. Channing, even if our Lord did say what is alleged.

"A heaven upon earth was the first and last word of Jesus." Be it so. Yet never did Jesus propose a heaven upon earth as the end of man. It was not on the earth, and in time, that he went to prepare mansions in his Father's house for his followers. But let that pass. "My kingdom," he said, "is not of this world"; and therefore, even if he proposed a heaven on earth, he proposed not a heaven of the earth, or a heaven derived from this world, consisting in the happiness which comes from it, — the precise order of happiness Mr. Channing and his

ends are avowedly laboring to secure to all men. If our author admits the authority of Jesus at all, he must admit it through-
out. Our Lord either was what he professed to be, or he was impostor. If an impostor, his authority is good for nothing; what he professed to be, his authority is sufficient for all he said, and we are then bound to believe all he said, for he was God himself. The practice which our Socialists have of referring to his authority, when it suits their purpose, and taking his words in a sense of their own, — a sense which even they do not pretend was his sense, but at most only what would have been his sense, if he had thought like them, — is by no means logical, and is utterly unworthy of such a man as Mr. Channing.

“Some portion of a DIVINE CHRISM anoints us to the work of redeeming man universal from brutality by the miraculous power of good-will.” How does Mr. Channing reconcile the idea of *redemption* with his doctrine of progress? A month ago we had presented to us the Divine Humanity, and Mr. Channing, as is evident from a subsequent part of his Discourse, maintains that it is only in humanity that we commune with God; now we have this same humanity, “man universal,” reduced below his nature, degraded to the category of brutes, and needing redemption from brutality. If man universal is Divine and progressive, how can he become brutalized, and in need of redemption? Need we tell the author that the idea of redemption negatives the idea of progress? Why, again, does the author call *good-will* miraculous? Nothing is miraculous that is natural. *Will* is certainly natural, for man is inconceivable without it. Is it the *good*, then, that is wanting in human nature, and that can be supplied only by a miracle? If man’s nature is destitute of good, by what authority do you call him Divine, and speak of “Divine Humanity”? Or is it that the author means not that good-will itself is miraculous, but that it works miracles, is thaumaturgic? But if the will is natural, in the order of man’s nature, how can it work miracles, since a miracle, by its very definition, is an effect produced in the natural order by a *supernatural* cause? Will Mr. Channing maintain that natural causes can produce supernatural effects? If not, why, then, we ask again, does he call the power of good-will miraculous? If miraculous, it is more than human, and the good does not belong to man, and then can be his only through a supernatural medium of communication. But Mr. Channing admits no such *medium*, for the only medium he admits is man, humanity.

When Mr. Channing speaks of the *Divine Chrism*, he makes allusion to the Christian Sacrament of Holy Orders. If he takes that Sacrament in the sense of the Church, even he himself will not pretend that he has received it ; if he takes it in some other sense, it is another thing, and does not answer to that Sacrament at all. His notion, that the Sacrament symbolizes a great natural fact, and that he has the thing symbolized, is not authorized, for the Sacrament is not symbolical at all. It is either an empty form, a vain ceremony, or it is a Divinely instituted medium through which a peculiar grace is really and supernaturally communicated to the recipient, and which can, *in hac Providentia*, be communicated through no other medium. It is this, or it is nothing, just as the authority of the Church herself is all, or is nothing, or worse than nothing. Mr. Channing has no right to give the Sacrament of Orders any other interpretation than the Church gives it. To suppose a hidden sense to the Sacrament, which was not apprehended by the Church, nay, was denied by her, yet was implied in what she taught, will not be allowable, if you accept, and can avail you nothing, if you reject, her authority ; for if you reject her authority, you reject it for what she teaches implicitly as well as for what she teaches explicitly. If you reject her authority, why do you wish to make it appear that what you teach is only the hidden sense of her teaching, — is the real sense of her sacred mysteries ? Suppose it to be so, is that, on your principles, any proof that it is true ? You have, undoubtedly, as every man has, the right from Almighty God to engage, mind, heart, soul, and body, in the work of redeeming man, universal and individual, from brutality. There is no question of that. But, recollect you, only by the means, and in the way and manner, which He who gives you the right ordains ; for it is never lawful to do good by unlawful means. We may not do evil that good may come. The end does not justify the means, — a principle in morals, which we commend to the serious consideration and daily meditation of all non-Catholics in general, and of all modern philanthropists and reformers in particular. But we proceed to the author's third division.

“ III. THE PRESENT PERIOD. — Now, to take our part efficiently in the special work allotted to Christendom to-day, we need to form a comprehensive judgment as to the present period of its development. This alone will give us conviction, wisdom, zeal. We must not trust to the piety of earlier times to enliven us, or to the opinions of even the wisest of by-gone ages to point out our path. Other

labored, and we have entered into their labors. True loyalty perfect what they planned, to fulfil and more than fulfil their best longings. A brief historical review will show us where we d, and what Humanity expects of us.

Before proceeding, however, to the rapid survey which we must of the development of Christendom, let us define three terms which will frequently recur in the subsequent remarks. These terms THE CHURCH, THE UNIVERSITY, THE STATE.

Every man, every community, every nation, Humanity as a le, is constituted of three elements, which may be variously destined as love, truth, power, — or affection, intellect, energy, &c. se elements stand related as inmost, mediate, outmost ; and mutually influence each other as motive, means, and end. Once again, their instrumentality, communion is maintained with God, with its, with Nature ; so that they may with propriety be named the ne, the Spiritual, the Natural elements.

The CHURCH is the Divine element in man, the sphere of will. ning from the central spring of feeling, — Love, One and Universal, — through which the inspiration of God for ever flows in, it ns into the four grand humanitarian affections by which man is e one with his kind. These are Friendship, Conjugal Love, the ily Sentiment, Honor.

The STATE is the Natural element in man, the sphere of use. mencing from the supply of the lowest necessities of sensitive ures, — food, clothing, shelter, — it aspires to form substantial itions of comfort, refinement, and beauty, whereon the social tions may find materials of growth and symbolic manifestation, whence happiness may raise the religious affection in thankful- to the Author of good.

The UNIVERSITY is the Spiritual element in man, the sphere of om. Its function is harmonious distribution, — law, — order. the bond of reconciliation, the mediator between the Church and . It determines the relations which should interlink the different departments of existence ; it reveals the method of a truly human

From these definitions it is obvious that the Church and State are ch other as Spirit and Body, and that the University serves as ecting Soul. The Church gives inspirations, which the University translates into ideas, that the State may embody them in . Again, from the want or wealth, the success or failure, of ate, the University receives lessons, and thence deduces forms v, which it presents to the Church, that it may animate them moral life. In every man, individual and collective, these three ents exist with different degrees of vitality ; and sanity, integ- bledness, depend upon their equilibrium and harmonious .” — pp. 6 — 8.

These three constituent elements "stand related as inmost, mediate, outmost ; and mutually influence each other as motive, means, and end." The inmost, love, supplies the motive, truth or intellect furnishes the means, power or energy is the end. Here we observe that these are all three constituent elements of man, humanity, and therefore man has his motive, means, and end in himself ! This is very convenient, and saves him from the necessity of going out of himself. Why, then, does the author insist on Association, assert the *Solidarity* of the race, and tell us man "lives by receiving and diffusing life," — that is, receiving life from, and imparting it to, other men ? Love, or the inmost, is the motive, the outmost is the end. But love, or the inmost, is, again, the Divine element, or God, in man. The end we are to seek, then, since it is the outmost, is the end farthest removed from God. We are continuously progressive ; progress consists in going towards our end. Consequently, we are continually removing farther and farther from God, and our progress is in proportion to the distance we remove from Him. Is this the reason why modern society is asserted to have made such remarkable progress, and why our own age is supposed to have so far outstripped all its predecessors ?

"By their instrumentality communion is maintained with God, with Spirits, with Nature." A moment ago, these three elements were presented as motive, means, and end ; now they are all three presented as means. But as means to what end ? By love we commune with God, by intelligence with spirits, by power or energy with nature. Love is the motive power, intellect is the means, power the end ; that is, love moves us, intelligence enables us, to exercise power over nature. So man is constituted, and is bound to exert himself, to acquire power over nature, or the outward ! But the intellect is mediate between the two, and simply furnishes the means. So the motive and the end are both blind, and the man acts from darkness to darkness, — which we doubt not is the case with our modern Socialists.

We commune with God, according to the author, by love ; that is, God is the object of love, as spirits of intellect, nature of power ; whence we conclude that God is not the object of the intellect, or, in other words, that, though we may love God, we do not know or intellectually apprehend him. If we could intellectually apprehend him, we could commune with him intellectually, and intellect would be as rightfully termed

Divine, on the author's own principles, as the element of love itself. But how is it possible to commune with God by love without communing with him by intellect? To commune with God by love must imply loving him as well as receiving love from him, — unless the author uses language in a non-natural sense, like the Puseyites. But can we love what we do not intellectually apprehend? Can love act before the intellect acts and presents the object to be loved? Has Mr. Channing forgotten his philosophy?

Is the author correct in making the motive proceed from love, that is, will, instead of being addressed to it? Motive, if we understand it, is supplied by intellect, and is that which moves the will to act. It is the ground or reason of the act. The author identifies love and will, to which we do not object; but we never before heard will and motive identified. We have always supposed that the *power* to act and the *motive* to act were very distinguishable, — as much so as the belief of a proposition and the reason or evidence for believing it. Will, we have always been taught, is the power or faculty which we possess of acting from rational motives, or motives presented by intelligence, and hence of acting freely, without physical compulsion, — in which respect the action of will is distinguished from physical action, as the action of the lungs, the circulation of the blood, the contraction of the muscles, or the lightning rending the oak. The action of will is *for* an end, — *propter finem*; physical action, or even instinctive action, is simply *to* an end, — *ad finem*. The reason presents the end and the motive for seeking it, and the will chooses or rejects it, determines to gain or not to gain it. Mr. Channing, therefore, cannot be correct in making the will the motive. By doing so, he destroys the essential character of will, and reduces all human activity to simple impulsive or instinctive activity. Indeed, it is the characteristic of Mr. Channing's school to place instinctive action, which they call spontaneity, above will or voluntary action. But is Mr. Channing aware, that, in doing this, in reducing will to instinct, he is destroying the very condition of all moral action, of all ethics, of all merit or demerit, and placing the goodness of a man in the same category with the goodness of the dog, the horse, or the pig? If he is, we ask him if he expects to reform society, and to realize an earthly paradise, by denying all moral distinctions, all moral accountability, that is, by striking out the whole moral order? Can it be that Fourierism has entirely obliterated that fine

moral sense, that rare conscientiousness, that intense, almost morbid, feeling of accountability, which we so admired and loved and revered years ago in our young friend, and which made him so dear to us, and to all who knew how to appreciate him ?

“ The Church is the Divine element in man, the sphere of will.” The Church, then, is in man, a constituent element of man’s nature ; then not an outward institution, a visible organization, or congregation. As it is restricted to the sphere of will, it can have no authority to teach or to govern, and therefore nothing to do with faith, morals, or discipline. These belong respectively to the University and the State. Have we here the Christian conception ? Is such a Church the Christian Church ? Does it bear any analogy to any thing called the Church in any speech or tongue of men ? Assuredly not. By what right, then, does Mr. Channing call it the Church ? He is an honest man and a brave, and therefore cannot wish to make people believe that he holds to what he does not, or does not hold what he does. How can he justify himself in using a common and well-known term in a sense purely arbitrary, and unauthorized by any analogy in the ordinary sense ? Language is not his or ours ; it is *common* property, and not even Socialists have the right to enter upon and appropriate it as private property, — Communists as many of them are.

“ Opening from the central spring of feeling, — Love, One and Universal, — through which the inspiration of God for ever flows in, it [the Church, Love, the Divine element in man] widens into the four grand humanitarian affections by which man is made one with his kind.” Here it is to be remarked, that the Divine element is identified with love, one and universal. This love, one and universal, we take it, is what the author means by God, or the Divine Being himself. So God, at least in his essence, is one of the constituent elements of man, that is, of human nature ! We do not understand this, or, if we do, we have some difficulty in accepting it. We are made *after* the image and likeness of God, and we live and move and have our being in him, but not as God. If this is the author’s meaning, why does he make the Divinity merely *one* of the three constituent elements of man ? In this sense, He constitutes our whole being, is the being of our being, under the aspects of intellect and power or energy, as under that of love. But if he means something else, what can he mean, but that man, in so far as he is love, or loves, is God, and in all other

respects is to be distinguished from God, so that man is at once man, a creature, and God, the Creator? Is this his meaning, and what he means by "Divine Humanity," that is, a humanity constituted by a blending or confusion of the human and Divine natures? By restricting the Divine to a single element, and asserting two elements not Divine, he recognizes a proper human nature as distinct from God, at least an imperfect or inchoate human nature; and by making the other element, necessary to the constitution of man, identically God, he compounds man of both natures, and regards the human, on one side, as the complement of the Divine, and the Divine, on the other, as the complement of the human. This is the only meaning we can extract from his several statements. If this is his meaning, it has all the difficulties to contend with, which the Spinozaists allege lie in the way of creation from nothing, and all the unanswerable objections to which pantheism is itself exposed. Mr. Channing seems to have devised it expressly for the purpose of harmonizing the conception of a creative Deity, on the one hand, with the pantheistic conception on the other; the assertion of created beings distinct from God, with the assertion that all is God, and nothing can be distinguished from him,—two assertions, which, being eternally irreconcilable, can give birth only to a monstrous syncretism.

If the author had given man complete as man, having his being in God, yet distinct from God, as the effect from the cause, the creature from the Creator, and merely supposed, over and above, a supernaturally Divine element operative in him, we could easily have understood and accepted his view. If he had, then, defined the Church to be the Divinely constituted medium through which this Divine element, or Divine life, is communicated to man and kept alive and active in him, we should have recognized with pleasure the Christian doctrine, and have had little fault to find with his fundamental principle. And, after all, this is precisely the doctrine which he needs, and to which he must come in order to meet the demands of his own system. But this is not his meaning, as is evident from the fact that this Divine element itself only "widens into the *humanitary* affections, Friendship, Conjugal Love, the Family Sentiment, Honor." With all his influx of the Divinity, therefore, he does not elevate our life above the human. Evidently, then, the Divinity he recognizes in man is the Divinity in our nature, not the Divinity above it.

Taking our author's definition of the Church, what is his

problem ? "The Christian Church and Social Reform," he says, are "the two extremes of man's existence," and "the law of harmonious coöperation between them is the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds." But the Christian Church is love, one of the three constituent elements of human nature, and in its expansion gives us the humanitarian affections of friendship, conjugal love, family sentiment, and honor. Here is one extreme. The other is Social Reform. What means a law of harmonious coöperation between them ? Is it the reconciliation of Social Reform with friendship and honor, marriage, and parental and filial love and duty ? that is, to show how Social Reform can be carried on without wounding these ? That is a problem, indeed, but hardly Mr. Channing's. Is it by Social Reform to provide freer and fuller scope for these humanitarian affections ? No ; for that would make them the end, and they are the inmost, and not the end, since, as the author expressly tells us, the outmost, the other extreme, is the end.

The author says the Church is love, opening from the central feeling, love, one and universal ; and that the Church is one extreme, and Social Reform the other. The other extreme from love is hatred. If, then, the Church opens from love, Social Reform must open from hatred. The law of harmonious coöperation between love and hatred must, then, be "the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds." We shall be curious to see that thought when it has fairly shaped itself.

"It [the State] aspires to form substantial conditions of comfort, refinement, and beauty, whereon the social affections may find materials of growth and symbolic manifestation, and whence *happiness may raise the religious affection in thankfulness to the Author of good.*" There is much here not easily reconcilable with some other things which have been said, but we let it pass, for we are growing somewhat weary. We remark simply that the author makes the happiness derived from the world, from nature, represented by the State, the condition of religious activity. Happiness produces religion. Men are devout in proportion as they are filled with this world's goods, and "their eyes stand out with fatness" ! This is evidently a new discovery ; at least, it does not appear to have been known by St. Paul, or by our Lord. We have been accustomed to expect happiness from religion, not religion from happiness. So far as we have observed, prosperity is a far greater

enemy to religion than adversity ; and the poor and suffering, the wronged and afflicted, we have generally found more ready to raise their hearts in devout thanksgiving to God, than those who want for nothing, and " have more than heart can wish."

" It [the University] determines the relations which should interlink the different departments of existence ; it reveals the method of a truly *human* life." But what guaranties the University ? On one side you have a blind Church, through which streams of generous and noble feelings are pouring themselves in, and on the other the State, equally blind, wielding the whole might of physical power ; between these two blind forces you place the University, and make the truth and sanctity of the one and the wisdom and utility of the other depend on it alone. It is under no regimen, subject to no law, has no Divine revelations, and, even on your own principles, no Divine guidance. Whence is it to derive its own light, and what surety have you that it will not be made the tool of blind zeal, or of equally blind sensuality, and, in either case, precipitate you into the bottomless pit of error and corruption ?

" The Church gives inspirations, which the University translates into ideas, that the State may embody them in deeds." These inspirations are blind sentimental impulses ; nothing more, nothing less. What certainty is there that the University, which is uninspired, — which has, at best, only simple human intelligence, — will render them faithfully, and form them into sane ideas ? Is human intelligence infallible ? has it never been known to err ? Again, what certainty is there, that, even in case it should faithfully render the inspirations, the State will properly embody them ? The State represents the physical element, what modern psychologists call sensibility, or the principle of sensation, as distinguished from intellection and volition. It will be pushed by a contrary set of impulses, those of the senses ; and why may it not yield to these, instead of laboring to embody in deeds the ideas the University translates from the sentimental impulses ? Does it never happen in actual life that both understanding and will are led captive by the senses ? May it not, then, happen, as it has often happened, and, indeed, has become a characteristic of most modern states, that the State will lead captive the Church and the University, and thus establish the absolute despotism of the senses over both thought and conscience ? Mr. Channing himself tells us that " sanity, integrity, blessedness, depend upon the equilibrium of

the three elements, and their harmonious action." What is the guaranty of that equilibrium? It has been disturbed, and the author makes the evils of Christendom in the mediæval ages flow from the predominance of the religious sentiment, the Divine element in man, that is, from the fact that man and society were too religious, too full of God, too subject to Divine inspiration. May not men run to the opposite extreme, and come to have too little of God, and too much of the senses, to answer to Mr. Channing's *beau idéal*? We grant that he is disposed to "give the devil his due," and even to treat him generously; but we do not understand that he wishes to give him exclusive dominion. What guaranty has he, that, in the struggle not to have too much of God, we may not get quite too much of the devil?

But these three elements, the Church, the State, the University, are, in each man, constitutive of his nature. Now, as they exist in man, they are harmonized, are in equilibrium, or they are not. If they are, pray tell us how they can be otherwise in their manifestations? If not, pray tell us how, without something superior to them, you can contrive to reduce their manifestations to harmony? You tell us, here is the Church, as an element of human nature, pouring in a perennial stream of inspirations; here is the University to translate them into ideas; and here is the State to embody them in deeds. All admirable, no doubt; but they are too much or too little. Suppose them to be enough, they are too much, for then no disruption of harmony could ever have occurred; and we know, and you admit, the equilibrium, the harmony, has been and may be disturbed. If they are not psychologically in equilibrium, they cannot be in equilibrium in their manifestations, and are too little for your purpose. You cannot have in the effect what you have not in the cause, and the effect cannot react on its cause, and develop, perfect, or complete its causality, as we have already shown, and as is evident of itself.

It is, perhaps, but fair to the author to say, that, when he speaks of the Church, the State, and the University, as constituent elements of human nature, he probably means only that they are the products, or outward expressions, of those elements. He recognizes in man three elements, which he calls love, intellect, power, but which we may name, more intelligibly, sentiment, intellect, sensibility, or the principle of sensation. Out of sentiment springs the Church; out of sensibility, or sensation, the State; and out of intellect the Univer-

, the mediator between the other two. He does not wish the three institutions to be separated, to exist as separate distinct organizations, but wishes them to be all harmoniously blended in one association, which shall be at once and inseparably Church-State-University, — *sentiment-sensation-raissance*, in the language of Pierre Leroux. But as all proceeds from man, and is nothing but the outward expression of the inward, there can be nothing in such association not precisely in man himself. But since it is undeniable that the elements expressed do not exist in man in harmony, in equilibrium, it follows inevitably, that there cannot be the harmony, equilibrium, between the three constituent elements of the association, which is desired or contemplated.

Here is the difficulty. Some method must be devised by which the harmony or equilibrium may be restored or established in the interior of man. How is this to be done? One class of Socialists boldly assert the *natura integra*, which Christians believe was lost together with original justice by the fall; and they deny that there is any want of harmony or equilibrium in the interior of man, and maintain that all the elements or forces of man's nature are, interiorly considered, nicely balanced and properly adjusted. The apparent disorder does not inhere from within, but proceeds from obstructions without, the outermost, which prevent the innermost from acting itself out according to its own laws. Remove, then, obstructions raised by ignorance or craft, and all will proceed harmoniously.

But Mr. Channing cannot take this view, because he sees it is false, knows that the interior harmony asserted is a dream, and no reality; and because he begins by assuming that all action is from within outward, and that the *without* is the evolution of the *within*. This is clear from his definitions which we have quoted, and from his whole system of cosmology, which supposes the universe itself to be only the evolution of the Divinity in progressive series. Since, then, there is undeniable disorder and disproportion out of man, he must admit disorder and disproportion in man. Hence he says, "In every man, individual and collective, these three elements exist with *different* degrees of vitality; and sanity, integrity, blessedness, depend upon their equilibrium and harmonious union."

To restore, establish, or maintain this equilibrium, which is wanting even in the interior of man, there are only two methods in the reach of those who reject the supernatural. One,

to organize the outward ; but that will not do, because it will be only the image of the inward. The other is to draw upon the interior itself ; but that will not do, because from man's interior you can get only his interior, and that is disordered and out of proportion. Then it is obviously necessary to look beyond man's actual nature, as we say, — beyond man's actual interior life, as Mr. Channing says, — to God, who is harmony itself, and an inexhaustible supply of harmonious life. Hence the necessity of communion with God, religion, which Mr. Channing feels, and strongly asserts. In this he is more clear-sighted than most of his associates, and here we recognize the action of his religiosity.

But how to establish this communion, by means of which we may obtain from God this higher life, is now the problem. It is a difficult one for Mr. Channing, because he feels that he must confine himself to a natural communion, or, to be more strictly exact, to a natural *medium* of communion. He thinks, however, that he has a natural medium of supernatural communion, and therefore of supernatural life. The Church is the outward expression of inward sentiment, that is, the sentiment of love. This sentiment, he assumes, is the medium through which we commune with God, or through which his inspirations flow in to reanimate us. But this inward sentiment, which is a constituent element of our nature, without which we should want a portion of our nature, and should not be men, he next assumes, is identically the One Universal Love, the principle and life of all things, the Infinite and Eternal God. God being thus in our nature, we have in ourselves the infinite Source of life, to which we may recur, and replenish and enlarge our lives at will. Through the four humanitarian affections named, we may constantly receive fresh supplies of a higher and better life. We met this same view, substantially, some time ago, when we were reviewing Mr. Parker's *Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion*, and it is common to all our modern Transcendentalists. But this doctrine, which rests on two unproved assumptions, does not relieve the difficulty ; for *the* God supposed is not the God out of man and above him, but the God in him, and constitutive of his nature. Communion with him is only communion with our own nature, and, by simple communion with our nature, we can derive no life above it. Whatever be your meaning in making God one of the constituent elements of man's nature, you undoubtedly mean to assert it in a sense which leaves man distinguishable from God ; otherwise

make man God, and then God only man, which of course gives you nothing to your purpose ; for from man we can get nothing but man. In order that there may be a higher life than man's, God must be conceived above man, and then man must be distinguished from God, and have a fixed and determinate nature, which is human nature. Grant, then, that the Divine in man is in some sense one with the Divine out of man, one as to *essence*, but not one as to *existence*, — grant that the human does not exhaust the Divine, that God in us, as the being of our being, infinitely transcends us, and contains in himself exhaustless sources of life, infinitely higher than the life man actually lives, still, through human nature as your medium of communion, man can derive no higher life from him than your natural life. The quantity and the quality of the life to be derived from him is determined, not by the life he contains or is, but by the nature and capacity of the medium through which it is to be communicated. To deny this would be to deny all distinction of orders, species, and even of individuals, and would be to assert that all species and individuals are one, for they all live, and are one, and have their being in God, — all derive their life, whatever it is, and such as it is, from God, who is the only Source of life ; and it would, furthermore, be to assert, that man, that brute, and even inanimate things, are God, at least *in potentia*. The medium of communication must, then, determine both the quantity and the quality of life communicated, for God gives to each being life after its kind, and in proportion to its capacity. Then through a natural medium man can receive from God only his natural life. Can nature be a medium of any life larger than itself ? Of course not.

We here pass over the author's doctrine of Divine Humanity. Be it that our natural life is Divine, still, to obtain more than we already have by nature, we must have a higher nature, and a natural medium of communion. Here is the grand defect in Mr. Channing's system. He gains nothing by asserting the identity of one element of man's nature with the Divine, for the assertion either represents man as God, or it does not. If it does, it asserts that God is man, and then he contains nothing more than man, and man can have no higher life than he has ; if it does not, the Divine element in man is not the infinite, but determinate human existence, and therefore precisely what we mean by human nature, — man existing, — and can be no medium of only the proper determinate life of humanity. What the author wants is a superhuman life for man, — God su-

pernaturally present in man, elevating him above his nature, and enabling him to live, intellectually and morally, a life above his natural life. This is what he wants, — what, day and night, he is seeking with untiring perseverance, with a zeal which we honor, with a singleness of purpose which we reverence, and with an earnestness which is worthy of all praise. He wants to live in a higher and more intimate communion with God. Unhappily, his Rationalistic education has led him to suppose that the medium of this communion must be natural. We say *medium*, for we do not doubt that he recognizes the necessity of a supernatural life. It is not the need of supernatural life he denies, but the need of a supernatural medium of its communication. He supposes that God must have made man's nature the adequate medium of all the good man can need or receive. Hence, instead of asking whether God has provided a supernatural medium for the communication of supernatural life, he wastes his fine feelings, his noble intellect, and his great energies, in the vain endeavour to obtain that life through association or the communion of humanity, which compels him to turn for ever within the sphere of that very nature above which it is his earnest endeavour to rise. He is unwilling to admit any *extra* or *super-human* medium of life. Thus it is, he makes the Church, the State, and the University open from elements of human nature, the simple expression of man's interior life. Doubtless he holds that they have a Divine origin, and would regard us as misapprehending or misrepresenting him, if we should assert that he makes them purely human creations; but they are from God only mediately, through the medium of man's nature, which makes them pure human creations, in the only sense in which any thing can be a purely human creation. Here is the source of his difficulty.

That these institutions — or leaving out the University as a separate institution, for it is integral in the Church — are for man, and respond to deep and indestructible wants of his soul, and of his body, we of course do not question. But that they open from our nature, are simply the expression of these wants, is a mere assumption, — an assumption which cannot be proved, and which, if it could be, would entirely destroy their value; for, with all deference to Mr. Channing, *the end of man is not to express himself*, — to give *outness* to his thoughts, sentiments, and sensations, or to embody them in institutions. The expression can never be the end, because, if the being is reasonable, it must be for something, — there must be a *propter quem* of the expression.

deny this would be to deny reason itself. Man cannot, *in Providentia*, live his normal, natural life without the State, his supernatural, Divine life without the Church ; but what does that both have not been instituted for man by his Creator and his Redeemer, instead of having sprung out of man's own nature ? Christians assert this ; only a few men assert the contrary, and they are in general more remarkable for their bold theorizing than for their science or practical wisdom. Assertion for assertion, the assertion of the former, even at the very lowest, is worth as much as the assertion of the latter. May we ask Mr. Channing to reflect on this ?

It is no part of our purpose in these remarks to throw the Church in Mr. Channing's face, for our design has been to test his system by principles which he himself admits or must admit as a philosopher. To us, who occupy the high stand-point of Catholicity, it is easy to see that his only recourse for the higher life he wants, and which he feels that he must have, is the Church, the supernaturally constituted medium of supernatural life, — that in Christian language, grace. He wishes to secure the supernatural life, and without superseding the necessity of human effort. God doubtless could — we certainly know no reason why he could not — communicate a supernatural life, immediately, without the Church ; but if he communicated it immediately, he could not communicate it through nature ; for to communicate through nature, even if that were possible, would be to communicate it mediately. Moreover, if he communicated it immediately, there would be no sphere of human activity in attaining it. We could only long for it, and wait passively for its communication. If it is to be obtained by us, and we are to have any part in obtaining it, any merit in living it, there must be a medium to which we can apply, and through which we can regularly obtain it, — that is, there must be the Church. The Church is not needed by God to enable him to communicate the life, but by us, as a regular medium of obtaining it.

The Church lives a supernaturally Divine life, for she is the Body of Him who is "the way, the truth, and the life," — who has life in himself, and giveth life to all who come unto him. In communion with her we commune supernaturally with God, the exhaustless Source of life, and from him, through her, derive supernatural life. This is precisely what Mr. Channing wants. This meets and removes every difficulty he feels, and gives him all, and more than all, he seeks. Let it be, that, by what Leroux calls "the Communion of Humanity," he can

obtain a Divine life ; this does not diminish that life, but gives a superabundant life, — opens to him a life still more Divine, a truly supernatural life, by which man is raised to a higher participation of the Divine nature here, with the promise of a still higher participation of that nature in the *lumen gloriae*, or beatific vision hereafter. God, in giving us his Church as the supernatural medium of supernatural life, does not make the life we receive by natural communion less Divine, but provides for us a life Divine still, and without which the natural life wants a purpose, is inadequate to our good, and can never conduct to the glory for which our God in his superabundant goodness destined us. In nature, God is a beneficent Creator, a just Sovereign, an inflexible Judge ; in the Church, he is our loving Father, our compassionate Redeemer, our warm personal Friend, who is touched with our infirmities, who pleads our cause as his own, and holds us ever in the arms of his infinite tenderness and love.

There are other things in the extracts we have made on which we should like to comment, but we have exhausted our space, and must reserve them, with the remainder of the Discourse, for a future occasion. We have commented freely, not with asperity, on Mr. Channing's statements, — not, we assure him, for the purpose of giving him pain, but for the purpose of pointing out to him and his Socialistic friends, how vague and confused is the thought, how loose and uncertain the expression, of modern Socialism. This Discourse is a fair specimen. He has written it with care, and has weighed with more than ordinary attention the words he has used. The contradictions and confusion we have pointed out, whether in the thought or the expression, belong to the system, not to the writer. We are aware that his friends accuse him of being loose and illogical ; but we are equally well aware, that, if, in this respect, he appears to disadvantage by their side, it is only because he is really more logical and consistent than they, and because his vision is clearer and more comprehensive than theirs. He is more faithful to the system, and better aware than they of its defects without religion. He has tried to harmonize their conceptions with the Christian, and to give some sort of completeness to them. It is his endeavour to render Socialism religious and systematic, that has involved him in the inextricable mazes of contradiction and absurdity. If his mind had not been in some sense religious, and more than ordinarily logical, he could never have made Socialism appear so utterly irreligious and absurd. If his state-

ent is, throughout, irreligious, illogical, and absurd, it is because such was the intrinsic character of what he had to state. A less ingenuous writer, a more sophisticated mind, would have passed over some things, and suppressed others, and made his statement appear more consistent to the superficial ; but he would have been less faithful, and been more wanting in that higher logic which shrinks from no conclusions that follow from its premises. Let no man charge the absurdity to Mr. Channing's statement, and let every one know that he is just to the system. Mr. Channing is no every-day man, and no man of his school is clearer or more comprehensive views, though some may be more adroit sophists. He is inferior in learning to few of them, perhaps to none of them, unless it be Mr. Parker, to whom he is far superior in candor, ingenuousness, and innate reverence for truth and sanctity. Indeed, his views are so clear and comprehensive, and his sense of religion so strong, that we have little doubt that he will soon leave his school behind him, and seek what his heart craves and his mind needs, where alone can be found, in the Church of God.

RT. VI. — *The Saints and Servants of God.* 1. *The Lives of the Companions of St. Philip Neri, the First Fathers of the Oratory.* New York : Edward Dunigan. 1848. 12mo. pp. 336.

The Life of the Venerable Father Claver, S. J., Apostle of the West Indies ; and Memoirs of the Religious Life of Cardinal Odeschalchi, S. J. New York : The same. 1849. 12mo. pp. 421.

WE are happy to learn, that, contrary to an announcement made some months since, the series of *Lives of the Saints and Servants of God*, commenced by the Rev. F. W. Faber, or, as we should say, Father Wilfrid, is to be continued, and hereafter under the direction and responsibility of the English Oratorians established at Maryvale, to which congregation Father Wilfrid, and those associated with him at St. Wilfrid's, are now attached. The English Oratorians are placed under Mr. Newman, as their Father Superior ; and we take this occasion to correct a false impression which some entertain with regard to our feelings towards this distinguished convert from Anglican-

ism. We have had no controversy with Mr. Newman personally, and have never found the least fault with any thing he has written since his conversion. The work of his which we reviewed was written, and in great part printed, before he became a Catholic, while he was *in transitu* from error to truth ; and we censured it, not because we had any lack of confidence in him, but solely because those without, perhaps maliciously, and some few within, inconsiderately, insisted that we should receive it as a Catholic book, to which appeal might be made as authority on Catholic theology. For Mr. Newman personally, especially as the humble and devout Catholic, as the pious and laborious Catholic priest, and Superior of a religious congregation, we have, and have had, no feelings which his warmest friends and most enthusiastic admirers could wish changed.

We regard the establishment of the Congregation of the Oratory in England as among the few consoling events of our times, and as promising great good to the cause of Catholicity in Great Britain, and consequently in our own country. A common origin, a common language, and, to a great extent, similar institutions, manners, and customs, make us, and will long preserve us, and Great Britain, morally and intellectually, one people, and the conversion of the two countries must, in the main, go on *pari passu*. The great obstacle to the conversion of either is Anglo-Saxon pride, and especially pride of intellect. Controversy, however able, learned, conclusive, or judiciously managed, can effect little beyond protecting the weak among ourselves from the incursions of those without. It cannot reach the seat of the evil. The intellect must be humbled, and that can be humbled only through the heart, — only by making men feel their own moral weakness, their own sinfulness, and need of a Redeemer and Saviour. Our hopes for the conversion of England and of this country also arise, not from the number of converts, distinguished or undistinguished, who are almost daily returning to Catholic faith and unity, but from the increasing power, the deeper piety, the bolder tone, and greater spiritual energy, which we witness in the American and English Catholic population themselves. In some quarters we may, indeed, see a miserable namby-pambyism, a disposition to pare Catholicity down to its smallest possible dimensions, born of penal laws and a mistaken loyalty ; but, in general, Catholics are no longer afraid or ashamed to be Catholics in a large and generous sense, and to aspire to the highest and richest forms of Catholic life. This is, indeed, encouraging ; for when once our Catholic pop-

ulation is filled with the Catholic spirit, and becomes assiduous in the practice of Catholic piety, its prayers for the conversion of unbelievers and heretics will be heard, and God will grant any thing in answer to their devout and charitable requests.

It is on the principle we here express or imply that the English Oratorians seem to us resolved to proceed. They are nearly all converts from Anglicanism ; but it is worthy of remark, that, generally, they have been drawn to the Church through the force of her asceticism. They were shaken in their heresy and schism, not by the study of Catholic dogmatics, or works of controversy, but by the influence, under God, of Catholic ascetic literature. They set out with an earnest desire to be holy men, — humble, devout Christians, — and they were obliged to look for the models of what they would be in another communion than their own. They sighed for the Catholic life. They sought help from our spiritual works, and especially from the study of the lives of the Saints. They soon perceived, that, as they could find examples of the saintly life only in the Catholic Church, it was idle to hope to imitate those examples out of her communion. Anglicanism had no Saints, and the stream of holy life had ceased to flow in England at the Reformation. Anglicanism could not, then, be the Church of God, — could not introduce her children into “ the communion of Saints.” Their previous studies, their dispositions, and the motives which had brought them into the Church, peculiarly fitted them to exert, after their conversion, the kind of influence most needed by their countrymen and ours, by causing them to aspire to sanctity, — to be humble, devout, earnest Christians, rather than learned dogmatists or skillful controversialists. They embraced Catholicity under its aspect of sanctity, rather than under its aspect of truth, — as it addressed itself to the heart and conscience, rather than simply as it addressed itself to the intellect. Consequently, they must naturally labor to present it under that aspect, and as it appeals to the heart and conscience, which is the aspect under which it must always be most powerful to subdue the pride of the intellect, and to make men *lovers* of the truth.

The English Oratorians could not better express their own Catholic feelings, or better serve the cause of Catholic truth, than by such a series of biographies of the Saints and Servants of God as was projected and commenced by Father Wilfrid. We do not want dogmatical works, we do not want controversial works ; for in either of those departments we are well sup-

plied ; but all who read only the English language do want works adapted to the great body of the faithful, which shall at once interest their feelings, engage their attention, instruct them in the ethics of their religion, stimulate their Catholic practices, and excite and nourish their piety. Such works are the *Lives of the Saints and Servants of God*. They are more interesting than tales of fiction, more instructive to the people than simple didactic works, and are admitted to belong to the most profitable species of spiritual reading. In reading them we gain more than is in the books themselves ; we gain the prayers and intercessions of the Saints whose lives we read. We are grateful, in behalf of our countrymen and of our children, that the good Fathers have directed their attention to supplying one of our greatest literary wants ; and we hope the Catholic public will duly appreciate and reward their noble and pious undertaking.

The two volumes before us contain, indeed, not the lives of canonized Saints, but exceedingly interesting biographies of saintly men. The first volume named is properly the pendant to the *Life of St. Philip Neri*, the founder of the Congregation of the Oratory. We make an extract from the Preface :—

“ Wonderful indeed is the variety of the saints of God ! The reader will easily perceive a striking difference between the holiness portrayed in this volume and what has been exhibited in others. Not as though any comparison were to be instituted between them for the purpose of disparaging either. God forbid that we should have the miserable temerity to judge otherwise than with loving reverence of the diversities of graces, ministries, and operations which the Holy Ghost vouchsafes to work in the Church ; for in the *Lives of the Saints*, as well as elsewhere, ‘ the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,’ while they behold Him ‘ dividing to every one according as He will.’ One while, we see St. Joseph of Cupertino, St. Philip’s special devotee, flying through the air from altar to altar, from picture to picture, in Assisi, Fossombrone, and Osimo, in strange, unearthly raptures, a continual object of the wise jealousy and vigilant discretion of the Holy Inquisition, and yet uniting with this marvellous life the most illustrious example of humble virtues, solid piety, and the punctilious sanctification of ordinary actions, and an eccentric playfulness and manner of speech, which seem as though they had been caught from his special devotion to St. Philip. Another while, we behold the heroic virtues of the great St. Vincent of Paul, who, with some exaggeration, is said, like St. John the Baptist, hardly ever to have worked a miracle in his life, but whose life was his miracle, from the variety and greatness of his charitable enterprises, and his union of interior recollec-

tion, poverty of spirit, and simplicity with outward duties which were enough to have overwhelmed any one but himself. Yet in both St. Joseph and St. Vincent 'one and the same Spirit worketh all these things,' dividing His 'prophecies, miracles, graces of healings, helps, governments, kinds of tongues, interpretations of speeches,' separately or conjointly, according to His own good pleasure; and while one person is called to imitate this and another to imitate that, the effect of all upon the mind of a pious and believing reader is to make him cry out with St. Philip, 'O, who can tell the beauty of a soul in grace?' and so to make him yearn with unutterable longings for the vision of Uncreated Beauty which shall constitute the everlasting bliss of the true disciples of the Cross.

"Wonderful indeed is God in His saints; and while the air is darkening with His judgments, and men's hearts are failing them because of the things that are coming upon the earth, how naturally does the Catholic turn to the records of His mercies and the consoling manifestations of His grace in the Lives of the Saints, not so much to bury himself in the interesting study, and thus selfishly forget the heartbreaking work that is going on around him, as to give fresh nerve to his courage, to gain fresh incentives to intercessory prayer, and to see more clearly how the troubles of the Church and of its visible Head have been in all ages regarded by the good as so many additional calls, not to the common attainments of ordinary virtue, but to the rough roads and stony heights of arduous perfection, and heroic faith, and an utter weaning from all created love. O Patria, Patria! may the exile cry, how fair is the vision of thy far-off fields! May I not even bless God for the misery and the wretchedness, for the darkness and the strife, for the treachery and the unkindliness, which only serve to keep my eye more steadfastly turned on thine eternal peace, to detach me from this joyless earth, and to awaken in me the sweetly venturous hope that even I may dare to follow by some one of the luminous tracks which the saints of God have left still glowing across this wilderness of trial? Blessed are they who read in this temper, and who learn day by day to set a price upon one degree of sanctifying grace far above all the joys and honors and reputation of the world, — far, too, above the fulfilment of the schemes for the good of others for which they have fondly toiled, and, what is more, above the supernatural gifts and unearthly privileges of the wonder-workers of the Church, who gained those gifts by being zealous first of all for the better gifts of charity, — a charity that ever burned most brightly and most sweetly in submission and holy self-abjection." — pp. xvi. — xx.

As a specimen of the interest to be found in this volume, we copy entire the Life of Father Agostino Manni, which we very much admire.

“ Agostino Manni was born at Cantiano, in the Duchy of Urbino. In his early youth he applied himself eagerly to the study of letters, but somewhat neglected the fervent practices of a devout life ; being seduced by the attractions of the world into many of the faults of the thoughtless and the gay. It pleased Almighty God to rouse him from this state of tepidity by showing him one night in a dream a frightful abyss of flames, where the souls in purgatory were suffering dreadful torments. Agostino was horror-struck at witnessing the terrible chastisement inflicted on those small faults of which he had hitherto thought so lightly. In his alarm he had recourse with filial confidence to Mary ; he threw himself at her feet without delay, and made her an irreclaimable offering of his heart. In this moment of grace he bitterly repented of all his past indifference, and vigorously resolved upon a thorough change in his mode of life. With this good beginning he entered in all earnestness upon a virtuous course, and with the blessing of his most holy Mother he embraced the Institute of the Oratory, of which, as St. Philip used to say, our Lady was the Mother and the guide. Agostino begged the grace of loving God through the intercession of Mary, often repeating this little prayer in Italian verse : —

‘ Mary, deign my heart to move
With thy pure and holy love.’

He experienced such happy effects from his confidence in our Blessed Lady, that he used to say, ‘ A soul that has a true devotion to the Blessed Virgin has the greatest blessing a mortal creature can enjoy.’ It was his delight to collect from the Sacred Scriptures and from the Fathers all the various titles with which he could weave a garland to Mary’s praise. With these he composed devout canticles, which he loved to repeat himself and to teach to others. He was in the habit of presenting, as it were, before the eyes of Mary all the nations of the earth ; and with a tender compassion for the many unfortunate creatures who were living, some in the darkness of infidelity, others in the errors of heresy, and others again in the mire of their own sins, he would earnestly entreat her to implore for them of her only Son light and grace to free themselves from their misery, and to participate in the blessings of the incarnation. Sometimes contemplating her with her Divine Son in her arms, he begged, by the sweet and tender love with which she caressed the Blessed Child, that she would deign to embrace all sinners, amongst whom the humble priest reckoned himself the most unworthy. He composed a chaplet of simple and touching ejaculations to Mary, which he recited himself with great devotion, and taught to all his penitents. This little rosary was afterwards generally used by the public, and was printed with his other spiritual exercises. One of Agostino’s favorite devotions was to place himself in the presence of God, and imagine himself at the point of death. He used to repeat with

devout attention the recommendation of a departing soul, and then he represented to himself his sweet Mother, whom he had so often invoked in life, assisting him by her powerful aid in this awful moment of death. 'Pray for us sinners, now and at the hour of our death.' He excited himself to a filial confidence in her; he reminded her, that, whilst she was the Mother of God, she was also the Mother and the advocate of sinners; to her, he said, was confided the administration of mercy, and to her he intrusted the interests of his soul, imploring her to receive his spirit in these words of Holy Church: —

'O Mary Mother, full of grace,
Mother of clemency and peace,
Protect us from our evil foe,
And bliss at death on us bestow.'

Thus did he constantly prepare for his final appearance before the judgment-seat of God. The sweet memory of his blessed Mother seemed to be his greatest consolation; he never allowed a day to pass without making some pious remembrance of her, and he often exclaimed aloud, 'Comfort me, Mother of God!' Well might Agostino say, *Venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa*, — 'All good things have come to me with her'; for her benign assistance facilitated his progress in perfection, and she it was who renewed his fervor in a spiritual life.

"When Agostino first entered the Congregation, he could not understand how the holy father, under an exterior of so much simplicity, could conceal so exalted a sanctity. He afterwards confessed that he often felt an inward misgiving lest others should be scandalized by the ridiculous actions they saw the Saint perform. But when more fully enlightened by God, he clearly saw that this conduct resulted from the most perfect humility, which made St. Philip desire to attract nothing but contempt and to lose all credit for sanctity. He then comprehended the meaning of a maxim he had often heard from the lips of the man of God, that 'he who cannot bear the loss of his own honor and reputation will never advance in spiritual life.' Another favorite saying of the Saint's was, that 'external perfection, separated from the love of God and contempt of the world, is like a tree overburdened with leaves, which receives no nourishment from the root, and consequently in the heat of temptation falls to the ground.' St. Philip was far from leaving uncultivated the good dispositions of his disciple; he exercised him especially in all kinds of mortification; and Agostino, alluding to the tact and skill of the holy father in mortifying both himself and others, thus writes of him: 'He had a thousand wonderful arts and inventions, by which he eradicated from the soul every vestige of self-will, and prepared therein an abode for the grace of God.'

"Agostino had a singular love and esteem for the holy exercise of

prayer, and, meditating upon the blessed effects it produces in a soul, he used to say, 'Every thing depends upon thinking of God and praying to Him'; and, explaining himself, he added, 'While we pray, we amend our lives, we regulate our conduct, and we wash away all the stains of our souls; for the spirit of prayer suffers nothing sordid or impure to remain within us.' He was in the habit of beginning his meditation by placing himself in the presence of the Eternal Father. He then made acts of profound adoration and humility, putting no trust in himself, but confiding with a simple faith in the goodness of God, and saying, 'Eternal Father, behold, I come before Thee, sent by Thy only Son, the Divine Object of Thy everlasting love, and the Source of all my hope. He it is who begs Thee to grant me this grace; I come in His Name, and I bring my credentials, written with His sacred Blood. Behold and read, for therein wilt Thou find that He bestows upon me His infinite merits. I have accepted them; in justice, therefore, Thou wilt not refuse me what I ask. He has given me all things; His merits are no longer His, for He has referred them all to me.' Agostino said, 'I have no fear of not obtaining my petitions, when I remember Thy promise of the Gospel, "If you ask the Father any thing in My name, He will give it you."' 'Still,' he added, 'we must be careful not to hinder the blessings of God by our own evil dispositions. And there is one obstacle to the merciful designs of God, against which we are little on our guard; and that is a certain hardness of heart, which makes us omit to offer up prayers for our neighbour, and which causes our Lord (so to speak) to show a hardness of heart towards us.' He liked not to hear of persons seeking for spiritual sweetness in prayer; but he laid down as a rule, that our great object ought to be the overcoming of our passions, and therefore we should try to leave our meditation more patient and humble, more meek and gentle, than we went to it.' Comparing praying to fighting, he said, 'The soldier does not expect to feel pleasure when he fights, but he strives to conquer.' He quoted upon this subject the words of an eminent servant of God, who said, 'I have ever reputed and do repute it a great thing, to know how to abound in God; the reason is, because thus humility may be practised with much reverence. But a greater thing I have considered, and do consider, the knowledge of abstaining from God; the reason is, because faith is then exercised without further testimony, hope without expectation of reward, and charity without external signs of benevolence. This, indeed, is to gather honey from the rock, and oil out of the hardest stone.' Since the numerous occupations of his calling did not permit Agostino to spend all the time he wished in actual prayer, the pious priest made use of all creatures as means to raise his soul to God. He animated himself in this beautiful practice, saying, 'My soul, by the help of small drops, you will at length arrive at the

ocean of all good. Nevertheless, it is not well to tarry for the sake of rivulets that extend to this sea ; stay not without whilst all the good you seek is within.' In this manner every thing he saw seemed to this man of God a ladder, as it were, to raise him to heaven. He used to exclaim, ' What pleasure is there in being a mere spectator of this marvellous world, if we do not recognize in it the Hand of the Creator who formed it ? ' In order to find God in all his works, he deemed two things especially necessary, namely, faith and love ; for by these two wings did he soar from the visible to the invisible world. He constantly addressed this prayer to the Almighty : ' May each created object, O Lord, be to my eyes a glass, wherein I may behold Thy countenance, and be admonished of Thy presence.' He made frequent use of ejaculatory prayers, and particularly esteemed those which had been composed by the Saints. ' Thus,' he said, ' every one may say, " I have in my mind a thought which was first conceived in the heart of a Saint." '

" From the blessed union which Agostino enjoyed with Almighty God he further derived a singular tenderness of heart towards his neighbour. He loved all with the affection of a brother ; and so great was his charity, that he seemed to enjoy the good of another no less than if it had been his own personal advantage. He himself remarked, that love and good-will are endowed by God with the peculiar power of rendering all things belonging to others our own, without depriving the possessors of them. It was edifying to behold how much he esteemed and considered even the least amongst his brethren. He looked upon the brothers of the Congregation as so many superiors. He always spoke to them with reverence and affection, and never showed the slightest sign of contempt towards any one. Thus did he apply the maxim of St. Philip, ' We should despise none but ourselves.' Earnestly desiring to see this spirit reign in the Congregation, Agostino sometimes tenderly reminded his brethren of the admirable conduct of their holy father, and of the sweetness of his manners, which were always gentle and affectionate, even when exercising his disciples in the severest mortification. ' We all remember,' he said, ' with what simplicity and condescension our holy father governed us all ; how he testified his love for us by often calling us to his room, causing us to play and sing with him, and never commanding us, but, like one of ourselves, rather praying and sweetly showing us what he desired we should do.' This sweetness of spirit so peculiarly distinguished F. Manni, that he was commonly called the Father Sweet Manna. And we may well believe that it was no less pleasing in the sight of God than it was marvellous to the eyes of men, since it was instrumental in gaining many souls to Heaven. Agostino was assiduous in the confessional, and was ready to receive his penitents at all hours of the day. He had a wonderful tact for accommodating himself

to their several capacities, directing them to the attainment of the virtues they most needed, and recommending devotional exercises in proportion to their powers. When he found they were engaged in active occupations, he took especial care that their souls should not be idle before God. To all he advised frequent confession, and he taught them by wise and godly counsels how to make their confessions and communions with the greatest fruit to themselves. He constantly impressed upon them a filial devotion towards our sweet Lady, his own most loving and beloved Mother. For the use of his penitents he wrote many little books of devotion, by which he strove to enkindle the love of God in their hearts, and to instruct them in the practice of virtue. Agostino said that confessors ought to possess in an eminent degree sanctity of life and sweetness of demeanour, because sanctity draws down the blessing of God, and then sweetness (without risk under the safeguard of holiness) attracts the love of their neighbour. It did not satisfy him merely to hear and absolve his penitents, but he thought it necessary to assist them, and in some degree to provide them with salutary remedies against their sins, and not to leave them until he saw their cure completed. He approved the practice of some confessors, who, whenever they heard some grievous sin, first made an internal act of contrition for the injury done to God, and afterwards with gentle admonitions exhorted the unhappy offender to a true penitence. Kindness of manner he deemed particularly requisite in treating with timid souls, in order by gentle means to discover and remedy the hidden wounds of their hearts. He conversed but little with women, and his usual advice to them was, to avoid vanity. He was not in the habit of visiting them in their houses, except in cases of serious illness, and then he always liked to have a companion with him. When he heard their confessions, he was careful to place himself so as to be seen by others at a distance. He imitated St. Philip in refusing to give alms at the confessional, for fear self-interest should in any way prejudice the sincerity of the sacrament.

"Like all the holy men of whom we have written, Agostino had a great tenderness for the poor of Christ. He was in the habit of relieving them every day, more or less, according to his means; and when his money was all spent, he frequently gave away his clothes. He recommended to others this practice of daily alms-giving, saying that it was better to give a little day by day, than a great deal all at once, for we thus preserve in our hearts a love for this evangelical virtue, and perform (so to speak) a kind of ejaculatory alms. He taught those who had nothing to give away to say, at least in their hearts, when looking on the poor, 'May God, who nourishes the birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea, relieve thee also in thy need.'

"F. Manni was for many years confessor to the fathers of the

Congregation, and it is not easy to describe the zeal and prudence he displayed in this capacity. He was hardly chosen for this office, when he at once made up his mind that he had no longer any time to call his own. During the day he received all who came, even persons who did not belong to the institute, and in the night he never suffered himself to be refused to any one. He seemed almost as much concerned for the faults of others as if they were his own, and he undertook, himself, to make atonement for them. He watched over each penitent as if he had only that single soul to care for; and with all this incessant care and labor, he considered that he did nothing at all. He remembered the toils of St. Philip, and he used to say, 'I have seen more done than I can ever hope to do.' Agostino was much esteemed for his prudence and discernment in the direction of souls, and upon this account Pope Paul V. employed him in order to discern the spirit of Fra Bartolommeo da Salustio, a reformed Franciscan. F. Manni carefully fulfilled this delicate commission, bearing in mind that not so much as a suspicion of evil should rest upon a religious person. He therefore desired that Fra Bartolommeo, who was very severe in his mode of life, should discontinue his great austerities, such as his hair-shirts, chains, &c., saying, as he took off the chain which the holy monk had been wearing, 'Bind thyself not with chains of iron, but rather with the chains of Christ.' He added, 'Father Salustio, it would be better to desist from all singularity, and to resemble the rest of the community, by sleeping upon a straw bed, wearing sandals, and eating the same food as the others do.' Then hearing that he was in the habit of composing little spiritual works, he desired him to write something in his presence. The father with great simplicity immediately took up his pen, made the sign of the cross on it, and blessed himself with it, as he was accustomed to do whenever he wrote, and thus began his composition:—

' God's holy Will on earth to do,
Thine own will to forego,
To care nought for the praise of men,
Nor blush at what is low:
If thou wilt climb the mount of love,
For foes and scorners pray,
Pray likewise that the Will of God
Be done in thee alway.'

In order to try him still further, Agostino now forbade him to say mass, to assist at the Divine Office, or to continue any of his usual exercises of devotion. He thus endeavoured to discover whether this man of God was really free from all reprehensible attachment to these duties, or if, on the contrary, he retained some little vestige of self-love, some lingering trust in these spiritual helps, instead of confiding purely in God. To his prohibitions he did not fail to add harsh corrections, and severe reproofs for the scandal his past life had

given, declaring him unworthy to be ranked amongst the servants of God. Fra Bartolommeo submitted to the trial with the most perfect humility, meekness, and obedience; he quitted with equal readiness his corporal penances and his mental exercises, and preserved withal a constant peace and serenity of countenance. F. Agostino at last was fully satisfied; and now, having performed the task required of him by the Vicar of Christ, he thought it right to testify his own feelings of esteem and admiration towards the humble servant of God. One day, therefore, after giving him leave to pursue his customary pious exercises, he suddenly prostrated himself at his feet, and, taking the cord with which Salustio was girdled, he placed it round his own neck, and then implored pardon for all the unkindness he had been forced to show him. F. Salustio, hardly able to bear the sight of another thus humbled before him, replied in sorrowful accents, 'Ah! father, you little know what a demon is hidden beneath this habit!' Our good priest gave an account to the Pope of the solid virtue of Fra Bartolommeo, and begged the forgiveness of his Holiness for all the faults which, in order to obey him, he had committed against this innocent and saintly monk. The Pope was rejoiced at the relation, and he replied, that there was no need of asking forgiveness, since all that had passed had been an occasion of merit for both.

"F. Agostino had a singular talent for preaching the word of God with that simplicity of style with which it ought always to be delivered. This he had acquired at his own cost. For, once, after he had preached a learned discourse in a somewhat pompous manner, St. Philip (as is related in the Life of the holy father) desired him to repeat it so many times, that his hearers used to say of him, 'This is the father who only knows one sermon.' Agostino used to say that the whole science of preaching consists in first realizing the subject thoroughly to one's self, adding, 'I can never expect to make others feel what I have not felt myself.' He prepared himself for the pulpit by the diligent study of the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers, and his favorite works were the Collations of Cassian, and the writings of St. John Climacus. Conformably to the practice of the institute, he was accustomed to relate pious examples from the Lives of the Saints, and he generally quoted them from the Lives of the Fathers or the Ecclesiastical Annals. The study of the Annals, a work which had taken its rise in the Congregation, he particularly recommended to the members of the Oratory. After employing a sufficient time in study, he placed himself before God as one wholly unprepared, and waited for the Divine Goodness to inspire him with what he was to say. By this means he acknowledged that he had received considerable light from God, both in his words and ideas. He deplored the little fruit produced by sermons, and said that this was principally caused by the preacher seeking his own praise rather

than the salvation of souls, and thus losing all the merit of his labor for the sake of a passing breeze of human glory ; like the clerk of a rich merchant, as he himself expressed it, who, though daily counting out money for others, has his own purse empty. St. Philip, he said, instituted the daily expositions of the word of God in the Oratory, instead of the mortifications and rigorous duties of other religious orders, because this Divine word, preached with earnestness, and listened to with reverence, suffices to sanctify the world. Hence he implied that this holy exercise ought to be as powerful an instrument for the sanctification of Oratorians as the practices of a religious life are for the perfection of monks. Those who are unceasingly occupied in preaching and praying not only sow the good seed in others, but also reap an abundant harvest themselves. He affirmed that preaching served as a powerful stimulant to the soul ; for if the conscience did not feel what the tongue uttered, who would not dread to hear the words, ‘ Why teachest thou to others what thou hast not learned thyself ? ’ He thought that St. Philip could have left his children no richer patrimony than the continual ministration of the word of God, since they must always experience a kind of necessity to become themselves what they strove to render others. It pleased Almighty God to let Agostino witness the copious fruits of his daily sermons ; for many sinners, touched by his earnest words, abandoned the evil courses to which they had been scandalously addicted, and, placing themselves under his spiritual direction, made rapid progress in sanctity. Others entirely quitted the world and embraced a religious life, and it was observed that those who, guided by him, entered some pious institute, generally became men of eminent virtue. By the Divine Goodness F. Manni was also instrumental in the conversion of Jews and heretics, numbers of whom he conducted to the true way of salvation, treating them always with the most profound humility and unwearied charity.

“ As to his manner of life, it was in all respects similar to that of the rest of the Congregation. He carefully eschewed the least singularity, well knowing, that, by resembling the community, virtue shines less in the eyes of men, but is infinitely more precious before God. He insisted greatly upon preserving the true spirit of penance, and, explaining its importance, he observed, ‘ Where there is no mortification, there can be no genuine virtue. Our holy father, in order that his children should acquire this spirit, exercised them in continual exterior mortification, and always desired to see them humbled and abased.’ Agostino observed his institute with rigorous exactness, saying that ‘ the sons of St. Philip possess but few rules, in order that perfection of observance may compensate for deficiency of number.’ During meals he practised a continual mortification, all the more meritorious by being rarely perceptible. He deprived himself of some part of every dish that came to table, and he

used to say that these little acts of self-denial accustom the soul to bridle the senses. He resisted every inclination to avidity in eating, and never tasted any thing out of meals. He disliked wasting either his words or his thoughts upon eatables. He said, with St. Philip, that the temperance and sobriety prescribed for the ordinary meals of the community were sufficient to compensate for the more rigorous fasts and abstinences which were not commanded by the rule. Two things, he added, are to be borne in mind, namely, sobriety and cleanliness. F. Manni always joined in the usual recreations after dinner and supper, and he was wont to contribute in no small degree to the general cheerfulness. He loved to see all meet together in those joyous hours, and in this he resembled the holy father who never allowed his children to absent themselves under pretext of greater quiet and retirement elsewhere, nor would he permit the universal gayety to be disturbed by any appearance of sadness. Speaking of the manner of recreation, he said that it should be accompanied by moderation and a modest cheerfulness, so that, springing from a holy source, it might be in itself good.

“He detested idleness, and all the time he did not give to prayer and works of charity he employed in study, taking, however, especial care that his studies should be according to the spirit of his vocation, and should tend to his own and his neighbour’s profit. He displayed a singular charity towards the sick, and delighted in visiting the hospitals. He desired to see this pious practice observed by all the fathers and brothers of the Oratory, saying that St. Philip used to call it a short road to perfection. He asserted that many of the brothers declared, that by visiting the hospitals they had received the grace of chastity from God. His favorite hospital was that of the mendicants on the Sistine Bridge, where he especially loved to converse with two of the inmates, M. Angelo and M. Bartolommeo, both of them poor in worldly substance, but rich in the gifts of God, as is related in their Lives, published in 1671. They considered themselves greatly benefited by the advice and spiritual guidance of Agostino. When they heard of his death, they exclaimed, ‘F. Agostino was an angel of God to us poor creatures; truly he was an apostle and a saint!’ The same title was given him by the servant of God, Glicenio Landriani, one of the regular clerks of the Pious Schools, who frequented the spiritual exercises of the Oratory, and whose Life was published in 1694. He rendered every possible assistance to his penitents when sick, and, as he was ever most devout to our Lady, he used often to throw himself at Mary’s feet, and beg her to be their infirmarian, and to obtain for them either restoration to health, or the grace to profit by their sufferings. But with tenfold earnestness did he implore her assistance for them when they approached their last awful passage to eternity, that their death might be precious in the sight of God.

"It seemed natural that one, who had begun his life under the aspic of this heavenly Mother, should likewise end it under her blessed protection. And so it was with Father Agostino Manni. He had endured for many years a painful asthma, and now he was at last confined to his bed. He had recourse with his wonted faith and confidence to our sweet Lady, and he placed the interests of his soul in her tender hands. In these devout sentiments, after receiving the last sacraments with the greatest devotion, he placidly gave up his soul to God, November 29th, 1618. He was seventy-nine years of age, having spent forty in the Congregation of the Oratory, and eighteen under the discipline of St. Philip." — pp. 73–191.

The second volume named contains the life of a devoted Jesuit Father, who labored among the negroes of the West Indies, and the memoirs of Cardinal Odeschalchi, while he belonged to the Society of Jesus. Both are full of interest, and especially at this time, when so many are disposed to forget the eminent services rendered to religion by the great and holy men of the Society.

We hope soon to return to this series of publications, and to speak more at length on its general character, and on some of the topics it suggests for the meditation of the devout Catholic. We have at present only space to commend the entire series to our Catholic community.

PART. VII. — *The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Œcumenical Council of Trent, celebrated under the Sovereign Pontiffs, Paul III., Julius III., and Pius IV.* Translated by the REV. J. WATERWORTH. To which are prefixed *Essays on the External and Internal History of the Council.* New York: E. Dunigan & Brother, 151, Fulton Street; London: C. Dolman, 61, New Bond Street. 8vo. 1848. pp. ccliii. and 326.

OUR readers will best form a general idea of what they are to look for in this valuable work, from the editor's Preface, which we copy entire.

"Many years have elapsed since the Editor of this work formed the design of publishing a translation of the General Councils. The advantage, or necessity, of studying the Councils, as one of the

chief records of the faith, morals, and discipline of the Church ; as the main basis and exponents of canon law ; as containing much of the history of the Church and of heresy ; and finally, as forming part of that deposit of doctrine and practice which so many are called upon to receive in the Profession of Faith of Pius IV., — furnished motive enough to regard the undertaking as one of importance and general utility. And it was also thought that a work of this class would be acceptable and advantageous, not only to the ecclesiastical student, but also to all who may wish to make themselves acquainted with the real doctrines of the Catholic Church, as stated and defined, not by individuals, but by her assembled prelates, secured from error, in matters of faith, by the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit, when thus representing in Council the entire Church of God.

"The Council of Trent has been first prepared for press, because that Council is of more immediate use for the present times ; as the errors of the Innovators of the sixteenth century are there condemned, and the Catholic doctrine is there also stated, on the chief points which still unfortunately separate so many from our communion ; and also because the decrees of discipline and reformation, published by that Council, embody the leading principles of Canon Law, by which the government and polity of the Church are, in a great measure, now regulated.

"This latter consideration weighed much with the Editor, in inducing him to proceed at once with this last of the General Councils. The times were said to be ripe for a restoration, in this country, of the ordinary discipline of the Church, as regards bishops and clergy ; or, at all events, it appeared to many that the day could not be far distant when such a consummation must be looked for, and when, therefore, it would become, or was becoming, necessary, to enable all, readily and easily, to study the true duties and rights which they would, perhaps soon, be called upon to exercise.

"It only remains to notice such details in the execution of the work as may be thought likely to interest the reader.

"1. The edition of the Council used is Le Plat's copy* of the authentic edition, published at Rome in 1564.

"2. Neither time nor labor has been spared to render the translation as faithful a transcript as possible of the original ; the most minute accuracy being essential to the value of a work of this character. Hence, the translation will be found to be a literal, and, as far as was attainable, a *verbatim* representation of the words of the Council ; and where those words seemed either susceptible of a

* * Antwerpæ, 1779. This edition is very valuable, on account of its vast mass of various readings, and the catalogues of the Fathers present at the Sessions. Two of those lists will be found in an Appendix at the close of this volume."

somewhat different rendering, or to convey some slight shade of meaning not capable of being reproduced in our language, they have been uniformly placed in the margin.

"3. Many notes, and especially numerous references to previous Councils, had been prepared, to elucidate the meaning of the Council; but, after much reflection, they have been almost entirely suppressed, for fear of infringing on a wise and extensive prohibition, issued in the Bull of Confirmation, against glosses, and other attempts at illustrating the decrees of the Council. Such, then, is the general character, or what it has been the Editor's endeavour to render the character, of this the first translation* of the Council of Trent into the English language; but should any passage or word be discovered, or be thought, to be less accurately translated than might be wished, the translator will feel grateful to have the place pointed out to him, that he may give the suggested emendation a candid consideration, and adopt it, if advisable.

"4. To the canons and decrees are prefixed two historical essays. The first of those pieces treats of the causes and events which immediately preceded and occasioned the convocation of the Council; whilst the second essay is a connected narrative of the proceedings of the assembled prelates and theologians, preparatory to each Session. The one gives the history of the times, the other of the Council; and the second especially will, it is believed, be found useful in elucidating many phrases and canons, and in fixing the meaning of passages and decrees which might labor under some obscurity, if considered only as they stand in the text. In fact, without an intimate acquaintance with the debates in the congregations which prepared for and preceded the public Sessions, it would be difficult or impossible to form a just and an accurate judgment on the form of words used in several of the most important decrees, especially of discipline and reformation.

"5. In compiling both the external and internal history of the Council of Trent, continued use has been made of the noble work of Pallavicino; † and as nearly all the leading facts and statements are derived from that authentic record, it has not been thought necessary to load the margin with references; almost every important circumstance narrated in the essays being capable of being confirmed by reference to that work." — pp. v. — viii.

As far as we are able to judge, Mr. Waterworth has executed the difficult and delicate task he proposed to himself with singular skill, judgment, and fidelity, and he has given us

"* An anonymous translation appeared in 1687; but it is so unfaithful, and even ludicrously absurd, that it must be regarded as rather a burlesque, than a translation, of the decrees."

"† *Istoria del Concilio di Trento*, Roma, 1657."

a work of real value, which was much wanted in our English Catholic literature. The introductory essays have been written with great care and labor, and, though brief, leave unstated no important historical fact necessary for the elucidation of the Council. The translation, as far as we have compared it, is successful, and, for the most part, gives the exact sense of the original, without paraphrase, in good idiomatic and intelligible English. Mr. Waterworth has been so successful in this volume, that we hope he will be encouraged to continue his labors, and give us the other works he refers to in his Preface.

We subjoin the remarks with which Mr. Waterworth closes his essay on the internal history of the Council.

"Before closing these essays, it may be well to subjoin a short notice of some of the usual objections brought against the Council.

"It is not unusual with Protestant writers, to copy, without hesitation, the assertion of Fra Paolo, that the Council of Trent deceived the expectations formed of it at its opening, and to represent it as a perfect failure. So far, it is said, from restoring unity, it has rendered a reconciliation impracticable; the reformation of discipline was scarcely attempted, and, where attempted, was touched with too sparing a hand to be effectual; the jurisdiction of bishops was reduced, instead of being enlarged; and the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff was in the same proportion increased.

"1st. To represent the Council of Trent as in any way influencing the conduct, or confirming the separation, of any of the sects whose opinions it condemned, is to gainsay plain facts of history. For all these sects had completely separated from the Church, before a single decree had emanated from the Council. The change of religion in Germany, England, and elsewhere, was an established fact, before the Council was assembled. Before the Council, entire nations abandoned the faith of their fathers; after the Council, no single instance can be adduced of any extensive revolt from the authority of the Church.

"2. Neither is it true to say that a reunion has been rendered more difficult since the promulgation of the decrees of the Council. For what doctrine is there now prominently put forward as dividing the Catholic Church from the innovators, which had not already been defined by some other General Council, held before the Council of Trent? Whether on the sacraments, or on the other doctrines and practices of the Church, the decrees of Trent but followed those of anterior Councils, or the received constitutions of the Sovereign Pontiffs. There is not one article of faith contained in the profession of faith by Pius which cannot be shown to have been defined and believed as Catholic truth, or practised, when a

practical doctrine, throughout Christendom, long before the Council promulgated or enjoined that doctrine or practice.

"3. If there were any so credulous or zealous as to believe that the Separatists would be brought back to Catholic unity by means of the Council, they were indeed disappointed; but disappointed in spite of the warning of experience, and of all the past history of heresy and of the Church. No such hope could ever have been entertained, had they but reflected on the result of the decrees of the earliest, as well as of the more recent, Councils. The Arian heresy was not crushed by the Council of Nicæa; nay, it never was so extended, its ravages and power were never so great, as after the Council which condemned it. So was it after the Council of Constantinople, after that of Ephesus, and even after the magnificent assembly at Chalcedon. Such, then, had been the ordinary result; and there was every thing in the conduct, and doctrine, and declarations of the self-styled Reformers, to prepare men's minds for the conclusion, that the heresies of the sixteenth century would be no exception to the rule. In fact, their fundamental principle, or practical adoption of the absurd system of private interpretation, — their denial of all infallible authority, — would almost necessarily preclude the possibility of submission to the decrees of a Council which was based on principles diametrically opposite. Hence, as is recorded in the preceding pages, both Clement and Paul III. declared that the assembling of a Council was not to be regarded as a means of converting Germany.

"Irreconcilable, then, that separation may be, and reconciliation impracticable; but not on account of the Council of Trent, but on account of the denial of truths which Trent did not affect to discover, or first proclaim, but simply stated and explained, in conformity with the decrees of previous Councils, and the uniform belief and practice of the Christian world. At Trent, therefore, the scattered dogmas were collected, but there was no innovation. Before the Council, whole nations fell away; since the Council, the heresies condemned may count their gains, but can they count their losses? The former are as nothing to the latter.

"II. The reformation of discipline, especially in the ecclesiastical order and government, from the highest to the lowest ranks, cannot be denied by any one conversant with the state of the Church before and after the Council. The extinction of pluralities, the obligation of residence, the annihilation of the mass of privileges and exemptions, the establishment of ecclesiastical seminaries, — these and similar regulations have produced so favorable an effect, that the outward appearance of the Church has been almost entirely changed; and so effective and wise were those regulations, that, at the expiration of nearly three hundred years, they are as vigorous and operative as ever, in preventing those grievous evils which they

were established to remedy. It is very easy to decry the present, and to praise the past ; but it would be difficult to lay the finger on any one century in the history of the Church, in which the outward polity, government, and discipline, whether in the higher or inferior orders of the clergy, can be shown to have been more pure, or free from just subject of complaint. Neither would it be more easy to name an age which has produced men of greater eminence in holiness, in self-denial, in learning, in devotion to God's glory and the salvation of men, in all the virtues and counsels of the Gospel, than have adorned the Church since the time of the Council of Trent. Even Courayer, in his otherwise censorious remarks and notes, inserted in his translation of the history of Fra Paolo, acknowledges the excellence of the disciplinarian reforms.*

" III. As regards the jurisdiction and authority of bishops, it is a fact, which the slightest knowledge of history will make evident, that bishops have increased in power and honor, in proportion as the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff has been more fully and extensively exercised. And it is also certain, that the bishops, without losing one single particle of the jurisdiction which they enjoyed before the Council of Trent, recovered, by means of that Council, many of the privileges of which they had, by degrees and in various ways, been deprived ; so that, of all the Councils ever held, that of Trent promulgated the greatest number of decrees in their favor, and this on points the most important ; and it might even be safely said, that all the previous Councils united have done less towards restoring their unfettered authority over their subjects, of all degrees, and in consequent diminution of the power of the Roman tribunals, than was effected by the single Council of Trent. A very cursory examination of the decrees of Reformation will establish the truth of this assertion beyond all controversy. And this will suffice to show the emptiness of the statement, that the Papal power was increased by that Council ; the fact being, that not a decree was passed in favor of the Sovereign Pontiff, either by conferring one privilege which he did not enjoy before, or asserting even that preëminence which had been proclaimed in the Council of Florence, and that of Lateran ; — whilst, on the other hand, many graces and dispensations, previously granted freely by the Pontiff, were either suppressed altogether, or greatly limited ; many causes and persons that had been withdrawn from the cognizance of bishops, before the meeting at Trent, were again placed under their jurisdiction by that assembly, — nominally, indeed, as the delegates of the Apostolic See, but practically as completely as if no such form had been introduced to overcome the objections of privileged and exempted persons.

" It will be useful to close these remarks by a few lines on the

* * Preface, Vol. I. pp. xxvii., xxviii."

erty of the Council ; as it is constantly objected, that the Council of Trent was not free, but was a mere passive instrument in the hands of the Pontiff.

“ But, before coming directly to the question, the reader must be reminded, that the Germans, and other nations, would never consent throughout to the Council being held in any city of the Ecclesiastical States ; so that, in the three reunions of the Council, all the proceedings were conducted in a city subject to the Emperor ; and is even after the votes of two thirds of the Fathers had transferred the Council to Bologna. Neither is it to be supposed that the majority of the bishops were from the Pontifical States, or derived their revenues thence ; the fact being, that the bishops from those states were always but a small and inconsiderable minority, when compared with those who held their bishoprics under the Emperor, and who, therefore, were far more directly under his power and influence than that of the Pontiff. Neither, therefore, as to the place in which the Council was held, nor as to the number of prelates present, was the Pope even upon a parity with the Austrian Emperor.

“ As regards any undue influence exercised by rewards, I am not aware that any accusation has ever been brought, on this head, against the Popes ; but it may not be useless to remark, that there is no one instance of favor or advancement conferred on those who habitually supported the Legates, which their own merits and position did not of themselves justify and require ; whilst several of those most hostile and troublesome during the Council were, when their qualities demanded it, advanced to the highest dignities by the overreign Pontiffs. It is true, that, in order to retain some of the poorer bishops at Trent, a pension was assigned them out of the papal treasury ; but the amount, twenty-five scudi a month, was so trifling, that it was regarded, by the majority of those who received it, rather as a grievance than as a favor ; because, whilst it hindered them from leaving the Council, and returning to their dioceses, under the plea of poverty, it barely sufficed for their subsistence ; whence some of the most violent opponents of the Legates were to be found amongst those who were forced to accept that pension.

“ It now remains to consider, whether the Council was, on any occasion, induced or compelled to pass a decree which really was opposed to the wishes of the Fathers ; or, on the other hand, was prevented, in any instance, from acting as their desires and consciences prompted them.

“ As not a single decree of faith was promulgated to the advantage of the Pope, whilst many decrees of discipline were issued in direct opposition to his interests, and those of his courts at Rome, it is plain, that the plea of undue influence, or compulsion, cannot for a moment be sustained. Neither can that of hindering the Fathers

from passing decrees be better supported. Only two cases have been adduced in support of the accusation: the first, on the origin of the law of residence; the second, on the origin of the institution of bishops. Now, as regards the first, it has been seen, in this history of the Council, that Pius IV., though averse at first from any definition of a question so doubtful, and so violently debated, not only amongst the Fathers, but amongst Catholic writers, at length directed his Legates to decide it by the votes of the majority. Two of his own Legates were in favor of asserting the Divine origin of residence and one regarded it as of ecclesiastical law; and if the matter was left undetermined, it was not through the fault or interference of the Pope, but because the Fathers could not sufficiently agree amongst themselves, to justify the promulgation of any decree on the subject. Amongst those who maintained the Divine origin of residence were some of the most strenuous supporters of the authority of the Pontiff; men afterwards raised to the highest dignities, and even to the Apostolic throne. And it may be doubted whether the effect, which the affirmation of that Divine origin was considered likely to produce, has not been as effectually secured by the zeal and attention of the Sovereign Pontiffs, in this regard, as if the Council had unanimously agreed that bishops are bound to residence by the law of God.

"Much the same must be said on the Divine institution of episcopacy, in regard of jurisdiction. The subject was left to the votes of the prelates; and no decision was come to, because no agreement could be arrived at. Whilst, so far was the Pontiff from wishing to exalt his own privileges over those of the bishops, that, when nine tenths of the Fathers were willing to renew in his favor the decree of the Council of Florence, and even to proclaim his superiority over a General Council, he refrained from taking advantage of their readiness; and this at the desire of the Cardinal of Lorraine, and of a few French prelates, supported by a small number of other bishops, who alone were opposed to the promulgation of decrees so advantageous to his authority. Whence it follows, that, as regards the decrees of faith, only in two instances did the Pontiff interfere at all; and in those, the matter was eventually left to the unbiased judgment of the Fathers.*

"The decrees of Reformation present no difficulty: for not only did the Pontiffs leave the Fathers to decide as they pleased on all questions over which they had direct jurisdiction, but, even on those reserved especially to the Holy See, and in regard of his own tribunals, Pius repeatedly directed his Legates to leave the whole to the judgment and votes of the Council; and his complaint constantly was, that they continued to request his instructions, even

* This is acknowledged even by Courayer, T. I., Preface, p. xxix."

After he had ordered them to leave all to the votes and the wishes of the Fathers. The Cardinal of Lorraine, the Archbishop of Braganza, the Emperor of Austria, and the Kings of Spain and Portugal, each and all bore honorable testimony to the conduct of the Pontiff in this regard,—to his repeated injunctions to satisfy their demands in every practicable particular; whilst, if ever the Council was indeed checked in its wishes, it was when it was proposed to correct the abuses, caused by the interference of secular princes in the administration and government of the churches within their dominions. And whereas Pius at once accepted and enforced all the decrees of Trent, within his own territory, and in his own tribunals, detrimental as many of those decrees were to his interests and those of his courts, those princes, with few exceptions, refused to introduce the decrees of discipline, except by degrees, and in proportion as their necessity or utility was clearly manifested by the wants of their states, or the demands of their clergy.”—pp. cxlvi. — ccliii.

These remarks are solid and just, and completely vindicate the Council from the aspersions cast upon it by our adversaries. We find not the least fault with them, but we almost wish the reply to the charge of undue Papal influence on the proceedings of the Council had been omitted. All that is necessary to establish is, that the Council was regular and free. The Pope, on any hypothesis we choose to take, is an integral element of the Council, and whatever influence he exerts on its proceedings or its decisions is only so much of the integral influence of the Council itself. In no case can it be an infringement of the liberty of the Council, unless we suppose the absurdity that the Council can infringe its own liberty. What Catholic ever dreamed of excluding the Pope from the Council? or that, when the Council is congregated, the Pope is to hold his peace, and leave all to the Fathers, without his interference, advice, or suggestion? St. Peter, at the Council of Jerusalem, gave very frankly his view of the matters to be decided, and the Council followed it. It does not appear to have occurred to St. Peter that he must remain silent and passive, leaving it to the rest to decide, without him, the questions at issue. Instead of undertaking to show that the Pope did not exercise the influence charged against him, we would rather simply assert, that, if he did, he had the right to do so. The Pope is a better judge of the extent and limits of his powers than we are. The fact that he exercises a given power is, to say the least, a presumption that he has a right to do it, and we must be informed by a higher authority than his that he has not,

before we can deny it. It does not become us to judge our judge.

It is often better to pass over than to deny the charges of our adversaries, even when we are abundantly able to disprove them. In replying to objections urged, we have to consider our replies not only as they bear upon those without, but also upon those within. The objections we have to meet, for the most part at least, rest on a humanitarian principle, and virtually assume the point they are urged to prove. Resting on a humanitarian basis, they are, and can be, no valid objections against an authority assumed to be Divine and supernatural. If we meet and simply refute them on the humanitarian ground, we run the risk of having our refutations react on Catholics, and create even in them a tendency to regard Catholicity itself only from the humanitarian point of view. It is desirable, no doubt, to silence the arguments and cavils of those without; but it is far more desirable to maintain sound doctrine, and a high, uncompromising Catholic tone among those who are within. To consent to defend our own doctrines on a low, instead of a high ground, lowers the doctrinal tone of the faithful themselves, and renders them less able to withstand the attacks of the enemy. A line of argument that would be perfectly safe and even judicious in the schools, where the strict rules of logic are observed, may be the reverse when pursued before the people at large, who are unskilled in technicalities, and unable to make or to appreciate nice scholastic distinctions. The people understand us always as conceding what we do not expressly deny, and as giving up what we do not expressly assert.

The Catholic controversialist finds, to-day, his chief embarrassment, in defending the Catholic faith or repelling objections to it, in the concessions made or in the economical methods of argument adopted by his predecessors. He finds that they often deprive him of his readiest and most solid answers to objections, or render it impossible for him to use them without having to maintain a controversy with those within as well as with those without. We hold, that, in discussing the subject before the public, we should refuse to plead to objections which are objections only on the assumption of a false principle. To plead to them is to recognize the principle on which they rest, and to subject us to the inconvenience of having that principle thrown in our face just when and where we are the least prepared for it. To defend the Papacy, for instance, on humanitarian principles, even though we make a reserve in our own

minds in favor of its Divine right, can only tend to prepare the people to regard it as a human institution, and therefore as one to which they are not bound to submit. It is very convenient, in a democratic age and country, to answer objections urged against certain powers which have been claimed and exercised by the Popes, by asserting that they were held and exercised with the assent of the people ; but it is a great inconvenience to have done so, when the people become hostile to them, and assert in our face, as a truth, the principle we had conceded. What the people grant, the people can revoke. This fact, we think, is not unworthy the consideration, at the present moment, of all who have manifested a wish to assimilate the Papal power, at least in some departments, to the democratic principle. Rome is at this moment writing, in very legible characters, a striking commentary on their methods of asserting the legitimacy of the Papal authority and influence.

The Papacy is the element in our Church which is always the most exposed to attacks, because it is the foundation and centre of unity, because it is the chief executive authority of the Church, and because it is that which offers the more immediate and effectual resistance to those who would suppress the independence of the spiritual order, trample on the rights of conscience, and enslave their brethren. St. Peter stands in the forefront of the battle, protecting as well as leading on his troops ; and the enemy knows full well, that, if he can be struck down, they will soon be put to flight or compelled to surrender at discretion. Hence, all the efforts of the enemy are directed against the Papacy ; and no one can have read the history of the Church for the last six hundred years, without perceiving that the greater part of the evils which have afflicted her maternal heart have been occasioned by a disposition, among many even of her own children, to distinguish between her and the Papacy, and to circumscribe the Papal authority and influence within the narrowest limits possible. Hence, the Papacy is that to which all good Catholics should especially rally, and prepare to defend with their hearts and their lives. Whatever tends to lower it, or to favor low and narrow views of it, they must look upon as un-Catholic and dangerous in its effects.

But though the extract we have made has suggested this train of remark, our readers must not for a moment suppose that Mr. Waterworth is in the least degree obnoxious to the censure implied in what we have said. No writers have gone farther in their efforts to circumscribe the Papal authority than

English Catholic writers, and the wisdom of their proceeding may be seen in the leanness which has characterized English Catholics for these three hundred years, and more. They have, indeed, acknowledged the Primacy of St. Peter and his successors, but one can hardly help feeling, when reading their writings, that they regard the Papacy as little better than a blunder, and secretly wish that Almighty God had seen proper to have constituted his Church without it, — or at least, to have exempted Englishmen from the obligation to obey it, especially since the Holy See was to be at Rome, instead of Canterbury or York. They seem always to grudge the Pope every obedience they yield him, and to have no love, no warm, living affection, for the chair of Peter. But we see nothing of this in Mr. Waterworth, although he is an Englishman. Indeed, we owe it to truth and justice to say, that there appears to be a far more healthy and high-toned Catholic feeling growing up among our English brethren. A little namby-pambyism there may be still, here and there, in our mother country, as well as among ourselves, where the old English spirit remains to be exorcised ; but, upon the whole, English Catholics are beginning to set a truly edifying example. They are active, and their press teems with Catholic works, — many of them works of a lofty tone, and of great value. It would seem that the day has gone by when we were to say of them, They are first Englishmen, and then Catholics. They are becoming, rapidly, *Roman* Catholics, and apparently are already far more *Roman* than we are in this country. There is scarcely a periodical in this country that has the courage to use, on some subjects, the strong language which we read habitually in the *London Tablet*, or occasionally in the *Dublin Review*, which, notwithstanding its name, is English rather than Irish.

The English Catholics, in fact, are setting us an example which we should do well to follow, and which, while it consoles us, should excite us to renewed zeal and greater activity. They are far ahead of us. We rely upon them for nearly all the books we read in our own language, and for nearly all the matter that fills our Catholic newspapers. They send us much ; we return them little. This is not as it should be. If we were less engrossed in politics and the world, if we were only resolved to be, first of all, Catholics, and thoroughgoing *Roman* Catholics, our numbers and means are sufficient to enable us to take as active and as important a part in the Catholic movement of the day as our English brethren are taking.

We are too supine, too indifferent, too forgetful of the duty we owe to the Church, and of the blessed privilege of laboring to promote her interests. Let us look across the water to England, and to France, and ask ourselves if we have not reason to blush at the little we do. It really seems to us, that, unless in some portions of Spanish America, there is at this moment no part of the globe where the great body of the Catholic laity, and especially those in easy circumstances, are so little intent upon the interests of their religion, where they have so little mental activity and energy, as in this free and happy country of ours. May it be so no longer ; but may we all pray God to grant us the grace necessary to perform our share in the great work now going on.

ART. VIII. — *The Vision of Sir Launfal.* By J. R. LOWELL. Cambridge : George Nichols. 1848. 16mo. pp. 27.

THOSE of our readers who have not read this beautiful little volume from the University Press, Cambridge, will be able to form some idea of its general purpose and character from the author's "Note," which we copy, as its most appropriate introduction.

"NOTE. — According to the mythology of the Romancers, the San Greal, or Holy Grail, was the cup out of which Jesus partook of the last supper with his disciples. It was brought into England by Joseph of Arimathea, and remained there, an object of pilgrimage and adoration, for many years, in the keeping of his lineal descendants. It was incumbent upon those who had charge of it to be chaste in thought, word, and deed ; but one of the keepers having broken this condition, the Holy Grail disappeared. From that time it was a favorite enterprise of the knights of Arthur's court to go in search of it. Sir Galahad was at last successful in finding it, as may be read in the seventeenth book of the Romance of King Arthur. Tennyson has made Sir Galahad the subject of one of the most exquisite of his poems.

"The plot (if I may give that name to any thing so slight) of the following poem is my own, and, to serve its purposes, I have enlarged the circle of competition in search of the miraculous cup in such a manner as to include, not only other persons than the heroes

of the Round Table, but also a period of time subsequent to the date of King Arthur's reign."

Mr. Lowell may be right in calling the Holy Grail the cup from which our Lord communicated his disciples at the last supper, but, properly speaking, the Holy Grail, or San Greal, was not the cup, but the blood, *Sanguis realis*, from the side of our Lord, when on the cross, which the legend asserts was received into the cup, and preserved in it. The name is a corruption of the Latin *Sanguis realis*, or of the French *Sang réel*. Mr. Lowell has materially changed the character of the old legend. In the original legend, the knight, after performing his devotions and preparing himself for the search, went forth in pursuit of the Holy Grail, and the poet simply narrated his adventures, and his success or his failure. Mr. Lowell dispenses with the devotions, with the actual pursuit and adventures, and contents himself with making his knight see a vision. This alteration is characteristic of the difference between the early Romantic Age and our own. The old knights of romance, whatever the defects of their lives, — and they were rarely perfect models, — were always devout, always retained and loved the faith, and, if they sinned, were ready to do penance, — the next best thing to not sinning; and they really did go abroad, were active, ready, and able to encounter danger and to endure fatigue. They lived and acted in the open world, out of doors, among real objects. But the moderns stay for the most part in-doors, repose on soft couches, and dream. Their adventures all pass in their sentimental reveries; their heroic deeds, and knightly conduct, are visions.

Mr. Lowell has not only modernized the external character of the old legend, but he has entirely changed its internal character. The moral of the old legend was the merit of chastity, in thought, word, and deed; and chastity, not merely in relation to one passion, but in relation to all the passions, — chastity of the entire body and soul. Mr. Lowell dispenses with this as with the devotion, as foreign to the ideas and habits of the moderns, and more likely to offend than to interest. He makes the moral turn, not on the motives from which, but on the feelings with which, one acts. Thus he sings, —

“ As Sir Launfal made morn through the darksome gate,
He was ware of a leper, crouched by the same,
Who begged with his hand and moaned as he sate;
And a loathing over Sir Launfal came,

The sunshine went out of his soul with a thrill,
 The flesh 'neath his armour did shrink and crawl,
 And midway its leap his heart stood still
 Like a frozen waterfall;
 For this man, so foul and bent of stature,
 Rasped harshly against his dainty nature,
 And seemed the one blot on the summer morn, —
 So he tossed him a piece of gold in scorn.

“The leper raised not the gold from the dust:
 ‘Better to me the poor man’s crust,
 Better the blessing of the poor,
 Though I turn me empty from his door;
 That is no true alms which the hand can hold;
 He gives nothing but worthless gold
 Who gives from a sense of duty;
 But he who gives a slender mite,
 And gives to that which is out of sight,
 That thread of the all-sustaining Beauty
 Which runs through all and doth all unite, —
 The hand cannot clasp the whole of his alms,
 The heart outstretches its eager palms,
 For a god goes with it and makes it store
 To the soul that was starving in darkness before.’”
 — pp. 12, 13.

This giving of alms from a sense of duty will not do. The
 ion continues.

“‘For Christ’s sweet sake, I beg an alms’; —
 The happy camels may reach the spring,
 But Sir Launfal sees nought save the grewsome thing,
 The leper, lank as the rain-blanchèd bone,
 That cowered beside him, a thing as lone
 And white as the ice-isles of Northern seas
 In the desolate horror of his disease.

“And Sir Launfal said, — ‘I behold in thee
 An image of Him who died on the tree;
 Thou also hast had thy crown of thorns, —
 Thou also hast had the world’s buffets and scorns, —
 And to thy life were not denied
 The wounds in the hands and feet and side:
 Mild Mary’s Son, acknowledge me;
 Behold, through him, I give to thee!’

“Then the soul of the leper stood up in his eyes
 And looked at Sir Launfal, and straightway he

Remembered in what a haughtier guise
 He had flung an alms to leprosie,
 When he caged his young life up in gilded mail
 And set forth in search of the Holy Grail.
 The heart within him was ashes and dust ;
 He parted in twain his single crust,
 He broke the ice on the streamlet's brink,
 And gave the leper to eat and drink ;
 'T was a mouldy crust of coarse brown bread,
 'T was water out of a wooden bowl, —
 Yet with fine wheaten bread was the leper fed,
 And 't was red wine he drank with his thirsty soul.

“ As Sir Launfal mused with a downcast face,
 A light shone round about the place ;
 The leper no longer crouched at his side,
 But stood before him glorified,
 Shining and tall and fair and straight
 As the pillar that stood by the Beautiful Gate, —
 Himself the Gate whereby men can
 Enter the temple of God in Man.

“ His words were shed softer than leaves from the pine,
 And they fell on Sir Launfal as snows on the brine,
 Which mingle their softness and quiet in one
 With the shaggy unrest they float down upon ;
 And the voice that was calmer than silence said,
 ‘ Lo, it is I, be not afraid !
 In many climes, without avail,
 Thou has spent thy life for the Holy Grail ;
 Behold, it is here, — this cup which thou
 Didst fill at the streamlet for me but now ;
 This crust is my body broken for thee,
 This water His blood that died on the tree ;
 The Holy Supper is kept, indeed,
 In whatso we share with another's need, —
 Not that which we give, but what we share, —
 For the gift without the giver is bare ;
 Who bestows himself with his alms feeds three, —
 Himself, his hungering neighbour, and me.’

“ Sir Launfal awoke, as from a swoond : —
 ‘ The Grail in my castle here is found !
 Hang my idle armour up on the wall,
 Let it be the spider's banquet-hall ;
 He must be fenced with stronger mail
 Who would seek and find the Holy Grail.’ ”

— pp. 23 – 26.

Here is the moral : no matter what we give, if we give from a sense of duty, we merit nothing ; we are truly charitable and meritorious in our alms only when we give with them our feelings, or rather when we give them without motive, from the simple impulse of love. Mr. Lowell is either a bad psychologist or a bad moralist. Love, as distinguished from the sense of duty, is an affection of the sensible instead of the rational nature. He who acts from a sense of duty acts from the highest and noblest love of which man is capable ; he who acts only from what we may term sensible love acts from his lower nature, — that which he possesses in common with many animal tribes. For our own convenience and pleasure in acting, it is always desirable that our emotions should harmonize with our sense of duty ; but for the meritoriousness of our actions, it is not at all necessary. He who performs a duty which is repugnant to his nature, and which demands great self-denial and self-command, is far more meritorious than he who performs an act, in itself considered, of equal worth, to which he feels no repugnance. To throw an alms in scorn to a beggar is, indeed, not meritorious, because there is no virtuous intention, and because scorn of a brother man, however low, or however loathsome his appearance, is always wrong. But it is clear, from the author's comment, that the "scorn" he charges upon Sir Launfal, was simply giving from a sense of duty, and therefore no scorn at all.

"He gives nothing but worthless gold
Who gives from a sense of duty."

In fact, the author shows through his whole poem, that he has never made his philosophy, and is ignorant of the first principles of ethical science. This detracts from his merit as a poet no less than from his merit as a moralist. The poet aims, and should aim, at the expression of the beautiful ; but the beautiful is the form of the true, and cannot be found where the true is wanting. We are not so unreasonable as to ask of the poet a system of metaphysics or a code of ethics ; we do not ask the artist to leave his own proper department, and to enter that of science ; we understand the distinct sphere of art, and highly appreciate it, — more highly, perhaps, than we get credit for ; but we do contend that no man can be a true poet, or artist, who has in his mind a false speculative system. His mind must be informed with ideal truth, or he can never apprehend or express true beauty of form ; and all ideal truth pertains to the department of speculative science. The poet must know as well as feel, and know principles, the eternal verities of things, in their

normal order and relations, or his expression will be broken, confused, the ebullition of lawless passion, the extravagances of a wild and inconstant fancy, or the incoherent ravings of folly and madness.

Here is a point on which, in these times, there are many erroneous and mischievous opinions afloat. Every body knows that the great poets, the great artists, have never flourished, save in epochs and countries marked by severe discipline, and ennobled by serious and solid studies. The flourishing period of true art is always immediately preceded or accompanied by a flourishing period of philosophy, of moral science, and of religious truth; and just in proportion as men lose sight of the great and eternal truths of religion, of the discoveries and teachings of a sound philosophy, — that is, of the ideal truth in the super-natural order and in the natural, — their artistic productions become mean and contemptible. It is not that art must dogmatize, speculate, or indulge in didactic teaching, but that the truths of religion and philosophy must be received into and form the mind of the artist. In ages that are serious, earnest, enlightened, when men do not scorn the ideal truth and fritter away their powers on merely external and sensible objects, these truths are generally recognized, form the basis of all moral and intellectual culture, and are taken in with ordinary speech or language, in which they are embodied, — so to speak, incarnated. The man endowed with artistic genius — that is, one who has received from nature the gift, when they are presented to his mind, of apprehending and distinguishing these truths under the form of the beautiful — is furnished with the requisite conditions of art, and can give birth to expressions which all men shall admire; for then he has present to his mind and soul ideal truth, which is always universal and eternal.

But in other epochs, when religion and philosophy, which supply the artist with his materials, are lost sight of or obscured, — when the truths of revelation and speculative science no longer preside over education, and form the basis of moral and intellectual culture, — when the mind and the heart are turned to the external, and become intent only on sensible and material objects, — there can be no genuine art; for the ideal truth is no longer distinctly apprehended, and, when no longer so apprehended, it can no more be expressed under the form of the beautiful than under the form of science itself. Hence it is, — though, for the last two hundred years, there has been no lack of aspirants to artistic creation, — there has been no art. The Divine

idea, supernatural truth, was obscured by the Reformers, and as been pretty much lost sight of by their descendants ; and here has appeared no philosopher, and there has been no philosophy, since the middle of the seventeenth century. The ideal truth, which was embodied by our Creator in language, has remained undistinguished ; serious studies, unless in some of the physical sciences, have been despised ; the mind has been turned outward to sensible objects, and the heart and soul have been wasted on the material, the ephemeral, and the frivolous. Art has therefore languished, and its cultivators have been able to copy only imperfectly the old masters. If we except, and we are hardly willing to except, Alfieri, there has been no poet since Milton. Goethe and Schiller had poetical genius of a high order, but the former was ruined by sensualism and pantheism, — both equally opposed to ideal truth, — and the latter by his lack of religious faith, and his Kantian philosophy, which even in the practical reason obscures and enfeebles the truth which the poet must seize and express. Byron had the subjective power of a great poet, but had present to his mind, as the material of art, far less of ideal truth than either Goethe or Schiller. France has never excelled in art, for her genius is not philosophical, does not aspire to the higher order of truth, is turned to objects of sense, to the outward world, and seldom rises above secondary ideas. The first American poet is probably not yet born.

Mr. Lowell has a lively fancy, a quick eye for material beauty, or, as we say, the beauties of nature, and considerable facility of expression. He can see and express the beauty of a daisy, of the bee collecting honey, of cows feeding in the pasture, of the cock clapping his wings and crowing, and even something of the life of a spring morning, the sultriness of a summer noon, and of the golden hues of an autumnal sunset ; but beyond or above he does not appear able to go. When he aspires, he falls ; and when he seeks to express the beauty of moral truth, he only proves that he has never clearly and distinctly beheld it. His glory is, that he believes in moral truth, — that he believes that there is the Divine and eternal idea back of the ever-changing appearances which flit past his vision ; but his misfortune is, that he has never beheld it, — that he has, at best, caught only a partial and transient glimpse of it, as one catches a partial glimpse of the objects around him, in the night, when a sudden flash of lightning for an instant furrows the darkness which envelops them. With solid training under the direction of religion and sound philosophy, which should have given elevation to his soul,

clearness to his view, firmness to his will, and sanctity to his aims, he would have been a poet. He has no complaint to bring against nature. He has, if we may so speak, genius enough potentially, and artistic genius ; but he has neither been subjected to the discipline, nor has he submitted himself to the serious and patient labor of thought, necessary to reduce the potentiality of his nature to act. Alas ! we must say this, not alone of Mr. Lowell, but of nearly all our contemporaries, in this superficial and frivolous age.

We have touched cursorily on several points in these brief remarks, which we regret that we have neither the time nor the space at present to develop. We love art, and, of the various species of art, we love poetry the best. But we have too high an appreciation of its character and office, to receive with favor the light and frivolous productions of our modern race of poetasters and versifiers, however beautiful their print and paper, or rich and tasteful their binding. Puerile conceits, flimsy sentiments, false philosophy, bad morality, even delicate and truthful descriptions of merely material objects, though expressed in flowing numbers and harmonious verse, we cannot honor with the name of poetry. We have no wish to treat harshly our young aspirants to poetic fame, to wound their feelings, or to damp their courage ; but, for the honor of our age, and the interests of modern civilization, we feel that it is necessary to raise our voice, feeble though it is, against the miserable trash which, under the name of literature, is inundating Europe and America, and threatening the extinction of what little virtue and manliness may yet remain. Would that there were amongst us a strong masculine voice, that could make itself heard amid the din and chatter of the age, and, with mingled kindness and severity, recall our youth to the antique depth of thought, greatness of soul, and energy of will, and impress upon their yet ductile minds the solemn truth that they must aim higher, submit to longer and more rigid discipline, and devote themselves for years to those solid studies which task all their faculties, and call forth all the potentialities of their souls, before venturing to appear before the public, either to instruct or to delight it. No one who would deserve well of his countrymen, leave his mark on his age, or live in the memory of his race, should entertain for a moment that silly doctrine now prevalent, that the great and enduring in art must be a spontaneous production, and that a work is worthless in proportion to the labor of intellect and will that its creation has cost. Poetry is not the instinctive and unpremeditated

utterance of the spontaneous emotions and conceits of the poet. it might do to say,

Ich singe wie der Vogel singt
Der in dem Zweigen wohnet,

f man were a blackbird ; but it will not do, unless we are careful to understand it in Goethe's sense, now since man is man, and must find his glory in the cultivation and exercise, under the will and by the aid of his Maker, of his proper humanity.

We do not ask the poet to encroach upon the province of the theologian, or of the philosopher. We do not ask him to make his poem a sermon, a didactic lecture, nor do we wish him to be careful to tack a formal moral on to its end, as is done in Esop's Fables ; but we do ask that he feed his mind and his soul with the highest order of religious and speculative truth, and that he discipline himself to express this truth under the form of the beautiful. We would have him eminently religious, because eminently true, and eminently moral, because eminently religious ; we would have him serious, earnest, great, sublime, by virtue of the universal and eternal verities of things with which he holds intercourse ; but we have no disposition to restrict his sphere, to trammel the freedom of his mind, or to forge hackles for his genius. Nay, what we desire for him is freedom, elevation, greatness, manliness, a clear and lofty intelligence, and a robust virtue, which are absolutely impossible in the nature of things without a severe and thorough discipline, and the possession of the highest order of truth, both natural and supernatural.

Our readers will understand from these remarks why it is we have been so severe on the light literature of the day, and why we have treated with so much harshness the young brood of religious novels with which we were threatened. We condemn not art in any of its forms ; we condemn not poetry ; we oppose not even works of fiction ; we object not to the cultivation of man's whole nature, to the employment of any of his faculties, or to pressing into the service of religion even sentiment and imagination : on the contrary, we approve and call for them all ; only let the mind that writes be fed, and the heart that admires be filled, with the truths of religion and philosophy. The man who has been rightly nurtured, whose faculties have been rightly disciplined, and whose mind has been enlightened, will be strengthened, and soul elevated by profound study of ideal truth, and possession of the eternal verities of things, may appeal to

all nature and express himself in what forms he pleases. His expressions will be true and beautiful, his influence will be moral, will favor a robust civilization, and manly virtue, which in the saint will rise to heroic sanctity and command the veneration of all good men.

ART. IX. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *The History of England from the Accession of James II.* By THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1849. Volumes I. and II. 12mo. pp. 525 and 520.

THIS is a rival edition of Macaulay's History to the Messrs. Harpers', and, though intended to be sold at a moderate price, is neatly printed on good paper, and presents, upon the whole, a respectable and even an inviting appearance. The reason assigned for issuing it was to give the American public the work in the orthography of the English edition, which the Harpers departed from in favor of the orthography of Noah Webster, our great American lexicographer. This, perhaps, was a sufficient reason for a breach of that courtesy which our publishing houses are accustomed to observe one towards another in regard to the republication of English books; but it can hardly apply in the present case, for this edition, if we have been rightly informed, departs as widely from the orthography of the English copy as the Harpers'. We have no partiality for the New York publishers, but a sense of justice compels us to say that they had as good a right to adopt Webster's orthography as the Boston publishers have to adopt Worcester's, although we follow and prefer the latter.

The Harpers, if they have not been wrongly accused, have been in the habit of taking liberties with English publications, which they can hardly justify, unless on the plea that they were born British subjects; and we are not at all displeased to see a rival house depriving them of a portion of the profits they usually reap from their disregard of the rights and dignity of authorship. We do not understand the right of American publishers to fix the orthography of the English language. We are ourselves stanch Americans, boasting an American ancestry of as long standing as any of our New England friends, and we have been brought up with a hearty hatred of England which might satisfy even our Irish friends; but in all that concerns the orthography, orthoepy, and good use of the English language, the supreme authority is in England, not in this country, and we are bound to receive the law from England instead of giving it to her. Our language is not American, but English, and we use it properly only in so far as we follow the true English usage. In regard to it, we are, and must be, as long as England remains a civilized and cultivated nation, merely provincials, and must take our fashion from the metropolis.

As to the History itself, we have now little to say. We received the two volumes at too late an hour to be able to do more than glance at a few chapters. We have read enough, however, to perceive that it is Macaulay's, a fair transcript of his mind, and may be taken as good au-

thority for judging its author, if not for judging any thing else. We hope to be able to review the work, as far as it has proceeded, in our next number. In the mean time, we can recommend it as a work of more than ordinary historical merit, learned, eloquent, and attractive, but to be read with great care and discrimination. The author has his prejudices, and is not incapable of constructing a well-turned period at the expense of truth. He tells some plain truths with regard to the Church of England, but he strikes us as being far from just to the Puritans, who, in our judgment, with all their faults, long faces, sour looks, drawling tones, psalm-singing, and cant, are, under a human point of view, always to be preferred to the swearing, toast-drinking, and licentious Cavaliers. We know that our English and American Catholic friends inherit no little of the old Cavalier contempt of the English and American Puritans; but we are not ashamed to acknowledge our Puritan descent, and the Puritans of New England need only the Catholic faith to be the noblest people on the globe. Add the Catholic faith and virtues to their unwearied industry and ceaseless activity of mind and body, to their indomitable energy, firmness and constancy of will, gravity and force of character, and you have a model people. The real elements of that character which has made England the first of modern nations, in the temporal order, are to be found in their greatest strength and activity in the Puritans and their descendants. We have, of course, no sympathy with their Puritanism, but we have sympathy with their human virtues, and would exalt them by Catholicizing instead of destroying them.

2.—*History of Maryland; from its first Settlement, in 1634, to the Year 1848.* By JAMES MCSHERRY. Baltimore: Murphy. 1849. 8vo. pp. 405.

THIS is a well-printed volume, and is, for its typography and getting up, creditable to the Baltimore press. Its author is a Catholic gentleman residing in Maryland, a native, we believe, of Pennsylvania, and a graduate of Mount St. Mary's College. He displays in this work very respectable ability and industry, and we have no reason to doubt, that, in so far as he professes to relate facts, he may be relied on. With many of his opinions, and the general tone and spirit of his work, we have not been able to sympathize. Before reading a book, we often ask, Who wrote it? but in making up our judgment of it, we ask simply, What is it? We do not, because we conduct a Catholic Review, feel bound to condemn every book written by one who is not a Catholic, or to commend every book written by one who is a Catholic. We can name books written by Protestants that contain more Catholic principle than some written by Catholics. A man may have the Catholic faith, may keep the precepts of the Church, and yet, in all that concerns the application of principles to the various departments of practical life, have the views and feelings of the heterodox. Leibnitz, a professed Lutheran, was far more Catholic in principle, and in the general tendencies of his philosophy, than Des Cartes, a professed Catholic. We must tell Mr. McSherry, that, while we thank him for his book, and recognize in it a valuable contribution to the local historical literature of our country, we do not find that it has any special claims upon us as Catholics. Those of our readers who have perused it will understand at once why we cannot praise it with any great warmth. The

author commends views with regard to religious liberty, which we believe lead to indifferentism; and he shows a local feeling with which we have no sympathy, and which leads him, we will not say to overrate the virtues of Maryland, but to underrate every other section, especially our own section, of the Union. No Cavalier ever more heartily hated a Roundhead than he appears to hate a New-Englander. This is simply amusing to us as New-Englanders, but it is painful to us as Catholics. The author, moreover, shows a strange want of manliness in regard to his religion, and singular ingratitude to his own Alma Mater. When speaking of the Colleges in Maryland, he ignores all the Catholic Colleges in that State, on which its literary glory depends, and mentions only one or two feeble institutions under Protestant control. This was not by accident, for he must have heard of Georgetown College, at Georgetown, St. Mary's College, Baltimore, and have known that there was Mount St. Mary's College, near Emmitsburg, where he himself was educated, and to which the Catholic religion in this country owes some of the brightest ornaments of its hierarchy, both of the first and of the second order. We do not wish an historian to be a dogmatist or a controversialist; there is a time and a place for all things; but we cannot pardon the historian of a State founded in the main by Catholics, who studiously ignores the literary institutions which Catholics have established, and which they conduct.

As Americans, we love and honor Maryland as one of the old "Thirteen" that did her duty, and did it nobly, in the time that "tried men's souls"; and as Catholics, we love and honor her as the first and only one of the Anglo-American colonies that planted the Cross in this Western World, and brought here the Church of God, into which we trust, at no distant day, the great body of our population will be gathered. We regret that she has not found an historian more worthy of her real greatness, and one who more clearly sees and more deeply feels what it is that constitutes her peculiar and her unfading glory. Yet we would not speak harshly of the volume before us. If it might have been better, it assuredly might have been far worse, and that, in these days, is high praise.

3.—*The Plan of the American Union, and the Structure of its Government, Explained and Defended.* By JAMES A. WILLIAMS. Baltimore: Sherwood & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 168.

THIS is a work which one must study before passing a judgment on it. We have not found time, since receiving it, to devote the attention to it which the magnitude and importance of its subject demand. As far, however, as we have examined it, although we cannot say much of its method or originality, it seems to us to take a judicious view of the general features of the American Constitution, and to be worthy of the attention of those who wish to understand the structure of the American Government. We hope soon to return to it and to its subject, and to treat them at some length.

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ART. I. — *Outlines of History, compiled for the Use of Schools and Academies.* By PIERCE C. GRACE. St. Louis : Wm. J. Mullin. 1848. 32mo. pp. 216.

THIS little volume is intended to supply a serious deficiency in our historical manuals, and we should owe an apology to its publisher for not having sooner introduced it to our readers, if it were not one of those works which are as valuable this year as they were the last. Mr. Grace has compiled it with commendable industry and praiseworthy motives ; the Catholic press of the country has given it a favorable reception ; and, though it is hardly up with the present state of historical science, or always as scrupulously accurate in its statements as we could wish in a work intended for childhood and youth, we can cheerfully recommend it as the best work of the sort, within so moderate a compass, we are aware of in our language.

Our present purpose in calling attention to this little manual of history is not, however, to criticize it favorably or unfavorably, but to make it the occasion of offering some brief, and, we trust, not unseasonable, remarks on the subject of civil and religious toleration, which its compiler brings to our notice in the two following extracts : —

"In 1620, during the reign of *James I.*, the first permanent settlement was commenced in *New England*, at *Plymouth*, in *Massachusetts*, by a band of *Puritans*, — a class of religionists, who, abandoning England on account of persecution from the established church, sought in the wilds of America the enjoyment of religious liberty. They had scarcely, however, established themselves in the *New World*, before they themselves exhibited even greater intoler-

ance than that from which they fled, and most cruelly persecuted all who differed from them in religious belief." — p. 183.

"In 1633, during the reign of *Charles I.*, *Lord Baltimore*, a Catholic nobleman, and a man of distinguished talents, applied for and obtained a grant of land upon *Chesapeake Bay*, about 140 miles long and 130 broad. Soon after, in consequence of persecution in England, on account of their religion, *Lord Baltimore* and a number of Catholics came over and settled on this grant, which, in honor of the queen, *Henrietta Maria*, they named *Maryland*. The history of this colony presents, in several important respects, a striking and most pleasing contrast to that of most of the other colonies. Universal toleration of religion was, for the first time on this continent, proclaimed and protected by this colony, and a system of equity and humanity was scrupulously observed in all its dealings with the Indians. The historian, *Bancroft*, in speaking of the settlement of *Maryland*, says: — 'Its history is the history of benevolence, gratitude, and toleration. The Roman Catholics, who were oppressed by the laws of England, were sure to find a peaceful asylum in the quiet harbours of the *Chesapeake*; and there, too, Protestants were sheltered from Protestant intolerance.'" — pp. 184, 185.

Toleration, or, to be more exact, religious liberty, is in every one's mouth, and the constant theme of declamation with all who would depreciate their ancestors, glorify themselves, or win the applause of the multitude; but, unless we are greatly deceived, it is a theme on which there is much loose writing, and still more loose speaking and thinking. Comparatively few appear to us to understand it, or to have any passable appreciation of its reach and conditions. All men, in words at least, are stanch friends of religious liberty, ready to live and die in its defence; but the great majority seem to us to mistake it for the liberty to deny and to enslave religion. The early Protestant sects, who, wherever they were able, subjected religion to the secular authority, fined, imprisoned, exiled, or martyred Catholics, claimed to be the friends of religious freedom, and the liberators of religion from spiritual despotism; the old French Jacobins plundered churches, suppressed the freedom of worship, abolished the Sabbath, overturned altars as well as thrones, massacred the clergy, decreed that death is an eternal sleep, and installed the goddess of Reason, under the pretence of religious liberty, and amid deafening proclamations of universal toleration; the present Socialists, Radicals, or Red Republicans of France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, profess to be fighting under the flag of religious no less than of civil

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liberty, and yet their successes are everywhere marked by insults to religion, the expulsion of the religious, the spoliation of churches and convents, and the persecution of the clergy. The most superficial observer can hardly fail to perceive that the age understands, by religious liberty, not the freedom to worship God in the way and manner he prescribes, but the freedom not to worship him at all, — the freedom to enslave or suppress his worship, to plunder his temples, to desecrate his altars, to deny his existence, to blaspheme his majesty, to trample on his laws, and to live like the beasts that perish.

But, although we are anxious to avoid every unnecessary quarrel with our age, we must tell it, that this is no religious liberty at all, that it is the enslavement of religion, where not its total extinction, and the freedom of irreligion, infidelity, heresy, and schism. Religious liberty, as we understand it, is **THE ABSOLUTE FREEDOM OF RELIGION, IN ITS DOCTRINES, DISCIPLINE, AND WORSHIP, FROM ALL HUMAN AUTHORITY, and therefore implies the ABSOLUTE INCOMPETENCY, IN SPIRITUALS, OF ALL HUMAN AUTHORITY, WHETHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE.** We say the absolute freedom of *religion*; by which we, of course, mean the true, that is, the Catholic religion. Consequently, we recognize no religious liberty where our Church is not free in her doctrine, discipline, and worship, and where all men have not full and entire freedom to profess the Catholic religion without restraint from, or responsibility to, any human power whatever, whether vested in the king, the aristocracy, or the people. Where this freedom is wanting, there is no religious liberty. This freedom we demand, not as a favor, not as a gracious concession from the prince or the republic, but as our right, as the indefeasible right of our Church, for the reason that she is the Church of God, the representative of the Divine sovereignty on the earth; and this freedom we are bound in conscience to assert, and to vindicate, if need be, as did the early Christian martyrs under the persecuting emperors of pagan Rome, not indeed by slaying, but by submitting to be slain.

From this view of religious liberty, it is evident, that, when we speak of *toleration*, we have and can have no reference to our Church; for she holds immediately from God, and we recognize no power on earth that has the right to restrain her worship, and therefore none that has the right to *tolerate* it. The question of toleration, raised in the extracts from the little work before us, lies below the question of religious liberty, and

relates solely to false religions, — to infidel, heretical, and schismatical sects. Are these to be tolerated, or are they to be prohibited? Shall we assert the natural right of every man to choose his own religion, or shall we assert, and as far as able enforce, the moral obligation of all men to profess the true religion? Shall we be intolerant and exclusive, or assert and maintain universal toleration? This is the question.

To answer this question, we must distinguish between two sorts of toleration, — political or civil toleration, and religious or theological toleration; that is, toleration of false religions in the temporal order, and toleration of the same in the spiritual order. These two tolerations are often confounded, and supposed to be inseparably connected. Hence many assert religious or theological toleration as the condition of justifying the assertion of political or civil toleration, and many also deny political toleration, in order, as they suppose, not to be obliged to assert religious toleration. But the two are in reality distinct, and one has no necessary connection with, or dependence on, the other. Political toleration of religion is the permission conceded by princes or republics to their subjects to profess the religion they choose; religious toleration is the permission granted by Almighty God to all men to profess any religion they please, or none at all, and implies the equal right, or the indifference, of all religions before God, or in reference to eternal life. Universal political toleration presupposes that all religions are compatible with the peace and safety of civil society; universal religious toleration presupposes that all religions are acceptable to God, and available for salvation. The state regards religion solely under its relation to social interests, and the theologian regards it primarily in its relation to the future life or the salvation of the soul. It is easy, therefore, if we understand the distinction of the two orders, to see that it is possible to be politically tolerant and yet religiously intolerant, if not politically intolerant and yet religiously tolerant.

The question of the political toleration of religion we shall consider at some length before we close; but, for the moment, we must confine ourselves to religious or theological toleration. Religious or theological toleration is what is commonly called *Indifferentism*, — that is, the doctrine that men may be saved in all religions, in one as well as in another, or that every one may be saved in his own religion, the religion of his country, or of his sect. To concede this doctrine is religious or theological toleration, as distinguished from political or civil toleration; to

deny it is religious or theological intolerance and exclusiveness, expressed in the Catholic dogma, "Out of the Church there is no salvation." Whatever conclusion we may or may not come to on the subject of political toleration, or the indifference of religions before society and the civil authority, we must, unless bereft of reason, be religiously or theologically intolerant and exclusive; for toleration in the spiritual order is, at bottom, neither more nor less than the denial of the religious principle itself.

Certain is it, from natural reason, that no man can be saved unless he renders to God an acceptable worship, and that no worship is or can be acceptable to God, except the worship which he himself prescribes. Moreover, it is equally certain, that no man can be saved who does not, at least, fulfil the law of nature. By the very law of nature, all men are bound to worship God, and to worship him in the way and manner he himself prescribes. If he leaves them to the natural law, and prescribes his worship only through natural reason, undoubtedly such worship as they can render by a prudent, diligent, honest use of reason, and the means bestowed for such purpose, will be the acceptable worship, and all that can in justice be demanded of them; but if he prescribes a supernatural religion, and promulgates it with sufficient motives of credibility, as he must needs do if he promulgates it at all, then are they bound to worship him according to that supernatural religion, — bound by the very law of nature itself to receive and practise it; and they want even natural morality if they do not. Such a religion, with sufficient motives of credibility, he has prescribed in Christianity. How, then, can we assert the indifference of religions, and contend for religious toleration? Since God prescribes the Christian religion, the law of nature, as well as of revelation, binds us to believe and obey it. If we do not, we fail to fulfil the law of nature, as well as to render the acceptable worship, and are convicted of sin under both the natural law and the revealed. How, then, can we hope to be saved?

Christianity and Catholicity, at least in the faith of Catholics, are identical, — one and the same thing. We do and can recognize no Christianity, properly so called, out of the Catholic Church. We recognize, indeed, in those who are out of her communion, many human excellences, many noble and generous sentiments, many amiable and philanthropic qualities, many just and profound thoughts, many estimable, private, domestic, and civil virtues, which we delight to honor, and which will

have their reward in their own order, as St. Austin teaches us in regard to the ancient Romans ; but we recognize in them no supernatural faith or sanctity, nothing distinctively Christian, nothing meritorious of eternal life. Out of the Church there is no Christian religion, and therefore, if no salvation out of the Christian religion, none out of the Church, as the Church herself expressly teaches, and has solemnly defined in her general councils. "He cannot," says St. Cyprian, "have God for his father who will not have the Church for his mother." To concede religious toleration, or the indifference of religions, is neither more nor less than to deny the Christian religion itself, and to give up our faith as Catholics. If you require us to do this, you deny our right to be Christians, and are yourselves, even in defending toleration, intolerant ; if you concede our right to be Christians, you concede the right of religious intolerance, and then have no right to assert or to demand religious tolerance.

Every man is obliged, by the constitution of the human mind itself, and the very nature of things, to assert the principle of religious intolerance and exclusiveness. We know by natural reason, without revelation, that there is and can be but one true religion ; for truth is one, individual, and most simple. This one true religion is necessarily the one which God himself institutes or prescribes ; all other religions are false religions, and to suppose that one can be saved in a false religion is absurd and impious ; for it is to place truth and falsehood on the same footing, and to suppose that God, who is truth itself, makes no difference between them, that is, counts falsehood as if it were truth ! A man cannot believe this, unless he gives up reason ; nor even then, for without reason he can believe nothing at all. Indeed, all truth, all good, all opinions even, are and must be intolerant and exclusive. Truth cannot tolerate error, or even the semblance of error ; good excludes evil ; right excludes wrong ; holiness excludes unholiness. Nothing in the universe tolerates its opposite. In regard to all things we are obliged to assert a right and a wrong, a true and a false, and whoever asserts the one necessarily denies the other. Even he who asserts the indifference of all religions denies their difference, and is, in a manner, himself intolerant and exclusive. Hence we see, in our own days, sects formed against sectarianism ; and Dr. Bushnell, just now one of our New England "lions," is busy, consciously or unconsciously, in rallying a party around his pretended Christian dogma, that there are no Christian

dogmas, and should be none. Every man, who believes in any religion at all, believes his own religion is the true religion, the only true religion, and therefore that all other religions are false religions. He must, then, either believe that salvation is attainable in no other religion, or else that it is attainable in a false religion ; which, as we have seen, is absurd. If he believes his religion is the true religion, he believes it is the religion that all men are bound to believe, — for truth, like right, is obligatory, — and therefore believes that all men are prohibited from believing any other. Every man must, then, do or say what he will, be religiously intolerant and exclusive.

As Catholics, it is well known that we are obliged, by our very religion, as well as by natural reason itself, to deny religious indifference, and to maintain the impossibility, *in hac providentia*, of salvation out of our Church. This may offend fashionable latitudinarianism, but it is nothing that we should hesitate, or in the least degree be afraid, to avow ; for no severer sentence can be pronounced upon any pretended faith or church, than that it fears to assert its own indispensableness to salvation. What is it, in fact, we want a faith or church for, but to save us ? and what reason have we, or can we have, for embracing any particular faith or church, but that we cannot be saved without it ? A faith or church that concedes the possibility of salvation in another, or outside of itself, confesses that it is not the one true faith or church of God, — therefore, virtually, that it is a false faith or church, unacceptable to God, pernicious to the souls of men, and to be eschewed by all, as they fear hell or hope for heaven. Hence all Protestant sects, of past and present times, are condemned out of their own mouths ; for not one of them has, or ever has had, the courage or the audacity to assert that there is no salvation out of its communion, — that is, if we understand the matter, the courage or the audacity, without contradicting itself and conceding the contrary, to assert its own truth. This, perhaps, is a fact not insignificant. Falsehood is, by its own nature, compelled to lie unto itself as well as unto others.

The age, we grant, demands religious toleration, and religious indifference is the order of the day. Many are shocked, or affect to be shocked, when they hear us say that there is no salvation out of the Catholic Church ; they allege that it is harsh, illiberal, uncharitable to say so ; and even some of our own Catholic friends, now and then, try to persuade themselves and their dissenting brethren that this is going a little beyond the

mark, and savors somewhat of bigotry and indiscreet zeal. But he has little claim either to moral or to logical consistency, who refuses to say the true religion is the true religion ; and, certainly, there cannot be much bigotry or indiscreet zeal, if we use the terms in their ordinary sense, in asserting that the Catholic religion is the true religion. But he who so asserts necessarily asserts that all other religions are false, and therefore, either that it is possible to be saved in a false religion, or that there is no salvation out of the Catholic Church. More liberal or tolerant than this we cannot be, in the very nature of things, if we would, unless we could be foolish enough to contradict ourselves, and maintain, that, of contraries, both may be true.

However this may be, as Catholics we have nothing to do with liberality or illiberality in the matter. We have not instituted the laws of mind, and they remain unchanged, whether we conform to them or not. We do not make, and cannot unmake, the truth ; and it is eternally and immutably the same, whether we assert it or deny it. It is not *our* truth ; it in no sense whatever depends on our intellects, our wills, or our affections ; and whether it pleases or displeases us or our friends, appears to us or to them liberal or illiberal, we have just as little power as right to alter it. Should we seek to conceal it, to soften it, or to explain it away, we could only sully the chastity or destroy the integrity of our own faith, and confirm the unbelieving and misbelieving in their dangerous delusions. Still would it be as true as ever, that our religion is the only true religion, and that there is salvation in no other. The solemn truth, that out of the Church no one can ever be saved, would remain in all its force, unaffected by our concessions. Knowing this, — knowing that it is the truth which liberates, — we dare not conceal it, and are bound in Christian charity to proclaim it. We must not mistake natural sympathy and good feeling, or the natural kindness or softness of our tempers, for Christian charity. Christian charity, certainly, never gratuitously offends, — is never harsh, bitter, or censorious, — is always meek, gentle, affectionate, kind ; but it seeks, always and everywhere, the substantial good of its objects, even at the risk of giving them momentary displeasure or pain ; and, unhappily, in this perverse world, men generally have the most repugnance to that which is the most essential to their everlasting welfare.

We are not ignorant that many persons object to the intolerance and exclusiveness we assert, — that is, to the Catholic

dogma, Out of the Church no one can ever be saved, — not only that it is harsh and illiberal, but that it is contrary even to the justice of God ; for it implies, they say, that he will consign men to eternal tortures for not doing what they have never had the power to do. To punish men for not doing what has never been in their power to do is, we grant, unjust, and we may be well assured that our God will never do it. But the objection has no validity, unless it be true that there are persons who live and die without ever having it in their power to become joined to the Catholic communion ; consequently, they who urge this objection must prove that there are such persons, before they can have any right to insist on it, or we be under any obligation even to entertain it. An objection which rests for its validity on an uncertain principle, or an unproved assumption, proves nothing, and may always be dismissed without an answer. But is the assumption the objection makes even provable ? We know that our religion has been promulgated in all the earth for eighteen hundred years, and, as far as we know anything of the matter, that, if there is any nation to which it has not been preached, it has been that nation's own fault, because it would not receive, but repelled with insult and persecution, her Divinely-commissioned preachers. We know, also, that sufficient grace is given unto every man, that he who seeks shall find, and that if he knocks it shall be opened to him. Who, then, is prepared to prove that a single adult person, since St. Paul (Rom. x.) declared the Gospel had been preached in all the earth, has ever died out of the Church, who could never, if he had made a proper use of the means placed within his reach, have found his way into her communion ? Can they who urge the objection in any possible way whatever prove this ? How can they say that even the ordinary missionary has ever failed the ready mind and the willing heart ? Known unto God are all hearts from eternity ; all things are at his disposal, and it can cost him nothing so to order it, that, wherever there is one ready and willing to receive the truth, there the missionary shall be present to teach him, and to introduce him into the communion of the Church. How know you that he does *not* so order it, and that, if any have died without actually having heard of the Church, it has been their own fault, — that is, because they would have rejected her in case she had been presented to them ? Till you can assert the contrary with infallible certainty, your objection has no validity ; for the difficulty it suggests is con-

fessedly restricted to those who are ready and willing to receive the truth as soon as proposed to them.

But let this pass. The dogma in question certainly can in no sense impeach the justice of God, if it asserts the condemnation of none who have fulfilled the law of nature. Men are not entitled to salvation even for fulfilling that law ; but they may certainly be justly condemned, if they do not fulfil it. Suppose, then, as the objection itself supposes, that, in the gentile world, there are persons, or may be persons, who, concurring with the graces they receive, fulfil the natural law : what obliges us to suppose that they must die out of the communion of the Church, even if it be conceded that they have no *ordinary* means of entering it ? God may, if he chooses, use *extraordinary* means to bring them into the Church ; and it is far more reasonable to suppose that he will work fifty miracles to bring men into the *medium ordinarium*, if necessary, than it is to suppose, that, contrary to the whole economy of grace, he will save a single soul without it. We know that he has made use of extraordinary means to bring men into the Church, as in the case of Cornelius, and that of the eunuch, recorded in the Acts of the Apostles ; and, indeed, he has always used them in the conversion of nations ; for in no instance has a nation been converted, in which the ordinary means employed for its conversion were adequate to the end. Why may he not use extraordinary means in the case of individuals, as well as of nations ?

Again ; in asserting that no one can be saved out of the Church, we do not assert that all those who die out of her communion will be condemned precisely for the guilt of not being in her communion. Invincible ignorance, unquestionably, excuses from sin in that whereof one is invincibly ignorant. If there are persons out of the Church invincibly ignorant of her, — that is, persons who never have had the power of becoming acquainted with her, and of being joined to her communion, — they certainly are not guilty of the sin of infidelity, and cannot be condemned for that sin. But invincible ignorance, though it excuses from sin, has no saving efficacy, no positive power to advance the soul towards the kingdom of heaven. Certainly, mere negative infidels, as they are called, are excused from the sin of infidelity ; yet, without conversion, they cannot be saved, “for without faith it is impossible to please God.” Heb. xi. 6. Hence St. Thomas says, — “Infidels of this sort are damned, not, indeed, for the sin of infidelity, but for other sins, not remissible without faith.” Infidelity is not the only sin for

which men are damned ; if it were, we should be obliged to assert, that all bad as well as all good Catholics will be saved ; nor is it necessarily, by any means, the only sin of those not in the Catholic communion. The condemnation of these will not be for the sin of infidelity, if they are not guilty of it, but for their other sins. They will be condemned, not by reason of the guilt, but by reason of the fact, of being out of the Church, for their sins against the natural law, which are remissible only through the Church.

Finally, we are told that there are persons out of the Church who are not only free from the sin of infidelity, but from all actual sin. But this is a gratuitous assumption ; for, without a special revelation from God, we cannot know that there are such persons, and nothing, so far as we are aware, either in reason or sound theology, authorizes us to assume that there are or can be. But suppose there can be, and that there are, such persons, nothing obliges us to assert, or permits you to assume that we assert, their condemnation to the *tortures* of hell. The Catholic dogma objected to simply teaches, that no one can ever be saved out of the Catholic Church, that is, enter into eternal life,—see God in the beatific vision by the light of glory. What the dogma obliges us to assert is, that salvation, in this sense, which is supernatural both in its principle and its terminus, is unattainable out of the Church. But this salvation does not necessarily stand opposed simply to the torments of hell. Hell is twofold, and consists in the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense. None are saved who do not escape both ; but not therefore does it necessarily follow, that all who are not saved are doomed to suffer both. All are guilty of original sin, and original sin itself forfeits heaven, and incurs the punishment of loss ; but the Church does not teach that it incurs also the punishment of sense. Hence unbaptized infants, who die before committing actual sin, — though they lose heaven, can never see God by the light of glory, — do not, as our theologians teach, suffer the punishment of sense, do not, as we are permitted to hope, suffer positive pain, but will be gainers by having existed. Not of them, but of actual sinners who die in their sins, is it to be said, “ Good for them if they had never been born.”

Suppose now,—and if the supposition is inadmissible the objection vanishes,—that among the gentiles there are persons who die out of the Church, free from all actual sin : they, certainly, will never see God, will never enter heaven, will not be saved ; yet nothing obliges us to believe that they will be doomed to

the punishment of sense, or to the positive sufferings of hell. What will be their fate, beyond the fact that they will not be saved, we do not know, and do not attempt to determine. We remit them, if such there are, to the bounty of God, who, for aught we know, may place them in the category of unbaptized infants who die in their infancy. But no injustice is done them in not admitting them to the beatific vision ; for to see God by the light of glory is a *gratuitous* reward, promised only to supernatural faith and sanctity, never due and never promised to mere natural innocence or to mere natural virtue. The defect of natural innocence or of natural virtue excludes from it, but the possession of either or of both does not and cannot entitle to it ; and natural innocence and virtue are all that it can be pretended that these have. Hence, supposing such persons, supposing them to die free from all but original sin, no injustice is done them in excluding them from salvation, and therefore the dogma which denies the possibility of salvation out of the Church asserts nothing contrary to the justice or even to the fidelity of God.

But granting all this as far as regards Jews, Mahometans, and pagans, that is, unbaptized persons, it cannot apply, we are told, to persons in heretical communions, who are invincibly ignorant ; for these are baptized, and in their baptism have received the infused grace of faith and sanctification. But the reasoning we have used to show that it is not proved, and is not to be assumed without proof, that there are any who die without ever having had the power, if they had made the proper use of the means within their reach, of being joined to the Catholic communion, applies here in its greatest force, and renders an answer really unnecessary. The possibility of invincible ignorance, in an heretical communion, of the Catholic Church, — since the Catholic Church is always included in the formal reason of faith in those very articles which all admit are necessary, *necessitate medii ad salutem*, — may well be questioned, and is not to be presumed, especially since those of whom you would predicate it have received in their baptism the habit of faith which is a predisposition to believe, and a supernatural facility in believing, the truth. But let this pass. Suppose invincible ignorance in the case to be possible, and that there are persons baptized in heretical communions, who die invincibly ignorant of the Catholic Church, we grant that they are excused from the sin of heresy. If they have been sinners, they will be damned for their sins ; if they have retain-

ed their baptismal innocence, — an improbable supposition, — or if they make an act of perfect contrition and die free from mortal sin, — another improbable supposition, — they will undoubtedly be saved ; but not as members of heretical communions, but as members of the Catholic Church, to whose communion they were joined by baptism. Consequently, the admission of their salvation forms no exception to the dogma, that out of the Church no one can ever be saved. These, therefore, present no difficulty. But we may remark, by the way, that none, whether among the schismatical, the heretical, or the unbaptized, who are aware of the dogma of the Church and the explanations which Catholic theologians give of it, can be invincibly ignorant. They, whatever must be said of others, have had the opportunity of hearing the Church, and their ignorance is vincible, culpable in its cause, and can no longer excuse from sin. Whatever their characters in other respects, they may, therefore, be justly condemned for the single sin of infidelity, heresy, or schism, as the case may be.

We may say, in brief, that we are obliged, by the Catholic dogma of exclusive salvation, to divide all mankind, in the first instance, into two classes, — namely, Catholics and non-Catholics. Salvation is predicable only of Catholics, because they only are where there are the means of salvation ; it is to be denied of all not Catholics, or who die in the second division, for they are out of the Church, and at least under the penalty of original sin, and there is no remission of sin out of the Church. This is all that the dogma of exclusive salvation imports.

In the second instance, in regard to those who will be condemned to hell, including both the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense, we recognize four classes. 1. All who die bad Catholics. These will be damned for their sins and their abuse of the graces and privileges which have been extended to them. 2. All who have impugned the known truth, that is, persons who have actually known the Catholic Church and faith, but have rejected or refused to believe her, and died in their sin. These are formal heretics, schismatics, or infidels, and will be damned, if for no other sin, for their infidelity, heresy, or schism. 3. All who might have known the truth, if they had sought it, but did not seek it, — that is, persons who, though they have never actually known the Church, yet have had the opportunity of knowing her, and of becoming joined to her communion, and have neglected to avail themselves of it.

These are, by implication, infidels, or heretics, and will be damned for the sin of having neglected to become Catholics when they might. 4. All who, though they may never actually have had an opportunity of becoming Catholics, have nevertheless sinned against the law of nature. These will be damned, not for the guilt of not being in the Catholic Church, but for their failure to keep the natural law. On the supposition of the truth of the Catholic Church, there is nothing contrary to the justice of God in the damnation of these four classes.

In the third instance, you tell us that there is yet another class, not included in the first general division, nor yet in any one of these four special divisions, — namely, a class invincibly ignorant of the Church, yet innocent of all sin against the natural law, the only law by which they can be judged. But you do not and cannot prove the existence of such a class ; you have no authority for alleging that there is or can be such a class, and we are unable to reconcile its existence with the publicity of the Catholic Church, the ease with which she may be distinguished, the well-known fact that sufficient grace is given unto every man, and that Christ is always, along with the Church, operating by his grace to bring all men to her communion, as well as to save them in her communion after they have entered it. But, if there be such a class, they cannot be saved ; for they are out of the Church, — have by original sin incurred the forfeiture of heaven ; and there is no remission of sin but through the Church. But, as God was not obliged in justice to bring them into the Church, he does them no injustice in not admitting them to the beatific vision, — the only punishment to which we are obliged by faith to hold that they are doomed.

Thus much we have thought it not improper to remark on the first branch of our subject, that no false inferences may be drawn from the fact that Catholic writers, as well as others, contend for the political toleration of the various sects. We assert rigid intolerance of all false religions, in the spiritual order ; but it must not, therefore, be supposed that we deny, or do not assert, the legitimacy of their toleration in the political order. It is true, as we have said, that, in speaking of toleration, we exclude our Church ; for there can never be rightfully any question at all, whether she shall be free or not. She is God's Church, and is free by Divine right, not by the concession of the prince or the commonwealth. As much, we

concede, we do not and cannot say for the sects. They are contrary to the will of God, forbidden by his law, and have no Divine right to be at all. But not therefore does it follow that the civil authority is bound to suppress them, or is not bound even to tolerate them. The state — and we beg that the fact be borne in mind — is not commissioned to execute the *whole* law of God ; and, though it can never rightfully do anything contrary to that law, it has authority to enforce it only in externals, and even in externals only so far as necessary to the maintenance of the peace and welfare of society. There are mortal sins against the law of God, of daily and hourly occurrence, that transcend the reach of the civil magistrate, and which he has no right to punish. We may transgress against God in thought as well as in deed ; but the state must leave our punishment to Him who has said, “ Vengeance is mine, and I will repay,” — save when our sinful thoughts break out in deeds contrary to the rights of our neighbour or the real interests of civil society. Till then, our offences pertain to the spiritual order, and do not fall under the cognizance of the civil magistrate, who has no competency in spirituals. There are also virtues, — such as faith, hope, charity, meekness, gentleness, humility, benevolence, — all strictly obligatory upon all men, which the civil authority cannot enforce, and has no right to enforce ; for, though of the last importance to the peace and safety of society, they lie, as to their principle and motive, wholly within the spiritual order. Everybody knows this, and nobody, to our knowledge, directly contradicts it. It does not, then, follow, from the exclusiveness of religion in her own order, that the political order must always enforce the same exclusiveness, and suppress whatever is opposed to it.

All must agree that the state has no right to establish a false religion, or to prohibit the true religion ; because every man has from Almighty God himself full and entire freedom to profess the true religion, and no one can, under any circumstances whatever, be bound to profess or adhere, even externally, to a false religion. To profess the true religion is the duty of all men, and no government has or can have the right to hinder its subjects from performing their duty. Hence Protestant, schismatic, and infidel governments are justly accused of transcending their powers, exceeding their commission, and violating the first principles of religion ; for, with the exception of our own, which acknowledges its own incompetency in spirituals, there is not one of them that has not prohib-

ited, or that even now more than barely tolerates, the Catholic religion. Every state in Europe, not professedly Catholic, establishes by law even now a false religion, and in several of them the true religion is strictly prohibited, or not tolerated at all. Sweden and Denmark establish Lutheranism, deny all civil rights to Catholics, and forbid their subjects, under severe penalties, to unite themselves with the Catholic Church. In Russia, no man is allowed to leave the national church for ours; in Prussia, conversions from Protestantism to Catholicity, and efforts on the part of Catholics to effect them, are, or recently were, forbidden by law; and it is only two or three years since the Norwegian Storting first granted a partial toleration to the Catholic religion in Norway. It is still, we believe, proscribed by law in Holland, and has owed a precarious freedom, for some years past, chiefly to the connivance of the prince. In Switzerland, it is now suffering a cruel persecution from the government, and her noble prelate, the Bishop of Lausanne and Geneva, has recently been imprisoned, and is now in exile, simply for discharging his episcopal functions. We need not mention the well-known penal laws of England and Ireland, partially repealed in 1829, but still leaving the profession of the Catholic religion subject to many restrictions and vexations. By these laws, it was death for a priest to say mass in England, or to receive a member of the Establishment into his Church. Indeed, it is well known that Protestantism and infidelity, wherever able, have never failed to copy the example of pagan Rome, to place an interdict on the Catholic religion, and to enjoin, and to seek by pains and penalties to enforce, a false religion, or the profession of no religion. But all governmental acts of this sort are violences rather than laws, and have and can have no binding force. We are always bound to resist them, at least passively; for we must obey God rather than men; and there are times when charity to our neighbour may require us to resist them even actively.

But, though the state has no right to enjoin the profession of a false religion, or to prohibit the profession of the true religion, yet, is it not bound, we may be asked, to enjoin the profession of the true religion, and to prohibit that of the false? It certainly would be, if it were commissioned to promulgate and execute the *whole* law of God, and if there were nothing in religion left to conscience and free will. But the latter, we know, is not true; for even the canon law strikes only external actions, and the Church judges matters of conscience only in her tribu-

nals of penance, approach to which is and must be an act of free will, and before which the culprit is his only and his voluntary accuser ; and the former cannot be assumed, for that would make the state the church, and render all distinction between the secular society and the spiritual inconceivable. It would be the absorption of the church in the state, than which nothing is more to be dreaded, as the history of Russia since Ivan the Fourth, and of England since Henry the Eighth, abundantly testifies. The state has civil, but no spiritual, functions ; it is not in Holy Orders ; it has not received the mission of evangelizing the world ; and it has no vocation to preach the Gospel, or to assume the direction of consciences. It is certainly bound to recognize and protect the full and entire freedom of the true religion, and to suppress by force, if necessary, all external violence against it ; for this is included in the civil rights of those who profess it ; but it can legitimately use coercion, either in favor of the true or against a false religion, only for purely social reasons, and only so far as necessary to the maintenance of the order and interests of society ; for, as we never cease to repeat, its functions are purely civil, and it has no spiritual competency.

Certainly the obligation or right of civil governments, not Catholic, — where there is no publicly recognized infallible spiritual authority to determine which is the true religion, — to enjoin the profession of the true worship, and to prohibit others, cannot be asserted ; because the government, having only civil functions, cannot judge in spirituals, or discriminate between one religion and another. It cannot, then, enjoin one worship or prohibit another, for fear, if for no other reason, that it may enjoin a false religion and proscribe the true ; and therefore it must, even in common prudence, tolerate all religions not obviously immoral, like the obscene and cruel rites of many pagan nations, or directly incompatible with the safety and welfare of society. This binds all governments not Catholic to universal toleration, because all religions but the Catholic are confessedly fallible, and can, on their own showing, offer the government no infallible judgment by which it may form, or to which it is bound to submit, its own.

With regard to Catholic governments, or governments of Catholic countries, where there is an infallible spiritual authority publicly recognized by the nation, we distinguish between those governments which have only the ordinary obligations of civil government and those governments which hold from the

Church, or under the express condition of professing and defending the Catholic religion. Governments of the first-mentioned class are bound to acknowledge the true religion, and to throw their *moral* influence into its scale; for the state, as well as the individual, is bound to have a conscience, and even a good conscience; but nothing in the constitution of the state binds these governments to enforce the profession of the Catholic religion, or to prohibit that of other religions; and as these religions, if not palpably immoral, are not, in themselves, social offences, the government has no right to declare them so, or to suppress them. These governments, having by their constitution only the ordinary functions of civil governments, can do no more for the true religion or against false religions than the interests of society demand; and as such governments themselves presuppose a state of society in which false religions, as such, are not incompatible with these interests, they are bound to tolerate them, and leave their suppression to the operation of moral causes.

As to the second class of Catholic governments distinguished, that they are bound to recognize the Catholic religion as the law of the land, and are not free to tolerate all religions, we grant. But there are few, if any, such governments now in existence; and the reasons which formerly demanded and justified them have, in the social changes which have taken place in recent times, lost their force, and cannot now be urged for the establishment or the maintenance of similar governments. In the Middle Ages, nearly all the European governments not pagan were professedly Catholic, and did and had the right to punish open infidelity, heresy, and schism, — always sins against God, — because then they were directly crimes against society, forbidden by the public law; and crimes against society the civil government has always the right to punish. But now, when that political order has passed away, and, in the altered circumstances of our times, these sins against God are no longer to be treated as direct crimes against society, the government is not bound, and has no right, to punish them; because civil government has never the right, we repeat, to punish any sin, except for the reason that it is a social offence, which society cannot, with a just regard to its own safety, suffer to go unpunished.

We do not assume that infidelity, heresy, and schism were social offences, merely because they were declared such by the laws, or made such by the fundamental constitution of the

state. The laws, as in pagan Rome, or in England before Catholic emancipation, may establish a false religion and prohibit the true ; but that does not make the profession of the true religion a social crime, or incompatible with the legitimate interests of society. If religion and the laws come in conflict, it is the laws that are to be reformed, not the religion that is to be suppressed. To say otherwise, — to say that false religions are justly punishable by civil society, simply because contrary to the civil law, — would be to concede that the profession of the true religion may be justly punished in those states in which the civil law prohibits it. The laws must themselves be just, or they do not bind ; and the fundamental constitution of a state must be legitimate, or a measure is not justifiable simply because authorized by it or necessary to preserve it. What we assert is, that the political order, which, in former times, declared infidelity, heresy, and schism, when breaking out into overt acts, social offences, was itself just ; because then they were such offences in fact as well as in law, and the laws only declared a truth which existed independently of them. The intolerance of the government was justifiable, because demanded by its fundamental and essential constitution, and that constitution was itself justifiable by its absolute necessity, under the circumstances, to the existence of society and the interests of civilization.

In the barbaric ages which followed the destruction of the Western Roman Empire, — ages against which we hear so many noisy and senseless declamations, and in which we ourselves find little, except Catholicity and what proceeded from it, which does not revolt us, — the Church of God had a double mission to perform, and was obliged to add to her spiritual functions the greater part of the functions of civil society itself. She was the sole repository of what had been saved from the wrecks of the old Roman civilization, and the only civilizing force that remained after the barbarian irruption and devastations. The lay society was dissolved by the ruin of the empire and of the civilized populations, and was no longer adequate to the management of secular affairs in accordance with civilized order. The Church was obliged to add to her mission of evangelizer, which is her mission of all times and places, the temporary and accidental mission of civilizer, of the nations. She must tame the wild savage, humanize the ruthless barbarian, reestablish social order, revive science and the arts, and restore and advance civilization. All had been de-

molished, and she had all to reconstruct. She had to be statesman, lawyer, physician, pedagogue, architect, painter, sculptor, musician, agriculturist, horticulturist, bookbinder, and common mechanic or artisan, — in fine, everything but money-changer and soldier. Having thus the chief part of the work of civil society to perform, it became absolutely necessary that she should have a civil and political existence and authority, — that she should be incorporated into the state, as an integral element of the civil constitution, and have her worship, without which she could have as little social as religious influence, recognized as the law of the land as well as the law of God. There was no other condition of rescuing society from the chaos and barbarism in which it was plunged, and of reviving civilization and securing its progress. Infidelity, heresy, and schism, which were as directly in opposition to her mission of civilizing the nations as to her mission of evangelizing them, were then directly and proximately crimes against society, and as such were justly punishable by the public authorities. In attacking the Church, they attacked civil society itself, struck at the very conditions of social order, and jeopardized every social interest.

But, from the nature of the case, this mission of civilizer of nations is restricted to barbarous ages and countries, for the very good reason that the Church cannot be called upon to civilize nations when they are already civilized. This mission she has now, in great measure, accomplished in what is called Christendom; and the necessity of that particular political order which specially protected her in its performance, or which was requisite to enable her to perform it, does not now exist. The lay society she has rescued from barbarism, and civilized. It has now the arts of civilized life in its own possession, and does not need, as it once did, in barbarous ages, the Church to teach it how to make shoes, bind books, or brew hop-beer. It is now competent, under the *spiritual* direction of the spiritual society, to the management of secular affairs. It has, in these affairs, which properly belong to it, attained to majority, and no longer needs in regard to them, so far as purely secular and as they involve no moral principle, to be under ecclesiastical tutelage. The Church is now free to resign her temporary civil functions, and to devote herself exclusively to the mission of evangelizing the world. It is not necessary that she should be now incorporated into the state, in the sense she was in the barbaric ages; and consequently infidelity, heresy, and schism, though as great sins against God as ever, are not now crimes

against society in the sense they then were, or to be punished as such ; and therefore, as long as their adherents demean themselves peaceably, offer no external violence to the true religion, and discharge their ordinary social obligations, they are to be politically tolerated, and left to answer for their sinfulness, great as it unquestionably is, to God himself.

This reasoning cannot well be disputed. When infidelity, heresy, and schism, as well as any other sins against God, are clearly and directly crimes against society, they are justly punishable by the civil authorities ; but when they only remotely offend against social interests, and are chiefly censurable only as they injure the soul, they are not so punishable, and the prince or commonwealth is bound to tolerate them. This is the principle we lay down. In former times, they were obviously and directly crimes against society, and as such were justly punishable by the civil magistrate ; but, owing to the civilization effected by the social labors of the Church, they are not now such crimes, and therefore not now punishable as such, but are to be politically tolerated, for they now can be, without directly or immediately endangering the existence of social order, or sacrificing the general interests of civilization. Here are the facts we assert.

All this is virtually conceded by all the respectable publicists of our times. No intelligent Protestant or infidel really denies — though we know not how long it will be so — the immense services rendered to civilization by the Catholic Church, and with one voice all those who give us philosophies of history, from Guizot to our Kentucky friend, J. D. Nourse, agree that she could not have rendered those services without the civil constitution which made hostility to her faith, discipline, or worship social offences. The present popular theory of those who are not Catholics is, that the Church was the true Church, and faithfully and successfully performed her mission, down to the epoch of the Protestant Reformation, and that she is a false Church now, because now she leaves the interests of civilization to the lay society, and does not exert herself directly to promote them, which, according to them, she is bound to do, since, say they, her mission is merely that of civilizing mankind. We are aware of no intelligent voice, in even the uncatholic world, that does not defend the mutual relations of the civil and ecclesiastical societies which obtained in the barbarous ages as wise and necessary for those times, or that pretends to condemn them, except when insisted upon as equally necessary

or proper in the altered state of modern civilization. Here is all we ask. Restricted to the temporary and accidental mission of the Church as civilizer, we recognize a truth in what our popular authors advance. They say the political order in question was just and necessary during the barbarous ages : so say we. They say it is not just now : so say we ; and therefore we, as well as they, reject it for our times. Because the Church approved it in one set of circumstances, we are not obliged to maintain that she must approve it under every set of circumstances. Principles are immutable and eternal, but their application must vary according to the circumstances of time and place. 'This the popular authors themselves contend, and this is all we allege ; and we have no quarrel with them, except when they assert that the mission of the Church is primarily and exclusively that of civilizer, and contend that she is false or dead now, because she does not now labor directly for the advancement of civilization, which, we need hardly say, is as silly as it is untrue.

It is evident from what we have said, that, though we assert the most rigid theological intolerance, and the wisdom and justice of the political intolerance which nobody denies was during many centuries asserted, and sometimes practised, by Catholic states, we are bound by Catholic principles to assert for our times the toleration of all religions compatible with the existence and interests of society.

We do not, our readers will observe, justify the political intolerance in question, on the ground that it was sanctioned by the public opinion of former times, nor do we defend the political toleration of false religions now, because public opinion now demands it. Public opinion may often be pleaded in excuse or in extenuation of the conduct of individuals, but it is never to be appealed to as the standard of right and wrong, especially when the question turns on principles and institutions either sanctioned or not disavowed by an infallible Church. Not the public opinion, but the public necessities, the interests of society, of civilization, justified the political intolerance ; and these would, if they existed, justify it now as well as then, — and not only justify it, but even demand it. Let the modern political and social order be broken up, the civilization which Christian nations have, by painful toil and sacrifice for so many ages, slowly worked out, be swept away, the whole of Christendom overrun with hordes of ruthless and lawless barbarians, and the world be plunged once more into

the darkness and chaos of barbarism, — and let the Church remain the sole repository of what has been retained of the former civilization, the only living social organism, the only living organic force, able to reduce chaos to order, to restore society to its normal condition, to reproduce and provide for the advance of civilization, — and we would say at once, Revive the former political and social constitution ; incorporate the Church again into the state ; let her resume anew her functions as civilizer, as well as evangelizer, of the nations ; let her faith, discipline, and worship, without which she can have no social influence even, be made the law of the land, and whatever is repugnant to them be declared a crime against society, and, when manifesting itself in overt acts, punishable as such by the civil magistrate ; — and we should have little respect for the head, little reverence for the heart, that could not or would not say as much. But now, we repeat, when such is not the state of things, and, until some terrible calamity not now foreseen, and in all human probability not likely to occur, shall throw society out of its normal order, and bring it back, we say, Let the Church be the Church, and the state be the state, the two orders be distinct, and the lay society, under the *spiritual* direction of the spiritual society, manage the temporal affairs of the world, as now, thanks to the Church, which did not fail it in time of need, it is able to do ; let the public law, where it is proper, recognize the true religion, but let it punish no sins against God any farther than they are directly and immediately crimes against society. False religions are, no doubt, always offences against society, as are all sins against God ; but, as we have said more than once, when and where they are only remotely and indirectly so, when and where they are not directly and immediately so, the civil law has no right by coercive means to repress them, and could not do so if it should make the attempt. Their adherents, in all other respects discharging their social duties and demeaning themselves as good citizens, must be protected in their civil rights, and their punishment be remitted to the discipline of the spiritual society and the justice of God.

The Church cannot tolerate the punishment, by the civil authority, of offences purely spiritual, because the civil authority cannot do it without trenching upon her province. She allows no one to be molested merely for his want of faith, because, for his want of faith, the unbeliever is answerable to God alone. Faith is voluntary, and cannot be forced. Who-

ever chooses to run the risk of the penalty of eternal damnation annexed to infidelity is free to be an infidel, and Almighty God neither does violence, nor suffers any power on earth to do violence, to his free will. He proffers eternal life to all men, tells them the conditions on which they may receive it, gives them the necessary graces to accept and secure it, urges them by the most powerful motives which can be addressed to reason, conscience, free will ; but he forces no one to accept it. He demands the heart, its free, voluntary obedience, and will accept and reward only the free-will offering. Hence the Church strictly and solemnly forbids any one to be forced or compelled to receive the faith. Hence her missionaries are never armed soldiers, but humble preachers, bearing only the crucifix and pastoral staff. Never has she allowed the unbaptized — Jews, pagans, Mahometans, infidels — to be forced to profess the Catholic faith, or force to be employed against them, except to compel them to tolerate the preaching of the Gospel. If in Catholic states they have ever been disturbed or molested on account of their unbelief, it has been against her authority, or because they practised violence against the profession of the true religion ; or because they were dangerous subjects to the state, and could not, under the circumstances, be safely tolerated, — as, for instance, in Spain under Charles the Fifth, when the Jews and Moors conspired in secret and with the enemies of the Church, not simply to secure the peaceable enjoyment of their own religions, but to overthrow both altar and throne, both of which the state had the right, and was bound, to protect and defend, to the full extent of its power, against any and every class of enemies.

The Church certainly claims authority over all baptized persons, by whomsoever they may have been baptized ; for they are, in the Sacrament of Baptism. born her subjects, and she has a right to their obedience. Heretics and schismatics are her rebellious subjects, and she has the same right to reduce them to obedience, and to compel them to conform their life to their baptismal vows, that a temporal sovereign has to reduce a rebellious province to submission to his legitimate authority. But she can reduce them only by such means as she possesses, and can inflict on them for their rebellion only such punishments as she has at her command, which are all spiritual. If they make war on her, and attempt to seize her churches, to rob her of her possessions, to desecrate her

altars, and to suppress her worship or restrain its freedom, as was the case with the early Protestants in every country where they had power enough, and which caused the terrible religious wars of the sixteenth century, and the persecution of Protestants by Catholic princes, she has the right to call in the secular power to her aid, and it is bound to repel them by force ; because they themselves then transfer the controversy from the spiritual order to the temporal, and attack the social and civil rights of the Church no less than her spiritual rights. But when they themselves restrain their heresy and schism within the limits of the spiritual order, make no attempt to propagate their pestilential errors or iniquity by violence, and attack none of the rights of the Church or of the faithful, she, as we have seen, recognizes no right in the secular authority to molest them, unless guilty of other crimes against society, — and then only on principles which apply equally to all classes of social offenders. As simple heresy and schism, she cannot call in the secular authority to aid her in suppressing them. She is therefore reduced to her own spiritual resources, to addresses to their reason and their conscience, and can inflict on them only spiritual punishments, ecclesiastical censures, of which the greatest is excommunication. This, to a believer, is a terrible punishment, we grant ; but to those who do not believe, who excommunicate themselves, and glory in being severed from her communion, it is not a punishment too severe to be borne.

But even in inflicting her spiritual censures, and in all her dealings with her rebellious subjects, the Church always has their reformation at heart, and never forgets that her mission is to save men's souls, and not to destroy them. She pleads with them, and leaves no measure untried that is likely to be successful ; and she keeps the door always open for the return of the penitent. When she is under the painful necessity of delivering over to Satan those who set at naught her discipline, it is for "the destruction of the flesh," that "they may learn not to blaspheme." To the very last, she pleads with all a mother's sweetness, affection, and grief ; and if they are finally melted, and willing to return to their duty, she opens wide her arms, and wide her heart, to receive them, and generously forgets their past disobedience. Even the much decried and calumniated Inquisition, which it is possible politicians in some instances have abused, owed its origin to her

maternal solicitude, and was instituted no less for the protection than for the detection of the misbelieving. She would interpose the shield of her maternal love between her rebellious subject and the secular arm to the last, till all hope was gone, till all her resources to reclaim him were exhausted. They know little of the Church of God who call her cruel, proud, haughty, revengeful, thirsting for the blood of heretics, and rejoicing in their punishment by the civil authority. Long, long does she forbear with them, — long, long does she suffer them to rend her own bosom, — before she can endure to withdraw her affectionate embrace, and abandon them to their self-chosen doom.

And here we are admonished of what should be the spirit of our intercourse with our unbelieving and heretical neighbours and fellow-citizens. Rousseau asserts that the dogma, Out of the Church there is no salvation, is antisocial, and that whoever professes it should be banished from the commonwealth. But he might as well have said, that the dogma, No one who dies guilty of mortal sin can be saved, is antisocial, and he who holds it should be banished from society. We certainly regard infidels and heretics as guilty of mortal sin before God, and therefore, if dying in their infidelity and heresy, as condemned to hell. But they are not the only persons whom we regard as mortal sinners; and all who die mortal sinners, even though they should die nominally in our own communion, must, according to our faith, receive the same doom. There are persons in the Church who will talk, write, fight for their religion, do anything for it but live it, whose doom will be far more severe than that of many heretics and unbelievers; nay, we know not but we ourselves may be of the number, for no man knoweth whether he deserves love or hatred, unless he has received a special revelation from God. We live in a world of sinners, and there may be in our own families, in our bosom companions, sinners for whose salvation we have as little reason to hope as we have for that of the unbeliever or the heretic. These things are so, and must be so, and our rule of conduct is and should be the same towards sinners of all classes, that is, to conduct ourselves so as, if possible, to win them all to the love and practice of true religion.

It is very true that all who are not joined to the Catholic communion, if they die as they are, will come short of salvation. This we know by infallible faith; but we do not know that

all who are not now joined to that communion will die as they are, and have no right to presume that they will. Nothing assures us that their hearts will not be softened, their pride subdued, their eyes opened, — that they will not one day behold, love, and conform to the truth, and enter into the kingdom of heaven, while, perhaps, we ourselves shall be thrust out into exterior darkness, where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. It is no less an error to hold that all out of the Church will be damned, than it is to hold that they can be saved without being in the Church. If we so held, there would be some foundation for Rousseau's charge ; our doctrine would be antisocial, and we should be unable to discharge our social duties towards those out of our Church. But we hold no such doctrine. There is a place of repentance for them as well as for us, and nothing forbids us to hope and to labor for their salvation. The Lord alone knoweth who are his, and we have no right to presume, as long as there is life, that the doom of any one is sealed. We must, then, treat all men, those without as well as those within, as persons for whom Christ died, as persons who may be saved, and whose salvation is to be desired by us with an unbounded charity, and for which we are to rejoice to make any sacrifice in our power. Here is the reason why the dogma objected to is not antisocial, and why to profess it is no breach of charity to our neighbour, but, if done in the proper spirit, is the very reverse, — is, in fact, the highest evidence we can give of the truth and fervor of our charity.

The object of the Church, in all her dealings with those without, as well as with those within, is the salvation of souls. This must be ours, also, as her faithful children. This object we shall be able to further only as we live in accordance with the spirit of our religion. It requires no deep or extensive knowledge of mankind to know that the road to their convictions lies through their affections. If we would be instrumental, under God, in converting them, we must begin by loving them, and by our love winning their love. Nothing is gained by convincing a man against his will ; often the very logic that convinces, where the affections are not won, serves only to repel from obedience to the truth. We succeed in influencing others for their good only in proportion as we set before them an example fit for them to follow, — are meek, gentle, humble, charitable, kind, and affectionate in our intercourse with them. And why shall we not love these

neighbours and countrymen of ours, who have not the inconceivable happiness of being in the Church of God? Who are we, that we should set up ourselves above them, — that we should boast over them? What merit is it in us, that we are not even as they? or how know we that ours will not be the greater condemnation? Are they not our kinsmen according to the flesh? Has not our God loved them with an infinite tenderness? Does he not proffer them his love with infinite sweetness? And has he not so longed for their love that he has died to win it? How, then, shall we not love them and labor for their salvation with a charity that burns with an intensity proportioned to their danger? Is it not here where we come short? Repelled by the bigotry, fanaticism, and hard-heartedness of some, attracted by the sweetness, affection, and kind offices of others, are we not prone to look upon these countrymen of ours who are out of the Church, either as persons whose conversion is hopeless, or as persons who need no conversion; — excusing ourselves from zealous labors to bring them to God by persuading ourselves that their conversion either is not possible or not necessary, — forgetful that in either case we sin against faith and charity, and in both show ourselves wanting in true love of our neighbour, and therefore of God? Is not here, in this double error, the reason why so few, comparatively, of our countrymen are brought into the one fold, under the One Shepherd?

There is nothing in modern heresies that should discourage us. The world, before this, has been afflicted with as deep, as wide-spread, and as obstinate heresies as it is now. We must not suppose that we have fallen upon peculiarly evil times. Evils, indeed, there are, but our lot is cast in comparatively good times. What is the situation of Catholics now in comparison with what it was under the Arian successors of Constantine? or when the wild and destructive hordes of Northern barbarians overwhelmed the Western Empire? or when the yet more destructive Saracenic hosts, with the Koran in one hand and the scymitar in the other, shouting “There is one God and Mohammed is his prophet,” overran the East, and, over more than half the known world, over the fairest provinces of even Europe herself, supplanted the Cross by the Crescent? But Arianism has been subdued, and is remembered only in the immortal records of its victors; the barbarians have been civilized; the Saracenic hosts have been checked, their power has been broken, and their once

formidable empire retains a fitful existence only by the iniquitous policy of nominally Christian princes, who forget their God and the interests of civilization in a vain endeavour to maintain an ever-varying balance of power, and to arrest the march of Destiny. Better the Russian than the Turk at Constantinople. Protestantism itself, which swept away a third part of Europe, as the tail of the Apocalyptic dragon swept away a third part of the stars of heaven, has spent its force, has been driven back far within its original confines, and, for two hundred and fifty years, has made no progress in the Old World, but towards destruction. True, Unbelief, Indifference, Socialism, Communism, Revolutionism, are, or just now were, rife ; — true, they held during the last year their carnival, convulsed the greater part of Europe, exiled the Sovereign Pontiff, took possession of the Eternal City, and for a moment seemed on the point of rising to empire. But defeat follows on the heels of victory, their chiefs have fallen, are in exile or in prison, and they must soon be objects of ridicule and contempt, rather than of fear and dread. They are, in the nature of things, short-lived. The human race loves order, and must be a believer. It must worship, — must have a religion ; and the Catholic religion alone has life, has energy, has power. Even to a superficial observer, all other religions or pretended religions are struck with death, and are in their agony. Appearances indicate that a glorious day is dawning for the Church, and that there awaits her a more splendid triumph than she has ever yet enjoyed. The Lord God Omnipotent reigneth. Let us not feel that these unbelieving and misbelieving countrymen of ours — who now, alas ! have no hope but in this hollow and transitory life, who are laboring for that which is not bread, and spending their strength for that which satisfieth not — are all doomed to be lost, and that they of all the world are to have no part in the new triumphs reserved for Catholicity. Let us not feel that the time is never to come, when, for their many civic virtues and their generous contributions to an oppressed and famishing nation, they can receive no higher reward than the discovery of the gold mines of California. Let us not look upon their conversion even as difficult. They, too, are famishing, and for the bread of life. We have only to remember that this land is under the protection of the Immaculate Virgin, and to live as true children of Mary, in order to behold this noble country — whose destiny, if we are faithful, promises to surpass what the boldest imagination can conceive — won to the

Cross, and standing foremost among the Catholic nations of the earth.

But to return from this apparent digression, we will simply add, in conclusion, that, while we have asserted, as we were bound by reason and faith, the most rigid intolerance and exclusiveness in the religious order, and have justified the constitution and laws of Catholic states, during the Middle Ages, in declaring infidel, heretical, and schismatical sects social crimes, and punishing them as such, we have shown that, in a normal or civilized state of society, Catholicity is perfectly compatible with political toleration, and concedes at least as extensive toleration as is professed, and for the most part honorably maintained, by our American government. Our religion contains nothing, in case we should become the majority, and the political power should pass in this country into our hands, which would require any external changes in our existing political institutions, in our domestic and social economies, or in the present mutual relations of the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. In taking possession of a barbarous country, Catholicity must labor to change the institutions, the laws, the manners and customs, as well as the religion and interior sentiments, of the people. It has to do the same in taking possession even of a falsely civilized country, like India, China, or Japan. Catholicity can never tolerate the social institutions which are cherished by these Oriental nations, as the decisions of Rome, in the controversies between the Jesuits and Dominicans, fully prove. It can tolerate any form of government: but it can, wherever it becomes resident, tolerate no despotism, no government that is not a government of law. The prince, whether monarch, aristocracy, or democracy, must govern according to law, and, as far as possible, according to just law: for she recognizes no security for the worship of God where there is no protection for the rights of our neighbour, any more than she recognizes love to God where there is none to our brother. She can never tolerate the Oriental doctrine of castes, for she teaches that all men are of one blood, are brethren, equals before God, and should be equals before the law. The great reason why Christianity penetrates so slowly into these Oriental nations is, no doubt, the fact, that not their religion only, but their whole order of society, their whole political, social, and domestic life, is unchristian, and must be changed in order to make them Christian nations. A Chinese or a Hindoo might object, with truth, to the introduction of Chris-

tianity, that it would change his political and social institutions, as well as his religious beliefs and usages.

But when Catholicity took possession of the Roman empire, it changed nothing except the spiritual order, and what held from it. It stepped into the Roman civilization as if it had been expressly prepared for it, — as it no doubt, in a great measure, had been, — abolished the false gods, purged the temples of their idolatry, cleansed them with holy water, converted them into churches, and consecrated them to the true God, — changed the manners and customs of the people as far as they depended on the false religions which had been professed, but retained the social institutions, the schools, the academies, the laws, the whole exterior domestic and social economy as she found it, only infusing her own spirit into it, and animating it with a purer, a higher, and a more vigorous life. The same will be the case here. Our civilization is founded on a right basis, — is Roman and Christian in its groundwork ; and there never has been a state constituted throughout more in harmony with Catholic principles than the American. Its founders were not Catholics, — far from it ; but they would have been startled to have seen how much they were indebted to Catholicity for every important improvement they adopted. Their innovations were, for the most part, borrowed from Catholic teachers. Our American fathers had, unhappily for them, turned their backs upon the Church ; but they had been nursed in the bosom of her civilization. That civilization they brought with them to this New World, purged of the barbaric leaven which was still, in some measure, retained in the mother country, and against which the Popes and the whole spiritual society had protested for ten centuries. Whoever will examine the respective civil institutions of England and this country will hardly fail to perceive, that what of England we have rejected is what she owes to her barbarous ancestors, and what we have added which she has not has been borrowed from Roman and Catholic civilization. Indeed, just in proportion, under a civil and political point of view, as we have receded from England, we have approached Rome and Catholicity. They betray no little simplicity, and ignorance of modern civilization, who suppose that the triumph of Catholicity here would be the subversion of our political and civil constitution. Our institutions throughout are based upon the great principles of reason and common sense, which our Church presupposes and sanctions, inspired by Catholic tradition, and sustained by that portion of

Catholic life which the Protestant populations were able to carry with them when they broke away from its source, and which, we would fain hope, is not yet wholly extinct. Indeed, the body for Catholicity seems to us to be here already prepared. It is moulded from fine, rich, red earth, in a form of majestic proportions, and of surpassing beauty, wanting nothing but the Divine Breath to be breathed into its nostrils in order to become a living soul. The conversion of the country would destroy, would change, nothing in this admirable body, but it would quicken it with the breath of the Almighty, and secure its continuance, and its beneficent and successful operation.

We have not, we grant, defended the political toleration of different religions on infidel or even Protestant principles. It would have been idle to have done so ; for everybody knows that those principles are not ours, and cannot be, unless we give up our religion. We cannot place the sects on a footing of perfect equality with the Church, and defend their freedom on the same ground that we do hers ; because error can never exist by the same right that truth exists. The popular ground of defending the toleration of all religions by the state is the assumption of their equal right before God. This ground cannot be held by a Catholic ; and if we had assumed it, and on the strength of it asserted that Catholic states are bound to maintain universal toleration, who would have had any confidence in our sincerity, or not have supposed that our assertion was made merely for the purpose of escaping the odium of appearing to oppose the toleration by Catholic states of heretical or schismatical religions now, when toleration is popular, and we stand in need of it for ourselves ? Every intelligent Protestant or unbeliever, with the history of the Middle Ages before his eyes, would have said, " Yes, these Catholics here in this country, where they are weak, are exceedingly liberal, and preach universal toleration ; but let them become strong, let them once get the political power, and we shall quickly see that they are as intolerant in the political order as they are confessedly in the spiritual order." We Catholics must never forget that Protestants and unbelievers have a theory, to which they are wedded, that we are all ready to lie and swear to anything for the sake of Catholicity, and that we can go so far as to profess indifferentism, infidelity, or even Puritanism, if we think we can thereby promote the interests of our Church. Our assertions count for nothing with them. We are, in their estimation, fools when honest, and knaves when intelligent. Externally

considered, it is evidently for our interest, here in this country, and, indeed, in many other countries at the present time, to preach toleration; and they suppose interest governs us, as it does them, and therefore they place no confidence in our preaching, unless we show clearly and undeniably that it is in harmony with the principles of our Church, where she is strong as well as where she is apparently weak.

We have therefore defended the political toleration of the sects as a Catholic statesman, on strictly Catholic principles, without the least compromise, — without descending for a moment from the high ground of the infallibility and immutability of our Church, — without blinking, or hesitating to justify in its fullest extent, the political intolerance manifested by Catholic states to infidelity, heresy, and schism in past times. We have shown that not mere policy, but the very principles of our holy religion, require us now — on the supposition that modern unbelievers, heretics, and schismatics are civilized, and no longer barbarians, or addicted to barbarous practices — to assert and maintain as broad a toleration as our American Constitution guaranties; that they forbid the punishment by the civil authority of sins against God, however great, when not incompatible with the peace and welfare of society; and that the Church can of herself inflict only spiritual punishments, and no greater spiritual punishment than excommunication. If this does not satisfy, it is not our fault, nor that of our Church.

ART. II. — *The Good and the Bad in the Roman Catholic Church. Is that Church to be Destroyed or Reformed? A Letter from Rome.* By Rev. HENRY M. FIELD. New York: G. P. Putnam. 1849. 12mo. pp. 34.

If we have not mistaken him for another man, the writer of this Letter is a Calvinistic Congregational minister of our own neighbourhood, — a young man of fine abilities and generous feelings, respectable for his learning, and still more for his honest aims and strong religious tendencies. We cannot say that his pamphlet is highly creditable to him as a dialectician or as a theologian; but it presents him in an amiable light as a man and as a philanthropist. It is not very consistent; for it sets out with the assumption that our Church is a human institution,

then proceeds to prove it a true Christian Church, and closes by pointing out its supposed corruptions, and demanding its reformation. But if it is a human institution, it cannot be the Christian Church, nor a branch of it ; for the Christian Church is divine. If our Church is Christian, and actually doing the work of her Lord, as Mr. Field contends, it cannot be proper to judge her as a human institution, or to speak of "the good and the bad" in her ; and to propose the question whether she shall "be destroyed or reformed" is quite out of place. There is no little audacity in proposing to reform, there is something worse in proposing or in assuming it to be lawful to propose to destroy, the Church, or any portion of the Church, of Christ.

The author is aware that he may be charged with inconsistency, but he seeks to make it appear that the inconsistency is in his subject, not in himself. "I feel," he says (p. 3), "alternately admiration and disgust for the Roman Catholic Church. And if any man tells me that this is inconsistent, I answer that it is this very inconsistency which is alone consistent with truth. Human institutions are not wholly good, or wholly bad ; and he who praises or blames without discrimination is sure to be wrong." Very true of *human* institutions, which acknowledge themselves to be human ; and he who praises or blames *them* indiscriminately is sure to go wrong, we grant ; but this is not true of *divine* institutions. But is our Church a human institution ? The author contends (p. 20) that she is at least "a portion of the Church of Christ," and that Protestants should not "hesitate to allow that she is a true Christian Church." If Christian, she is divine, — for Christ is God ; and then she is not a human institution, unless God and man are identical, which the author would be as unwilling as we to assert. Then from the fact that human institutions are not wholly good or wholly bad it does not follow that the Church is not wholly good, for she is not a human institution. The author's reasoning labors under the fallacy termed by logicians *transitio a genere ad genus*, and therefore does not transfer his inconsistency from himself to his subject. He evidently says too much or not enough. Too much, if he holds our Church to be a mere human institution ; for if such, she is, as we often say, a gigantic imposition upon mankind, since she claims to be the Church of God, and, as a church, must be wholly bad. Not enough, if he holds her to be divine or Christian ; for in the divine all is good, and nothing bad ; and we are forbidden

to discriminate, but must praise indiscriminately, since to pronounce anything divine bad would be to blaspheme God. This is an awkward dilemma, and yet it is one in which every Protestant places himself who undertakes to vindicate to us as Catholics a Christian character, while he claims a Christian character for himself. There is no medium. The Protestant must either concede or deny all our Church claims.

But we have no disposition to dwell on the author's inconsistencies. He has evidently intended to be fair and candid, and we are sure that he has written with kindly feelings and friendly motives what he has actually thought and felt; and it does not surprise us, that, unacquainted as he is with the inner sense of our religion, he should fail to speak like a Catholic, with theological accuracy, or with even logical consistency. The child usually creeps before it walks, and lisps before it speaks. We cannot expect Protestants to go to bed at night in their heresies and errors, and to wake up in the morning sound and well-instructed Catholics. We must expect their approach to us to be gradual, now throwing off one error and taking up one truth, and now another; and though such approach can avail nothing for the salvation of those who stop short of unity, it may have an important influence in preparing the future conversion of the Protestant populations. We therefore welcome it as a favorable symptom, and cannot repel it, because we see clearly enough its insufficiency. All truth is ours, and it is our privilege as Catholics to acknowledge and reverence it wherever we find it, whatever the dialect in which it is spoken or the garb in which it is dressed. Mr. Field's errors and inconsistencies belong to his abnormal position, and to his sect; the truths he utters are ours, and his utterance of them does him honor as a man. He has, indeed, attained to less of Catholic thought, and enters less into the Catholic spirit, than he imagines; but he has made some progress from the rabble of his brethren, — has got rid of many foolish and unjust prejudices, and become pretty well convinced that Protestantism is far from embracing all truth, and that Protestants are very far from possessing all the piety and virtue of Christendom. This is much, and may become more. He says many things of our Church that we can accept without modification; but his *Letter* interests us chiefly for the picture it gives us, by contrast, of Protestantism. We pay little attention to what those without say in our favor, but what they say against themselves we regard as entitled to some respect. They must be

presumed to be acquainted with their own religion, and to have no motive to disparage it. We take Mr. Field's praise of us as so much dispraise of Protestants ; and when he commends something in our Church, and proposes it to them for imitation, we regard him as acknowledging that it is an excellence which we have that they have not. In this point of view, his Letter is a severe condemnation of Protestantism ; for most of the things he commends in our Church come under the head of the cardinal virtues, or pertain to the essential principles of the Christian religion, without which there is no sanctity, and no inquiry whether there is a Christian life can even be entertained.

The author begins by describing the ceremonies of Holy Week at Rome, at which he assisted. These, he tells us, left a very unfavorable impression on his mind, nay, absolutely shocked and disgusted him. At this we are not surprised ; for they were strange to him, contrary to what he had been accustomed, and he assisted at them to see and criticize, not to worship. We give him credit for trying to be impartial ; but he could only imperfectly understand their significance and appropriateness ; he could not enter into their spirit, or feel that he had lot or part in them ; and, at best, he could view them only as a mere curious spectator. We should have been, knowing his habits, tastes, and position, far more surprised if he had found them edifying. The things which he complains of, however, are for the most part mere accessories, dictated by national usage and taste, and form no essential part of Catholic faith or Catholic worship. That they should not be agreeable to a New England Puritan is easily understood ; but, after all, his habits and tastes may possibly be as much at fault as those which dictated the things which offend him. The firing of cannon, the waving of plumes and banners, in connection with religious ceremonies, may not be in accordance even with our own individual taste ; yet our judgment does not disapprove them, and we do not know what right we have to erect our individual taste, formed by our Puritanical training, and therefore very questionable, into a standard to which all mankind must conform or be voted dis-tasteful.

But Mr. Field had the candor and the good sense not to take up with his first impressions, and proceed no farther. The following is very honorable to him : —

“ Such was my first impression. Truth now compels me to say that I have attended other services of the Catholic Church less ostentatious, which have had upon me a very different effect. I go

often to the Convent of Trinità dei Monti, to hear the nuns sing their evening hymn, and it would be quite impossible for me to describe the effect upon my feelings. I listen till my heart dissolves. It seems as if some choir of the blessed were chanting a celestial hymn; as if that tender and plaintive melody, which comes to bear up my soul from gloom, were the distant music of angels.

" Ofttimes, too, at such an hour, I see the most simple and earnest devotion kneeling on the pavement of the church. I ask no questions, but there is a *look* which tells me that the thoughts of the worshipper are fixed on something beyond this world, — a look of sorrow and yet of peace. And often I say to myself, as I see men and women who have evidently led a life of extreme poverty and suffering kneeling on the church floor, ' While we sneer at their worship, these poor beings are ascending to heaven.'

" The contrast of these different services produces in my mind a confused feeling in regard to the Roman Church. I see evil there, but I see good also. And if I denounce the one, I will not deny or disparage the other.

" Besides, the fact stares me in the face that this Church has produced innumerable Saints, — some of an order of saintliness which has hardly a parallel in the world's history. If she has had a Cæsar Borgia, she has had also a Charles Borromeo, a Francis Xavier, a Pascal and Fénelon. I often go to the Church of Jesus in this city to muse at the tomb of Ignatius Loyola. This simple inscription is written over his body : *AD MAJOREM DEI GLORIAM*. Was ever epitaph more simple or just ? And shall I deny that such a man was a Christian, when his heroic self-denial, his voluntary poverty and labors, put to shame the Protestant world ?

" Farther observation has led me to modify still further my views of the Roman Catholic Church ; to discover in it many things beautiful, of happy influence, and worthy of imitation. To these I am happy to bear a tribute of admiration. Our condemnation as Protestants of what is bad would come with a better grace, and produce more effect, if we showed a readiness to appreciate and acknowledge what is good. There are several pleasing aspects which I wish particularly to notice : —

" First, — The Catholic Church eminently cherishes the feeling of reverence. Its history, its associations, its very architecture, contribute to this. Its age of itself makes it venerable, and supplies many touching associations which Protestantism wholly wants. It has been the faith of a large part of mankind for eighteen centuries. Millions have staked their eternal salvation upon its truth, and supported the agonies of life and of death upheld by its hope. They have found in its communion comfort, joy, and peace. A cloud of witnesses seems to fill the arches of every cathedral, and stretch forward like a shining column into heaven.

"Often, as I stand at twilight in some old cathedral, leaning against a column which has stood while centuries have been rushing past it, — just as the last rays of the dying day gleam through the stained windows, shedding 'a dim, religious light' on the marble monuments and the kneeling worshippers, and as the vesper hymn is filling the vault above, —

'Dimly on my soul streams the light of ages.'

Then, more than at any other hour, I feel myself united to all the living and the dead, — a unit in that mighty host which is hurrying to the unknown, yet inseparable from the rest. I think how many have come up here to drink the waters of life and gone away to die in peace. On this pavement generations have knelt, and looked up to heaven, and now 'the sheeted dead' seem still to walk here. An invisible bond unites me to all the human souls that are kneeling at my side. I should feel guilty if I dared to disown my brotherhood to them. I feel that we are one family, one great brotherhood of guilt and misery, and that I can unite in their prayers.

"Again, — The arrangements of the Catholic worship seem to me peculiarly fitted to nourish a spirit of devotion. Its churches are open at all hours, and my observation is that I have seldom entered a Catholic church that I did not find some individual — some poor man or woman — absorbed in prayer, and often with a look so eloquent of woe, and yet of that peace which passeth understanding, that I have wished that I might receive the same consolation.

"The *hours* of devotion are chosen with a wise discernment of the periods at which man is naturally disposed to reflection and to prayer, — to thoughts of a better world. The Church celebrates the rising and the setting of the sun with her *matin* and *vesper* hymns. As the sunset touches with its last rays the mountain-tops, the shepherd on the hills and in the valleys hears the evening bells that call him to prayer. How touching is that music of the convent bell ringing among the mountains! The air seems hushed and holy. Nature unites in the worship of man.

" 'Blessed be the hour,
The time, the clime, the spot, where I so oft
Have felt that moment in its fullest power
Sink o'er the earth so beautiful and soft,
While swung the deep bell in the distant tower,
Or the faint, dying day-hymn stole aloft,
And not a breath crept through the rosy air,
And yet the forest leaves seemed stirred with prayer.' "

— pp. 6 – 9.

This is well written, and indicates deep sensibility, a warm heart, and a rich imagination. The sentiment so eloquently

approved, and the absence of which in his own communion the author so feelingly laments, cannot be found out of our Church. What the author really feels and expresses is not the sentiment of reverence itself, but his own sense of the want of it among Protestants, and his strong emotions at beholding it in Catholics. Protestantism cannot be reverential, for it has nothing to reverence. It has no fund of rich associations ; no stock of cherished memories ; no patrimony ; no long line of noble and heroic ancestors ; no " cloud of witnesses to fill the arches of every " meeting-house, " and to stretch forward like a shining column into heaven." It has broken from the " communion of saints," and its children cannot look upon the patriarchs, prophets, and apostles, upon the saintly and heroic preachers of the Gospel who won the nations to the Cross by their missionary labors, their toils and privations, their prayers and vigils, their mortifications and austerities, their crucifixion to all worldly ties and affections, their tears, and their blood, — as members of their own household, or claim them as their own kith and kin. To these Christian noblemen, these honored servants of God, these champions of truth and love, to whom we owe it that we are not sunk in the chaos of barbarism, or in the fetid pool of idolatry and superstition, they feel that they are strangers, and that in their glory they have no share. The link which should have connected them in one glorious brotherhood with them has been severed, or never formed, and they can at best only half persuade themselves that possibly it may hereafter be formed or reunited in some remotely future world. Protestantism is of yesterday, and the heroic ages of the Christian Church it does not and cannot inherit. When our Protestant friend summons up the long line of saints and martyrs who have adorned the annals of religion, and says he does not disown his brotherhood to them, he only expresses his weariness of his own isolation, and the joy he conceives it would be to be able to feel himself of their brotherhood ; — in a word, his deep longing, the inward yearning of his heart for " the communion of Saints."

As Catholics, we cannot enter into his feelings, we cannot sympathize with his emotions. We are " to the manner born." All this, which so powerfully affects the imagination of our Protestant friend, is with us a matter of course, and we enjoy it as we do the air and sunshine of heaven, pure water from the brook or fountain, or as a gentleman does his estate which has descended to him, through father and son, from

time immemorial. The saints — all who have heroically served their neighbour in their lives or in their deaths, and secured the approbation of their God — are of our household, members of our family, our own dear relations, with whom we live, and daily and hourly converse, as with our most familiar acquaintances and bosom friends. It is not surprising to us, that our Protestant ministers, who are conscious that they have no Christian antiquity, no heroic ages, no spiritual chivalry, no saints, no martyrs, in a word, no ancestors, — who feel that they have sprung up in the night, like the mushroom from the dung-hill, and are oppressed with a sense of their newness and isolation from all that is grand, beautiful, holy, or inspiring in religious history, — should long for our privileges, and half envy us their possession ; but it does surprise us, that they should not see, that, in acknowledging that we inherit Christian antiquity, they condemn their own communions, and exclude themselves from the heritage of the Gospel. They who are not one with the Church in all ages cannot share in the associations, recollections, and achievements of all ages.

The author appears to be charmed with the monastic institutions of the Church.

“ Another winning feature of the Catholic Church is *the repose* which its numerous institutions offer to the weary, the broken heart. Protestantism has no cloisters, — no places of holy retreat, to which a man broken with the labors of life, or with private grief, or sick of the selfishness of the world, can retire to pass his days in devotion, and in communion with the wise and good of other days, or in labors of charity and mercy.

“ To an old man, — if without children, or if they are dead, or his lot is hard, or his life unhappy, — I can conceive of nothing more grateful than such a retreat as he approaches the evening of life. There the seductions or the treachery of the world cannot reach him. He is secluded from its occupations, and heavy, wearying care. Hours of study alternate with the gentle religious excitement of matins and vespers. His life has been full of sorrow, and now he finds a soothing repose in the monastery which creates a solitude in the heart of a city, — the stillness of its paved court broken only by the murmur of a fountain, and its long corridors echoing only to the footfall of some passing solitary who has retired from the world. In the lonely imprisoned cell, the lamp suspended from the ceiling lets fall its light on the bald head of the aged pilgrim bending over the pages of St. Augustine,

‘ The scrolls that teach him to live and die.’

In former ages, monastic institutions had a high literary utility. Never have I seen a monastery afar on the top of a mountain, glowing in the sunset, without recognizing gratefully a luminary of the Middle Ages,—one of those stations along which the torch of knowledge was transmitted from summit to summit while the world beneath lay buried in darkness. The importance of these institutions to learning is lessened, now that the sun shines down into the valleys as well as on the hill-tops. But as places of religious seclusion, I cannot but wish that there were some such retreats in Protestant lands, to which a man who has nothing more on earth to live for could retire to calm the fever of his mind, and prepare to go to God.

“The Catholic Church deserves also great honor for her charitable institutions. She has erected monasteries in lonely and almost inaccessible places; on the top of the Alps and of Mount Sinai; amid perpetual snows and frightful deserts, to extend assistance and relief to lost or helpless travellers. I walked over the Pass of the Simplon with an Episcopal clergyman, and I remember well his animated exclamation, as we first caught sight of the Hospice on the top of the mountain,—‘There is what the Catholic Church does!’ And I confess I could resist any abstract argument better than the Monks of St. Bernard, or the Sisters of Charity.” — pp. 10, 11.

We find no fault with this as far as it goes, for it is all that we could expect from a Protestant minister; but how far short it falls of the Catholic thought which has generated and sustained monastic institutions, we have no occasion to inform our Catholic readers. Mr. Field's thought, singularly enough in one who protests earnestly and eloquently against the prevailing humanism of the day, remains in the humanitarian order, and makes the monastery simply a sort of Sailor's Snug Harbour for those who are weary of the storms and tempests of life, or too old or too feeble to buffet them. This is something, as was the generous provision made in his will by an Eastern Emir for the erection and support of a hospital for old and worn-out horses; but far different was the thought which gave birth to the monastery, and which has continued to sustain it through the lapse and changes of wellnigh twenty centuries. This thought was that of SACRIFICE, which lies at the bottom of all worship. It was not simply the desire to retreat from the world, to throw off its cares, its responsibilities, and to lead a calm and indolent life away from its troubles and temptations, but to immolate one's whole self to God, to die, to be crucified, unto all, in order to live only unto God. For the weak and the way-worn, for the old and the sick of heart, still pertaining to the

world, the monastery was an *hospice*, an asylum ; but, to the monks themselves, it was the cross to which they were nailed, — the altar on which they offered themselves, heart and soul, body and mind, reason and will, — the place of trial and suffering, of labor and vigil, of fasting and prayer, of pain and mortification, though of interior peace and consolation, — the list into which the aspirants, as skilful and determined *athletæ*, entered to struggle even unto death for the crown of life to be given to the victors by the Sovereign's own hand. It is not when the old and infirm, who have outlived their worldly pleasures and affections, or when they whom early misfortune, disappointments, or blight have sickened with the world and rendered unable to bear its rude breath or its scornful eye, retreat from society, and wait in concealment and silence for death to relieve them of their burdens, that the Catholic sees the peculiar beauty and worth of the monastery ; but it is when the strong and the beautiful, in the bloom of life, in the freshness of their thoughts and affections, for whom the world is full of promise and society reserves its choicest pleasures and its richest honors, turn their backs upon them all, and, adorning themselves as the bride for the bridegroom, offer their virgin hearts and virgin bodies on the altar of sacrifice, and pledge themselves to their celestial Spouse, to be his, and his only, for time and eternity, that the Catholic heart swells with admiration, that Catholic eyes fill with tears of thanksgiving and joy, and pious souls fall down and adore the wondrous power of Divine grace.

The following throws a strong light on Protestantism, and shows its utter worthlessness under its least objectionable aspect, under which one would expect it to have, at least, some appearance of merit.

“ I believe no church is so faithful to the sick and to orphans as the Church of Rome. In hospitals, the Sisters of Charity are the most faithful watchers, performing the most menial services with their own hands ; and, much as I dislike their vows, I can never see these sisters pass in the streets of our cities without a feeling of pitying admiration.

“ When a city is visited by plague or cholera, the Catholic priest has the feeling of a soldier in the hour of danger. If his people ever need him, they need him then. And the priest never deserts his flock, while the Protestant minister often flees with precipitation.

“ No other church is so faithful to the poor, and to this I ascribe the hold which she has on the Irish peasantry and on the masses

wherever her faith prevails. She has accomplished that greatest task of any religion, — to make it penetrate the lower strata of society, — to make it sink down into the ocean of popular ideas and affections.

“In countries where the Catholic Church is dominant, religion has at least some hold on all classes. The lowest, the most degraded, have some touch of religious sentiment about them, some veneration for sacred things, some sensibility to holy influences. The Irish peasant, the Sicilian beggar, still keep some fraction of Christian faith, even in circumstances fitted to cast down and brutalize human nature. They do not sink to such brutish degradation as the same class in Protestant countries. They are not such *animals* as the low population of London, the haggard wretches of St. Giles. It appears to me that it is the highest triumph of the Catholic religion that it has infused some touch of heavenly love and hope into such stern and savage breasts.

“Eternal honor to the Catholic Church for this, — that she makes no distinction between the rich and the poor! In that church, as before God, all men are on a level. In the immense multitude that prostrate themselves on the floor of the cathedral, the rich and the poor, the prince and the laboring man, kneel side by side, and feel that God is the maker of them all. The thought of their Creator and of their immortality, that rushes over them at such a moment, makes them equal.

“To all conditions of men the Church administers the same sacraments, from baptism in childhood to extreme unction in the hour of dissolution. When the poor man is taken sick, the priest is at his bedside to administer the consolations of religion; and over the departing soul of the poorest of her children the Church pronounces her last benediction, — ‘Go forth, O Christian soul! from this world, in the name of God, the Father Almighty, who created thee; in the name of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who suffered for thee; in the name of the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth thee. When thy soul shall depart from thy body, let the resplendent multitude of the angels meet thee; let the triumphant army of the martyrs, clad in their white robes, conduct thee.’

“Being pervaded by the same sentiment of religion, there is a *sympathy between all classes*, where all belong to the same communion, which, in our divided Protestant communities, does not exist. The tendency of sects is to isolate a man from his neighbour, to make him selfish, clannish, and proud.

“It is perhaps owing to this difference of religion, that there is much less of aristocratic pride and assumption in Catholic countries. Their religion has at least a softening and beautiful effect upon *manners*. In persons of the highest rank, they are softened by a courtesy which the burly Englishman, or the purse-proud

American, never knows. I believe there is more *pride*, more insolence, in England, than on the whole continent of Europe. I do not suppose that their religion has produced this pride, but it certainly has not prevented it.

"Protestantism seems to have no machinery to reach the poorer classes. The most that has been done in England or in this country has been done by the Methodists. But the spirit of our churches generally is worldly, self-seeking. They court the rich. The ambition of a Protestant minister, even in democratic America, is to be the head of an aristocratic congregation. The churches themselves are a kind of religious aristocracy. In New York, for example, what a rivalry as to which congregation shall be most *exclusive*! The very buildings in which they worship are constructed as if on purpose to shut out the poor. They are arranged just like a theatre, *in boxes*, which are sold to the highest bidder, and all are held at such a price that the poor are almost as a matter of necessity excluded.

"I may be wanting in reverence, but to me a *fashionable church* is about as sacred a place as a fashionable theatre. One is as much devoted to the god of this world as the other. Both are fitted up with gay or gaudy decorations. Both resorted to by very fashionable audiences for curiosity or display. The principal feeling excited or gratified is poor, pitiful human vanity. In the church, as in the theatre, the audience are entertained for an hour with public speaking in which there is an occasional religious reflection or sentiment, about as solemn, though by no means as eloquent, as the moralizing of Hamlet. From both places the public, or the poorer part of it, are strictly excluded.

"How Christianity is to penetrate the whole mass of society by the agency of such churches surpasses my comprehension. Sad would be the fate of the world, if its moral condition or happiness depended on these fashionable Christians, who are giddy with folly and dissipation half the year, but — religiously abstain from the opera during Lent!" — pp. 12–15.

This speaks for itself, and should for ever silence those who pretend that Protestantism is favorable to the million. But here is another passage which proves equally the worthlessness of Protestantism as the medium of maintaining faith in Christianity as a divine revelation.

"Lastly, I honor the Catholic Church for this, — that it has held inflexibly to its high ground, that Christianity is a divine religion; not merely what Mr. Emerson or Mr. Parker *thinks*, or what any body *supposes*; but that it is the eternal truth of God; not a system of philosophy like that of Plato, or a mere classification of natural laws which man has discovered, but a revelation from the in-

visible world, which the Son of God has come down from heaven to give to mankind. We have been so long trying to explain everything in the Christian religion, from a wish to make its truth and evidence palpable to all, that we have insensibly let go the sublimity and grandeur of this mighty faith. We have sought to reduce its mysteries to the level, not only of the highest, but of the most vulgar comprehension; to classify its stupendous facts under the ordinary course of nature. Some have gone so far as to reduce Christ to be a mere man, his miracles to be merely natural phenomena, and his teachings to be simply the wise sayings of a virtuous philosopher. Christianity is merely the reiteration of those general laws of the mind which we knew before, or might have known, from our own consciousness. When we have reached this point, what place is left for faith, or for anything that had been before called religion? What need of temples, and altars, and anthems to bear up the soul on high? The church becomes merely a hall for public lectures, and human flattery and compliment take the place of the prostration of man before his Maker.

"I do not wonder that some minds, when they reach this lowest point of belief, or disbelief, rush back from it into the unquestioning faith of the Church of Rome. A dark, half-understood faith, mysterious yet sublime, is better than total unbelief, than universal doubt. As they turn away sickened from the miserable transcendental philosophy of the day, which reasons God and all spiritual existences out of the world, which knows no being but man, — the faith of Rome presents itself as a refuge. There is an attraction in its mysteries, there is a solemnity in that darkness of the future and the invisible, which the Catholic Church professes to illumine but dimly, as with a few faint stars twinkling in the midnight sky, which casts over the soul a spell as deep and awful as the shadow of eternity.

"Better even an excess of veneration and belief than a total abnegation of faith. Better even for the intellect, for the arts, for poetry and eloquence, which can only live in an atmosphere of faith; and infinitely better for the character. Superstition may be a weakness, but it is the error, though of an ignorant, yet of a sincere and truth-loving mind. Skepticism, still farther from the truth, is the error of an understanding but half instructed, yet conceited and flippant. Better any extreme of credulity than this, the laugh and gibber of a low, licentious, sneering infidelity.

"The Catholic Church, I think, deserves the thanks of all Christendom for this, — that it has held so firmly that Christianity is a divine religion, the direct revelation of God, and eternal and immutable as its Author. Standing on this foundation, that church asserts the majesty of religion above all the interests of this world, in face of the secularizing influences of a commercial, and the sneers and scoffs of a skeptical age.

“ And she is not ashamed to bear her cross before the world ! I confess I like those popular signs of its faith, crucifixes and oratories by the way-side, which are the landmarks of a Catholic country. I once looked on all such things as superstition ; but now they produce on me rather a pleasant impression. I like, as I enter a foreign country, to be greeted with some token that I am entering a Christian land. A Protestant country you may travel through, from one end to the other, without meeting a single symbol of the national faith. You see buildings devoted to religious worship, but whether Christian temples, or Mohammedan mosques, or Hebrew synagogues, no visible sign tells. But over every Catholic Church a silent cross proclaims *whose name* they bear. Along the highways stand a thousand shrines like so many fountains, inviting the pilgrim to stop and drink of living waters. I confess I love to see these things ; as I travel through strange kingdoms, to behold here and there the blessed symbol of my faith standing in a grove of pines, or on some headland overlooking the deep ; and as I see it standing at the head of those swelling mounds, which mark where we all must lie, it gives me a firmer hold of my immortality. It seems to say, ‘ I am the resurrection and the life : he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live.’ ” — pp. 16 – 18.

It is a little remarkable that a Protestant minister should mark it as a signal merit of the Catholic Church, that she has never ceased to assert that Christianity is a divine revelation. What must be his estimate of his own religion, when he acknowledges that ours is, in this respect, honorably distinguished from it ? It is clear in his mind, that, if it had not been for our Church, the idea of Christianity as a positive, divine revelation, in contradistinction from mere philosophy or Rationalism, would have been lost, and the world would have lapsed into the abyss of infidelity, — in a word, that it is to her that Protestants themselves are indebted for even the preservation of Christianity in the world. This is, no doubt, true ; but how can a Protestant acknowledge it ? Is it not fatal to his own communion ?

Mr. Field says he does not wonder at persons who recoil from the abyss of infidelity going over to Rome, but seems to imply that, if these persons were acquainted with some of the higher forms of Protestant Christianity, they might satisfy themselves without taking so long a journey. But if the world is indebted to the Roman Catholic Church, as it undoubtedly is, for the preservation of the belief in Christianity as a divine revelation, how could we be saved from the abyss of infidelity out of that Church ? It follows necessarily from what he con-

cedes, that no form of Protestantism has power to save from infidelity ; and if not, how can any form of Protestantism be a secure refuge to those who would be Christian believers ? The fact is, that all those who, like ourselves, have been converted from Protestant Rationalism or Transcendentalism to the Roman Catholic Church, are as well acquainted with the higher forms of Protestantism as with the lower, and it was from the higher we had descended to the lower ; when we recoiled from the lower, we went to Rome, because we knew that there was nothing in these higher forms that could save us from relapsing into the lower.

All Protestant communions may be divided into three classes : — 1. The Genevan, or Calvinistic ; 2. The Anglican, or Episcopalian ; 3. The Unitarian, or Rationalistic. The best that Protestantism has to offer is to be found in one or another of these three classes ; and he who cannot find the Gospel in some one of these need not hope to find it in the Protestant world. The first class embraces all the sects commonly called Evangelical. Their principle is enthusiasm, and their fruit fanaticism, alike repugnant to faith and to reason. Anglicanism, or Protestant Episcopalianism, embracing Lutheranism in so far as Lutheranism is not Evangelicalism, is mere formalism, — what Carlyle calls a “ sham.” It is the broken hull of Catholicity, emptied of its kernel, and has nothing to feed the famishing soul. Doubtless both of these classes recognize many Christian truths, and retain large portions of Christian ethics ; but these, if not defended on Rationalistic principles, must be defended on Catholic principles. If we defend them on Rationalistic principles, we necessarily, as our author will not deny, precipitate ourselves into the yawning abyss of infidelity ; if on Catholic principles, we cannot stop short of Catholicity, — save at the expense of our logic, — where they exist in their unity and integrity. Not one of these truths ever has been or ever can be defended against the Unitarians, or third class, save on principles which equally defend the Roman Catholic Church. Here is the difficulty under which Protestantism, so long as it professes to be Christian, necessarily labors. It is always too much or too little for itself. No man capable of reasoning consecutively, and whose intellect is not warped by passion or prejudice, can for a moment avoid either sinking to the lowest depths of infidelity, or rising to Catholicity.

Then, again, as a matter of fact, the active living men

amongst Protestants are all dissatisfied with every existing form of Protestantism ; and if they cling to a particular form, it is never for what it is, but for what they hope or persuade themselves it may become. Our author himself has no sympathy with Evangelicalism, and he would reform it by inducing it to copy the principal features of Catholicity ; and he stands by no means alone. There is a deep feeling among our New England ministers, that Evangelicalism is far from being the adequate expression of Christianity, and that it by no means answers the great ends of a divine religion, as we have had ample means of knowing, and of which we have ample proofs in our own possession. What is Dr. Bushnell's movement but a revolt against Evangelicalism, now in favor of Rationalism, now in favor of Mysticism, and now even in favor of Catholicity ? Protestant Episcopalians, with their kindred, may talk emphatically of their church and their "admirable liturgy," but none of them appear to be satisfied with their church as it actually is, and most of them, whether in England or in this country, are at work to develop it, some in favor of Evangelicalism, some in favor of Catholicity, others, like Whately and his school, in favor of Unitarianism, or Rationalism. Unitarians acknowledge with one accord that they have not found what they want, and never expect to come to the knowledge of the truth. The late Dr. Channing, a short time before his death, made the remarkable confession, in a letter to a friend, that, though he approved of his past course, and believed Unitarianism had been useful in combating Calvinism, he still looked for the manifestation of a higher form of Christian truth and of Christian life. These are facts which have their significance, and which prove, that, in recoiling from infidelity, we have no resource but to fall back on the Catholic Church, not merely to satisfy our imaginations or our sensibilities, but our sober reason. There is nothing else, even on the showing of the sects themselves, for us to fall back upon.

We, who have run through the higher as well as the lower forms of Protestantism, are not to be put off with a mere abstraction, which has nothing positive, definite, and is nothing but the negation of Catholicity, and the assertion of anything we please in general, and nothing in particular. It is here that Protestants delude themselves. Our author claims to be a Protestant, and yet it is evident from his letter that there is no form of Protestantism that he believes to be the adequate

expression of Christian doctrine, or which is able to produce and support the genuine Christian life. But what is this Protestantism in general, which is nowhere realized in a specific or individual form? The general, abstracted from the particular, has no existence, and is only a mere possibility, not an actuality. Protestantism exists only as Evangelicalism, formalism, or Rationalism; and he who is not an adherent of one or another of these, though he may be no Catholic, is no Protestant,—is in Christian countries nothing at all,—belongs, as it is said in the language of the day, to the “Big Church,” that is, the “Nothingarian.” It is idle to ask us to be Protestants in general and not Protestants in particular,—to embrace a mere abstraction and not a real thing. If we are to be Protestants, we must embrace some particular form, enter some particular communion; and if you yourselves cannot offer us any such communion, which, as it is, and not merely as you are hoping it one day will be, is in your own belief the true Christian communion, you should not sneer at us for going to Rome, since that, according to yourselves, is our only refuge from infidelity; for to ask us to make a church for ourselves, or to remain in a false communion till you have succeeded in forming the true one, is asking quite too much of us. Life is short, and death is near at hand: we have no vocation ourselves to make a church, and you seem to have just as little; for you appear to be no nearer getting a true church constructed than you were three hundred years ago. You are busy, we grant; but unless God build the house, how shall they prosper who build it? Does the Church of Christ now exist in its integrity, or does it not?

Perhaps, were our Protestant friend to look closer into the matter, he would find that we who have gone over to Rome did not go because we had become disgusted with this or that particular form of Protestantism, in a fit of ill-humor or despair,—in obedience to the craving of a morbid sensibility, or of a disorderly imagination. Perhaps he would find that we need no such apology as he generously volunteers for us,—that, in fact, we did not fall into that abyss of Transcendentalism and infidelity till we had examined the higher forms of Protestantism, and found them empty, or go into the Church but upon full and sober conviction. And perhaps, too, if he should form his conclusions from our Catholic faith as our Church teaches it, instead of forming them from his own glosses, he would not hold it necessary to defend superstition

in order to defend the reasonableness of our conversion. It is amusing as well as painful to witness the absurd mistakes which even able and well-disposed Protestants fall into in regard to our faith ; and we must tell even the able and well-disposed, that, while we appreciate their motives, and honor them for their good intentions, their apologies are hardly less offensive to us than the most bitter accusations they could bring against us. However, our kind-hearted friend has intended nothing offensive, and while we refuse to accept his well-meant apology for us and our brother converts, we assure him that we only wish him to be able from his own experience to see its absurdity, and the little need we have of it, or of any apology for renouncing error and embracing truth, — for leaving the Protestant conventicle for the Catholic Church.

We have laid before our readers "the good" which Mr. Field finds in the Church, and the conclusion is evident, that, in his mind, — however the case may stand as to doctrine, in which he admits we are substantially orthodox, — the Christian life is to be found, at least in its perfection, only in our communion. This is enough for us, and we will not press him with the logical consequences which naturally follow from it ; for we trust, in due time, with God's grace, he will see them for himself. As to "the bad" he finds in the Church, it really amounts to little. We pay too great a regard to *relics*, have too many ceremonies in our worship, use in the service of the Church a dead language, find too great a facility of pardon in the confessional, have a source of abuse in the celibacy of the clergy, and have too many monks. Here is the whole list, we believe. We have no intention, at present, of discussing these subjects at length. The recent revolutions in Europe are fast removing the last abuse, if abuse it be, and there is no danger of the monastic orders becoming too crowded, at least for some time to come. The celibacy of the clergy is not a debatable question at this late day. If it were productive of evil, experience would have demonstrated the fact long before this ; and it would be giving the Church little credit for that consummate policy she is said to profess and practise, to suppose, that, if experience had so demonstrated, she would continue to insist on it, since it is within her competency to abolish it. Did it never occur to our friend, that the very fact that the Church insists on the celibacy of the clergy in face of the opposition it encounters, and after ages of experience, is a palpable proof that it is not an abuse, that

its practical effect is good, and that she has good and solid reasons for insisting on it? As to the use of a dead language, we are surprised that such a man as Mr. Field should find it an objection. Just consider the number of languages and dialects in the world, the constant changes and alterations they undergo, and ask, if a more unreasonable proposition was ever put forth, than that the Church should translate her sacred offices into them all, many of which have never been written languages, have no grammar, and no alphabet. And what need is there of it? The prayers are addressed to God and not to the worshippers, and he can understand, we presume, Latin as well as English or French. As to the ceremonies objected to, if, as the author says, they were borrowed from the Jewish worship, they were originally prescribed by God himself, and therefore cannot be in themselves objectionable, but must be, one would be disposed to think, such as God himself approves. The Catholic Church teaches that the Jewish worship was prescribed by divine authority, and remains in force save so far as repealed by the New Law.

On the other two points, we have now only one or two suggestions to offer. The author recognizes true Saints in our Church, and names some; and we request him to take notice that those whom he recognizes for Saints were remarkable for their veneration of the Saints, the honor they paid to sacred relics, and the frequency with which they approached the confessional; and that we never find a Saint, nor an eminently pious Catholic, of whom we are not obliged to say as much. Has our friend meditated this fact? Did St. Francis of Sales, St. Charles Borromeo, St. Vincent of Paul, or even Fénelon, ever hint that these things were abuses and needed reforming? Are not such men as these better judges of what favors the growth of sanctity, than is a stranger to our Church, who can judge only according to uncertain speculation from uncertain data? May it not be that there is a connection between these things and holiness of life, which our Protestant friend, with his Protestant eyes, does not perceive? Let him produce an instance of real eminent sanctity disconnected from them.

The author nowhere shows himself to so little advantage as when speaking of confession, and he proves himself by no means well informed when he reckons *Pascal* among Catholic Saints. *Pascal* was no Saint, and not even a Catholic. He

was a Jansenist, and therefore a heretic ; and his life shows, that, whatever were the austerities he practised, he was lacking in the Christian virtue of humility, without which there is no sanctity. The author does not appear to have made himself at all acquainted with the ordinary Catholic expositions of the sacrament of Penance. He fancies that the main end of confession is the relief of a scrupulous conscience, and to reassure the self-distrustful. Beyond this he thinks it is an abuse, or only an indulgence to sin. What blunders sensible men will commit when they venture to speak on topics of which they are ignorant ! “ Many a bad man,” he says, “ sins with a light heart, thinking that he can get a release from the Divine penalty by whispering into the ear of the priest. Confession relieves his conscience altogether too easily.” (p. 24.) How does our friend know this, since he has never believed or practised confession ? Even if what he says were true, he is rash in saying it, for he has no sufficient reason for saying it. But there is no truth in it. The bad man supposed knows, if he knows anything of his religion, that to sin presuming on pardon is an additional sin of presumption ; and he knows, also, that he cannot receive pardon unless he has all that Protestants understand by *repentance*, and that, if he should approach the sacrament with an impenitent heart, without sorrow for his sin, and a firm resolution to forsake it and obey God for the future, he would not only not obtain pardon, but would commit the sin of sacrilege. No Catholic is so ignorant as not to know that something more than whispering in the ear of the priest is necessary to obtain pardon for his sins. The simple fact is, that, in this matter of forgiveness, Protestants hold that there is forgiveness of sins on repentance, without confession ; and Calvinists hold that all sins, past, present, and to come, are forgiven at once ; — we, that there is none with confession, without repentance. So we make the matter more difficult than they do, requiring all they require, and confession into the bargain. The author mistakes the motive which he tacitly assumes the Reformers had in rejecting confession : it was not to make pardon less easy, but to remove an unpleasant restraint ; for confession is anything but agreeable to flesh and blood. As to its being an indulgence to sin, that is all moonshine. Is it an indulgence to sin to say that God pardons the penitent for Christ's sake ? No man dares say it, and what more do we say in the sacrament of Penance ?

We request the attention of the author to a well-known fact in all Catholic countries, that the pious, the devout, they who aspire to Christian perfection, and who really adorn their religion, and extort the admiration of Protestants by their virtues, go regularly and often to confession, and some of the greatest Saints confess daily ; while the bad, the profane, the licentious, the men who dishonor their manhood by their vices and their religion by their profligate lives, the very persons Protestants throw in our faces as fruits of Catholicity, rarely, if ever, approach the tribunal of Penance ; and the first thing the good priest, in order to reform them, attempts, is to bring them to it. Here is a fact worth all the speculation in the world. If confession were an abuse, if sinners were made worse by frequently confessing, the fact would be as little likely to escape the observation of the Catholic pastor as of our Protestant minister ; and if he found such to be the fact, why should he resort to it as the most efficient means of reforming them ? Why should he spend days and nights in the most arduous and painful labors to get sinners to confess and in hearing their confessions ? The most painful and laborious part of his mission is that of hearing confessions ; and why should a good, intelligent, faithful, and zealous priest impose this task upon himself, if aware that it is not only of no use, but of real injury to the souls of his flock ? He could easily, to a great extent, escape it, and without subjecting himself to canonical censure, if he chose ; and bad or indolent priests, who care nothing for the souls committed to their charge, do escape it, and with what fruit the wretched condition of their flocks bears witness. The morals of a Catholic community may always be measured by the numbers who approach, and the regularity and frequency with which they approach, the confessional and Holy Communion. Mr. Field would seem to suppose that it is the bad, the dissolute, among us that frequent the confessionals, and that these, as soon as they sin, run to the priest and confess it. Would that it were so. But it is not so ; for these are precisely the ones who keep aloof from the confessional, and, in this respect at least, are good practical Protestants. The terrible corruption in France, during the last century, began in a neglect of the sacrament of Penance ; and it is only as we succeed in bringing men to it that we succeed in reforming them. Even Anglicans are so struck with this fact, that they are trying to introduce the practice of confession into their communion.

But we have extended our remarks farther than we intended. It is not necessary to dispute these matters with our Protestant friend, for we do not perceive that he recognizes any standard according to which he proposes to reform us ; and we should think he had had enough already, in his Protestant communions, of the absurd attempt to reform the Church of God by private authority. Churchmen may need reforming in order to bring them up to the standard of the Church ; but, as recent as is the time since we became a Catholic, the proposition to reform Christ's Church sounds harshly in our ears. We cannot help thinking that Almighty God had the ability to construct, and has constructed, his Church to suit the ends for which he instituted it, and that it cannot be improved by us, or stand in need of us to repair it. After all, it seems to us not unreasonable to accept it as he has given and sustains it, and, if we do not happen to find ourselves in harmony with it, to conclude that the fault is far more likely to be ours than his or its. It seems hard that God should submit to man, but not hard that man should submit to God.

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- ART. III.—1. *Mores Catholici : or Ages of Faith.* By KENELM H. DIGBY, Esq. Cincinnati: Catholic Society. 1841. 8vo. Vols. I. and II.
2. *The Dark Ages : a Series of Essays intended to illustrate the State of Religion and Literature in the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Centuries, reprinted from the "British Magazine," with Corrections, and some Additions.* By the Rev. S. R. MAITLAND, F. R. S. and F. S. A., Librarian to His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, &c. London: Rivingtons. 1844. 8vo. pp. 498.
3. *The Christian Examiner and Religious Miscellany.* Boston: Crosby & Nichols. May, 1849. Art. I.

OUR attention has been specially called to "the Dark Ages" by *The Christian Examiner*, the literary and theological organ of the American Unitarians, for May last, in an article entitled *The Artistic and Romantic View of the Church of the Middle Ages*, written, as we learn from the initials appended to it, by one of the ablest and most respectable of our New

England Unitarian ministers. Aside from its theology, with which, of course, we have no sympathy, *The Christian Examiner* is second to no periodical in the country ; and it was in its pages that Channing, Norton, Ware, the Peabodys, Lamson, Walker, Frothingham, Dewey, Ripley, and others, first became generally known to the reading public, and acquired their literary reputation. We have many pleasant, as well as painful, recollections connected with it, for we were ourselves for several years counted among its contributors ; and the men who gave it a character, and made it a leading organ of New England literature as well as of Unitarian theology, were, for the most part, our personal acquaintances and friends, whose many amiable qualities, generous sentiments, private and social virtues, we always delight to remember. The writer of the article we have designated is a young man of more than ordinary natural endowments, of respectable attainments, and a cultivated taste. He is earnest, and seems really to have some principle, and to be disposed to treat those from whom he differs with fairness and candor. He shows, in the article before us, better temper, more liberal feeling, more manliness, and more loyalty to truth, than we are accustomed to meet or to expect from writers who oppose the Church, and we have read him occasionally with pleasure. His sneers are comparatively few ; his declamations are not very long, nor remarkably violent ; his reasonings, if his premises were sound, would frequently be conclusive ; and many of his criticisms are just and well merited.

The article itself is principally taken up with criticisms on various works which have recently appeared in favor of the Middle Ages, and more especially with a review of the *Mores Catholici, or Ages of Faith*, by Kenelm H. Digby, one of the most remarkable literary productions of our times. With the writer's remarks on several of these works, especially those which have emanated from the Puseyite or Oxford school, we in the main agree. The Oxford men who remain attached to Anglicanism, and even some others, in what they wrote before they abandoned it, appear to us to betray much childishness and want of manly criticism ; and their indiscriminate commendation of the Middle Ages is not less offensive to our judgment, and is even more offensive to our taste, than the indiscriminate condemnation of them so characteristic of our modern Evangelicals. Even Pugin's exclusive and excessive praise of Gothic architecture has wellnigh

turned our stomach, and driven us out of our former sober admiration of it. We have no sympathy with one-sided views in art, and just as little with the spirit that forgets that we have the same Church which our ancestors had, — that she is not dead, but living, — as dear to us as she was to the mediæval knights and monks, — as good, as wise, as powerful, as young, as fresh, as beautiful, as vigorous, as she was in the Dark Ages.

The writer in the *Christian Examiner* bestows his chief attention upon the *Mores Catholici, or Ages of Faith*. He justly praises, and, if it were possible, even overpraises, this work for its immense erudition, at once comprehensive and minute ; but he contends that it is partial, deceptive, and not to be relied on as a faithful representation of the Middle Ages. It should, he thinks, be regarded not as an historical work, properly so called, but as “ A Romance founded on Facts of Mediæval History.” It is impossible to conceive an author more thoroughly imbued with the spirit of romance, or more interesting for the rich and brilliant hues which his imagination throws over every object he presents. But the coloring he gives to the Middle Ages is his own ; he fails to present them, in their totality, as they really were, and he disguises or suppresses such of their phenomena as are not agreeable to his Catholic faith or Catholic fervor. No man, we apprehend, has carefully read Digby’s work, without feeling that there is some truth in this criticism. For ourselves, we admire the *Mores Catholici* for its various learning, its deep reverential tone, its undoubting faith, its sincere and fervent piety, and its noble appreciation of Catholic honor and Catholic heroism ; but we have never been able to give it any very high rank under the relations either of art or of science. The author is saturated with the religious, and also with the romantic, spirit of the *later* mediæval times ; he has a keen relish for art, and we are told that his merits as a painter are beyond those of an amateur ; but as a writer he exhibits very little artistic skill. He has vast learning, and he accumulates a mass of materials from all sources, near and remote, open and recondite, at which we stand aghast ; but his power to mould these materials into a proper shape, to reduce his facts to their proper places, under their proper laws, and to draw from them the proper inferences, seems to us to be more than ordinarily defective. His book is a chaos of erudition, of faith, piety, sentimentality, and romance, which, indeed, may often be

read for edification, for its gentle and subduing effects on the heart, but which can seldom be consulted with entire confidence as a work of simple instruction. It does not give us, nor does it enable us to form, a complete picture of mediæval life in its totality ; it is one-sided, often fanciful, illusory ; and its rambling character, its absorbing subjectivity, its neglect of order, of method, of proper definitions and distinctions, render it not unfrequently as apt to suggest conclusions against Catholicity as in its favor.

In reading Digby's work, we certainly receive the impression, that, in his view at least, society in the Middle Ages was in what we may regard as its normal state, really under the spiritual direction of the Church, and, with insignificant exceptions, obedient to her doctrines and to her precepts, — that the Church was in fact, as well as in right, supreme, had all things her own way, and was able to realize for society, as well as for individuals, in the secular order no less than in the spiritual, her ideal of Catholic life on earth. The facts he relates, collected from all ages and nations, appear to be intended to illustrate that life, and to prove that it was, under both the secular and religious aspects, successfully realized. Hence to him the Middle Ages are peculiarly Catholic ages, that is, "ages of faith," as he expressly denominates them ; and therefore to be not only admired, but imitated. But if this be really his view, he makes the Church responsible for their general and special character, and therefore binds himself to defend them in their totality, under their secular as well as under their religious relations, or to give up his Catholicity. This the writer in the *Examiner* has not failed to perceive, and hence he throws in Digby's face the iniquity, the vices, the corruptions, the barbarism of those ages, — which it were idle to attempt to deny or to conceal, — as a conclusive refutation of the claims of the Church as the Church of God. Undeniably false and monstrous as is the reasoning of our Unitarian friend, nevertheless, as against Digby, it is apparently sound, and not easily set aside ; for it rests on an assumption which Digby himself certainly has the appearance, at least, of making, and nowhere of denying.

Our readers are well aware that we are not among those who are continually decrying the Middle Ages ; we have frequently defended them, and are always ready to defend them, against their calumniators. We are far from believing them to have been throughout, under all their relations, so dark, so utterly

wretched, as it has been for a long time commonly imagined, and we by no means admit that the present is so far in advance of them as modern advocates of progress would persuade us ; but we have never supposed that we were bound to praise them indiscriminately ; we are far from being prepared to regard our Church as implicated in the totality of their phenomena, and we cannot permit either our friends or our enemies to lay them, with all their evil as well as their good, upon our back, and compel us to carry them with us wherever we go, or else give up our Catholic faith and worship. They are, thus taken, a load which we have no disposition to carry, and which no man has the right to insist upon our carrying. As we often say, we are Catholics of the Middle Ages, because Catholicity never varies, and undergoes no development in the sense of the believers in "the progress of the species," and because the Catholic, as a Catholic, of one age is the Catholic of every age. But as men, as affected by simply human movements, we belong to the nineteenth century, in which our lot is cast, and we labor to serve our own generation, under the conditions to which it and we are subject, without calumniating either the past or the present.

The apparent error of Digby, and the real error of his Unitarian opponent, as of nearly all the modern adversaries of the Church, is in neglecting to make a very obvious distinction between the divine element in the Middle Ages, represented by the Church, and the human element that subsisted and operated by its side ; and in failing to distribute to each of these elements its appropriate share of the collective phenomena. The secular or human element then, as before and since, held divided empire with the Church, and is answerable for a portion of the phenomena we encounter in mediæval history ; and as the Church was then not alone, was not the sole operative or efficient cause, it is obviously unjust, as well as unscientific, to hold her responsible for any portion of those phenomena, except those which, directly or indirectly, proceeded from her as their principle.

As far as the part of the Church, or her influences and effects, are concerned, Digby's work misstates, miscolors, exaggerates, nothing, and fails, if in anything, simply in falling short of the full truth. We are to distrust it only when it goes beyond the religious element, and the facts dependent on it, and claims to be a faithful picture of mediæval life in its totality, of what depended on the human as well as the divine. It is then a

false picture ; for the human element was not so Catholicized, nor, as to its independent and hostile operations, confined within so narrow limits as its author supposes ; and the Church was not so supreme, did not, in fact, exert so exclusive or so abiding a control over entire mediæval life, as he represents. Here is the grand defect of Digby's book, and here is the point on which we insist. There is no truth in the assumption which Digby appears to make, and which our Unitarian friend really does make (p. 371), that "the Church had a thousand years of almost triumphant ascendancy." In this world the Church is militant, never triumphant. Only he who perseveres unto the end is permitted to triumph. That the supremacy of the Church was generally admitted, in the Middle Ages, as a doctrine, — that she maintained an ascendancy over heresy greater than she did at some periods before them, or than she does now, — as far as our present argument is concerned, — may or may not be true ; but that she had an almost triumphant ascendancy, or anything approaching it, over the secular order, is utterly false ; and throughout the entire thousand years supposed, she had not for one moment her unrestrained freedom, and often, often, had she to struggle for her very existence against pagans, heretics, schismatics, Mahometans, and lawless, ambitious, licentious, and barbarous sovereigns. Never, indeed, did she give more unequivocal proofs of her supernatural origin and support, than in those ages of ignorance, violence, and blood, — never did she struggle with more manifest supernatural constancy and force, or win more glorious trophies to her celestial prowess ; but never found she her path beset with greater difficulties, or was her just dominion resisted by more numerous, fiercer, more powerful, or more obstinate enemies.

The assumption, that the Church reigned quietly and peacefully during the Middle Ages, is warranted by no authority, and is contradicted by the whole history of the period. That period extends from the beginning of the sixth century to the close of the fifteenth. A simple glance at its history will suffice to dissipate the illusion, that the Middle Ages were all the work of the Church, or that she worked throughout them comparatively at her ease. Those ages open with the destruction of the Western Roman Empire and the permanent settlement of the Northern Barbarians on its ruins. For all Western Europe the old Græco-Roman civilization is destroyed, save the wrecks preserved by the Church, and some few towns in Italy and Gaul. The old cultivated populations are in great measure

exterminated, and the few that survive have been plundered, impoverished, and for the most part reduced to slavery. Over the vast extent of the once flourishing, wealthy, and highly civilized and Christianized provinces of the Empire, you see nothing but ruined cities, deserted towns and villages, large tracts of once cultivated land becoming wild, a thin population, composed of miserable, trembling slaves, and rude, ignorant, proud, arrogant, and merciless barbarian masters. The churches and religious houses have been demolished or plundered; the schools and institutions of learning, so numerous and so richly endowed under the Empire, have disappeared; the liberal arts are despised and neglected; the domestic arts, except a few, are lost or forgotten; war, pillage, general insecurity, misery, want have loosened all moral restraints, unchained the passions, and given free scope to vice and crime; the clergy are few, poor, illiterate, for their conquerors, as subsequently in Ireland, have left them no means of education, and, besides, they belong for the most part to the conquered races, and are therefore despised. The barbarian conquerors and masters, moreover, are not all even nominally Catholic. Many of them are Arians; more of them are pagans, still adoring their old Scandinavian and Teutonic deities, and looking with proud disdain on the Christian's faith and the Christian's worship. An Arian kingdom has been erected in Northern Africa, another is establishing itself in Northern Italy; what is now Switzerland and Eastern France was subject to the part heretical, part pagan, but wholly savage Burgundians; in the rest of France there are portions of the old Gallo-Roman population that have not yet received the faith, and portions of the old Celtic population who in their dense forests still cherish their ancient Druidism; the barbarian kingdom in Spain has but recently and imperfectly yielded to Catholicity; the British churches have lost their vigor, and are confined to the narrow district of Wales, and through all the rest of Britain paganism is rampant, and the altars smoke with sacrifices to Woden and Thor. Ireland alone, at this period, is a Catholic oasis in the immense desert of heresy and barbaric infidelity. Belgium in part, all Germany, all Northern and all Eastern Europe above the Byzantine empire, are one unbroken Cimmeria of heathenism; and even Rome herself is not all Catholic, nor even all Christian. Such is a birdseye view of what is now the most civilized and the ruling part of the globe, at the opening of the Middle Ages; and such, after having once Christianized the Empire,

was the new world committed to the charge of the Church. Far more disheartening were her prospects than when she concealed herself in the catacombs, or bled under Nero, Decius, Maximian, and Diocletian ; and far more laborious was the task now before her, than that which she had accomplished in passing from that "upper room" in Jerusalem to the throne of the Cæsars.

Nor was it only at the beginning of the Middle Ages that the Church found herself in face of a hostile world. The hostility continued till the close of the period, and even then did not cease, but broke out under a new form, that of Protestantism, with undiminished virulence. It was in the Middle Ages, we must remember, that Mahometanism sprang up in the desert, and, breaking forth with wild and ferocious fanaticism for eight hundred years, devastated the fairest and most fertile regions of the earth ; that the Iconoclasts persecuted the Church and sought to prepare it for Islamism ; the Greek schism originated and was consummated ; the Huns made their new invasion from the East ; the Saracens ravaged the South of Italy and France, and established themselves in Spain ; the fierce and shaggy Norsemen came down from the frozen North, with their wild courage, their savage cruelty, and their Scandinavian superstitions ; the dissolute Albigenses renewed the heresy of Manes, and perpetrated their horrors ; the Beghards, Wicliffites, followers of the *Evangile Eternelle*, and other sectaries, arose, and by their pantheistic and socialistic movements and insurrections in England, France, and the Low Countries, preluded not unworthily the pantheistic and socialistic revolutions which we have seen, during the last year, convulse all Europe, and threaten the destruction of all law, all order, all society, both civil and religious. Add to these great facts, the deplorable effects of which are still widely and deeply felt, that during these same ages there was scarcely a moment of peace between the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. The civil authority never ceased to encroach on the spiritual, and the Church was obliged to maintain a constant and severe struggle to prevent herself from being swamped, so to speak, by the state, as the schismatical and heretical churches of England, Russia, Scandinavia, and Northern Germany have been and now are. In order to protect society and herself against armed heathenism, Mahometanism, and barbarism, the Church was obliged to revive, or suffer to be revived, in Charlemagne, the Western Roman Empire, before Europe was prepared for it ; and ever after she was but too

happy when in his successors she did not find, instead of a protector, a cruel, oppressive, and sacrilegious spoiler. It is easy now to say, that the revival of the Empire was premature and bad policy; but it was the best thing possible at the time, or, if it was not, it was inevitable so far as the Church was concerned, and she could not have prevented it if she had tried. Pious as Charlemagne was, he never suffered religion to interfere with his ambition, or the Church to stand in the way of realizing his projects of temporal aggrandizement. The Empire once reëstablished, barbaric as it necessarily was, a formidable schism between the temporal authority and the spiritual commenced, which continued to widen as long as the Empire existed. Rarely was there a "Kaisar" of "the Holy Roman Empire," from Charlemagne to Charles the Fifth, that respected the freedom of the Church, that allowed her to exercise her spiritual discipline without his interference, that permitted her without restraint to manage her own affairs, or that did not wage open or secret war against her. Rarely did the Church, in her struggles for religious liberty against the temporal powers, come off victorious; never was she able, through the whole period of the Middle Ages, to gain, and never yet has she gained, in even a single Catholic state, the freedom and independence she enjoys here in these United States, which is all she asks, and all she has ever struggled for. The very instance of Philip the Fair of France insulting Boniface the Eighth, and successfully braving his authority, cited by the writer in the *Examiner* to prove the "enormous power of the Popes," is a striking proof of their weakness, and of how completely they lay at the mercy of the crowned despots and tyrants. The sainted Hildebrand, the seventh Gregory, one of the most powerful of the successors of St. Peter, was driven from his throne by the temporal authority, and died in exile. We all know that the rivalries and machinations of the temporal powers effected and sustained the great and scandalous schism of the West, which the Church could never have survived if she had not been upheld by the arm of the Almighty. It is all a delusion, the notion which some seem to cherish, that the Church met no resistance in the Middle Ages, and that emperors, kings, princes, and nobles demeaned themselves as her obedient sons. Their submission was the exception, not the rule, and their protection of the Church was seldom anything but a pretext for enslaving her. They seem never to have responded to her call to execute the sentences she pronounced, unless it suited their humor, flatter-

ed their ambition, or promised them some temporal aggrandizement. They seldom heeded her spiritual censures, or her excommunications, if they persuaded themselves that they could guard against their evil temporal consequences ; and it was rare, indeed, that a prince, even excommunicated and deposed, could not command the support of his army, of the greater part of his own subjects, and even of the national clergy. Godfrey of Bouillon, subsequently the pious Crusader, fights for Henry of Germany after the Pope has deposed him, against his competitor Rudolph, sustained by the Church. If the barons of England desert John Lackland, it is for reasons of their own, not because he is under excommunication ; and a few years after, they can conspire against him at Runnymede, under the lead of Archbishop Langton, in defiance of the excommunication pronounced by the Pope against them.

Nothing is more evident to every one who has studied them without being captivated by their romance, or blinded by his hatred of Catholicity, than that the Church was by no means the only force at work in the Middle Ages, and that she was far enough from being able to carry out into practical life all her own views, and of having everything to her own liking. She had by no means a "thousand years of almost triumphant ascendancy for the full trial of experiments," as our Unitarian friend rashly asserts. She was resisted on every side ; her rights were perpetually invaded ; her authority was continually braved ; her discipline was seldom suffered to have free course ; her clergy, when they did not add the feudal to their ecclesiastical character, and become princes and barons as well as priests, were treated by the representatives of the barbarian conquerors with contumely and contempt ; and her doctrines, her precepts, her admonitions, were scorned or set at naught by the great whenever it suited their humor or their passions. The Church became the possessor of great riches, it is true ; but her wealth bore witness full as much to the vices, the crimes, and the disorders as to the piety and zeal of the times, and, moreover, she possessed them, in no small part, simply in her accidental character of the public almoner. The donations and bequests she received were not seldom made by a tardy and doubtful repentance, in the hope, we fear often vain, of purchasing repose for the soul of a sinner whose life had been spent in breaking every precept of the Decalogue. The "baron bold" of romantic poetry was not unfrequently a bold blasphemer, a dissolute and sacrilegious wretch, an oppressor of his people,

measuring his rights only by his might. We are not insensible to the charms which romance lends to the Middle Ages, or to the golden hues which a rich and fervid imagination spreads over them when contemplating them at a distance, or in brilliant lamp-light ; but whoever has ventured to look at them, stripped of all the deceptive coloring of his own fancy, in their nakedness, as they actually were, will quickly dismiss the pleasing illusion that they were in any peculiar sense "ages of faith," or that it is from them that we are to form any adequate notions of what are really *Mores Catholici*, or Catholic morals and manners. Not in them, indeed, had our good Mother the fair field and the fitting opportunity to realize her idea of Catholic secular life. Faith there was, and piety, and charity, and heroic sanctity, such as has never been surpassed, and the blessed fruits of which we and all modern civilized nations are now reaping ; but alas ! something else was there too,—something which did not proceed from the Church, which she did not sanction, which she never ceased to oppose, but which resisted all her supernatural efforts, and continued to exist in spite of her.

Undoubtedly, it will not answer to recognize in modern society only the human element, and to attempt to explain all its phenomena from the point of view of simple human activity. In no age, certainly in no age since the advent of our Lord, is it true to say that all in human history is the product of man alone. The Christian religion, the Catholic Church, has placed in the modern world a divine element, supernatural in its source, in its principle, in the mode of its operation, and in its effects. This element was in the Middle Ages, represented there by the Catholic Church ; and all the phenomena or historical facts of those, as of all other ages, which proceeded from her, or have received her sanction, we as Catholics are bound to maintain, and are ready to maintain, against all challengers, to be just, right, pure, holy, and salutary to the life of society and of the individual soul. But if we are bound to recognize the part of the Church, we are equally bound to recognize the part of man. Because we recognize the Church in the Dark Ages, it must not be supposed that we recognize only her, and hold her, or concede that she is to be held, responsible for all the phenomena we meet in their history. She never subsists alone, and neither in society nor in the individual, in professedly Catholic states nor in professedly Catholic men, is she the only efficient cause or opera-

tive force. In the individual believer, human nature remains after regeneration ; the flesh survives, and, as long as we live, lusteth against the spirit, making the Christian's life, whatever its interior peace or consolation, one unremitting warfare, from which there is no escape. This, since true of the individual, must also be true of society. In every society, large or small, by the side of the Church subsists fallen human nature, with its evil concupiscence, its grovelling propensities, its disorderly affections, its fierce and ungovernable passions. It will not answer to overlook the facts which have their origin in this source, nor will it answer to charge them to the account of the Church. Both elements coexist, both have their respective phenomena which are intermingled and grow together in history, as grow together the wheat and the tares in the same field. In forming our judgment we must discriminate between them ; and if we do this, and assign to each element its own phenomena, or the class of facts of which it is the principle, we shall have no difficulty in granting all that the most unscrupulous of the enemies of Catholicity allege against the Middle Ages themselves, and yet maintaining the claims of the Church as the infallible Church of God.

The discrimination we here insist on, all Catholic writers, Digby among the rest, no doubt, silently intend, and suppose they never fail to imply ; but when writing with reference to those who are out of the Church, and who therefore have an interest in overlooking it, they seem to us not to make it as clear, as express, as prominent, as its importance demands. Thus Digby, who certainly would, if called upon, admit its propriety and even its necessity, — wishing to present a popular argument for the Church, addressed to the emotions and the affections rather than to the pure intellect, and unhappily consulting the tastes, prejudices, and tendencies of the Puseyitish class of his former Anglican friends, as if they were the fair representatives of the uncatholic world, at least of the Protestant portion of it, — passes it over as if it were a matter of sheer indifference ; and assuming, or appearing to assume, that all was substantially Catholic in mediæval times, — that society was then in its normal state, — that the Church found herself in the midst of a civilization, surrounded by a secular order, precisely to her mind, — that there was nothing in the measures she adopted, the policy she pursued, the institutions she cherished, designed simply to meet an exceptional state, to provide for accidental wants or temporary exigencies, and

which, under other circumstances, would be neither necessary nor desirable, — looks at everything through the Claude Lorraine glass of his own sunny imagination, sees everything *colour de rose*, and writes as if the human element — then, as ever, but too active — had been wholly suppressed, and as if the Church had supernaturalized the whole secular order, and made it one with herself by infusing into it her own divine and supernatural life. Our Unitarian friend, wishing to obtain an argument against Catholicity, is delighted to find this conceded to his purpose, assumes as unquestioned the exclusive ascendancy of the Church, makes no discrimination between the phenomena which are really hers and those which are really not hers, and, fixing his eyes solely either on facts which have the corrupt human element for their principle, or on measures which, though adopted or approved by the Church, have their reason and justification in the exceptional secular order of the times introduced by the barbarian conquest, and not to be brought within the rule except after centuries of painful and often interrupted civilizing labors, he finds enough, and more than enough, that no man of ordinary virtue and intelligence can approve, and which we should be utterly unable to reconcile with the claims of the Church, if we were bound to maintain or to concede that she had in the Middle Ages full power to suppress the lawless workings of our fallen nature, or to shape the entire secular order to her will. Digby, assuming or conceding the exclusive dominion of the Church, finds scarcely a defect in the secular life, as must have been the case if she had in fact had the dominion he concedes ; our Unitarian friend, taking the same exclusive dominion for granted, from the manifest defects of the secular life concludes the defects of the religious life, — that the Church must herself have been defective, barbarian, and superstitious, — as concluded Machiavelli and Rousseau, and as conclude all our modern Socialists ; — falling thus into a monstrous error, which we should suppose the age, if its boasted intelligence had the least foundation in fact, could easily escape.

Making the proper discrimination, we as Catholics can judge the Middle Ages with as much freedom as can they who are not Catholics, or as we ourselves can judge pagan Greece or Rome, Egypt or Syria, India or China, or modern Mahometan and Protestant nations themselves. Of their aggregate phenomenon, the Church is undoubtedly responsible for that portion of which she is the principle, or which she has expressly or

tacitly sanctioned ; but these are all good, and, reference had to time and circumstance, the severest critic, unless he sets all reason and common sense at defiance, cannot bring even the shadow of a reproach against them, as Digby's work itself proves, and as many of the adversaries of the Church admit, and have admitted over and over again. As to the remaining phenomena or historical facts, those which did not proceed from the Church, but depended on causes and influences hostile to her, and against which she never for one moment ceased to struggle, we have no responsibility, and feel in them no special interest. Our Church is not implicated in them, for she neither produced nor approved them, and was indeed no slight sufferer from them ; she is not answerable for not having prevented or suppressed them, for she can govern men, collectively or individually, only by moral power, through reason, conscience, and free will. The Divinity of our Saviour was not implicated in the treachery of Judas Iscariot, nor were the truth and sanctity of his religion rendered questionable by the fact, that, when he was arrested and brought before the Roman governor, his disciples all forsook him, and Peter thrice denied him. The moral disorder and wickedness of the world furnish no argument against Divine Providence,—in no sense impugn the goodness of God, or the wisdom or the power of his government ; because he has made man a free agent, governs him by the law of freedom, not by the law of necessity, and does and will do no violence to his free will. The Church, as the representative of God on earth, can govern only as he governs, and is, therefore, restricted to a moral dominion over men. She cannot coerce them into sanctity ; she cannot force them against their wills to receive her sacraments, and it would avail nothing if she could ; for although they do not depend on the recipient for their efficient power, they can produce their sanctifying effect only when he interposes no obstacle to their operation ; and an obstacle he does interpose when his will is against them, or, if old enough to have a will, is not for them.

There is an inexcusable want of science, as well as gross injustice, in holding the Church responsible for the conduct of those members of her external communion who disobey her instructions, and will not comport themselves as her faithful and dutiful children. Science traces effects to their cause, and classifies phenomena according to their principle. It is not science, but nescience, to ascribe to the Church phenom-

ena which, though sound intermingled with hers, she has not produced, and which are repugnant to her. Our modern travellers, who have so much to say of the ignorance and corruption they meet or pretend they meet with in Catholic countries, would do well to bear this in mind. The individuals they hold up as exhibiting the fruits of Catholicity are precisely those who do not exhibit them, — are precisely those who neglect the teaching and break the precepts of the Church. The practical effects of any religion must be judged of from the uniform characters of those who sincerely and faithfully practise it, not from the characters of those who do not. • Whoever would look for the fruits of Catholicity must look for them in her obedient children, who believe what she teaches and do what she commands. The moral and religious worth of these no sane man can really question. The rule which we adopt in reference to Catholic individuals we must adopt in judging of Catholic nations and Catholic ages. The glory of the Church is not tarnished by human depravity, even though it is found in persons attached to her external communion. Let this be always borne in mind, as well when we judge the Middle Ages as when we judge the Christian ages which preceded or which have followed them. The glory of the Church in the Middle Ages is, not that there was then no human depravity, no injustice, no ignorance, no superstition, no violence, no barbarism, but that she was able to resist the hostile influences to which she was exposed, to preserve herself from becoming ignorant, superstitious, violent, or barbarous, and that, by unwearied effort and constant struggle, she was able gradually to get the better of those hostile influences, to subdue the barbarism, to restore social order, and to recover civilization, to place it on a solid and imperishable basis, and to provide for its future advancement. Here is her glory under the secular point of view. The darker the colors in which you paint those ages, the grosser and more revolting you prove their barbarism to have been, the more do you enhance her merit, the more unequivocal testimony do you bear to the fact that she is God's Church, upheld by his almighty arm, and assisted by his supernatural presence. Had she been human, she would have been carried away by the floods of Northern barbarism and have become herself barbarian; had she been human, had she not been God's Church, she could never have survived the wreck of the old Græco-Roman civilization, but would have been dashed to pieces with

it ; had she been human, had she not been God's Church, she could never have stood firm and immovable as wave after wave of barbarians rolled on and beat with fearful impetuosity against her, — could never have gained an influence over those ferocious hordes, whose sole occupation was war and plunder, penetrated their hearts with some portion of her own light and warmth, infused into their souls sentiments of gentleness, meekness, love, and peace, and raised them to be the foremost nations of the earth. The greater the task she had before her, the greater was her need of Divine assistance, and the greater her glory in having accomplished it.

We may, perhaps, find here one of the reasons why Catholics, who have from earliest infancy been reared in the bosom of the Church, appear so indifferent to mediæval history, and show so little solicitude to prove, that, on its secular side, it was not as dark and forbidding as Protestants heretofore have been accustomed to represent it. They have, in fact, no special interest in vindicating it. They seek their Lord, not in the dead past, but in the living present, — in the Church that is, and is to be until the consummation of the world, unvaried and invariable ; and they may well leave the history of their antiquity, save so far as necessary to repel charges preferred against the Church, to those outside of her communion. Hence, the attempted rehabilitation of mediæval society in our days is the work of Protestants ; the Romantic School is of Protestant German origin ; the greater part of the recent historical works, many of them really able and learned, which have refuted the stale charges against the Popes and the Church in the Middle Ages, are nearly all from Protestant, at least uncatholic, authors ; and the mania which rages for reviving mediæval arts, tastes, usages, and institutions chiefly affects Oxford men and their friends, disturbing the equilibrium of comparatively few Catholics. It is an admirable economy, that they who see that their Church is a mere corpse should seek to dress her in the robes of the past, instead of those of the present. It spares the living and does no harm to the dead. Indeed, we are expecting the assailants of the Church to shift, erelong, their position, and to attempt to rob her of the glory of having subdued the barbarians and founded modern civilization, by stoutly maintaining that there were no barbarians to subdue ; that the Goths, Vandals, Huns, Franks, Burgundians, Longobards, &c., were highly cultivated and polished tribes, far in advance of the degenerate races they invaded and supplanted ; that the Middle

Ages were admirable for their successful and complete realization of the loftiest and most perfect civilization ; and that we poor Romanists fail to be Catholic, because we fail to be sufficiently mediæval ! We are looking for books and pamphlets intended to prove that the grand error of the Popes, their grand apostasy, which caused and justified the Reformation, consisted in their regarding the invaders and destroyers of the Roman Empire as barbarians, in resisting their advanced civilization, and laboring to impose upon them the inferior and effete civilization of Greece and Rome. Nay, we already see evident indications that we are soon to be subjected to this new line of attack ; and in more than one Puseyite publication we detect the germs of the view we here suggest, and which the Romanists seem to us to be pledged by their fundamental principles to develop and mature.

It does not enter into our present purpose to discuss at length the actual character of the Dark Ages on their purely human and secular side. As far as the Church was implicated in their phenomena, we accept them and glory in them ; but as it regards all lying beyond, we feel comparatively indifferent. Under the point of view of humanity, it matters little to us, as Catholics, how dark, how superstitious, how turbulent, violent, or barbarous they were. Certainly we do not believe, and it will take much to persuade us, that they were truly civilized ages, either when compared with the present or when compared with classic antiquity. *Civilization* is a word, no doubt, not easy to define, and different persons may define it differently ; but as we define it, the Middle Ages, aside from what they owed to the Church, were barbarous ages. We take the word in what we suppose to be its ordinary sense, as designating the exterior and interior life of a cultivated and polished people, having a fixed residence, and living under the empire of law, as distinguished from the empire of mere arbitrary will ; and making abstraction of religion and what is derived from it, our standard of civilization is that of ancient Greece and Rome, combining the *νόμος* of the former with the *jus* of the latter. Here, we frankly confess, we are Græco-Roman, and to us all tribes and nations are barbarian just in proportion as they recede from the Græco-Roman standard. We do not assert, we do not pretend, that, prior to Greece and Rome, no people had been truly civilized ; we raise here no question as to whether the Græco-Roman civilization was indigenous or whether it was borrowed ; we simply assert that the civilization of Greece and

Rome, at their most flourishing period, under the purely human point of view, is the standard civilization of history and of human philosophy. Nowhere else does history show us man receiving, under all the aspects of his nature, so high, so thorough, so symmetrical, and so masculine a cultivation as under this wonderful civilization. Græco-Roman art embodies the highest ideal truth conceivable without the Christian revelation. The Phidian Jove embodies the highest ideal, not indeed of the Divinity, but of the full-grown man, without Christianity, in the order of nature. Eliminate from the Græco-Roman civilization all that it contains which depends on its false religion, or on its corruptions or misapplication of the principles of the primitive revelation in the sphere of the supernatural, add the Christian religion, and animate it with the Christian spirit, the Christian's faith, and the Christian's love, and you have a civilization beyond which there is nothing to seek.

Tried by this standard, under the secular and human aspect of civilization, the Middle Ages cannot stand the test. The tribes which overthrew the old Western Roman Empire were barbarians, and inflicted on civilization what, had it not been for the Church, would have been an irreparable evil, of the magnitude of which, confining our views to man merely as a social being and an inhabitant of this earth, we are utterly unable to form any adequate conception. The downfall of ancient Rome and its civilization stands alone in history, and we seek in vain for the record of an event analogous to it. Even external nature, if we may believe the accounts transmitted to us, felt the shock, and the seasons became inclement as society became barbarous. The changes in the natural world in parts of Italy, Gaul, and Britain seem to have been hardly less terrific than those of the political and social world. The downfall of Rome was also a terrible calamity to religion. It undid in a moment the labors of ages, and for long centuries crippled the missionary enterprises of the Church, repressed her expansive energies, and imposed upon her the immense labors — not yet completed — of re-civilizing mankind, and of restoring civilization to the height it had previously attained, or at least to the height at which she found it, when, emerging from the catacombs, she assumed, in the person of Constantine the Great, the imperial purple, and encircled her brows with the imperial diadem.

Nor let it be supposed that these labors of re-civilizing the world were not demanded by the spiritual order. We know

our Church is catholic ; we know that she can reach the heart of the barbarian or the savage, as well as of the civilized man, and can infuse into him her holy faith, her purifying and her sanctifying grace ; but it is nevertheless true, that she finds herself at home, in her normal relations to social and secular life, only in the bosom of a high and true civilization. Man was originally constructed, and society was originally organized, with reference to the Catholic Church, and she can find them adapted to her purposes as a social or national religion, only in proportion as she finds them in their normal state. Their normal state is that of civilization. Neither man nor society, as we know from infallible faith, began either in savagism or barbarism. Savagism and barbarism have resulted from the corruptions which supervened as men departed farther and farther from the original seat of the human race, and from the primitive revelation. There must have been, therefore, an original normal civilization. This civilization, probably, at no period has ever wholly ceased to exist, although it may have had its seat now in one nation and now in another. But, however this may be, it is evidently, at their flourishing period, domiciliated in Greece and Rome, and is preserved or reproduced in the Græco-Roman civilization, under its human and secular relations, in its purity and vigor. Being normal, and realizing the original type as far as possible without Christianity, the Church must have an especial affinity for it, and must bear to it a relation perfectly analogous to that which Catholic theology bears to sound philosophy. Where, then, it does not exist, she must seek to introduce it, and where it has fallen into decay or been destroyed, she must seek to restore it ; — not, indeed, as a preparation for the reception of her faith and charity by individuals, — for that would deny her catholicity, — but as the condition of domesticating herself, so to speak, in the country ; of converting or securing the conversion of the nation itself, — baptizing, as it were, its very soil ; of becoming the vivifying sap of all its institutions, and the informing principle of its whole instinctive and unconscious life.

History, as well as speculation, establishes this view. The Church, in converting the Empire, found nothing in the Græco-Roman order of civilization to change, nothing in its essential constitution of the state, nothing in its general economy of life, public or domestic, — in the *res publica* or the *res domestica*, — and very little in the laws themselves. The great body of the civil law, still the public law of all Catholic, and, to a great extent,

of some Protestant states, existed and was in force before the introduction of Christianity. The changes required were, for the most part, purely spiritual, such as conversion of itself effected, or as the Church, in the discharge of her purely spiritual functions, could herself effect, without the aid of the civil power. What we mean is, that there was nothing in the order of the civilization that constrained her; and after the law had recognized her and ceased to enjoin paganism, she had no other obstacles to contend against than those which human depravity in individuals always and everywhere interposes to her operations. On the other hand, though the Church has certainly converted innumerable individuals who were strangers to the Græco-Roman civilization, we can call to mind, at this moment, no nation which had not originally received that order of civilization or has not subsequently been subjected to it, at least in its essential principles, that has ever accepted, or, if it has at one time accepted, has for more than a brief period retained, the Catholic faith. When the barbarians invaded the Empire, the limits of the Macedonian and Roman conquests were very nearly those of Christendom. The Church had indeed extended her missions beyond, but they were the mere outposts pushed into the enemy's country, or, as it were, the military occupation of a country whose conquest was not yet completed. Other nations assuredly have been brought within the pale of Christendom, but they have remained within only as the Church has succeeded in civilizing them, — so to speak, Græco-Romanizing them. Wherever the barbaric element has remained predominant in the national life, as in Russia, Scandinavia, Prussia, Saxony, Northern Germany, or where, through exterior or interior causes, it has regained the preponderance, as in England and the once Christianized Oriental nations, the nation has relapsed into heathenism, or fallen off into heresy or schism. In several of the nations which have fallen off from the Church, the old barbaric institutions, traditions, customs, and hereditary hatred of Græco-Roman civilization always survived in the heart of the people, and nourished a schism between its national life and its Christian faith. In nearly all, the barbaric monarchy was retained after the conversion, or subsequently introduced or developed; and between the barbaric monarchy — that is, Oriental despotism, the distinctive principle of which is, that the commonwealth is the private property of the prince, the natural termination of all barbaric chieftainship — and the Græco-Roman polity, whose distinctive principle is that the prince repre-

sents the majesty of the state, — is the first magistrate of the republic, bound to govern according to law, — there is an eternal and irreconcilable hostility, because between them there is all the difference that there is between liberty and slavery. Barbarism is essentially slavery, — or rather slavery is the distinctive principle of barbarism, — and the distinctive principle of Græco-Romanism is liberty. Hence, as the Church always and everywhere presented herself as the uncompromising asserter of liberty, upholding the supremacy of LAW, and declaring it no less binding on princes than on their subjects, on the master than on the servant, barbaric nations and barbaric governments, recognizing no authority but mere will, would not, and as such could not, submit to her spiritual jurisdiction.

With these views of the relations of the Church to civilization, and which it would be easy to confirm by decisions of the Holy See, and by a reference to the history of modern missions in barbarous and savage countries, we can have no disposition to defend the Middle Ages, save in what they owed to the Church, and cannot be expected to sympathize with their sentimental and romantic admirers. Under many relations we believe that, after the tenth century to the middle of the fourteenth, they were far superior to the present, though not under the relations of civilization properly so called. But what they are principally lauded for by our sentimentalists and Romanticists is precisely that in them which was the least in accordance with Catholicity and genuine civilization; for it is what proceeded from their barbaric, not from either their Christian or their Græco-Roman, elements. The revival of Letters in the fifteenth century — that century of wonderful activity and enterprise — was a great event, and its bearing on human culture has hardly been over-estimated; but it came in a shape hostile to the Schoolmen, and even to Catholicity, and it revived to a fearful extent the old Græco-Roman gentilism. Paradoxical as it may seem, in doing this it prepared the way for another revival, which this age witnesses, not less important, and far more dangerous; namely, the revival of barbaric gentilism. The Humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries have produced the Romanticists of the nineteenth century. They seized upon the Græco-Roman elements of modern society, sought to render them exclusive, to develop and realize them independently, on the one hand, of the Church, and, on the other, of mediæval barbarism, and they

deprived them of life, and brought forth a dead and petrified classicism, as offensive to good taste as to true piety,—as incapable of aiding the growth of a truly human as of a truly Christian life. The Romanticists revolted at this petrified classicism, and, already gentilized by the old Humanists, had no alternative but to seek a living literature in developing the barbaric elements of the Middle Ages, and realizing them independently of the Greek and Roman elements, and also of Catholicity. This they attempted, and their success would be the restoration, not of cultivated and polished gentilism, but of rude, unpolished, barbaric heathenism, after the Teutonic and Scandinavian modes.

We are not disposed to deny that the Schoolmen were defective in taste. They wrote barbarous Latin, and were seldom good Greek scholars ; their humor was grotesque rather than delicate, and their jokes smacked of men who live among themselves, remote from the great world ; their forms were dry and rigid, and their rules too narrow and too unelastic for the play of the free spirit and expansive genius of man. The Humanists, in combating them and substituting the purer taste and the more symmetrical and graceful forms of ancient art, did a valuable service to the cause of human culture and refinement. So the Romanticists, in freeing us from the fetters of a dead classicism, from the narrow and pedantic rules of men who servilely copied the exterior forms, but were incapable of producing in the free and original spirit, of the ancient classics, and permitting us to move more at our ease, according to our natural dispositions, have served the cause of good literature. By their excavations of mediæval romance from the tombs of centuries, and their importations from the old mystic East, they have enlarged our literary horizon and augmented our literary materials, for which we cheerfully render them all fitting acknowledgment. But as the Humanists, along with their classicism, revived old gentile theories and speculations, by which they ruined philosophy and shook the faith of no small part of Christendom while professing to labor to confirm it, so the Romanticists, to the extent of their influence, must revive the old barbaric heathenism, and tend to ruin literature, art, philosophy, and through them both religion and civilization. The Humanists gave us heathenism, but it was cultivated heathenism, which, as to its forms, was repugnant neither to good taste nor to Christianity ; the Romanticists, the Humanists of our time, give

us heathenism to an equal extent, and what is worse, rude, uncouth, barbaric heathenism, with its grotesque images, its gigantic figures, its huge disproportioned shapes, its hideous and grinning monsters, which no Christian art can baptize, no power can lick into a Christian shape, inform with a Christian soul, or train to a civilized behaviour. Do the best possible, it will always remain the man-bear of recent German romance.

Nothing would be more amusing, if the matter were not so grave, than to see our Romanticists parading the old mediæval romances, chronicles, ballads, lays, and roundelays, as genuine specimens of Christian literature. Indeed, the irony is too obvious to be witty. Even if sometimes the thought and sentiment happen to be Christian, the form is barbarian. The mediæval romancers frequently profane Christian thoughts and expressions, as the old magicians profaned the Sacred Host in their spells; but the substance of their works is always derived from heathen sources. The Troubadours of Provence are moved by their own corrupt passions, and sing under Arabic, Moorish, and Manichæan influences; the Trouvères of Normandy, the bards of Armorica and Wales, the Minnesingers of Germany, recite or sing, for the most part, the old barbaric and heathen memories and superstitions of their respective nations, which long survived, and are not even yet wholly extinct, in the heart of the old Celtic, Scandinavian, and Teutonic families. To call the mediæval literature proceeding from these sources Christian is only to prove how far we have lost, or never received, the true conception of Christianity. In admiring such a literature, we give no evidence of a return towards Catholicity; we only show that we are doing our best to return to the state of the barbaric nations before the Church had commenced the work of their conversion, and are trying to satisfy our souls with mere vagaries, or to enrich ourselves with the *débris* of old barbaric nationalities, idolatries, and superstitions.

As to the Middle Ages themselves, we conclude, with an Italian writer, that "they are admirable for their Christian genius, and the nations then, so far as they were animated by the Catholic idea, undoubtedly far surpassed the most cultivated people of gentile antiquity; but except that which they derived, in effect, from religion, we know not what there is in their annals to be admired, and the modern encomiasts of feudalism, chivalry, Gothic architecture, &c., appear to us lit-

tle reasonable and very dull." In all those lofty qualities of the civilized man, in themselves indifferent to vice or virtue, the man of mediæval history appears to us far inferior to the man of Greek and Roman antiquity. Compared with the latter, he seems to us a mere dwarf, stunted and warped in his growth by a one-sided and incomplete culture. We find in the mediæval man, the moment he steps out of religion, very little of that simplicity, naturalness, repose, sustained courage, prudent energy, sedate strength, greatness of soul, constancy of will, firmness of resolution, or force of character, which so strikes and charms us in the men of classic antiquity. There is, as Gioberti — a writer whom we like for some things, and dislike for many — has well suggested, a considerable distance between the men of Plutarch and Livy, and the romantic heroes and lion-hearted warriors of Boiardo and Ariosto, with their mad adventures and their silly love-makings.

The causes of this inferiority of the mediæval man, and perhaps equally of the man of our times, we have no space to consider now at length. The remote cause of it lies, no doubt, in the depravity of human nature, in consequence of which men will do a thousand times more to improve themselves and society for the sake of self, or of worldly or human greatness, than they will for the sake of God, or at the command of duty. Hence, in a certain sense, all those religions which are the most consonant to corrupt human nature, and give the largest scope to selfish and worldly motives, will always, for a time at least, be more favorable to the growth of the qualities we have named than Christianity itself. Hence we should look for more striking manifestations of them under paganism, Mahometanism, Protestantism, or modern Radicalism, than under Catholicity ; for these impose fewer restraints on our motives of action. Christianity, if there is any truth in what we have said in the course of this article, demands, along with her supernatural virtues, the highest human excellence, because she demands for her permanent home in a nation, and her free and regular action on the mass of the people, the highest and truest civilization. But she cannot encourage the cultivation of human greatness for the sake of self, society, or the world ; for though she recognizes and uses these as means, she will never suffer them to be sought as ends. Here is her glory, her strength, and at the same time her weakness. Paganism could suffer us to cultivate and perfect our natures for their own sake, and permit us to pro-

pose human greatness as our end. Protestantism virtually, if not avowedly, does the same. The Church not only tolerates, but seeks, the improvement of society, its progress and perfection, yet only for the sake of the purposes of our present existence, and as facilitating the operation of the means of securing eternal life. Radicalism or Socialism disdains to look so high or so far, and is content to propose the progress and perfection of society for its own sake. As the motives paganism, Protestantism, and Radicalism propose or tolerate are those which are the most agreeable to fallen nature, we can easily understand that, for a time, their adherents should be more remarkable for the qualities we have pointed out than the great body of Catholics, who can cultivate them only from purer, loftier, and more distant motives, therefore motives less powerful for a depraved will and a corrupt concupiscence. Here, undoubtedly, is the real cause of the inferiority of the modern to the ancient man, — an inferiority which results from his actual moral and religious superiority.

Though the remote cause is in the corruption of human nature, and the fact that paganism imposed less restraint on its operations than Catholicity, the proximate cause of this inferiority is in the schism which has always existed, since the institution of the Church, between the secular and the spiritual elements of society. The secular element has never been brought into harmony with the spiritual. The Church could not do it at first, because the state was pagan, and persecuted her; and it took her full three hundred years to convert it. But she had no sooner converted it, than the barbarians began their invasion, and she had to commence her struggle against barbarism, which, in part, still continues. She has never been able to baptize secular life, and to institute a culture as perfect for it as that which she has always sustained is for the religious life. The secular order has therefore, from the first, remained outside of Christianity, and the secular mind has never been informed with the Christian spirit. The spirit of all secular art, secular literature, secular science, even when cultivated by Catholics, is and always has been, from Nero to Mazzini, unchristian. This is obvious to every one. Whenever we leave the religious order, escape its external control, and abandon ourselves instinctively to secular pursuits, or in any degree yield to the spirit of the secular order, however pure our intentions in the outset, however firm our faith, sincere and earnest our attachment to our religion,

we are imperceptibly borne away in a direction hostile to Christianity, and, ere we suspect danger, are sunk in the quicksands of vice or dashed against the rocks of heresy or infidelity. We have a striking proof of this in Lamennais, another in Padre Ventura, and still another, we fear, in Gioberti, — three of the greatest, and, in various ways, most extraordinary men of our times. All three set out sincere, earnest, and enlightened Catholic priests, with rare philosophical genius and attainments, and rarer knowledge of the spirit and tendencies of the age. Lamennais has fallen to the lowest depths ; Ventura has, by his recent conduct at Rome, outraged the feelings of the whole Catholic world ; and Gioberti, as his case now stands, or as it is known to us, we must regard as having betrayed his religion and forfeited all his claims upon sincere Catholics. What can more clearly prove that the secular order remains even to this day unbaptized, and that whoever follows its spirit is sure to find himself on the side against the religion of God ?

Our modern literature is all full of this schism between the two orders, and the secret of most of the movements of our times is the effort to heal it. From Pusey to Parker, Ventura to Proudhon, the Hegelians to the Fourierists and Icarians, the harmony of the two orders is the secret, in general the avowed, object. But, unhappily, nearly all efforts not only fail, but tend to widen the breach ; because they are efforts to heal the schism by harmonizing the spiritual with the secular, instead of the secular with the spiritual. Here is the grand difficulty. As friends of religion, we are obliged to hold on, in most countries, to things as they are, — to desist from efforts to effect such educational improvements and social ameliorations as are good in themselves, such as are really needed, and such as we are most anxious to effect, — because we cannot, in the present state of the world, make a single move in their behalf, without throwing the power into the hands of the men who would subject the spiritual order to the secular, destroy the whole influence of religion, and with it the very conditions of civilization. The certain evil that would follow would infinitely outweigh the good we could effect. If any one doubts it, he has but to meditate on the exile of the Holy Father at Gaëta, and consider what during the last year has taken place at Rome. The Holy Father attempted wise and judicious reforms in his states, and, in consequence, was driven from his throne, not by the men opposed to them, but by the very men who clamored for them, who feasted him a whole year for them, and in whose

favor they were more especially effected. The very attempt on his part to ameliorate the temporal order drove him into exile, and gave up his dominions to as miserable a set of infidel vagabonds, as cowardly a set of miscreants, as the sweepings of all Italy could furnish. If the men who so clamor for reform, and so strenuously urge the amelioration of the secular order, would lay aside their hostility to religion, and consent to work with the Church, under her spiritual guidance, she would soon, through them, effect all needed ameliorations, establish a true system of secular culture, effect a new civilization, which would give us tempered together in one, as Gioberti demands, the full-grown Christian and the full-grown man, as much superior to the ancient Græco-Roman civilization as the morals of Christianity are superior to those of paganism. But the thing is not possible so long as they are able, and continue, to keep the secular order armed to the teeth against her. But as human depravity will last as long as the world stands, the schism between the two orders will probably never be entirely healed, and the glorious results for civilization, so easy to effect if men were only reasonable, or not madmen or fools, will probably remain for ever without being fully attained. All we can do is to be faithful to the spiritual order, and to labor diligently to realize them as far as possible, — not for the sake of the temporal good to be secured, but for the sake of the purposes of our present existence, and the free and unimpeded action of the Church in preparing men for eternal life.

Our Unitarian friend will find, if he meditates what we have written, his article answered as far as answer it needed. We have not followed him step by step, nor was it necessary ; we suppose him capable of applying principles, when they are furnished to his hand, without our applying them for him. He will see that we rely no more than he does on poetry and romance as evidence of the truth of religion. To some minds they may be occasions of conversion, and they were in some respects so in our own case, dry logic-grinder as many people suppose us to be, for they removed certain obstructions there were to the operation of the grace of God on our heart ; but causes or grounds of conviction they never were, and never can be. Christian art has its uses, and important uses they are, too. Persons of a certain temper may be led by it to reflect on the claims of the Church, or it may soften their feelings and subdue for the moment their prejudices, and prepare them to listen to her claims. So far, it contributes, and legitimately, to conver-

sions ; but as an argument addressed to the reason, or as a motive of credibility, it is of no value, for it may well be questioned if Christian art, as pure art, has ever surpassed, or even equalled, pagan art.

We recognize no Church *of* the Middle Ages ; but the Church *in* the Middle Ages, as in all ages, our Unitarian friend will see, we hold to be irreproachable, not, indeed, because we are a great admirer of those ages themselves, nor because we believe they were themselves irreproachable, but because what there was in them objectionable proceeded from causes independent of the Church and hostile to her, which she had no power to control, and could remove only in proportion as she could induce men to become voluntarily her subjects. There were, doubtless, things which she did then that she would not do now ; for the circumstances now are different, and do not demand, might not even justify, them. She is in the world to bless it ; and while her doctrines and principles remain eternally unvaried and invariable, she applies them with perfect freedom to the circumstances of time and place. She never permits herself to become the slave of routine or of stereotyped modes of exterior action. When society is in an exceptional state, she deals with it accordingly. When it throws upon her the burden of providing for the poor, she does it in the best manner existing circumstances allow. We rejoice when we read that seventeen thousand poor were fed in one day at Cluny, and we see in the fact her maternal solicitude and forethought for even the temporal subsistence of her children ; but we see no evidence in it of the perfection of the secular order of the time, and no reason for wishing to perpetuate a state of society that leaves such a number of poor daily to be fed at a single monastery. Many of the institutions which the Church founded and cherished in the Middle Ages have passed away, or must pass away, with the social changes which are constantly taking place ; but this is no cause of reproach to her, or of alarm to us. Others, better adapted to the altered circumstances of new ages, she will institute in their place, and gain the same ends by other means. And thus it is, that, while we adhere to the Church in all times, and *because* we do so, we are free to condemn barbarism wherever we find it, and to labor with all our zeal and ability for an advanced, and, if possible, an ever-advancing, civilization.

ART. IV. — *Spirit Sculpture ; or the Year before Confirmation.* By ENNA DUVAL. Philadelphia : James Fullerton. 1849. 24mo. pp. 166.

OUR readers will perhaps remember, that, some time since, we expressed our decided disapprobation of the greater part of modern novels, and especially of a certain class of so-called Catholic novels, with which, for a moment, it seemed that our community was to be inundated. Our censures were far from being received in the spirit in which they were offered ; and we were charged with being invidious, one-sided, bigoted, and ultra-Catholic, — though what *ultra-Catholic* means, or what sort of an animal it is, we are sure, is more than we know. The Catholic authors censured appear to have taken it for granted that we intended to condemn all works which make use of fiction as a medium of amusement or instruction ; and one gentleman, who had written the longest and heaviest, if not the best, novel of the class specially disapproved, opened a fire upon us in the newspapers, applied to us sundry uncouth epithets, and proved to his own satisfaction, we presume, that we were certainly erroneous, if not, indeed, heretical ; for Nathan the Prophet used allegory, and our Lord himself spake in parables ! It is true, we limited our censures to a special class of works ; it is true, also, that, while we censured that class, we praised another class, in which fiction is employed with great effect as a medium both of instruction and amusement ; but that counted for nothing, for readers who are one-sided, and averse to “ nice distinctions,” are pretty sure to suppose that authors must be as narrow and indiscriminating as themselves.

It is no easy matter to set the public right, when once it has got a wrong notion concerning your views into its head. It is infallible, and if there has been a blunder, it is, of course, yours, not its. If you finally get it to take in your real meaning, and to understand you correctly, it never conceives that it had misunderstood you, but quietly assumes that you have changed your views, and abandoned your former notions. Nevertheless, on this subject of Catholic novels, we shall try once more to place ourselves before our own public in the light in which we choose to stand, and that, too, without abandoning the ground we have heretofore assumed.

This is a reading age, and reading of some sort Catholics, as well as others, must and will have. It is idle to suppose that

we can satisfy the reading propensity with polemical or ascetic theology. This may be an evil, but it is one we cannot remove. Perfection in human affairs is not to be expected ; and the greatest fool going is he who imagines himself able to mend all things, and who will tolerate no imperfection. We must do what we can, not always what we would. Religious are always a small minority, the exception rather than the rule ; the great majority are and will be seculars, with secular habits, secular tastes, and secular pursuits. Our chief attention is due to these, and our principal study must be to enable them to live secular lives without forgetting God, or coming short of salvation ; that is, to save men in the world, without compelling them to retire from the world. The religious state is far higher than the secular, and blessed are they who are called to it ; but the secular is not unlawful, and salvation is attainable without forsaking it, and becoming monks, friars, nuns, or sisters.

A slight glance at our Catholic literature — we mean that which is accessible to the mere English student—is sufficient to satisfy us that we have very little literature adapted to seculars, to the great body of the laity living in the world and taking part in its affairs. The religious are amply provided for. Our ascetic literature is rich, varied, and extensive. We have admirable manuals of devotion for all ages and classes, and suitable to all stages and modes of the spiritual life ; we have, too, an abundance of theological works, speculative and practical, dogmatical and polemical ; but we have no secular literature in English. The monastery is richly endowed ; our secular life has nothing but the crumbs that fall from its table, or the soup dealt out at its gate. Secular literature, whether its authors are Catholics or Protestants, breathes, for the most part, an unchristian spirit, and is dangerous to Christian truth and Christian piety. Here is the literary defect we have wished on various occasions to point out, and which we wish our authors to undertake to remedy.

The novels we censured were intended to remedy this defect, — to supply seculars with amusing, interesting, and instructive reading, which should keep their minds free from error, their hearts protected from impure influences, and both in a healthy state, alike compatible with religious duties and worldly avocations. So far as the intention of their authors was concerned, they were admirable ; but in execution they were failures, because they were marked by the schism between the spiritual order and the secular, which characterizes all modern society.

On their religious side they smelt of the schools or the convent; on their secular side, of unregenerate human nature; and could as well have been written by pagans, Protestants, or unbelievers, as by Catholics. They lacked unity, failed to temper the two orders together, to blend them in one, or, in other words, to baptize the secular, to infuse into it the Catholic spirit, and yet suffer it to remain secular.

Christianity undoubtedly enjoins self-denial, detachment from society, and contempt of the world; but morally, not physically. She recognizes and preserves these as physical facts, and the denial enjoined is simply their moral destruction as motives or ends of human activity. Physically considered, they are indispensable. Without the world, there were no society; without society, no self; and without self, no subject of the Christian law. Hence Christianity suffers us to do no injury to self, to society, or to the world, but, in fact, commands us always and everywhere to seek their true interest, their greatest good, — only as means, not as ends. The cultivation and perfection of our nature, so dwelt upon by the Goethean school, Christianity cannot, in the sense of that school, tolerate, — that is, for the sake of our nature itself; but as the means of comprehending and successfully discharging the duties which devolve on our state in life, she makes them morally obligatory on each one of us to the full extent of our ability and opportunity. The amelioration and perfection of society as an end, or for the sake of society itself, Christianity forbids, and therefore forbids us to sympathize with modern Socialists; but as a means of enabling all to fulfil the great purpose of their present existence, or to provide for the free and regular operation of the means of securing eternal life, the ultimate destiny of man, she enjoins them, and in no degree permits us to neglect them. She certainly bids us remember always the end for which we have been made, and declares every act sinful, or at least destitute of virtue, that is not referred to God as its ultimate end, and therefore recognizes no duties but duties to God; yet she makes these duties in almost every case *payable* to our neighbour, so that, while their glory redounds to God, their benefit inures solely to man and society.

The principle here involved is universal in its application. In no case does our religion require ontological or physical destruction. Our ascetic writers, indeed, tell us of the necessity of self-denial, self-crucifixion, self-annihilation; but their sense

is always moral. What is physical or ontological is the work of the Creator, and all his works are good, very good. Physically considered, man's nature has not been essentially altered by the Fall, and is good now as well as when it came from the hands of the Creator. We have not a single appetite, passion, or faculty, which, in its being or essential nature, — not in its exercise or manifestation, — did not belong, and which would not be necessary, to us as human beings in a state of innocence. We did not lose our nature, we did not acquire another nature, by the Fall. By the Fall we lost the supernatural grace and endowments we before had, by which our nature was maintained in its integrity and we were established in justice, and in consequence of the loss of which our nature became turned away from God, so that we are now naturally averse to him, and need to be converted, that is, turned towards him ; but, ontologically considered, taken as pure nature, our nature remained essentially what it had always been, and remains so still, even after conversion or regeneration. Take, for instance, the appetite for food. This appetite belongs to us in a state of innocence precisely as much as in a state of sin. Its satisfaction, that is, the partaking of food, must, then, be a legitimate act ; and it would, as we all know, be a sin to starve ourselves to death. The same is to be said of all our natural appetites. The crucifixion religion enjoins as a duty — we speak not now of voluntary penances and mortifications — is a moral crucifixion. It forbids us to take food for the sake of the sensual gratification it affords. It requires us to eat for the sake of preserving our life and health, and requires us to preserve our life and health, not for their own sake, but for the sake of God. But in eating and drinking for the end here proposed, and as far as requisite to this end, we experience as much sensual delight as they do who eat and drink for the sake of that delight itself, and perhaps more too. Hence our Lord says, " Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added to you " ; hence he promises that they who lose their life for his sake shall find it, and they who forsake all for him shall be rewarded a hundred-fold even in this life.

Since, then, the self-denial or self-annihilation is moral, not physical, the destruction of nature, and therefore of the secular order which Christianity enjoins, is their destruction simply as ends or motives of our activity, and therefore a destruction perfectly compatible with their physical existence and prosperity. In the conversion of the individual, grace does not destroy

or supersede nature ; it retains and elevates or supernaturalizes it, by infusing into it a higher principle, and enabling it to act to a higher end, as is inferable from the well-known fact that Christianity does not abrogate the law of nature, but confirms it, and makes it an integral part of her own law. The fault of nature, aside from its inadequacy to the supernatural end to which we are destined, is, that, when left to itself, to act without grace, it acts to a subordinate and selfish end, and by so acting carries us away in a direction contrary to that required by religion. Because this is so with nature, it is so with the secular order. What is wanting, then, is not the destruction of the secular, but the change of the direction of its activity ; so that, though it remains, as it always must, below the spiritual, its heart shall always beat in unison with it, and conspire to the same ultimate end.

What we are here to labor for is to conform the secular to the spiritual, so that we may retain it in its natural sphere, and remain seculars, without ceasing to be good Christians, devout Catholics, — not, indeed, by virtue of the secular, but of the spiritual which transforms it, as in conversion our nature itself is transformed by grace, so that our proper acts have a supernatural character and worth. If we overlook or deny this, we, on the one hand, run into infidelity or license, or, on the other, assert that the monastic life or its equivalent is the only normal Christian life, and that we can lawfully be seculars only by dispensation. Religious who withdraw from the world do so, not because it is unlawful to remain in the world, or because they could not have remained in the world without a dispensation, — not because salvation is not attainable without entering religion, — but because they have a vocation to do more than is enjoined, to fulfil the Counsels as well as the precepts of the Gospel, and to labor, not only to inherit eternal life, but also for perfection. They voluntarily assume obligations beyond the precepts of the law, and bind themselves to penances and mortifications which exceed what the law exacts, and thus place themselves in a state above that in which we are who have taken upon ourselves no obligations but those which the law imposes. They are, no doubt, highly privileged ; but to require all to be like them, or to treat us poor seculars with food prepared only for them, is only converting in effect the Evangelical Counsels into precepts, and making the road to heaven narrower and more difficult than our Lord himself has made it. It would be not baptizing the secular order, and, by infusing into it the Christian

spirit, Christianizing it, but disowning it altogether, and keeping it always outside of Christianity, and therefore hostile to it.

Undoubtedly, the Christian should always and everywhere aspire to the highest ; and he may well fear, if he only aims to get into heaven by the skin of his teeth, that he will not get in at all. Undoubtedly, exhortations and admonitions to aspire to the highest sanctity should be addressed to all men, to seculars as well as to religious, in such form and manner as the pastor and the spiritual director judge best ; but we must deal with the world as we find it, and consult the practicable as well as the desirable. By exacting too much, we may get nothing. The bow over-bent is sure to break. If we furnish to seculars only the spiritual food appropriate to religious, we shall leave them to die of inanition ; for that food the state of their stomachs will not bear. By insisting on a monastic discipline for seculars, we make them rebel against all spiritual discipline, and leave them to the operations of unbaptized nature. Refusing to accept the secular in a subordinate and subservient sphere, we force it, as the condition of its existence, to assert its independence, and to aspire to supremacy. We thus widen the schism between the spiritual order and the secular, which, as we have seen in the foregoing article, is the great evil of all modern society.

The secular order, in its subordinate and subservient sphere, exists by divine right ; and within that sphere we have no more right to labor to destroy it, than we have to labor to destroy the spiritual order itself. We have, on the other hand, no right to assert its independence and supremacy. It has the right to exist as a servant, no right to exist as a master. Here are the two truths which it is always necessary to keep in view. The recognition of the spiritual alone leads, in effect, to the same result as the recognition of the secular alone ; for the secular will always, in spite of us, remain and assert itself ; and when not subject to law, it will assert itself without law, or, if need be, against law. The only way to escape infidelity or licentiousness is, not to demand exclusive spirituality of the mass of mankind, but to accept within its sphere the secular, and, by Christianizing, render it not only innocuous, but even serviceable to religion. We utter nothing new here, and, indeed, only advocate what a class of writers we have for years warred against really have in their minds, if they did but understand themselves. The only difference between them and us is, that they secularize the spiritual, while we would spiritualize the secular ; or

rather, they seek a sort of alliance or compromise between the two orders, while we allow no compromise, and seek to temper together the two orders in the unity of life, as soul and body are united in one living man. They would bring religion down to the secular, and take from the integrity of the spiritual, subtract from its sublimity and universality, while we would leave, as in duty bound, the spiritual in its integrity, its sublimity, and its universality, and simply conform the secular to it without destroying it. It is not that we would have less of the secular than they, but we would have it under more orthodox and Christian conditions.

One of the most powerful instruments of bringing about the unity we contend for is literature, and in this we agree perfectly with the authors of the Catholic novels we have censured. We censured them because they did not furnish the kind of literature we needed. On one side they give us religion, but religion that excludes the secular order; on the other side, they give us the secular order independent of religion. Their religion is for religious, their secularity for the infidel and licentious; and instead of tempering the two orders together by infusing the spiritual into the secular, they only alternately sacrifice one order to the other, now the secular to the spiritual, and now the spiritual to the secular. Here is their defect, a defect which proceeds, not from the intention of their authors, but from the duality which introduces antagonism into their own life, — from the schism which, unsuspected by them, runs through their own interior moral and intellectual world, sundering the two orders, and maintaining them in perpetual hostility one to the other. What we want is a literature which is the exponent of the harmony in the mind and heart of the two orders, which is adapted to the secular in its subordinate and subservient sphere, and which, without any formal dogmatizing or express ascetic dissertations, exhortations, or admonitions, shall excite the secular only under the authority of religion, and move it only in directions that religion approves, or at least does not disapprove.

We are far from pretending that works pertaining to a literature of this sort should supersede dogmatical, controversial, or ascetic works, — that they are works of the highest order, or even works that are always and everywhere needed. We hold, of course, that the religious state is higher than the secular, and that general literature is a temporary and accidental want. But here and now, taking into consideration the

age and country, such works are much needed and would be of very high utility. They would amuse, interest, instruct, cultivate in accordance with truth the mind and the affections, elevate the tone of the community, and, when they did not directly promote virtue, they would still be powerful to preserve and defend innocence, — often a primary duty. They would weed out from the modern world what it still retains of mediæval barbarism, advance true civilization, open to thousands a source of rational enjoyment, and preserve a healthy and vigorous state of the public mind and heart. In a word, they would contribute to what we need, a Christian *secular* culture, perhaps the greatest want of our times, and that which would more than any one thing else — the grace of God supposed — aid, not only in preserving the faith in those who have it, but in winning to it those who now have it not. Purely spiritual culture is amply provided for ; but owing to the barbarism of past ages, and the incredulity and license of the last century and the present, secular culture in unison with the Christian spirit is, and ever has been, only partially provided for, and but imperfectly attained. It seems to us that the best way for our Catholic writers — not theologians by profession, and whose works come and must come under the head of general literature — to serve the cause of truth and virtue is to devote themselves, not to controversial or ascetic works, of which we have enough, but to the *Christian secular culture* of the age, or, in a word, to the advancement of Christian civilization. They need not aspire to teach Catholic theology ; let it satisfy them to breathe into literature the true Catholic spirit, and, as far as possible, inform the secular world itself with the genuine Christian life.

The field is ample, and genius and talent can never be at a loss for materials. Undoubtedly, the composition of such works as we suggest will require genius, talent, learning, long and patient study, as well as profound and devout meditation ; but we cannot understand wherefore that should be an objection. Nothing great or good is ever produced on any other conditions, and what is neither great nor good in its order we do not want ; we have enough of scribblers and drivellers. No man should open his mouth in public unless he has something to say, and something, too, which the public ought to hear. We know no necessity there may be that every one who can bring together a mass of high-sounding words, or round or polish a period, should turn author, and send forth, to the great

annoyance of good sense and good taste, his wordy or his polished no-meanings. Many a good man, many a worthy man, who would have made an excellent hodman, shoemaker, or carpenter, has been spoiled by his ambition to be an author, or at least a writer for the newspapers. Alas! the newspapers have much to answer for. Had it not been for them, we ourselves probably should have gone through life a respectable mechanic. Indeed, many of our so called able editors themselves are more at home at the case than at the desk, and far better at clipping than at inditing. Even with good brains, no man can succeed well as an author without discipline, without cultivation. How, then, shall the poor wight succeed who has neither brains nor culture? Let no such wight attempt authorship on either a large or a small scale.

But, nevertheless, let no one despair. Genius and talent are more widely diffused than is commonly pretended. They are both susceptible of growth, and where there is a firm will and a noble purpose, those who promise little in the beginning by persevering effort may finally attain to excellence. All men are born helpless infants, and are subsequently what they are made or make themselves. Bulwer, no great philosopher, but a keen observer, shows in his novels two characters, Alice and Fanny, regarded in childhood as partially idiotic, subsequently expanding under the strong passion of love into not only amiable, but highly intellectual, women. His explanation of the fact we reject, but the fact itself we can believe was taken from actual life. The love did not expand the intellect; it simply concentrated the will, and enabled it to act with firmness and vigor. Feebleness of intellect is usually the effect of feebleness of will. The intellectual faculties are present and good enough in most men, but the will is too weak and inconstant to apply them with the requisite steadiness and perseverance. Whatever strong passion or sentiment, demanding for its gratification the exercise of intellect, possesses a person, tends to strengthen the will, to give it the force and constancy necessary to call into play the intellectual powers which were previously dormant or dissipated by being left to themselves. Alice and Fanny have great susceptibility, great quickness and strength of feeling, but feeble wills. They are infantile, and have no self-subsistence, no force of character, till the powerful passion of love seizes them. Then they suddenly unfold, develop unexpected intellectual power, because then, subjected by an invincible motive, they apply it with intensity,

energy, constancy, and perseverance. The principle is not applicable to the passion of love alone. Men weak and inconstant in all else are often remarkably steady, persevering, and acute in all matters of business. Eminent Saints, estimable for their genius and learning, had been dismissed in youth from school for their incapacity. The love of God became with them a ruling passion, made them strong, energetic, firm, constant, and then they showed to all men that they had no lack of intellect. The same thing is evinced by the fact, that some men write and speak admirably under excitement, who can hardly speak or write at all when unexcited. They do not want intellect, but they want the force of will to use it. Wherever there is a noble purpose, a firm will, a fixed resolution, genius and talent never fail.

The feebleness and frivolousness of modern literature are due to no deterioration of men's intellectual powers, which are as great and as good now as ever they were, but to the want of force and constancy of will, which itself is owing to the neglect of severe studies, the want of true philosophical discipline, and of high and noble aims. We have, in consequence of the ruin of philosophy commenced by Descartes and completed by the modern French and German philosophers, had our minds brought down from the higher order of speculative truth, and turned outward upon merely material and sensible objects, in which there is nothing to demand and nothing to suggest noble aims or lofty purposes. The good the will seeks is low and trifling, and no grand and mighty passion seizes the soul, and concentrates and employs all its energies. Hence we see everywhere weakness and frivolity, imbecility and inconstancy, and hear from the depths of all souls a low wail for something they have not, and which may prove itself adequate to their inborn nobility.

If, then, the order of literature we are contending for does demand genius and talent for its creation, so much the better. It presents a high and noble aim, demands a lofty purpose, and, with a strong will and a firm resolution that shrink from no labor, pause before no obstacle, and only gather force from opposition, we can easily answer to its calls. Nature is kinder to all men than we commonly imagine, and few there are who cannot, with God's blessing, if they strive with a strong and constant will, form their own characters, and attain to more than respectability, if they choose. To will is always in our power, for will is always free. Will strongly, will nobly,

will firmly, will constantly, and fear not but you will execute, in due time, bravely and successfully.

The aim of the literature we demand is not positive or strictly scientific instruction in religion and morals. The purpose is to cultivate the secular element of individual and social life, — to press that element into the service of religion and morality, on the principle that the Church makes use of poetry and music in celebrating her Divine Offices, or art in the construction and decoration of her altars and temples. The great artist, if he is to aid religion, if he is to subserve her influence by removing the obstacles which the flesh interposes, subduing the passions, and setting the affections to the keynote of devotion, must, it is true, understand his religion well, and in some sense be himself eminently religious ; he must also, if he would be great even as an artist, whatever the sphere or tendency of his art, be a man of genuine science ; for art is the expression of the true under the form of the beautiful, and it is obvious that a man cannot express, under the form of the beautiful, or any other form, what he does not apprehend. Here, perhaps, is the secret of the present low state of art. There is no want of artistic aspiration, skill, or effort, yet throughout the world art languishes, and no great master makes his appearance ; because the aspirants do not qualify themselves for success by genuine scientific culture, do not rise to the clear, distinct, and vivid apprehension of the higher order of truth, the eternal verities of things, and there obtain a noble and worthy ideal. The most that art, in our days, can do, is to copy external nature, paint flowers, or babble of brooks, woods, and green fields ; for we have no science, no philosophy, and even our faith is languid when it is not wholly extinct, and seizes nothing firmly, vividly. Nevertheless, though the artist must be well instructed, be a great theologian, philosopher, and moralist, his province is not to express truth under the form of science, but, as we have said, under that of the beautiful. In a degree, the province of the literature we are contemplating is and should be the same. Instructive it should be, by all means ; but as Beethoven's Symphonies, Hayden's Masses, or Mozart's Requiem are instructive, — instructive by the moral power they excite, the lofty thoughts they suggest, the tone and direction they impart to the whole interior man.

Or, if more direct instruction is aimed at, it should be of that general kind, and in those general departments of knowledge,

which are open to men who may be widely apart as to their special views. The Catholic cultivator of secular literature should, of course, be always governed, influenced, by his religion, and should always take care not to utter a single sentiment not in perfect harmony with his Catholic faith and morals ; but his aim should not be the direct exposition or propagation of his faith, any more than it is when he is cultivating his field, attending to his merchandise, or taking part in the political affairs of his country. He must not affect to be the theological doctor, the missionary, or the spiritual director. He must remember that he is a layman, or at least is to act here as a layman, not as a professional man. He may instruct, but it is with regard to those matters which are properly within the province of laymen. He may even be controversial ; but let the controversy be on matters where he may carry with him the suffrages of all men who recognize the law of nature or the authority of natural reason, — where he may have intelligent and well-disposed men, who are not of his communion, for readers and for friends. There is a vast field in which we can labor, a field which is our own, but in which we may have for fellow-laborers many who, in the immediate province of religion, would be against us. Not that we are to make any concession to them, or to go out of our way to please them, — far from it ; but it is lawful and profitable to bring out the truth which they and we hold or may hold in common. We must follow out our own principles, and should never court or seek to gain them ; but if, in following out our own principles on literary, moral, historical, or political subjects, we gain them thus far, it is an advantage for us, if not for them, that we are under no obligation to forego. Thus Lingard, in writing the History of England, did well to keep to his character as an historian, and to waive in that work his character as a Catholic doctor. His business in his work was to write true history, not theology. If the truth of history redounded to the credit of his Church, all well and good ; so far the defence of his Church was legitimate ; but beyond that he had nothing to say on the subject. We wish he had been always mindful of this, and had suffered the theologian to appear less often ; for then he would have avoided certain judgments not called for by the purposes of his history, not essential to the full and impartial statement of historic truth, and which, however pleasant they may be to Protestants, are not a little painful to Catholics.

As to the form Catholic literature among us should assume,

there need be no controversy. We make no objection to the novel as a literary form, and it has much to recommend it. The strong man, of good taste, always avoids whatever is singular or eccentric, and conforms to the fashion and tastes of his age and country as far as he can do so without sacrificing truth and simplicity. The novel is a popular form, and may be adopted by those who have received the proper culture, and entertain just views, with advantage. Perhaps there is, just at the moment, no literary form which promises more advantage to the Catholic secular writer than the historical novel. What might not a Catholic of genius, talent, and learning have made of such a subject as Rienzi, Harold, Warwick "the king-maker," the destruction of Pompeii, Attila, Wat Tyler, Van Artevelde, Darnley, or many others seized upon by English novelists? He would have had open to him all the sources of interest which were open to Protestant authors, besides others peculiar to himself. He could have been at once true to nature, to history, and to religion and morals, and even without trenching upon the province of theological controversy. In Rienzi he could have shown us the impotence of genius, learning, and zeal to restore an order of things which have passed away, or to establish a political and social order incompatible with the ideas, manners, and customs of the age or country. In Harold he could have traced the effects on civilization in England, on the one hand, of the barbaric and heathen invasion by the Danes, and, on the other, of the partially civilized and Christianized Normans. In "The Last Days of Pompeii," he could have introduced real Christians in the place of the wild and uncouth fanatics imagined by Bulwer, delineated the corrupting effects of paganism, and sketched the amelioration of morals and manners which everywhere followed the introduction of Christianity. In Wat Tyler, or in Jack Cade, he might have portrayed the barbarous state of society which resulted from the establishment of the Northern barbarians on the ruins of Græco-Roman civilization, the sufferings of the enslaved masses, the arrogance and cruelty of the feudal nobility, and at the same time given by way of example solemn admonitions against the folly of attempting to reform society on pantheistic, Socialistic, and agrarian principles, — the madness of an insurrection of the poor against the rich, of subjects against legitimate sovereigns. History, indeed, is full of passages which are replete with instruction for the present, and which the enemies of truth and morals and social order have seized

upon and perverted to their base and destructive purposes. Why cannot Catholics seize upon them, and, without perverting them, use them in the cause of truth, justice, wisdom, and social order? Are we less learned, less active, less energetic than our enemies? Can we not do as much in the cause of truth as they do in the cause of error? In fact, we sometimes half doubt it, when we see large Catholic populations controlled, enslaved, by a handful of radicals, as we have seen in France and Italy.

Indeed, we feel a little indignant when we see, as we did in the old French Revolution, more than twenty millions of nominal Catholics subjected to the Reign of Terror, instituted and upheld by a small and contemptible faction, not numbering a twentieth of the whole population; or as we do two millions and a half in the Papal States without sufficient energy or force of character to free themselves from the despotism of a contemptible radical mob, numbering at best only a few thousands; or even in Catholic states, Jews, heretics, and infidels at the head of affairs; and we confess we cannot but think that the storm that is sweeping over them is but a just judgment of Almighty God upon them for their imbecility and sluggishness. It is time that the friends of truth try to prove themselves men, and to take the lead in affairs; and we are sure that Catholic secular writers in our day can render no better service even to religion than to possess themselves of the secular literature of the age, and to make it speak the language of truth, of wisdom, of moral majesty, — not in faint, timid tones, or feeble, apologetic whispers, that will be lost in the infidel, Socialistic, and revolutionary din of the times, but in free, bold, manly tones, that will ring through all men's hearts, and recall them to their senses, to think and to act. Resist the Devil and he will flee from you; show yourself afraid of him, cower and crouch before him, and you are gone. Pray, trust in God, by all means; but be also active, strong, energetic men, quick to perceive and fearless to perform what duty commands.

Of the little work, the title of which we have quoted at the head of this article, we have not much to say. It is a quiet, domestic tale, intended for children preparing for the sacrament of Confirmation. It shows fine taste, very considerable powers, and much facility on the part of the author, and gives us promise of far greater and better things from the same source hereafter. We like its design, its sweet spirit, and its healthy tone. The author has a ready eye for the beautiful, a keen

perception of character, and, with a little more maturity and practice, will be able to give us specimens of the domestic novel that will rank favorably by the side of Lady Fullerton's *Grantley Manor*, which, but for the mistake of mixing up Protestants and Catholics together, would have been a model of its class. We should have been better pleased with Miss Duval's book, if she had left out the excellent Protestant lady she has introduced, and also if she had been less theological. In her own proper department, that of the domestic novel, she writes admirably, with great truth and beauty; but her theological attainments are not precisely those we look for in a theological professor. We do not mean this as a censure, for she everywhere maintains the modesty which becomes her sex, and professedly uses, in explaining Catholic doctrine, works which she could have no reason to distrust; and the errors into which she is betrayed are the errors of those she has innocently followed. Yet, with the exception of three pages (152 – 154), which contain what we believe all theologians on a critical examination will agree with us is unsound doctrine, we like *Spirit Sculpture* very much, and cordially commend it to the Catholic public. We assure the excellent author that we shall be happy to meet her again in a larger and more elaborate work, and risk nothing in promising her beforehand the most gratifying success.

ART. V. — *House Document, No. 130. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Education, to whom was recommitted the Report on the Petition of John B. Fitzpatrick and others. House of Representatives, April 13, 1849.*

THE petition reported on was the petition of the Rt. Rev. the Bishop of Boston, and others, to the General Court, for an act incorporating the College of the Holy Cross in the city of Worcester. The petition was presented to the House by a distinguished member from this city, and referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Education. This committee consisted of seven members, and were divided on the subject of the petition four to three, the majority being against, and the minority in favor of, granting the act prayed for. The ma-

jority, without assigning any reason, reported that "the petitioners have leave to withdraw." This report was at first silently accepted, but was subsequently reconsidered in the House, and recommitted, with instructions to the committee to report their reasons. This the committee did in the document before us, which consists, first, of the report of the majority, assigning their reasons for refusing, and, second, of the report of the minority, accompanied by a bill granting the prayer of the petitioners. The reports came up in order, and, after an animated debate of two days, the bill was lost by a vote of 84 to 114, and the report of the majority was accepted.

This result was hardly in accordance with the real sense of the House, and we are sure could not have been obtained, had it not been for the false view of the prayer of the petitioners presented by the report of the majority. If the majority had represented the question in its true light and real bearings, free from foreign or irrelevant matters, there can be no doubt that a large majority of the House would have voted for the bill reported by the minority of the committee. Nevertheless, the petitioners make no complaint. The debate, which, with one exception, was characterized by more than ordinary courtesy on both sides, and by rare ability, good sense, manly feeling, statesmanlike views, legal learning, and logical acuteness and force on the side of the minority, will do good, and we entertain no apprehensions that the next legislature will not correct the mistake into which the present has been betrayed, and cheerfully grant the act of incorporation prayed for. We have full confidence in the wisdom, intelligence, and high sense of honor of this ancient Commonwealth, and it will take much to persuade us that she will for a moment hesitate to retrace a false step, which through misapprehension she may have taken, when once she perceives that it is demanded by her own honor or justice to any class of her citizens.

The report of the minority, though we differ from it on one or two points, is able, and highly creditable to Messrs. Upham, Motley, and Williams, whose names are appended to it; and Mr. Upham, especially, deserves the thanks of the friends of the college for his generous and stanch support of the bill he reported. But the report of the majority of the committee is a document of which we cannot speak in the terms which seem to us the most appropriate, without appearing to want that deference which should always be shown to the high official source from which it emanated. Yet we must be permitted to say,

that it appears to have been drawn up with a total disregard or misapprehension of the real nature of the prayer of the petitioners, and with an imperfect knowledge and understanding of the laws and policy of the Commonwealth, which, though natural enough in a fanatical country minister of one of the minor sects, we are surprised to meet in the report of a grave legislative committee. The best thing we are able to say of it is, that, when sound in its principles, it is inapplicable to the question before the committee, and when applicable, its principles are unsound and its statements unwarranted. Far be it from us to deny the ability or to question the motives of the learned gentleman who is understood to have penned it, and who so distinguished himself in the debate in the House ; but he seems to us to possess a very peculiar psychological conformation, and we are utterly at a loss to conceive the mental process by which he convinces himself that he arrives legitimately at his conclusions, or persuades himself that anything can justify his extraordinary statements. Instead of presenting the prayer of the petitioners for the action of the House in its true light and real bearings, his report seems to have been expressly designed to misrepresent it, to envelop it in a dense fog, to render it obscure and confused by mixing up with it foreign or irrelevant matters, and to prevent ordinary minds, without long and patient investigation, from being able to form any tolerable notion of its actual character, or to judge it on its own merits. That it had this effect on many minds in the House cannot be doubted ; and hence there is a propriety in our taking it up, and endeavouring to unravel its sophistries, to correct its mistakes and misstatements, and to present the prayer of the petitioners to the public in what we conceive to be its true light, and leave it to be accepted or rejected for what it really is, and not for something else.

It is true, this was done for the House, as far as it could be in the excitement of debate, by the very able and statesmanlike speeches of the supporters of the petition ; and if those speeches had been correctly or adequately reported and published, nothing more would need be said. But they were not correctly reported, and the ablest and most conclusive of them were mangled, mutilated, misrepresented, to a degree almost incredible. This was peculiarly the case with the masterly argument for the bill by Mr. Healy of Boston, who presented the petition to the House. Mr. Healy's speech, we may say, without the least disparagement to the speeches of the other gen-

tllemen who preceded or followed him on the same side, covered the whole field of discussion, dissipated, to all who understood him, the fog which had been collected around the question, disentangled it from all irrelevant matters which had been adroitly mixed up with it, placed it in its true light and real bearings, on its legitimate grounds, answered all the objections which had been or could be brought against it, showed its perfect accordance with the uniform policy of the laws of the Commonwealth, and proved conclusively, that, according to that policy, the petitioners made out a clear case, and were honestly entitled to a charter for their college ; and it did this with the calm earnestness and courtesy of manner, the clearness and distinctness of expression, the enlarged and liberal views, the depth and accuracy of legal knowledge, and the aptness and force of argument, for which that gentleman is so eminently distinguished. If we had that speech as it was delivered, we would not attempt to add a word of our own ; we would simply insert it in our pages, sure that it would carry conviction to every calm and deliberate reader. But we have it not, and cannot procure it. The report of it in the newspapers was meagre and false, in scarcely an instance giving what was actually said, and in some giving precisely the reverse. Under these circumstances, we trust we shall show no want of respect to the gentlemen who supported the prayer of the petitioners, if we renew the discussion of the question in our own feeble way, and reproduce as well as we can some few of the many arguments they used.

The petitioners — and of their petition we can speak with some knowledge, for we drew it, and were present at their first hearing before the committee — state that “ the College of the Holy Cross, a literary institution, in the city of Worcester, designed to teach a course of classical and scientific studies, equal to the course usually taught in the higher class of colleges in the United States, has now been in operation five years ; and it being proposed to enlarge the sphere of its operations,” they ask that certain individuals named, “ and their successors, be incorporated under the name of The College of the Holy Cross,” with the “ powers usually conferred on such institutions.” Here is the prayer of the petitioners ; it is simply for an act of incorporation as a college, with such powers as are usually conferred on colleges. To this prayer it was objected that the petitioners ask for a grant of unusual powers, special or exclusive privileges, or the patronage of the Commonwealth

for their religious denomination ; that their prayer cannot be granted without contradicting the uniform policy of our legislation, and revolutionizing, in principle, our whole system of public education ; and, in fine, that the petitioners do not make out a case which entitles them to an act of incorporation.

We here fairly state the sum of all that was objected, and we say very frankly in the outset, that, if these objections are pertinent or well founded, they are conclusive. All profess- edly Christian denominations stand, under our constitution and laws, on the same footing, and the legislature has no power to discriminate between them, in favor or in disfavor of one or another of them. If any one of them, forgetful of this, — or, indeed, as to that matter, if any particular class of our citizens, forgetful of the equality before the law of all classes, — comes before the legislature with a petition for exclusive favors, for special patronage, it should uniformly meet a stern and indig- nant refusal. On this point we, at least, shall join no issue with the report of the majority of the committee. But we venture to affirm, that the objections urged are without foundation, for the petitioners asked for no exclusive favors, for no patronage, for no unusual powers ; that they asked for nothing incompati- ble with the policy of our legislation, for nothing more than the legislature is every day in the habit of granting ; and that they did, as we shall see, make out as clear a case as the legisla- ture usually requires.

The whole substance of the prayer of the petitioners, simply stated, is to be permitted to use a corporate seal, to be empowered to do as a corporation what they are now doing, have been doing for the last five years, will continue to do, and have a perfect right to do, under our constitution and laws, as individuals, and which the Commonwealth, if they are molested, is now bound to protect them in doing. This, which is an un- deniable fact, is of itself a sufficient answer to all the objections urged, except the last. The petitioners ask for no grant from the public treasury, they ask for no rights or powers in regard to their religion not now secured to them by the constitution and laws ; and they ask only for certain facilities in transacting a perfectly lawful business, and even these facilities they ask for the convenience of those with whom the college must trans- act business full as much as for the convenience of the college itself. How, then, can it be said to ask for patronage, for ex- clusive privileges, for unusual powers, or the introduction of a new principle into our legislation ?

As far as we can understand the report of the committee, which unhappily is rarely very definite in its statements, its charge is grounded on the fact that the college belongs to a particular denomination of Christians, and is to be open only to such as conform to the faith, discipline, and worship of that denomination. 'This, the report says, "appears to constitute the distinctive feature and turning-point of the case." "The petitioners ask for a college strictly and exclusively sectarian in its type and character, under influences and rules which practically exclude the great majority of our youth, and which, being vital, cannot be altered." (p. 4.) This is hardly correct, but let it pass. Whence, we ask, does it follow that the petitioners ask for anything exclusive, any unusual power, or anything contrary to the policy of our laws, even if this be so? Does the report mean to insinuate that the petitioners ask, or need, an act of incorporation to authorize them to teach their religion in their college, and to receive into it only those who conform to it? If so, it is a mistake. The petitioners have asked, and need to ask, for nothing of the sort; for the right to do all this they already possess, and they are exercising it now with the recognition and under the protection of the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth, which guaranty to all the freedom of faith and worship. The Congregationalists have a perfect legal right to establish a college in which none but Congregationalists shall be professors, and none but Congregational youth shall be admitted as pupils or students. As much must be said, too, of Protestant Episcopalians, Baptists, Methodists, Unitarians, Universalists, and Quakers. Less than this, then, cannot be said of Catholics; for they, in the eye of the law, stand on the same footing with Congregationalists, and have equal rights with them. If, then, Catholics choose at their own expense to found a Catholic college exclusively for Catholics, into which none but Catholics are admissible as pupils or students, they have a legal right, and do not need a legislative grant to enable them, to do so, as the report itself, with an inconsistency remarkable enough, fully concedes. "Our principles and policy forbid," it says, "our giving special privileges for sectarian education, *while we cheerfully tolerate and protect all the institutions sectarian influence may establish.*"—p. 7.

The incorporation of a college founded by, and exclusively for, Catholics does not give to the college the right to be exclusively Catholic; for the right to be so it possesses prior to

the act of incorporation, and independently of it. That right, which is not conferred by the charter, must survive the incorporation unless the charter itself positively annuls it. Here is what the report has the air of overlooking. The report confounds not taking away a right with conferring a right; and because the petitioners refused to accept a charter that would take away a right which they now have, it represents them as asking a charter that confers upon them that right, and therefore as asking for a special favor, and the grant of unusual powers, — a misapprehension, or an instance of fallacious reasoning, not usual, we apprehend, in grave legislative documents.

The report says the committee offered the petitioners the charter of Amherst College, in which is a clause prohibiting the religious freedom which the petitioners refused to surrender, and concludes, from the fact that they would not accept it, that they asked for unusual powers. This conclusion is not warranted. The petitioners did not refuse that charter because it did not confer on them an unusual power, but because it required them to make an unusual surrender of private rights. They did not ask a charter which should confer the right of making their college a Catholic college, exclusively for youth of their own religion, but they did not choose to accept one which deprived them of the right to make it so. The charter of Amherst College would deprive them of their religious freedom, and they did not choose to be deprived of it. Nor did they think the legislature had any right to insist on their giving it up as the consideration of receiving an act of incorporation. If they had come before the legislature with a request to be incorporated as a public institution, to be supported in whole or in part at the public expense, they would cheerfully have conceded the right of the legislature to exact the conditions proposed as those on which it would bestow its bounty; for the State has no right, placing as it does all religious denominations on the same footing, to endow any literary institution which is for the exclusive benefit of any particular religious denomination. Public institutions, supported at the public expense, must be open to the public, open to all classes of citizens who choose to avail themselves of them. The State has no right to endow a college under the control of Catholics, which Protestants cannot enter without violence to their Protestant conscience; and, for the same reason, it has no right to found a college under the control of any one

of the Protestant sects, which Catholics cannot enter without violence to their Catholic conscience. But this has nothing to do with the case before us, because the petitioners did not ask for State patronage, for a public endowment. They had erected, sustained thus far, and proposed for the future to sustain, their college with their own private funds, without receiving or wishing to receive any bounty from the public treasury. This makes all the difference in the world. The reasons which justify, nay, demand, the restrictive clause of the charter of Amherst College in the charter of a public college, designed to be a public college, and to be supported as such from the public treasury, could not, therefore, apply in their case, and we do not understand what right the committee had to propose such a restrictive clause. To propose it was to demand the surrender of a right without offering any compensation in return.

The original policy it adopted in regard to Amherst College, and which it adopted under the influence of feelings hostile to the denomination that founded it and prayed for its incorporation, the legislature itself has since abandoned. That policy was to subject the college to all the restrictions, and yet to grant it none of the advantages, of a public institution, — to take away the denominational rights of its founders and supporters, and yet to give it no claims upon the public in return. A more unjust policy it is difficult to conceive, and it was felt to be extremely unjust at the time, by the friends of the college. But they submitted, probably because they saw that by submitting they could, in practice, keep the college under their control, make it in fact as denominational as they wished, and yet one day get it supported as a public college ; for by submitting they obtained the right to come into the legislature, and tell it, that, having made the college a public institution, it is now bound to support it. They have availed themselves of this right, and Amherst College is now supported in part from the public treasury. The legislature saw that it could not maintain its original policy, that it must, in common justice, either give back to the college its religious freedom, or else give it public support. It chose the latter ; but this was as much an abandonment of its original policy, as if it had struck out the clause restricting the religious freedom of the college. It was hardly fair in the committee, with this fact before their eyes, to offer the petitioners, who had no wish to make their college a public institution, or to receive State patronage, the charter of Amherst College.

Nor was this all. The petitioners asked for an act conferring the powers *usually* conferred, and the committee offered them a charter which demands an unusual surrender of rights ; and, because the petitioners refused it, the committee gravely report that they asked for *unusual* powers, and would not be content with a charter conferring those which are *usual*. Hence the majority and the advocates of their report in the House take occasion to rebuke, in their smooth way, the petitioners for their impudence in asking more than equal rights ; and this with such blandness of manner, and such an air of good faith, that some did not for the moment see through it, and verily supposed that the committee were really willing to grant a reasonable charter, but that the petitioners were so exorbitant in their demands that it was the painful duty of every honest legislature to refuse them. Now the committee knew perfectly well, before they offered the charter of Amherst College, that it would not be accepted. Why, then, did they offer it ? Was it because they dared not assume the responsibility of directly refusing the act of incorporation prayed for, and because they wished the public to get the impression that the refusal was due to the fact that the petitioners themselves would not accept a charter in the *usual* form ? Are we wanting in respect to the committee, if we suggest that in this they gave a better exemplification of what is popularly understood by the word *Jesuitical* than of that open and manly proceeding which we always look for in grave and dignified legislators ?

But how could the refusal on the part of the petitioners to accept the charter of Amherst College be construed into a proof that they would not be contented with a charter in the *usual* form ? At the close of their first hearing, the committee asked the petitioners if they wished anything peculiar in their charter ; and were answered, by ourselves, " No ; nothing peculiar ; all we want is a charter in the *usual* form." But the charter of Amherst College is not in the *usual* form ; it is peculiar ; it stands " solitary and alone," and the restrictive clause to which the petitioners objected is found in the charter of no other incorporated literary institution in the State. This fact the committee knew, or should have known. Surely, to offer an unusual form was not to offer the *usual*, and to refuse an unusual form was not proof that the *usual* form would not have been accepted. The committee say the petitioners would not accept a charter in the *usual* form, and adduce as

proof the fact that they refused to accept an *unusual* form ! The fact is, the committee did not offer the petitioners a charter in the usual form, and they had the full assurance, that, if they would, it would not be refused. If the committee were willing to give a charter in the usual form, why did they not offer it ? Did they offer the charter of Williams College ? Not they. If they had, it would have been willingly accepted ; and that is a far more usual form than that which was offered. Yet the majority place their refusal to grant the prayer of the petitioners solely on the ground that they asked for unusual powers, exclusive privileges, and were not willing to be placed on the same footing, before the State, with other religious denominations ! Is the logic of the majority of the committee as peculiar as their ingenuousness ?

The report has much to say of the exclusiveness avowed and insisted on by the petitioners. Its author would fain persuade us that this exclusiveness was the sole objection to granting their prayer. He alleges that the petitioners "stated that they were exclusive and must be so, and were frank enough further to admit, that, had they the civil power, they *could not* exercise it otherwise than exclusively as to religious rights." That the petitioners made any such admission, in the sense here implied, as to what they should be obliged to do if they had the civil power, is not a fact, and such admission would have been false if it had been made, as every man knows who knows anything of the religion professed by the petitioners. The author of the report must have misapprehended the answer of the petitioners to a question which exceeded the competency of a legislative committee to ask. Whether the petitioners are or are not exclusive in their religious views, what are or are not their religious tenets, the principles of their discipline, or the forms of their worship, their merits or demerits as a religious denomination, are matters, as the report itself, with admirable inconsistency, frankly acknowledges, "with which the legislature has nothing to do," (p. 7,) and therefore no proper subjects of legislative investigation or of legislative report. The petitioners, doubtless, have their religion ; but whether true or false, good or bad, is, so far as the government is concerned, their own private affair. They are free to profess it, and they have the right to call in the Commonwealth, if necessary, to protect them in its free, full, and peaceable profession and enjoyment ; for need we at every turn repeat, that all professedly Christian denomina-

tions, under our constitution and laws, stand on the same footing, and have legally, not, as some say, equal *toleration*, but equal *rights*?

That the College of the Holy Cross is designed for Catholic youth, and refuses to receive non-Catholic youth, nobody denies; but it is not true, as the report appears to maintain, that this exclusiveness is vital, is a rule of the Catholic religion, and cannot be altered. The petitioners did not say, that, in this respect, they are and *must be* exclusive. They informed the committee in our hearing expressly to the contrary, that the rule obtained in no other Catholic college in the United States. There is no principle in the Catholic religion which requires Catholic colleges to refuse to admit to their course of studies non-Catholic youth, and in all the Catholic colleges in the country, except the one in Worcester, they are received, and without being required to conform to the Catholic faith and discipline.

The college in Worcester is exclusive in this respect, because its founder deemed it prudent to make it so, and because its present managers have seen no good reason for making it otherwise. The great complaint against Catholic colleges, particularly in the West, is that they are proselyting institutions, intended, under pretence of giving a classical education, to steal away the youth of non-Catholics, and convert them to the Catholic religion. This complaint, we all know, was brought against the Female Academy of the Ursuline Convent in Charlestown, and nobody doubts that one of the principal causes which excited a mob to lay it in ashes was the fact that many of its pupils were from our respectable Protestant families. It was to obviate a like catastrophe for his college, to escape the loud complaints made by non-Catholics against the Catholic literary institutions of the country, that its munificent founder, the late learned and eminent Bishop Fenwick, who wished as far as possible to live in peace with all men, and to give occasion of wrath to none, adopted the exclusive rule, and refused to receive into the College of the Holy Cross any but children of Catholic parents, or such as, with their own free will and the free and full consent of their parents or guardians, were preparing to become Catholics. He wished a college for the Catholic youth growing up in our midst, under his care, both for their sake and for the sake of the community, for he was a public-spirited citizen, a friend of the young and of education; and he sought to obtain such a

college, without giving umbrage to his Protestant neighbours and fellow-citizens, or doing anything to provoke their hostility or suspicions against his college, or the people of his charge. Here was the motive which led to the adoption of the rule, a motive wholly in the interests of the non-Catholic portion of the community ; and the rule is unalterable only because the college does not choose to alter it. Being established and supported by Catholics with their own private funds, the college believes that it has the perfect right to confine its benefits to Catholic youth, and therefore does not choose to accept a charter which prohibits them from doing so, or which requires it with their private funds to educate youth out of their denomination. But if the legislature should attempt to make the rule obligatory, and forbid the reception of any but Catholic youth, it would perhaps find the college as little disposed to accept its action as when it proposes a charter which suppresses it. This, as the college is private property, and the petitioners do not wish to make it a public institution, they regard as a matter within their own competency, and they insist on retaining their freedom to receive or not to receive, as they judge proper.

Is it not, however, a little singular that gentlemen who evidently are no admirers of the religion of the petitioners should make it their only objection to incorporating the College of the Holy Cross, that it refuses to receive to its course of studies the children of non-Catholics ? Do they thus object, because they have sons whom they wish to place in that college, — because they are desirous that the youth of the Commonwealth should be educated under Roman Catholic influences, in a Roman Catholic college, by Roman Catholic priests ? or is it because they are unwilling that Catholics should have a college for their own youth, and seize upon this exclusiveness as a pretext for suppressing as far as in them lies the freedom of education ? Shall we be unjust to those gentlemen if we suggest, that, in all probability, they would find the college still more objectionable to them if it were not exclusive ? We can easily fancy, if the college had been open to all, that this same highly respectable committee would have rung the changes on the very opposite objection, and have gravely reported, Since the College of the Holy Cross is evidently intended to be a proselyting institution, and, under pretence of giving a classical education, to mould the young and ductile minds of our non-Catholic youth to its peculiar

religion, and since the legislature has no right to aid or countenance it in this its insidious design, therefore, the petitioners have leave to withdraw. They could have made this objection, under the supposition, with as much propriety as the one they now urge ; and we can hardly doubt that they would very readily and even eagerly have urged it.

What we have said sufficiently proves that the petitioners asked for nothing unusual, nothing exclusive, — for no State patronage ; we further add, that what they did ask for required the introduction of no new principle into our legislative policy. On this point we reluctantly differ from the excellent report of the minority, as well as from that of the majority. The report of the majority, as we have intimated, is never very explicit, and insinuates rather than distinctly states its meaning ; but if it is not mere verbiage or idle declamation, which we are not by any means to suppose of a grave legislative report, it means to assert that there is not a single literary institution, within the bounds of the State, incorporated on the principle contended for by the petitioners. The petitioners ask for an act of incorporation which leaves them their present right of not admitting into their college non-Catholic students, or of admitting only the youth of their own denomination. This the committee themselves tell us is “the distinctive feature and turning-point in the case,” and the principle here involved is that, and that only, to which they profess to object. This principle, they imply, is a novelty in our legislation. “Has Massachusetts,” they ask, “ever recognized such a principle ? Is there an incorporated institution within her borders which *requires* such a religious conformity as to operate to the exclusion of a single individual ? Are our common schools or our normal schools on such a basis ? Are not one and all of the corporate literary institutions, from the professional schools of theology, law, and medicine, down to the smallest district school, open to all classes without distinction of sect, the privileges of which they may enjoy without any *annoying* religious conformity ?” This, if it means anything to the purpose, means that there is not a single incorporated literary institution in the Commonwealth, which is not legally open to all classes of citizens, and therefore legally *forbidden* to exact any religious qualification as the condition of the free and full enjoyment of its benefits. Is this true ?

The committee raise here a question of fact, not of speculation, and, striking out of the account the common and normal

schools, which are State schools, and do not come into the category of incorporated institutions in the sense applicable to the case before us, the reverse of what they state, with the single exception of Amherst College, happens to be the fact. The right to be exclusive, in the sense in which the College of the Holy Cross is exclusive, is in this Commonwealth inherent in every religious denomination, because essential to the freedom of each to profess and teach its own religion. Its denial would be the total denial of the freedom of religion, which is guaranteed by the constitution and laws to every professedly Christian denomination. It therefore survives in every incorporated literary institution whose charter does not expressly prohibit it. No clause in the charter is required to confer it; it is legally possessed, if there is none that takes it away. This is undeniable. Hence the petitioners asked for no charter conferring that right; they only refused a charter which took it away, — that is, deprived them of their religious freedom.

Now the clause prohibiting this religious freedom is to be found in the charter of no incorporated literary institution in this Commonwealth, except that of Amherst College; and the only instances we are aware of, in the whole history of the legislation of this State, in which there has been an attempt by the legislature to suppress the religious liberty of literary institutions, are the one made under anti-Trinitarian and anti-Calvinistic influences in the case of Amherst College, and that made by the majority of the committee in the case before us. The principle which the committee say is not recognized by Massachusetts is recognized by her to the full extent that the petitioners demand in the charter of Williams College at Williamstown, the Baptist Theological Institute at Newton, the Wesleyan Academy at Wilbraham, and the Congregational Theological Seminary at Andover. Here are four incorporated institutions, not one of which is subjected to the prohibitory clause of Amherst College. Is it not singular, that, in the face of this well-known and undeniable fact, the committee should make their extraordinary denial? Is it not singular that they should say that *none* of our incorporated literary institutions are on the basis they object to, when, in fact, all *but one* are on that basis and no other, and possess all the freedom for their religion demanded by the College of the Holy Cross?

The case of the Andover Theological Seminary is peculiarly apposite to our purpose. It was founded by private munificence for the Congregational denomination. It holds its funds on the

express condition of being exclusively Congregational. They are forfeited unless the professors subscribe a certain creed, and to prevent it from ever becoming other than exclusive, or departing from the faith to which it is pledged, the professors are required solemnly to renew their subscriptions to that creed once in every five years. Everybody who knows the history of the institution knows that it was intended to be strictly denominational, and that every legal device the astutest lawyers could devise was resorted to to prevent it from ever becoming otherwise. The motive of its founders was to guard against its following the example of Harvard College, which had become Unitarian ; and they secured for it, not only the legal right to be strictly and exclusively Congregational, but bound it by all the means in their power never to be anything else. And yet Andover Theological Seminary enjoys a charter from the legislature of this State. Here is a recognition of the principle objected to by the committee, of which they should not have been ignorant. It is true, that when Mr. Healy in the House asserted that Andover was in law and in fact exclusive, the gentleman who presented the report of the majority of the committee rose in his place and contradicted him. He said that he had himself been educated at Andover ; he knew the institution well, and asserted on his own knowledge that such was not the fact, either legally or practically. But Mr. Upham of Salem, who presented the report of the minority, produced, from the State library, the charter, and asked permission to read it, which was granted. When it was read, the respectable and learned gentleman who had so positively, on his own knowledge, contradicted Mr. Healy, rose and frankly acknowledged that he was wrong, and that what Mr. Healy had said was true. The acknowledgment was honorable, no doubt, to the gentleman who made it ; but, nevertheless, it left him in an attitude somewhat awkward, and proved that his statements, whether in his report or in his speeches, were not always to be taken as indisputable facts.

This incident settled the question as to exclusiveness of the Andover Seminary, which was well known before to everybody, except to the reverend gentleman who had received his education in it, and knew it well ; and settling that question negatived the assertion of the committee. The idea that theological institutions founded by a particular denomination, for the express purpose of teaching its peculiar theology, and training up candidates for its peculiar ministry, are not exclusive, and that their

benefits can be equally enjoyed by those who do and those who do not conform to the religion taught, seems to us original, and we doubt whether it ever entered into the head of anybody before it was conceived by the learned and ingenious author of the report of the majority of the committee. It perhaps ought to secure him great honor as an original inventor, but we fear that he will find most people disposed to regard his invention as nothing more than the product of a remarkable idiosyncrasy, or of a distempered fancy which sometimes sees things "not to be seen."

It is nothing to our purpose whether Williams College, the Wesleyan Seminary, the Baptist Theological Institute, and the Andover Theological Seminary, are or are not in practice exclusive; it is enough for our purpose that they have the legal right to be as exclusive as they please. There is nothing in their charters, or in the legislation connected with them, that prohibits them from being as strictly denominational as the College of the Holy Cross. Yet it is said that even in practice they are not quite so unexclusive as they profess, and we much doubt if there is one of them that does not exert such influence as it has to secure conformity to its own peculiar religious views and tendencies. But whether so or not, we do not complain. We say they have the legal right to be exclusive, because there is nothing in their charter restricting them; and having this legal right, we say it is a mistake to assert that the petitioners ask for the introduction of a new principle into our legislation. The truth is the reverse of what the committee assert. What the petitioners ask for is in perfect accordance with the principles, with one exception, sanctioned by the uniform practice of the legislature, and that exception, as we have seen, is not to be taken into the account.

The principle which the committee assert, simply stated, is, that no charter of incorporation should be granted to an institution which is under the control and for the exclusive benefit of a particular religious denomination. But this principle is unknown to our legislation, and the legislature never refuses to incorporate a religious congregation or parish on the ground of its exclusive denominational character. We have not heard that any objection of this sort is ever raised. Congregationalists, Baptists, Unitarians, Universalists, and others, obtain acts of incorporation for their congregations and parishes, which are for purely denominational purposes and no others. What is the difference between incorporating a denominational parish,

and incorporating a denominational college? In either case the legislature gives no sanction to the religion of the corporation; it merely grants to a class of citizens facilities of using a corporate seal in the transacting of business which is perfectly lawful to them as individuals. The principle is the same, whether the corporation be a college or a parish; and there is nothing to be objected in the one case that may not be in the other.

The committee seems all the time to labor under the hallucination, that the petitioners ask the legislature to grant them the right to teach their religion, and to authorize them to require the youth admitted into their college to conform to it. This, we grant, would be the introduction of a new principle into our legislation. But how often must we repeat that they ask no such thing? They recognize in the legislature no authority to give or to take away this right. This is a matter on which they only ask the legislature to leave them where they are. They say that they have a right to teach their religion, that they have a right with their own funds to erect a college and to say who may enjoy its advantages and who may not, and that to refuse them an act of incorporation because they will not consent to be deprived of that right is as unreasonable and as unjust as it would be to refuse to incorporate a manufacturing company on the ground that it claimed the right of exercising its own discretion as to the persons with whom it should deal or whom it should employ. Suppose such company claims the right, and should very frankly tell the legislature, beforehand, that it intends, to trade with and employ only members of the Congregational denomination: would that be a valid reason for refusing to charter it? or would a charter not denying them that right require the introduction of a new principle into our legislation? If so, on what principle does the legislature charter a company to erect and keep a temperance hotel? The legislature has nothing to do with those private transactions of a private corporation, for the doing of which corporate powers are neither needed nor asked, any more than it has with the transactions of a private individual; and therefore they can be no reason for granting or for withholding a charter. The things which the College of the Holy Cross claims the right to do, and to which the committee object, are not things to be done under cover of a charter of incorporation, — will not be, and are not wished to be, done by virtue of any corporate authority the legislature may confer; but will be done by the corporators in their unincorporate ca-

capacity, by virtue of rights possessed by them in common with all private or associated citizens of the Commonwealth. The corporation as such has no more to do with them than the manufacturing corporation has with the fact whether the individual corporators go to bed at nine o'clock or at twelve, eat white bread or brown, or pray standing or kneeling. The corporate seal merely covers the business transactions, and all else that is done is done by virtue, not of corporate, but of private powers. The charter of incorporation gives, then, no sanction, express or implied, to the religion, discipline, worship, internal arrangements, or management of the college, and the objection founded on the supposition that it would give a sanction to them falls to the ground.

The pretence set up, that the incorporation of the College of the Holy Cross would revolutionize our whole system of public education, cannot stand a moment, for the very good reason that the principle on which it asked to be incorporated is the principle common to all our colleges and incorporated literary institutions, with the single exception of Amherst College, and because its incorporation does not make it a part of our public system of education, but leaves it as it is now, a part of the private education of the Commonwealth. It has never been, and we trust it will never be, the policy of old Massachusetts to prohibit private education, and adopt a system of compulsory public education. She always has respected, and we trust always will respect, in matters of education, the rights of conscience, and also the rights of parents and guardians. She establishes a system of public schools, and a noble system it is too, and for this we honor her ; but she does not compel parents to send their children, or guardians their wards, to her public schools, or forbid them to open or patronize private schools, if such be their choice. Far distant, we trust, is the day when she will follow the example of European despots and deny to her citizens the liberty of education. There need, then, be nothing more said on this point. The incorporation of the College of the Holy Cross would not authorize it to perform a single act or do a single thing which it is not now doing, and which it may not continue to do with the full sanction of our laws as they are. This is an undeniable fact, which we beg the opponents of the college to bear in mind. If, then, the college does not now interfere with our system of public education, and everybody knows that it does not, it would not, and could not, if incorporated.

We ourselves should be sorry to see any measure adopted which would revolutionize or in any way interfere with our present system of public schools ; for we happen to be citizens, and not unproud citizens, of old Massachusetts, and we have as deep an interest in the preservation and successful working of that system as has any other citizen of the Commonwealth. That system is designed to be open to all the children of the Commonwealth, and to furnish them a good common education. Considering the variety of religious views in the State, and the fact that the State is bound to treat them all with equal respect, the relation of the public schools to religion must be negative, excluding what is peculiar to each denomination, and admitting only what is common to them all. There is no justice in the complaints which have been heard from several quarters, that our common schools are not as positively religious as they should be. We are in favor, and decidedly in favor, of a system of common school education for all the children of the Commonwealth, and we are not so unreasonable as to object to the only conditions on which such a system can be established and maintained. Our common schools cannot be more positively religious than they now are, unless they adopt the peculiar doctrines of some one of the several religious denominations which divide our citizens ; and if they were authorized or permitted to do this, the favored denomination would be virtually established by law, and its peculiar religion made the religion of the State, which would be to deny that freedom of its religion now secured to every denomination, and to render it henceforth untrue that all denominations stand on the same footing before the constitution and laws, having equal rights, and entitled to equal legal respect and protection.

But at the same time that our public schools must refrain from meddling with religion, except so far as all professedly Christian denominations are agreed, it will not do for the State to say that we shall have no schools which are more positively religious ; for that would be to deny to every denomination the freedom of its religion, — to prohibit, so far as education is concerned, all religion but a vague generality, which, if taken alone, is satisfactory to no class of believers, and in practice is tantamount to no religion at all. The deficiency of religious instruction in our common schools is now supplied by denominational schools, — by each denomination in its own way, according to its own views of truth, — and therefore is no evil, and no objection to the system of common school instruction. But

to deny to our citizens the right of establishing and supporting these denominational schools would be the denial to each denomination of its undoubted constitutional right to educate its children in its own peculiar religion. The State cannot do this ; for, if it cannot in its schools teach any particular form of Christianity, it cannot, on the other hand, authorize the teaching of infidelity. But when any denomination asks for more positive religious instruction than the State can give without discriminating between denominations, or when it asks for schools in which its children, while acquiring a literary and scientific education, shall be trained up in its peculiar religious faith, discipline, and worship, it must establish and support them at its own expense. It is only in this way that, in a community divided on the subject of religion into different denominations or sects, it is possible to establish a system of public instruction on the one hand, and of religious education on the other, with a due regard for the equal rights of all and the special religious views of each. The State provides a system of education for all in common, as far as all are willing to abide by what all have or can receive in common, and each denomination provides for what is not common to all, for what is peculiar to itself, by a system of private schools of its own, free, so long as they infringe the rights of no other denomination, from the control of the public. This is what our Commonwealth does, and with this no reasonable man can find any fault.

Catholics are as much attached to the existing system of common schools as Protestants are, as we may infer from the fact, that full one third of all the children in the public schools of this city are children of Catholic parents. They derive great advantage from these schools, — no class of our citizens greater advantages than they are now deriving, — and they must be strangely shortsighted to wish for the sanction of any measure by the legislature that shall tend to lessen their importance or their efficiency, — that may change the basis on which they are established, or endanger their existence. But these schools, though sufficient for the great mass of the children of the Commonwealth, are not sufficient for all. We are the friends of classical education, and ask for schools of a higher order, that can give it ; we wish also to be free to make our own selection of the schools to which we shall send our sons or our daughters to obtain it ; and we apprehend that, in saying this, we only express the common sentiment and the common right of all parents. We wish also to be able, when we send our children

away from the domestic circle to a school where we cannot ourselves watch over their religion and morals, to send them to a school in which we have full confidence, and where they will be under such religious influences as we approve, and trained up in the religion and morality we hold to be true and acceptable to their Heavenly Father. This cannot be, unless the school is under the control of the denomination to which we ourselves happen to belong. We are, therefore, in favor of every denomination having its own denominational college, supported, indeed, not from the public treasury, but from its own private funds. No harm would result, for a sound and thorough education is not likely to become too common or to be too widely diffused through the community. We must deal with the world as we find it. Various denominations with peculiar views exist, and are "fixed facts" in our community, and the State cannot overlook them, and deal with her citizens as if they were all of the same religion, or as if she had a right to discriminate between one form of Christianity and another. Up to a certain point, all can go together; up to that point let the State provide, as in our common schools, for all in common; beyond that point, let her simply furnish the necessary facilities and protection for each denomination to provide for itself in its own way, — only exacting that each shall respect in the other the right it demands for itself.

But the report furthermore asserts, that, passing over the other objections, the petitioners do not make out a case; that is, do not show a public reason why they should receive a charter. "It seems to your committee," says the report (p. 6), "that there is a fair and sufficient objection to the charter prayed for, that the institution under it will still remain a private and not a public institution. A public institution is one open to the whole community, and which is supposed to confer its benefits as widely as possible. The legislature have no right to grant any charter without the prospect of a public benefit to result plainly and promptly therefrom. The general ground of objection to acts of incorporation is, that they confer no benefits on the public, but are special and exclusive in the interests they protect. This objection, wherever it lies, is conclusive." It does lie against the charter prayed for; therefore the legislature has no right to grant it.

But this objection, if valid against the prayer of the petitioners, is valid against all corporations not public in their character, and proves that the legislature has no right to charter a pri-

vate corporation, — which is the extreme radical doctrine on the subject. Do the committee mean to maintain that all private corporations are unconstitutional? This is a bold doctrine to be put forth in a State all covered over with private corporations, by the committee of a legislature in the daily habit of granting them. If this doctrine is to prevail, it will stand our numerous literary, religious, and manufacturing and other business corporations in hand to look well to their position, and close up their concerns as soon as possible, for their charters are no better than so much waste-paper. No manufacturing or simple business corporation is a public corporation; no particular incorporated religious or denominational society or parish is a public corporation; and Andover Theological Seminary is nothing in the world but a private corporation. The legislature, if the committee are right, has for a long time been singularly deficient in regard for the constitution, and our wisest statesmen and legislators have been mere ninnies. What a pity that the learned author of the report had not been born some fifty years sooner, so as to have saved our legislators from committing their numerous blunders!

But we deny the doctrine of the report on corporations. The principle which it asserts may be true, when applied to the granting of powers to corporations, which interfere with the property, rights, or privileges of others; but powers of this sort do not inhere in the corporation as such, and cannot be exercised by it, unless specially granted. Mr. Healy stated the true doctrine on corporations, and showed conclusively, in his speech in the House, that the established policy of the Commonwealth is to grant charters of corporations where there is a reasonable prospect of benefit to the corporators, and no danger of injury to the public, or infringement of the rights of any other party. Such corporations are for the public benefit, because the public benefit is in the benefit of the parts, and is augmented whenever the benefit of any one of the parts is augmented without subtracting from the rights of any other part. This is the principle of Massachusetts legislation in regard to corporations, as is obvious to any one who chooses to look into the history of her legislation on the subject. The applicants for a corporation must undoubtedly satisfy the legislature that there is a reasonable prospect of a benefit to be derived to them from the act of incorporation, and that what they ask does not interfere with the rights or legitimate interests of any other party. When they have satisfied the legislature on

these two points, they have made out their case, and are entitled to a charter, and the legislature is bound by the uniform policy of the Commonwealth to grant it.

Nobody pretends, that, in the case of the petitioners, the first of these two points was not sufficiently made out; the second was evident of itself, because all they proposed to do as a corporation, the use of the corporate seal excepted, they are already doing with the sanction and under the protection of the laws. Their case was then made out in both its parts, and the legislature was bound by its uniform policy to grant their prayer. The corporation being for their benefit, and injurious to no one, is for the public benefit, and they had therefore the right to ask it, not as a boon, not as a special favor, which the petitioners had too much self-respect as well as too much public spirit to ask, but as a facility for the transacting of a perfectly lawful business, due from the legislature, under like circumstances, to any class of citizens who may ask for it; for it is bound to consult the public good,—to promote the public benefit.

But the petitioners made out, in fact, a stronger case than is here supposed. They petitioned, not for a college,—for that they had, and had founded and intended to support with their own private funds,—but for an act of incorporation. Their college is designed to impart a literary and scientific education to a very considerable number of the youth of this Commonwealth, who would not receive that education elsewhere, and we need not say, here in Massachusetts, that the education of any portion of our youth is a public benefit. That matter is not here a mooted question. Education is regarded as of so high public utility that even private individuals who have no children to educate are publicly taxed to pay for it, and the public at large are compelled to contribute, not only to the support of common schools, but of academies and colleges, whose direct benefit, in the nature of the case, can be enjoyed only by a very small portion of the community. We need but refer to the public grants to Cambridge University, to Williams and Amherst Colleges, to prove that the Commonwealth holds the literary and scientific education of the few to be for the benefit of the many,—for the benefit, in fact, of the public. Nay, the committee themselves concede this, and thus answer their own objection. "True," say they, "*the education of their children in learning and knowledge WILL BE A PUBLIC BENEFIT.*" (p. 7.) This is enough, and, even conceding the untenable doctrine of

the committee on corporations, would entitle the petitioners to the grant of the charter prayed for. The committee add, indeed, that the petitioners "have the means of all this through the public schools and institutions, which are truly open to them as to all"; but this, though it might be a good reason against incorporating an additional college to be supported in whole or in part from the public treasury, is no objection to the incorporation of a college to be supported by private funds, without any charge on the public. Indeed, the petitioners made out an unusually strong case, if the committee are to be believed, why they should have had the act prayed for. They proposed to support their college themselves, and, in doing so, proposed to confer from their private resources a public benefit; for the committee acknowledge that "the education of their children in learning and knowledge would be a public benefit." It is not every day that citizens come before the legislature, and petition to be authorized to use a corporate seal in conferring a public benefit at their own expense. Yet this is what the petitioners actually did, according to the committee themselves. Nevertheless, the committee regarded it as a fair and sufficient reason to refuse them a charter, because no public benefit was to result therefrom!

The committee appear to treat the prayer of the petitioners as if their college was designed primarily for teaching the Roman Catholic religion. If such had been the fact, it would have been no valid reason against incorporating it, since our constitution and laws place Roman Catholics and the several Protestant sects on the same footing, and guaranty to them all equal rights. But such was not the fact. The College of the Holy Cross is a literary and scientific institution, and its primary design is to impart a literary and scientific education. The religion is incidental to the main design. It can hardly be proposed, in a Christian commonwealth, that youth shall be sent from home, and educated in colleges which have no religion, no faith, no worship, — especially at that critical period when the passions begin to unfold, and the character is forming. We profess to be a Christian people, and are by no means prepared for a system of infidel or atheistic education, like that which Frances Wright and Abner Kneeland proposed and labored to introduce into our country. But if religion at all is to enter into our colleges, it must enter in some form, and then in the form of some particular denomination. It is impossible that it should be otherwise, for religion in a vague generality ab-

stracted from all forms is practically no religion at all. It must be Catholic, Episcopalian, Congregational, Baptist, Methodist, Unitarian, &c. Hence the religion of Cambridge University is Unitarian, of Williams and Amherst Colleges, Congregational. In the same sense the religion of the College of the Holy Cross is Catholic. It is inevitable that the college have the religion of some one denomination, or that it have no religion at all. The thing is so, and cannot be helped. Experience proves, that, let the law and let profession say what they may, the religion of some one denomination is the religion of the college, if not a godless college. Between the religion of different denominations the legislature has no authority to discriminate, and to say what religion may and what may not be the religion of this or that college. Consequently, whatever be the particular religion of the college, it can be no valid reason for granting or refusing to grant it a charter. If the college claims, not only its religion, but the right to admit only such as will conform to it, that may be a good reason for not chartering it as a college to be supported at the public charge, but it is no reason at all for refusing to charter it as a college to be supported by the private funds of the denomination under whose influence it is established.

We have here answered all the objections which were urged against granting the prayer of the petitioners, and have shown, that, according to the uniform policy of the Commonwealth, it should have been granted. We have no doubt that the reason why it was not granted was simply because, the case having been misrepresented to the House in the first instance, many members were unable to seize its real character and actual bearings. The bill, however, received a generous support, and, although it failed to secure the vote of the majority, it secured the weight of the talent and respectability of the House, whether of one political party or another. The vote itself we regard as amply sufficient to refute the charge of bigotry so often brought against this Commonwealth by those who are ignorant of her character, as well as the charge set up abroad that the bill was lost in consequence of hostility to Catholics. For ourselves, we repudiate every insinuation of the sort. That the majority of the people have strong feelings against the Catholic religion, nobody doubts; but, at the same time, we doubt just as little the honest intention of the great body of our people to treat their Catholic fellow-citizens as their equals before the law, and to administer the government fairly, and without undue

bias towards one religious denomination or another. The result, which we regret chiefly for the honor of our State, whose fair fame and unsullied honor are as dear to us as the apple of our eye, we believe to have been due solely to a temporary misapprehension of the question on which the House was called to act ; and, having now cleared up the misapprehension and placed it before the public in its simplicity and in its real character, we leave it without the least misgiving as to the action of a future legislature.

ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *The Sea-Lions: or the Lost Sealers.* By J. FENIMORE COOPER. New York: Stringer & Townsend. 1849. 2 vols. 12mo.

THERE was a time when the organs, or pretended organs, of public opinion in this country were all united and loud in their praises of Cooper as the greatest novelist of the age, denominating him, with as little taste as judgment, the “American Scott” ; but for some years past they seem to have been almost equally united and loud in decrying him as a man, and in depreciating his merits as an author. He has ventured to think and write as a freeborn American, to intimate that the American national character is not exactly perfect nor regarded as exactly perfect by European nations, and that there is room for improvement ; he has even gone so far as to point out some of our faults, to tell us that good-breeding is not necessarily incompatible with patriotism, that there is no necessary connection between ill-manners and democracy, and that a man may be a gentleman without ceasing to be a republican. In doing this he has given mortal offence to the two extremes of American society ; — on the one hand, to the radicals, who are for levelling all distinctions, and making all equal, not only before God and the state, but before reason and fortune, in natural gifts and acquired possessions ; and on the other, to our gutter aristocracy,* who, conscious of no inherent nobility, or intrinsic claims to notice or an honorable social position,

* By *gutter* aristocracy, we do not mean those who have *risen* from a low origin or condition, and by their talents and worth attained to honorable distinction ; but those who have *remained* in the gutter, and become distinguished by the gold they have contrived to collect around them.

wish to substitute artificial for natural diversities of social rank and condition, and have them supported by some legal recognition or sanction. But, in all this, it may be that he deserves praise rather than censure, and that we should do better to understand and follow his counsels than to be angry with him for having given them.

Mr. Cooper's taste in some minor matters may, now and then, be questioned; his tone is sometimes arrogant, and his manner apparently egotistical; and it must be admitted that he tells us our faults, without much consideration for self-love, or regard to personal vanity, in a downright, earnest manner, that is sometimes harsh, and seldom politic. But he is a genuine patriot, keenly alive to the honor of his country, and willing to do all that man can do to raise her to that genuine prosperity every good man wishes for her, and to that high character in the estimation of the civilized world, to which she would be entitled if true to her own noble political institutions. His aims are just and honorable, and we have yet to learn that he has misapprehended the national character of his countrymen, or laid to their charge a single fault of which they are not guilty; and, severe as is his *Home as Found*, it is a book which every American citizen would do well, for some time to come at least, to read and meditate as often as once in every three months.

When Mr. Cooper went abroad, some years since, he carried with him a warm American heart, and an enthusiastic love of his country. He also, we should judge from his earlier writings, carried with him the false persuasion common to the great body of his countrymen, that our national character stands high in the estimation of foreigners, and that to be an American citizen is everywhere an honorable distinction. But he was not long in discovering that this persuasion is merely the result of national ignorance and vanity, and that our country is nowhere out of itself regarded as standing even on the ordinary level of civilized nations. Abroad, our national character is held in low esteem, almost in contempt, and we are looked upon as unprincipled, cunning, rapacious, — a nation of speculators and swindlers. The author of *The Spy* and *The Pioneers* could not endure this, and he sought to give to Europeans a more just and favorable view of his country. To this end he wrote and published his *Notions of the Americans, picked up by a Travelling Bachelor*. This work was the production of an enthusiastic American, who saw in his countrymen everything to admire, and nothing to censure. It over-praised us, but it was calculated to meet, and in some degree to soften, the prejudice imbibed against us. Its effect was considerable, and to its influence we may trace the more respectful and the more truthful tone in which subsequent European travellers have spoken of our character and institutions. For this work, faulty as it was, he should have received the thanks of the American people, for it was written and published

not without hazard to his European reputation. But, unhappily, his services in defence of the character of his country were far from being duly appreciated by his countrymen, and it was not long before his generous defence abroad of republicanism called forth bitter denunciations against him at home. Instead of corroborating the truth of what he ventured to assert by uniting as Americans to support him, the American press assailed him and did all in their power to confirm the despisers of our national character in the opinion they had previously formed of it. If, then, he has felt wounded, if he has shown some bitterness of feeling towards his assailants, if he has used little ceremony in telling them of their characteristic faults, and told them some unpalatable truths in a tone somewhat lofty, and in terms somewhat blunt, he has had sufficient provocation, and they have no right to complain. Indeed, they ought to congratulate themselves that he has not been more severe, and less discriminating in his censures. The editors who assail him, whether as a man or as an author, would show more good sense, if they would receive with meekness the wise admonitions and merited rebukes he has given them, and endeavour to improve their tempers, correct their principles, and cease to use their means of influence to debase their countrymen and ruin their country.

Mr. Cooper is an earnest-minded man, and, though a novelist, he is no trifler. Through all his works there runs a serious aim. In some of his earlier novels there is, perhaps, a little too much leaning towards the religion of nature, and not so deep a feeling of the importance and necessity of revealed religion as we could wish; in his series of novels the scenes of which he lays in Europe, there may, perhaps, be detected certain radical and socialistic tendencies which are to be regretted; but he is never really lax in his morals, never prurient in his fancies; we remember no sentence in all he has written that could raise a blush on the cheek of modesty, and we recall no scene attractive to a libertine taste, or that can sully the chastest imagination. He never scoffs; he is never irreverent; he never forgets that man is a moral being, accountable to his Maker for his thoughts, words, and deeds. This, as the times go, is high praise, and honorably distinguishes him from the herd of popular novelists and romancers. It gives him a claim to the love and gratitude of all pure-minded men and patriotic citizens.

We live so much out of the novel-reading world, that we do not know how the work before us, Mr. Cooper's latest publication, has been received; but, for ourselves, we think it the very best of his novels. It is equal in power and interest to his most popular works, and superior to them in its deep religious feeling and high moral tendency. We have found very little in it to which we can object, and very much that, under a moral and religious point of view, we can commend. The author is not a Catholic, but it would be

difficult for us to select a so-called Catholic novel which contains less than is repugnant to Catholic faith and morals. *The Sea-Lions* is as far superior in this respect to *Pauline Seward*, for instance, as it is in creative genius and literary execution; and abating a few expressions, which are merely incidental, we could give it an honorable place in what we call "Catholic secular literature." Its great design is to illustrate the doctrine of Divine Providence, to show the worthlessness and danger of talent, energy, and perseverance in the pursuit of wealth for its own sake, and to urge the importance, in all the relations of life, of accepting and conforming to the great truths of the Gospel, even though they are mysteries, and tend to humble the pride of reason. No recondite moral this, we grant, — nothing more than is encountered at the very threshold of the Christian religion, — but of the highest importance to be insisted upon in these days of philosophy, rationalism, and worldly-mindedness, and which no popular author can now insist upon without hazarding, in some degree, his literary reputation. The author has done no more than his duty, but we live in an age and country when we feel bound to be grateful to the man who will do even that, or, in fact, even do it only in part.

The execution of the work is superior to that which we ordinarily meet with in Cooper's novels. There is no straining for effect; the tone is subdued, and the manner is marked by that repose, the characteristic of strength, which we seldom meet with in our American authors. The characters are happily conceived and well sustained throughout. Roswell Gardiner is, indeed, nothing new, but Deacon Pratt, his niece Mary, and Captain Daggett of the Vineyard, are characters which Cooper has not before given us, and are in their way as original, as truthfully and as delicately drawn, as the character of the Leatherstocking himself.

We extract the following on deacons in general, and Deacon Pratt in particular: —

"There are two great species of deacons; for we suppose they must all be referred to the same *genera*. One species belong to the priesthood, and become priests and bishops; passing away, as priests and bishops are apt to do, with more or less of the savour of godliness. The other species are purely laymen, and are *sui generis*. They are, *ex officio*, the most pious men in a neighbourhood, as they sometimes are, as it would seem to us, *ex officio*, also the most grasping and mercenary. As we are not in the secrets of the sects to which these lay deacons belong, we shall not presume to pronounce whether the individual is elevated to the deaconate because he is prosperous in a worldly sense, or whether the prosperity is a consequence of the deaconate; but that the two usually go together is quite certain; which being the cause, and which the effect, we leave to wiser heads to determine.

"Deacon Pratt was no exception to the rule. A tighter-fisted sinner did not exist in the county than this pious soul, who certainly not only wore, but wore out, the 'form of godliness,' while he was devoted, heart

and hand, to the daily increase of worldly gear. No one spoke disparagingly of the deacon, notwithstanding. So completely had he got to be interwoven with the church — ‘meeting,’ we ought to say — in that vicinity, that speaking disparagingly of him would have appeared like assailing Christianity. It is true, that many an unfortunate fellow-citizen in Suffolk had been made to feel how close was the gripe of his hand, when he found himself in its grasp; but there is a way of practising the most ruthless extortion, that serves not only to deceive the world, but which would really seem to mislead the extortioner himself. Phrases take the place of deeds, sentiments those of facts, and grimaces those of benevolent looks, so ingeniously and so impudently, that the wronged often fancy that they are the victims of a severe dispensation of Providence, when the truth would have shown that they were simply robbed.

“We do not mean, however, that Deacon Pratt was a robber. He was merely a hard man in the management of his affairs; never cheating, in a direct sense, but seldom conceding a cent to generous impulses, or to the duties of kind. He was a widower, and childless, — circumstances that rendered his love of gain still less pardonable; for many a man, who is indifferent to money on his own account, will toil and save to lay up hoards for those who are to come after him. The deacon had only a niece to inherit his effects, unless he might choose to step beyond that degree of consanguinity, and bestow a portion of his means on cousins. The church — or, to be more literal, the ‘meeting’ — had an eye on his resources, however; and it was whispered it had actually succeeded, by means known to itself, in squeezing out of his tight grasp no less a sum than one hundred dollars, as a donation to a certain theological college. It was conjectured by some persons that this was only the beginning of a religious liberality, and that the excellent and godly-minded deacon would bestow most of his property in a similar way, when the moment should come that it could be no longer of any use to himself. This opinion was much in favor with divers devout females of the deacon’s congregation, who had daughters of their own, and who seldom failed to conclude their observations on this interesting subject with some such remark as, ‘Well, in *that* case, and it seems to me that everything points that way, Mary Pratt will get no more than any other poor man’s daughter.’

“Little did Mary, the only child of Israel Pratt, an elder brother of the deacon, think of all this. She had been left an orphan in her tenth year, both parents dying within a few months of each other, and had lived beneath her uncle’s roof for nearly ten more years, until use, and natural affection, and the customs of the country had made her feel absolutely at home there. A less interested or less selfish being than Mary Pratt never existed. In this respect she was the very antipodes of her uncle, who often stealthily rebuked her for her charities and acts of neighbourly kindness, which he was wont to term waste. But Mary kept the even tenor of her way, seemingly not hearing such remarks, and doing her duty quietly, and in all humility.

“Suffolk was settled originally by emigrants from New England, and the character of its people is, to this hour, of modified New England habits and notions. Now, one of the marked peculiarities of Connecticut is an indisposition to part with anything without a *quid pro quo*. Those little services, offerings, and conveniences, that are elsewhere parted with without a thought of remuneration, go regularly upon the day-book, and often reappear on a ‘settlement,’ years after they have been forgotten by

those who received the favors. Even the man who keeps a carriage will let it out for hire; and the manner in which money is accepted and even asked for by persons in easy circumstances, and for things that would be gratuitous in the Middle States, often causes disappointment, and sometimes disgust. In this particular, Scottish and Swiss thrift, both notorious, and the latter particularly so, are nearly equalled by New England thrift; more especially in the close estimate of the value of services rendered. So marked, indeed, is this practice of looking for requitals, that even the language is infected with it. Thus, should a person pass a few months by invitation with a friend, his visit is termed 'boarding'; it being regarded as a matter of course that he pays his way. It would scarcely be safe, indeed, without the precaution of 'passing receipts' on quitting, for one to stay any time in a New England dwelling, unless prepared to pay for his board. The free and frank habits that prevail among relatives and friends elsewhere are nearly unknown there, every service having its price. These customs are exceedingly repugnant to all who have been educated in different notions; yet are they not without their redeeming qualities, that might be pointed out to advantage, though our limits will not permit us, at this moment, so to do.

"Little did Mary Pratt suspect the truth; but habit, or covetousness, or some vague expectation that the girl might yet contract a marriage that would enable him to claim all his advances, had induced the deacon never to bestow a cent on her education, or dress, or pleasures of any sort, that the money was not regularly charged against her, in that nefarious work that he called his 'day-book.' As for the self-respect, and the feelings of caste, which prevent a gentleman from practising any of these tradesmen's tricks, the deacon knew nothing of them. He would have set the man down as a fool who deferred to any notions so unprofitable. With him, not only every *man*, but every *thing* 'had its price,' and usually it was a good price, too. At the very moment when our tale opens there stood charged in his book, against his unsuspecting and affectionate niece, items in the way of schooling, dress, board, and pocket-money, that amounted to the considerable sum of one thousand dollars, money fairly expended. The deacon was only intensely mean and avaricious, while he was as honest as the day. Not a cent was overcharged; and to own the truth, Mary was so great a favorite with him, that most of his charges against *her* were rather of a reasonable rate than otherwise." — Vol. I. pp. 16 – 19.

We must protest against the justice of the character here given to us New-Englanders, — a character far more applicable to those who go out from us than to those who remain at home, and to some portions of Connecticut bordering on New York than to New England generally. It has very little truth when applied to Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, or Maine, — States as remarkable for their hospitality, generosity, and liberal and manly sentiments, as they are for their industry, energy, and enterprise. The notions of the Yankee common in the Middle and Southern States are taken chiefly from Connecticut, — in fact, from Connecticut peddlers of tin-ware and wooden clocks, — and are as false when applied to the great body of the people of the New England States as when applied

to the middle or western sections of the Union. People in the State of New York ought to know that Connecticut is not all of New England; and any one who knows Connecticut knows very well that the peddlers are not a fair sample even of her population. The New England States have a great resemblance in their political and social institutions, and there is a general resemblance in the character and usages of the people of those States of which Boston is the metropolis. We say *metropolis*, for Boston has had, and still has, though it is fast losing it, a metropolitan character,—a character less provincial than any other city in the Union. But beneath all these general resemblances there are striking differences. The Connecticut man is as different from a Massachusetts man as a Pennsylvanian is from a Marylander, and either of these is as different from a Vermonter as a New-Yorker is from a Kentuckian. We speak without prejudice, for, though we were born in Vermont, we were brought up in the Middle States, and it has been our lot to love the South, to reside in the West, and to find a home in old Massachusetts.

New England is behind the other sections of the Union in her agricultural resources, and she has been compelled to turn her attention to trade, commerce, and manufactures. Her people are not, generally speaking, wealthy, and the great majority of her sons are obliged to start in life with little other capital than a good education, business capacity, and habits of industry; economy and frugality—thrift, if you will—have been inculcated from childhood as virtues, not for love of money as an end, but for the sake of independence. That such a people should be to a great extent worldly-minded, that they should be shrewd and successful business-men, was to be expected; but we have yet to learn that New-Englanders, though perhaps more methodical and more successful in what is called getting on in the world, are more attached to money, or less scrupulous as to the means employed in obtaining it, than the people of other sections of the Union. As far as we have observed, they are less mean and tricky in money matters, more just and honorable in their business transactions, than the people of either the Middle or the Western States. The traits of New England character, which Mr. Cooper brings out, are certainly to be detected here and there in New England, but they are not characteristic; and the bigotry and sectarianism he so justly satirizes in nearly all his novels are less marked in New England than in New York or Pennsylvania. We have very little Presbyterianism, the most odious of all the forms of Protestantism, and our Puritanism has been much softened by time. The things which the author finds most frequent occasion to censure in his *Homeward Bound*, or *Home as Found*, are hardly known in New England. His Aristabulus Brag, or his model editor, Steadfast Dodge, Esq., might

have been born in New England, but neither could have played the part he assigns him in any New England society. In New England there is more real equality than in any other section of the Union, and at the same time less vulgar tenacity in asserting it. The social distinctions which grow legitimately out of a difference of cultivation, manners, and tastes are cheerfully recognized, and, in general, every one falls, without murmuring or heart-burning, into his own rank, class, or set, where he is at home and can enjoy himself. In any part of New England, there is *society* in Mr. Cooper's sense of the word, because we have an old, permanent population, born where they live, and not a miscellaneous population, made up of strangers and adventurers from all parts of the country, and from every quarter of the globe. At least, such is as yet the fact, but how long it will be so in our principal towns we are unable to say. We think, however, that it will remain so, for what Mr. Cooper calls the "movers" go out from us, as not being of us; and few adventurers are likely to come from other parts of the Union to settle, or even bivouac, among us.

Littleness, meanness, low cunning, legal honesty and moral dishonesty in money matters, may certainly be found in New England; and we have quite too many Deacon Pratts and Captain Daggetts, we own; but, relatively to the other sections of the Union, we have our full and more than our full share of high-minded and liberal men,—men of talents, cultivation, and manners, who are an honor to any country; and nothing is more false than the common notions elsewhere entertained of the Yankee character. We challenge the world to produce a finer specimen of the gentleman than the well-bred and cultivated Bostonian. Bigotry we certainly have, as well as religious indifference, and fanaticism in regard to temperance and abolitionism has certainly seized a fraction of our population; but at the same time these things find here their ablest and most energetic opponents, and there is not one of the Middle States in which public opinion interferes less despotically with individual freedom. So much, as not being a Bostonian, and hardly a Yankee, we have felt that we might say without impropriety, or subjecting ourselves to Mr. Cooper's charge of provincialism. To our own heart our country is one, and we dislike all these sectional divisions. We love our whole country, and mean to be true to it, "however bounded"; but we protest against the opinions in regard to New-Englanders which we find in almost every American book written by men born in other parts of the Union,—not for the sake of New England, who needs no defence, but for the sake of her assailants.

We have been led farther than we intended in these remarks, which we have made less for Mr. Cooper than for some others. We return to the work before us. We have little room for extracts, but we must express our warm affection for Mary Pratt, a pure-minded

and excellent girl, the very best female character in her walk in life Mr. Cooper has ever drawn. She has pure, deep, strong affection, and high, uncompromising religious principle. She loves Roswell Gardiner, but though her heart break she will not give him her hand as long as he remains a Unitarian, for she will not form the most intimate and sacred union which two human beings can form with one whose God is not her God. We cannot resist the temptation to extract the following, which we commend to those of our Catholic friends who see no harm in mixed marriages.

“The young sailor left the wharf at Sag Harbour about ten minutes after the deacon had preceded him, on his way to the schooner. As the wind was so light and so fair, he soon had his sheets in, and the boat gliding along at an easy rate, which permitted him to bestow nearly all his attention on his charming companion. Roswell Gardiner had sought this occasion, that he might once more open his heart to Mary, and urge his suit for the last time, previously to so long an absence. This he did in a manly, frank way, that was far from being unpleasant to his gentle listener, whose inclinations, for a few minutes, blinded her to the resolutions already made on principle. So urgent was her suitor, indeed, that she should solemnly plight her faith to him, ere he sailed, that a soft illusion came over the mind of one as affectionate as Mary, and she was half inclined to believe her previous determination was unjustifiable and obdurate. But the head of one of her high principles, and clear views of duty, could not long be deceived by her heart, and she regained the self-command which had hitherto sustained her in all her former trials, in connection with this subject.

“‘Perhaps it would have been better, Roswell,’ she said, ‘had I taken leave of you at the Harbour, and not incurred the risk of the pain that I foresee I shall both give and bear in our present discourse. I have concealed nothing from you; possibly I have been more sincere than prudence would sanction. You know the only obstacle there is to our union; but that appears to increase in strength, the more I ask you to reflect on it, — to try to remove it.’

“‘What would you have me do, Mary? Surely, not to play the hypocrite, and profess to believe that which I certainly do not, and which, after all my inquiries, I *cannot* believe.’

“‘I am sorry it is so, on every account,’ returned Mary, in a low and saddened tone. ‘Sorry, that one of so frank, ingenuous a mind should find it impossible to accept the creed of his fathers, and sorry that it must leave so impassable a chasm between us, for ever.’

“‘No, Mary; that can never be! Nothing but death can separate us for so long a time! While we meet, we shall at least be friends; and friends love to meet and to see each other often.’

“‘It may seem unkind, at a moment like this, Roswell, but it is in truth the very reverse, if I say we ought not to meet each other here, if we are bent on following our own separate ways towards a future world. My God is not your God; and what can there be of peace in a family, when its two heads worship different deities? I am afraid that you do not think sufficiently of the nature of these things.’

“‘I did not believe you to be so illiberal, Mary! Had the deacon said

as much, I might not have been surprised ; but for one like you to tell me that my God is not your God is narrow indeed !’

“ ‘ Is it not so, Roswell ! And if so, why should we attempt to gloss over the truth by deceptive words ! I am a believer in the Redeemer, as the Son of God, as one of the Holy Trinity ; while you believe in him only as a man, — a righteous and just, a sinless man, if you will, but as a man only. Now, is not the difference in these creeds immense ! Is it not, in truth, just the difference between God and man ! I worship my Redeemer ; regard him as the equal of the Father, — as a part of that Divine Being ; while you look on him as merely a man without sin, — as a man such as Adam probably was before the fall.’ ”

“ ‘ Do we know enough of these matters, Mary, to justify us in allowing them to interfere with our happiness !’ ”

“ ‘ We are told that they are all-essential to our happiness, — not in the sense you may mean, Roswell, but in one of far higher import, — and we cannot neglect them, without paying the penalty.’ ”

“ ‘ I think you carry these notions too far, dearest Mary, and that it is possible for man and wife most heartily to love each other, and to be happy in each other, without their thinking exactly alike on religion. How many good and pious women do you see, who are contented and prosperous as wives and mothers, and who are members of meeting, but whose husbands make no profession of any sort !’ ”

“ ‘ That may be true, or not. I lay no claim to a right to judge of any others’ duties, or manner of viewing what they ought to do. Thousands of girls marry without *feeling* the very obligations that they profess to reverence ; and when, in after life, deeper convictions come, they cannot cast aside the connections they have previously formed, if they would ; and probably would not, if they could. That is a different thing from a young woman, who has a deep sense of what she owes to her Redeemer, becoming deliberately, and with a full sense of what she is doing, the wife of one who regards her God as merely a man. I care not how you qualify this opinion, by saying a pure and sinless man ; it will be man, still. The difference between God and man is too immense to be frittered away by any such qualifications as that.’ ”

“ ‘ But, if I find it *impossible* to believe all you believe, Mary, surely you would not punish me for having the sincerity to tell you the truth, and the whole truth.’ ”

“ ‘ No, indeed, Roswell,’ answered the honest girl, gently, not to say tenderly. ‘ Nothing has given me a better opinion of your principles, Roswell, — a higher notion of what your upright and frank character really is, than the manly way in which you have admitted the justice of my suspicions of your want of faith, — of faith, as I consider faith can alone exist. This fair dealing has made me honor you, and esteem you, in addition to the more girlish attachment that I do not wish to conceal from you, at least, I have so long felt.’ ”

“ ‘ Blessed Mary !’ exclaimed Roswell Gardiner, almost ready to fall down on his knees and worship the pretty enthusiast, who sat at his side with a countenance in which intense interest in his welfare was beaming from two of the softest and sweetest blue eyes that maiden ever bent on a youth in modest tenderness, whatever disposition he might be in to accept her God as his God. ‘ How can one so kind in all other respects prove so cruel in this one particular !’ ”

“ ‘ Because that one particular, as you term it, Roswell, is all in all to

her,' answered the girl, with a face that was now flushed with feeling. 'I must answer you as Joshua told the Israelites of old, — "Choose you, this day, whom you will serve; whether the gods which your fathers served, that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of the Amorites, in whose land ye dwell: *but as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord.*"'

"Do you class me with the idolaters and pagans of Palestine?' demanded Gardiner, reproachfully.

"You have said it, Roswell. It is not I, but yourself, who have thus classed you. You worship your reason, instead of the one true and living God. This is idolatry of the worst character, since the idol is never seen by the devotee, and he does not know of its existence.'

"You consider it, then, idolatry for one to use those gifts which he has received from his Maker, and to treat the most important of all subjects as a rational being, instead of receiving a creed blindly, and without thought?'

"If what you call thought could better the matter, if it were sufficient to comprehend and master this subject, there might be force in what you say. But what is this boasted reason, after all? It is not sufficient to explain a single mystery of the creation, though there are thousands. I know there are, nay, there *must* be, a variety of opinions among those who look to their reasons, instead of accepting the doctrine of revelation, for the character of Christ; but I believe all, who are not open infidels, admit that the atonement of his death was sufficient for the salvation of men: now, can you explain this part of the theory of our religion any more than you can explain the divine nature of the Redeemer? Can you *reason* any more wisely touching the fall, than touching the redemption itself? I know I am unfit to treat of matters of this profound nature,' continued Mary, modestly, though with great earnestness and beauty of manner: 'but, to me, it seems very plain, that, the instant circumstances lead us beyond the limits of our means of comprehension, we are to *believe* in, and not to reason on, revelation. The whole history of Christianity teaches this. Its first ministers were uneducated men; men who were totally ignorant until enlightened by their faith; and all the lessons it teaches are to raise faith, and faith in the Redeemer, high above all other attainments, as the one great acquisition that includes and colors every other. When such is the fact, the heart does not make a stumbling-block of everything that the head cannot understand.'

"I do not know how it is,' answered Roswell Gardiner, influenced, though unconvinced; 'but when I talk with you on this subject, Mary, I cannot do justice to my opinions, or to the manner in which I reason on them with my male friends and acquaintance. I confess it does appear to me illogical, unreasonable, — I scarce know how to designate what I mean, — but improbable, that God should suffer himself, or his Son, to be crucified by beings that he himself created, or that he should feel a necessity for any such course, in order to redeem beings he had himself brought into existence.'

"If there be any argument in the last, Roswell, it is an argument as much against the crucifixion of a man as against the crucifixion of one of the Trinity itself. I understand you to believe that such a being as Jesus of Nazareth did exist; that he was crucified for our redemption; and that the atonement was accepted and acceptable before God the Father. Now, is it not just as difficult to understand how, or why, this should be, as to understand the common creed of Christians?'

“ ‘Surely, there is a vast difference between the crucifixion of a subordinate being, and the crucifixion of ~~one~~ who made a part of the Godhead itself, Mary! I can imagine the first, though I may not pretend to understand its reasons, or why it was necessary it should be so; but I am certain you will not mistake my motive when I say, I cannot imagine the other.’ ”

“ ‘Make no apologies to me, Roswell; look rather to that dread Being whose teachings, through chosen ministers, you disregard. As for what you say, I can fully feel its truth. I do not pretend to *understand* why such a sacrifice should be necessary, but I *believe* it, *feel* it; and believing and feeling it, I cannot but adore and worship the Son, who quitted heaven to come on earth, and suffered, that we might possess eternal life. It is all mystery to me, as is the creation itself, our existence, God himself, and all else that my mind is too limited to comprehend. But, Roswell, if I believe a part of the teachings of the Christian Church, I must believe all. The apostles, who were called by Christ in person, who lived in his very presence, who knew nothing except as the Holy Spirit prompted, worshipped him as the Son of God, as one “who thought it not robbery to be equal with God”; and shall I, ignorant and uninspired, pretend to set up my feeble means of reasoning in opposition to their written instructions?’ ”

“ ‘Yet must each of us stand or fall by the means he possesses, and the use he makes of them.’ ”

“ ‘That is quite true, Roswell; and ask yourself the use to which you put your own faculties. I do not deny that we are to exercise our reason, but it is within the bounds set for its exercise. We may examine the evidence of Christianity, and determine for ourselves how far it is supported by reasonable and sufficient proofs; beyond this we cannot be expected to go, else might we be required to comprehend the mystery of our own existence, which just as much exceeds our understanding as any other. We are told that man was created in the image of his Creator, which means that there is an immortal and spiritual part of him that is entirely different from the material creature. One perishes, temporarily at least, — a limb can be severed from the body and perish, even while the body survives; but it is not so with that which has been created in the image of the Deity. That is imperishable, immortal, spiritual, though doomed to dwell awhile in a tenement of clay. Now, why is it more difficult to believe that pure divinity may have entered into the person of one man, than to *believe*, nay, to *feel*, that the image of God has entered into the persons of so many myriads of men? You not only overlook all this, Roswell, but you commit the, to me inexplicable, mistake of believing a part of a mystery, while you hesitate about believing all. Were you to deny the merits of the atonement altogether, your position would be much stronger than it is in believing what you do. But, Roswell, we will not embitter the moment of separation by talking more on this subject now. I have other things to say to you, and but little time to say them in. The promise you have asked of me to remain single until your return, I most freely make. It costs me nothing to give you *this* pledge, since there is scarce a possibility of my ever marrying another.’ ” — Vol. 1. pp. 98 – 104.

2. — *The Four Gospels, translated from the Latin Vulgate, and diligently compared with the Original Greek Text, being a Revision of the Rheims Translation, with Notes Critical and Explanatory.* By FRANCIS PATRICK KENRICK, Bishop of Philadelphia. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1849. 8vo. pp. 572.

THE MESSRS. Dunigan have sent out this excellent volume in a dress far superior to that in which our Catholic publications usually appear, for which they deserve our hearty thanks and the hearty thanks of all readers. We welcome the volume, also, as a proof that the demand for Catholic books is rapidly increasing, and that the taste of Catholic readers is rapidly improving. We trust the time is not far distant when we shall have in this country a Catholic public large enough and wealthy enough to support our booksellers, and encourage the labors of our authors in any department of literature or science they may choose to cultivate.

Of the work itself before us, we are hardly qualified to speak. Though a reviewer by profession, we are not of the class who know all things and some others. There are subjects of which we know too little to be authorized to express even an opinion. It would be presumptuous in us to attempt to criticize such a work as the present, and for us to commend a work by the learned and illustrious Bishop of Philadelphia would be simply impertinence. All we can say is, that, as far as we have found leisure to compare the translation with the original, it appears to be faithful, and not unfrequently felicitous. The style of the translation is good, and preserves the simplicity of the ancient translation without being antiquated. The Notes, critical and explanatory, we have found interesting and instructive. They elucidate most of the obscurities of the Sacred Text, and justify the reading and the rendering adopted. As a work for Biblical students, engaged in the critical study of the Holy Scriptures, it must possess a high value, and it is, under any point of view, the most important contribution to the branch of Catholic literature to which it pertains, that has recently, or to our knowledge ever, been made in the English tongue, — although we are bound to add, that this is by no means saying as much as some might imagine. Saving a few ascetic books abominably translated from the Latin or some of the Continental tongues, and several very respectable controversial works on the points usually disputed between us and a few of the Protestant sects, our Catholic *English* literature is, to our shame, among the things that are not. We cannot study in English a single art or science, nay, cannot teach our children the simple rudiments of an English education, without the aid of our heretical and schismatical neighbours. If the learned doctors and scholars, so numerous among us, would each be half as industrious in some department to which his genius and attainments are adapted as the learned Bishop of Philadelphia is in the several departments he cultivates, we should soon rise to literary independence, and be able to collect an English library not unadapted to the wants and tastes of a cultivated Catholic family. We thank the eminent prelate for this contribution to Catholic Biblical literature, and hope we shall find others to imitate his example.

3. — *The Eucharistic Month; or Thirty-one Days' Preparation and Thanksgiving for the Holy Communion, useful to Priests and all who often Communicate. Translated into English, and revised by a Catholic Clergyman. To which is added, Devout Entertainments on the Holy Sacrament of the Altar.* Philadelphia: McGrath. 1849. 24mo. pp. 176.

THIS is an admirable work, the very best of its class we are acquainted with. We speak of the book as the author wrote it, not as it stands before us in its pretended English dress. We know not who is the Catholic clergyman who has revised the translation, and it is some relief to us that we do not. He is, no doubt, a pious man and a good priest, but he does not happen to be master of the English tongue. This is nothing to his discredit as a holy man, but it is a serious drawback upon his merits as a translator. The simple fact is, that the translations of popular works which are circulated amongst us are, in general, without any exaggeration, execrable. They appear to be made either by foreigners who have only an imperfect knowledge of English, or by persons who, though not foreigners by birth, have been so accustomed to read, think, and pray in a foreign language, that they have lost the proper use of their mother tongue. The translator of the work before us is either a Frenchman, or one who has been accustomed to perform his devotions and to make his meditations in French, or at least accustomed to use ascetic works in which the French idiom is retained. We mean in this no disrespect to the Frenchmen or to the French language, but we do mean to protest against Frenchifying our own mother tongue. We are in the habit of conversing with our Father and our Redeemer in English, and we suppose this to be the case with the great majority of those for whom translations into English are needed.

The translator, in direct addresses to the Supreme Being, to the Father, the Son, or the Holy Ghost, invariably, as far as we have observed, uses the pronouns of the second person in the plural number. This is proper in French, but in English borders on levity or profanity. *You* applied to God affects an Englishman precisely as *tu* applied to him would affect a Frenchman. In French, the singular is familiar, and can be properly used only by equals and intimates; in English, the plural is familiar, and can never be applied when the address is to God, or *nakedly* even to persons of dignity. We listened, some time since, to an admirable sermon by a most excellent priest, loved and revered for his piety and his zeal, and yet the constant use of the plural instead of the singular in his frequent addresses to our Maker and Redeemer, our Father and our Friend, shocked us, and deprived us of the edification his admirable sermon was otherwise fitted to give. We can hardly take up a devotional or ascetic work in which we do not find the same violation of the English idiom. Why is this so? Does piety disdain good taste, and regard it as a merit to discard purity of language? Why cannot a little more attention be paid by our translators to the genius of our tongue, and some pains be taken to elevate our hearts to God without barbarizing our language?

The translator of the work commits other faults which should be corrected. Addressing our Lord under the figure of the sun, — Sun of justice, which the printer makes *Son* of justice, — he says, “*Lovely Sun, warm me, — lovely Sun, enlighten me,*” &c. This is intolerable. Usage

has made *lovely*, as here applied, wholly inadmissible, and the expression is neither sufficiently elevated nor sufficiently affectionate. *Lovely*, when taken alone, or when not reinforced and elevated by the turn of the phrase, is an inadequate translation of the French *aimable*, or the Latin *amabilis*, as used by ascetic writers. The English is not, we own, a language of phrases, like the French, but it makes the *phrase* of some importance in determining the sense or appropriateness of single words, — a fact never to be lost sight of by those who wish to write it idiomatically. It is not for us to say what term the translator should have used, but, if he chose to retain the construction, *amiable*, *beautiful*, *sweet*, or *dear* would have been preferable to *lovely*. In the case before us, writing in English, we should without hesitation have written, “*Dear Sun, warm me,*” which is, to the English reader, as forcible as *amabilis* or *aimable*, and more affectionate. It expresses the loveliness intended by expressing its effect, and enlivens the abstract by making it concrete. It is English, and in accordance with good English usage. The English language is far from being so cold as is commonly imagined, as might be inferred from the fact that it always prefers the concrete, and has a dislike for abstract terms. It is the language of living men, — of warm, living, loving hearts, — and it is cold and repulsive only because, in using it, instead of following its own genius, we try to conform it to the genius of languages with which it has very little affinity. If in writing, as in ordinary conversation, we would forget the forms of expression and the terms we have become familiar with in the learned languages or in the languages derived from them, we should soon find ourselves able to express in it all the ideas and affections we wish to express. The English term or phrase often dissatisfies us solely because, in our own minds, the thought or affection intended to be expressed is associated with a term or phrase of another language, and we fail to perceive the beauty or force of the English term or phrase. The simple fact is, very few of us know our own language well enough to be able to translate into it works from other tongues; and seldom should a translation be permitted to appear in public till it has passed under the revision of some good English scholar who has no knowledge of the original.

4. — *Macaulay's History*. — Domestic afflictions have prevented the writer from whom we expected a review of this work from preparing it in season for this number of our journal. Those of our readers who may be disappointed will find an able, and, except in what relates to Catholics, a just, review of it in a recent number of the *London Quarterly Review*, which proves that, however brilliant Mr. Macaulay may be as a writer, he is worthy of no confidence or respect as an historian.

. WE cannot resist the temptation to publish the following letter, designed to approve and encourage our humble labors in the cause of Catholic literature. The letter was as unexpected as it is kind and cheering, and we are utterly at a loss to express our deep sense of the high testimony it bears to our Review. No higher testimonial could be asked, and no higher, out of Rome, could be given; and to say we are grateful is to say nothing. We thank the eminent prelate who drew up

the letter, and each and all of the illustrious Archbishops and Bishops who generously signed it, and gave us their approbation and a pledge of their support. It was more than we deserved, more than we can deserve, more than any editor can deserve; but we will do our best not to make them regret their generous act. We should be oppressed with their approbation, did we not know that, whatever merits this journal may have, as a Catholic journal, they are due not to us, but principally to the distinguished Bishop of this diocese and his venerable and learned clergy, who have always been ready to instruct our ignorance, and to advise and direct us in the course proper for such a journal to pursue, and in the proper views to be taken of the several important theological questions we have discussed. To them pertain the merits of the Review, — to us alone its faults and imperfections, which we hope will diminish with time and experience. The letter is signed by both the Archbishops, and by every one of the prelates assembled in the Council recently held in Baltimore, whom we thank again and again for their act of unexpected and spontaneous kindness.

Baltimore, 13th May, 1849.

DEAR SIR, —

After the close of our Council, I suggested to our venerable metropolitan the propriety of encouraging you by our approbation and influence to continue your literary labors in defence of the faith, of which you have proved an able and intrepid advocate. He received the suggestion most readily, and I take the liberty of communicating the fact to you, as a mark of my sincere esteem, and of the deep interest I feel in your excellent Review. I shall beg of him and of other prelates who entertain the same views, to subscribe their names in confirmation of my statement.

Your very devoted friend,

† FRANCIS PATRICK KENRICK,

Bishop of Philadelphia.

OL. A. BROWNSON, Esq.

† SAMUEL, Archbishop of Baltimore.

† PETER RICHARD, Archbishop of St. Louis.

† MICHAEL, Bishop of Mobile.

† ANTHONY, Bishop of New Orleans.

† JOHN JOSEPH, Bishop of Natchez.

† JOHN, Bishop of Buffalo.

† M. O'CONNOR, Bishop of Pittsburg.

† MARTIN, Bishop of Dubuque.

† JOHN, M. O'NEIL, Bishop of Galveston.

† MARTIN JOHN, Bishop of Lexington, and Coadjutor of Louisville.

† M. DE ST. PALAIS, Bishop of Vincennes.

† WILLIAM TYLER, Bishop of Hartford.

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† ROBERT PHILIP, Bishop of Nashville.

† JOHN BAPTIST, Bishop of Cincinnati.

† JOHN HIGGINS, Bishop of New York.

† RICHARD VINCENT, Bishop of Richmond.

† JAMES OLIVER, Bishop of Chicago.

† JOHN M. HENRI, Bishop of Milwaukee.

† JOHN, Bishop of Albany.

† AUGUSTUS, Bishop of Cleveland.

† PETER PAUL, Bishop and Coadjutor Administrator of Detroit.

† IGNATIUS AL. RYNOLODS, Bishop of Charleston.

† ANDREW BYRNES, Bishop of Little Rock.

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meeting it under the various forms it at present assumes, and of imposing silence on its arrogant and noisy pretensions. He does not confine himself to the field of theological controversy, properly so called, but he meets Protestants on their own chosen ground, on the broad field of European civilization, and shows them that, under the point of view of civilization, of liberty, order, and social well-being, Protestantism has been a total failure, and that, even in reference to this world, Catholicity has found itself as superior to it as it claims to be in regard to the world to come. He does not merely vindicate Catholicity, in relation to civilization, from the charges preferred against it by the modern advocates of Liberalism and Progressism, but, by a calm appeal to history and philosophy, he shows that the opposing system has interrupted the work of civilization which the Church was prosecuting with vigor and success, and has operated solely in the interests of barbarism. In doing this, he has done a real service to the cause of truth, and we learn with pleasure that one of our friends in England has translated his work, — which he wrote originally both in French and Spanish, — and rendered it accessible to the great body of English and American readers.

Such a work as this was much needed in our language. We have, indeed, many able controversial works, — works admirable for the learning, ability, and skill of their authors; but we have comparatively few which are adapted to the present state of the controversy with Protestants. The greater part of those accessible to the mere English reader are well adapted only to the few individuals whose hearts the grace of God has already touched, and whose faces are already set towards the Church. Truth is one and invariable, but error is variable and manifold. It is always the same truth that we must oppose to error, but it is seldom the same error for two successive moments to which we must oppose it. We must shoot error, as well as folly, “as it flies,” and we must be able to shoot it under ever varying and varied disguises. The works we have, excellent as they are in their way, and admirably fitted to guard the faithful against many of the devices of the enemy to detach them from the Church, and to aid and instruct persons in heretical communions who are virtually prepared to return to the Church, do not hit the reigning form of Protestantism; they do not reach the seat of the disease, and are apparently written on the supposition of soundness, where there is, in fact, only rottenness. The principles they assume as the basis of

their refutation of Protestantism, though nominally professed or conceded by the majority of Protestants, are not held with sufficient firmness to be used as the foundation of an argument that is to have any practical efficacy in their conversion. They all appear to assume that Protestants as a body really mean to be Christians, and err only in regard to some of the dogmas of Christianity and the method of determining the faith; that Protestantism is a specific heresy, a distinct and positive form of error, like Arianism or Pelagianism, and that its adherents would regard themselves as bound to reject it, if proved to be repugnant to Christianity, or contrary to the Holy Scriptures. This is a natural and a charitable supposition; but we are sorry to say, that, if it was ever warrantable, it is not by any means warrantable in our times, except as to the small number of individuals in the several sects who are mere exceptions to the rule. Protestantism is no specific heresy, is no distinct or positive form of error, but error in general, indifferent to forms, and receptible of any form or of all forms, as suits the convenience or the exigency of its friends. It is a veritable Proteus, and takes any and every shape judged to be proper to deceive the eyes or to elude the blows of the champions of truth. It is Lutheran, Calvinistic, Arminian, Unitarian, Pantheistic, Atheistic, Pyrrhonic, each by turns or all at once, as is necessary to its purpose. The Protestant as such has, in the ordinary sense, no principles to maintain, no character to support, no consistency to preserve; and we are aware of no authority, no law, no usage, by which he will consent to be bound. Convict him from tradition, and he appeals to the Bible; convict him from the Bible, and he appeals to reason; convict him from reason, and he appeals to private sentiment; convict him from private sentiment, and he appeals to skepticism, or flies back to reason, to Scripture, or tradition, and alternately from one to the other, — never scrupling to affirm, one moment, what he denied the moment before, nor blushing to be found maintaining, that, of contraries, both may be true. He is indifferent as to what he asserts or denies, if able for the moment to obtain an apparent covert from his pursuers.

Protestants do not study for the truth, and are never to be presumed willing to accept it, unless it chances to be where and what they wish it. They occasionally read our books and listen to our arguments, but rarely to ascertain our doctrines, or to learn what we are able to say against them or for ourselves. The thought, that we may possibly be right, seldom

occurs to them; and when it does, it is instantly suppressed as an evil thought, as a temptation from the Devil. They take it for granted, that, against us, they are right, and cannot be wrong. This is with them a "fixed fact," admitting no question. They condescend to consult our writings, or to listen to our arguments, only to ascertain what doctrines they can profess, or what modifications they can introduce into those which they have professed, that will best enable them to elude our attacks, or give them the appearance of escaping conviction by the authorities from tradition, Scripture, reason, and sentiment which we array against them. Candor or ingenuousness towards themselves even is a thing wholly foreign to their Protestant nature, and they are instinctively and habitually cavillers and sophisticators. They disdain to argue a question on its merits, and always, if they argue at all, argue it on some unimportant collateral. They never recognize—unless it is for their interest to do so—any distinction between a *transeat* and a *concedo*, and rarely fail to insist that the concession of an irrelevant point is a concession of the main issue. They have no sense of responsibility, no loyalty to truth, no mental chastity, no intellectual sincerity. What is for them is authority which nobody must question; what is against them is no authority at all. Their own word, if not in their favor, they refuse to accept; and the authority to which they professedly appeal they repudiate the moment it is seen not to sustain them. To reason with them as if they would stand by their own professions, or could or would acknowledge any authority but their own ever-varying opinions, is entirely to mistake them, and to betray our own simplicity.

Undoubtedly, many of our friends, who have not, like ourselves, been brought up Protestants, and have not to blush at the knowledge their Protestant experience has given them, may feel that in this judgment we are rash and uncharitable. Would that we were so. We take no pleasure in thinking ill of any portion of our fellow-men, and would always rather find ourselves wrong in our unfavorable judgments of them than right. But in this matter the evidence is too clear and conclusive to allow us even to hope that we are wrong. There is not a single Protestant doctrine opposed to Catholicity that even Protestants themselves have not over and over again completely refuted; there is not a single charge brought by Protestants against the Church that some of them, as well as we, have not fully exploded; and no more conclusive vindication

of the claims of Catholicity can be desired than may be — nay, than in fact has been — collected from distinguished Protestant writers themselves. This is a fact which no Protestant, certainly no Catholic, can deny. How happens it, then, that the Protestant world still subsists, and that, for the last hundred and fifty years, we have made comparatively little progress in regaining Protestants to the Church?

We may, it is true, be referred to the obstinacy in error characteristic of all heretics; but, in the present case, — unless what is meant is obstinacy in error in general, and not in error in particular, — this will not suffice as an answer; because, during this period, there has been no one particular form of error to which Protestants have uniformly adhered. No class of Protestants adheres to-day to the opinions it originally avowed. In this respect, there is a marked difference between the Protestant sects of modern times and the early Oriental sects. The Jacobite holds to-day the same specific heresy which he held a thousand years ago; and the Nestorian of the nineteenth is substantially the Nestorian of the fourth century. But nothing analogous is true of any of the modern Protestant sects. Protestants boast, indeed, their glorious Reformation, but they no longer hold the views of its authors. Luther, were he to ascend to the scenes of his earthly labors, would be utterly unable to recognize his teachings in the doctrines of the modern Lutherans; the Calvinist remains a Calvinist only in name; the Baptist disclaims his Anabaptist original; the Unitarian points out the errors he detects in his Socinian ancestors; and the Transcendentalist looks down with pity on his Unitarian parents, while he considers it a cruel persecution to be excluded from the Unitarian family. No sect retains, unmodified, unchanged, the precise form of error with which it set out. All the forms Protestants have from time to time assumed have been developed, modified, altered, almost as soon as assumed, — always as internal or external controversy made it necessary or expedient. Here is a fact nobody can deny, and it proves conclusively that the Protestant world does not subsist solely by virtue of its obstinate attachment to the views or opinions to which it has once committed itself, or in consequence of its aversion to change the doctrines it has once professed.

This fact proves even more than this. Bossuet very justly concludes from the *variations* of Protestantism its *objective* falsity, because the characteristic of truth is invariability; but we may go farther, and from the same variations conclude the

subjective falsity of Protestantism, or that Protestants have no real belief in, or attachment to, the particular doctrines they profess, — not only that Protestants profess a false doctrine, but that they are insincere, and destitute, as a body, of real honesty in their professions. If they believed their doctrines, they could never tolerate the changes they undergo. New sects might, indeed, arise among them, but no sect would suffer its original doctrines to be in the least altered or modified. The members of every sect, if they believed its creed, would, so long as they adhered to it, be struck with horror at the bare idea of altering or modifying it; for it would seem to them to be altering or modifying the revealed Word of God. This is a point of no slight importance in judging the Protestant world, and seems to us to deserve more attention than the great body of Catholics even are disposed to give it. These variations prove, at least, that Protestantism is something distinct from the formal teachings of Protestants, and something that can and does survive them.

That we are neither rash nor uncharitable in our judgment of Protestants, severe as it unquestionably is, may be collected from facts of daily occurrence. The great body of Protestants, it is well known, labor unceasingly to detach Catholics from the Church, and to this end use all the means the age and country will tolerate. It was to combine their forces against Catholicity, that, a few years since, under the pontificate of Gregory XVI., the Protestant ministers held their World's Convention in London; that they formed Protestant alliances in England, Germany, France, Switzerland, and this country, devised a plan in concert with the Italian refugees in these several countries for effecting a civil revolution in every Catholic state, especially in the Papal States, and called upon the Protestant people everywhere to contribute funds for carrying it out, — a plan, even to minute particulars, which the well-known ministers, Bacon, Coxe, Beecher, Kirk, and others, forewarned us of in a meeting of the Protestant Alliance in this city in 1845, and which we have seen to a great extent realized during the last two years, much to the joy of thousands of nominal Catholics, who little suspected themselves to be the dupes of miserable demagogues on the one hand, and of hypocritical Protestant ministers on the other. But while Protestants, in season and out of season, by means fair and by means foul, by means open and by means secret and tortuous, seek to detach Catholics from the Church, they appear quite indifferent as to

which of the thousand and one Protestant formulas they are led to embrace, or whether, indeed, they are led to embrace any one of them. Excepting, as we always do, here and there an individual, they are satisfied with the simple fact, that those drawn off from the Church are no longer Catholics. Whatever we lose, they count their gain, and although they are well aware that the majority of those they gain from us turn out rank apostates, infidels, and blasphemers, they nevertheless rejoice over them, and claim them as so many accessions to their ranks. If Protestants had any sincerity in their professions, if they had any sense of religion, how could they regard themselves as triumphing in proportion as they succeed in detaching miserable wretches from us, and sinking them in religion even below the ancient heathen, — especially since none of them dare pretend that we do not embrace all the essentials of the Christian religion, or that salvation is not attainable in our Church? They profess to be Christians, but they would rather make us infidels, apostates, atheists, blasphemers, than suffer us to remain Catholics. What more conclusive proof can you ask of their insincerity, — of the fact that their professions afford no clew to the real state of their minds, and ought to count for nothing?

Doubtless, we are not to be understood to imply that Protestants are always distinctly conscious of their own want of strict honesty and sincerity. No man knoweth whether he deserveth love or hatred. Knowledge of one's self is hard to acquire; self-deception is one of the easiest things in the world, and few there are who are certain that they have a *good* conscience, or are sure of the motives which govern them. No doubt, Protestants gloss over their conduct, and have some method of justifying it in their own eyes; no doubt, they persuade themselves that they are sincere, — at least as sincere as they can afford to be, as honest in their belief as people generally are; but they know not what manner of spirit they are of, and as that spirit is inherently a lying spirit, as Catholics well know, it must needs lie unto themselves as well as unto others. Probably every heresiarch dupes himself before he dupes others, and holds the post of leader only because a greater dupe than his followers. That kind of honesty and sincerity compatible with a false spirit and gross delusion, we are not disposed to deny to Protestants; but we should remember that no really sincere and truthful mind ever is or ever can be deluded. No man ever is or ever was strictly honest and sincere

in the profession of a false doctrine, — for no false doctrine can ever, in the nature of things, be so evidenced as to exclude doubt; and he who professes to believe what he doubts professes what he knows he does not believe, and therefore professes what he knows is not true. A man may be honestly in doubt as to what is or is not the truth on certain points; but no man can honestly *profess* faith in a false doctrine, — for in a false doctrine no man can have faith.

A sort of honesty and sincerity we certainly concede to the generality of Protestants; but as to the end for which they profess their doctrines, rather than as to the doctrines themselves. The principle common to them, and the only one we can always be sure they will practically adhere to, is, that the end justifies the means. The end they propose is, neither to save their souls nor to discover and obey the truth, but to destroy or elude Catholicity. The spirit which possesses them maddens them against the Church, and gives them an inward repugnance to everything not opposed to her. To overthrow her, to blot out her existence, or to prevent her from crushing them with the weight of her truth, is to them a praiseworthy end, at least a great and most desirable end; directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, it becomes the ruling passion — after money-getting — of their lives, — a passion in which they are confirmed and strengthened by all the blandishments of the world, and all the seductions of the flesh. Any means which tend to gratify this passion, to realize this end, they hold to be lawful, and they can adopt them, however base, detestable, or shocking in themselves, with a quiet conscience and admirable self-complacency.

That the ruling motive or dominant instinct of Protestants, in their character of Protestants, is, under a negative point of view at least, to destroy or elude Catholicity, is evident from the character of the variations which their Protestantism has undergone, and is daily and hourly undergoing. Examine these variations, and you will find that they each and all tend to remove Protestantism farther and farther from the Catholic standard, and to shelter it from the blows of Catholic assailants. Each successive reformer eliminates from his sect some Catholic doctrine which it may have retained, or modifies some element of which he sees the Catholic controversialist can take advantage. The tendency of the Protestant world, collectively and in each of its divisions and subdivisions, has been steadily in the direction from the Church against which it pro-

tests, and the progress, which Protestants so loudly boast, has consisted, and still consists, in getting rid of what they originally retained in common with Catholics. The Protestant vanguard, which announces that the main body is at hand, has advanced very far, and retains less of Christian principle than was retained by the old heathen world in the times of the Apostles. Take your fully developed Transcendentalist, the last word of Protestantism, and you will find him divested of every Catholic principle, and, under the point of view of religion, reduced, not only to nudity, but to nihility. The poor man retains nothing, not even so much as a shadow. He is a Peter Schlemil, and has sold his shadow to the man in black. What can have reduced him to such straits, — driven him to such extremes? Love of truth, force of conviction? Nothing of the sort. Be not so simple as to pretend it. He assigns, and attempts to assign, no authority, no reason, for his nihilism. He even acknowledges that he has no reason to assign, and tells you that he only throws out what he thinks, without pretending to prove it. He is a seer, and utters what he sees, and you must take him at his word, or not at all. Why, then, does he rush into nihilism? Simply, because he is seer enough to see, that, if he admits that anything exists, he will be driven ultimately to acknowledge the truth of Catholicity. Rather than do that, he will sell his soul, as well as his shadow, to the man in black, and consent to deny his own existence. Almost every day, we meet intelligent Protestant gentlemen who frankly acknowledge that there is no alternative but Catholicity or no-religion, and yet who just as frankly tell us that they will not be Catholics. Not long since, a Protestant minister of respectable standing in this city assured us, in all seriousness, that he “would rather be damned than become a Catholic.” We of course informed him that he could have his choice, for Almighty God forces no one to accept the gift of eternal life. This worthy minister is, no doubt, very ready to embrace the truth that does not convict him of error, if such truth there be; but if we may take him at his word, he is prepared to resist, at all hazards, the truth that would indict him. Is it truth, or his own opinion, that he loves?

The mistake of our popular controversialists seems to arise from their supposition, that Protestantism can be learned from the symbolical books and theological writings of Protestants. Undoubtedly we can thus learn that Protestantism which is put forth to elude Catholicity, or to lure Catholics from their

Church, and therefore a Protestantism highly important, for the sake of Catholics, to be studied and refuted ; but not thus can we learn the Protestantism which lies in the Protestant mind and heart, and which it is necessary to refute for the sake of Protestants themselves. This Protestantism is not learned from symbolical books or theological writings, and but comparatively few Protestants themselves can give us a clear and distinct statement, much less a just account, of it. We can seize it only in the historical developments and manifest tendencies of the Protestant movement, and explain it only by means of a thorough knowledge of human nature on the one hand, and of Catholic faith and theology on the other.

It appears to us, that our controversialists are mistaken, also, in regarding the more reputable sects — that is, the sects which, in their symbols and professions, have departed the least from the Catholic standard — as better exponents of the Protestant mind than the less reputable, and as those whose views it is the most important to study and refute. Nearly all the controversial works we have, originally written in the English language, are directed against the Anglican and Protestant Episcopal sects. We are not aware of a single Catholic work, written expressly against the so-called Evangelical sects, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, or what we may call Pietism. And, with the exception of the profound and scientific work of Father Kollmann, against Unitarians, — too profound and scientific to be intelligible to those for whom it was written, — we have in English not a single work against Rationalism, which, in reality, has a larger number of adherents, in both England and this country, than either Anglicanism or Evangelicalism. This indicates a serious defect in our controversial literature, and seems to us to be owing to a false estimate of the relative importance of the several Protestant sects. There are, no doubt, many individuals included in the more reputable sects, who, if compelled to choose, would sooner return to the Church than follow the Protestant movement to its natural terminus ; but they are only a small minority, and would hardly be missed in the sects to which they respectively belong. All the sects are on the move, tending somewhither. Not one of them is stationary. This they make their boast ; and one of the most frequent and most effective charges they bring against the Church is, that she is not progressive, but remains immovable, insisting that we shall believe to-day the very doctrines which she taught and believed in the Dark Ages. The

dominant tendency of any given sect is the tendency which the great majority of its members obey. Ascertain, then, the dominant tendency of each sect, and you have ascertained the direction in which the great majority of its members are moving, and will continue to move, if diverted or arrested by no foreign influence. But what, in fact, is the dominant tendency of each and every Protestant sect? Is there a single one whose successive developments, modifications, and changes tend to bring it nearer and nearer to the Catholic standard, and to prepare it for communion with the Church? Nobody can pretend it. Everybody knows that every sect is moving in the opposite direction, and that the dominant tendency of the Protestant world, a few individuals excepted, is towards Rationalism, Transcendentalism, and therefore towards pantheism, atheism, nihilism. This is decisive, and proves that those sects which have departed farthest from Catholicity are the truest representatives of the Protestant spirit, and the best exponents of genuine Protestantism, as the fully developed man is a better exponent of humanity than the new-born infant. What it is most important, then, to study and refute, must be the principles of these more advanced sects, not those of the sects who remain behind, or are still rocking in their cradle, — Transcendentalism, rather than Anglicanism.

Undoubtedly we see, from time to time, a conservative, perhaps a retrograde, movement in the bosom of the several sects. But this movement is the result, in most cases, of alarm for the credit or prosperity of the sect, rather than of any deep or sincere attachment to the principles or doctrines the sect threatens to leave behind. Besides, the movement is ever but a mere eddy in the stream, or a slight ripple on its surface. It reaches never to the bottom of the sect, and arrests or diverts never its main current. This is evident from the late Oxford movement, one of the most important movements of the kind which has recently been witnessed. There was a time when timid Protestants feared, and many good Catholics hoped, that it would restore England to Catholic faith and unity; but no sooner did it become manifest to all the world that its tendency was to communion with Rome, than it was arrested. A few individuals became reconciled to the Church, but the majority of those at first favorably disposed towards it avowedly or tacitly abandoned it, lapsed into the ordinary channel of their sect, and suffered themselves to be borne onward with it towards its natural term, — no-religion, or nihil-

ism. So it is in every sect in which a similar movement takes place. As soon as it is clear that its tendency is anti-Protestant, that is, towards Rome, it is arrested, and only here and there an individual dares henceforth avow his adherence to it.

It may be thought by some, that the more reputable sects are the real bulwarks of Protestantism, and that, if we refute them, the less reputable sects will fall of themselves. Doubtless this is one reason why our English and American Catholic controversialists direct their attacks so exclusively against Anglicanism and Protestant Episcopalianism. But we are disposed to believe that the real supporters of Protestantism, if not in themselves, at least in their views and influence, are the sects which are farthest removed from Catholicity. If there was nothing below Anglicanism to which Anglicans could descend, we should have short work with it, and the Anglican and Episcopal sects would soon disappear. The more reputable sects, comparing themselves with the immense Protestant world below them, look upon themselves as substantially orthodox, and are more disposed to dwell on what they retain than on what they themselves lack which we have. They form, too, a sort of aristocracy, a *haute noblesse*, in the sectarian world, and are pleased with their rank, and unwilling to forego the importance it gives them in their own eyes. Moreover, the sects below them, all Protestant, and of their own race, smooth the descent for them in proportion as they are driven from their more elevated position, and enable them to descend by an easy gradation, by almost imperceptible steps, to the lowest depths of error. If the High-churchman is defeated, he can descend to Low-churchism; if the Low-churchman is defeated, he can descend to Evangelicalism; if the Evangelical is defeated, he can descend either, on the one hand, to Rationalism, or, on the other, to Transcendentalism, — for, in point of fact, Evangelicalism is nothing but a loose combination of Rationalism and Transcendentalism. It is far easier for a High-churchman to become a Low-churchman than it is for him to become a Catholic, and always is the next step in the descending scale far easier to take than the next step in the ascending scale.

“Facilis descensus Averno :

Nortea atque dies patet atri janua Ditis ;
Sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras,
Hoc opus, hic labor est.”

As long as there is a lower step that can be taken without

abandoning the essential element of Protestantism, the defeat of the more reputable sects, on the ground they profess to occupy, will do little for their conversion ; for they will never acknowledge, even to themselves, that they are defeated, so long as there is any conceivable Protestant ground from which they are not actually driven. It is owing to the fact that Protestants now claim as Protestant all the territory between the ground occupied by Dr. Pusey and that occupied by M. Proudhon, and thus have a larger field for advance or retreat, that we find their conversion in our times so much more difficult than it was formerly. St. Francis of Sales, Bishop of Geneva, himself alone regained seventy-two thousand Protestants to the Church ; we are aware of no bishop in the present age, however zealous, learned, able, or saintly, who has the consolation of recovering anything approaching a like number. We cannot, therefore, but regard the views and tendencies of the more advanced sects as those which it is now altogether the most important to study and refute.

Not only does Protestantism, as our divines have from the first maintained, logically lead to the denial of all religion, to atheism, and therefore to nihilism,—for to deny that God exists is to deny that anything is,—but it is now clear to all who have examined the subject, that the great body of Protestants are really prepared, as occasion may require, to follow it thus far. The majority of the Protestant world are really, if not avowedly, Transcendentalists to-day, as every one knows who is acquainted with recent Protestant literature ; and Strauss, Feuerbach, Bauer, Parker, Emerson, Michelet, Cabet, and Proudhon have more sympathizers than Hengstenberg, Pusey, Seabury, Schaf, Alexander, Beecher, and Kirk. Proudhon is nothing but a consistent Red Republican ; and where is the Protestant, in case he is not restrained by his temporal interest, who does not sympathize with Red Republicanism ? Have not Protestants very generally, in England and this country, sympathized with Mazzini and his Roman Republic ? Nay, was it not in concert with, and by aid even of, the more reputable Protestant sects, that he expelled the Sovereign Pontiff, and established his Reign of Terror ? Is not Protestant sympathy very generally enlisted in favor of the infidel and Socialistic revolutions in Europe, all of which have been stirred up and helped on by Protestants, under the lead of their ministers, in the name of liberty, but really for the purpose of overthrowing and annihilating the Church ? Evident is it, then, that they

will go, as a body, to all lengths which they find necessary to accomplish their purpose of hostility to Catholicity ; and as they never can even logically overthrow the Church, so long as the existence of anything is admitted, they must deny everything, and rush into nihilism.

It is necessary, then, if we wish to arrest the Protestant movement, and do what in us lies to save the souls of Protestants, that we reason with them, not as if it were a sufficient refutation of them to prove that they are tending to atheism, but as men who believe nothing, and build up our argument against them from the very foundation. Prove to them that their doctrines are anti-Christian, and they will only beg you to inform them wherefore that is a reason for not believing them ; prove Christianity to be true, and they will merely beg you to prove your proofs, and thus demand of you an infinite series of proofs. They are, under the point of view of religion and philosophy, wholly rotten, and from the sole of the foot to the crown of the head there is no soundness in them. Nothing will answer for them that does not descend as low as the last denial that it is possible for the human mind to conceive, and drive them from position to position, till there is no position remaining outside of the Church which they can even affect to take.

Protestantism as we now find it, and even as it was, virtually, in the sixteenth century, is not merely the denial of certain Catholic dogmas, is not merely the denial of the Christian revelation itself, but really the denial of all religion and morality, natural and revealed. It denies reason itself, as far as it is in the power of man to deny it, and is no less unsound as philosophy than it is as faith. It extinguishes the light of nature no less than the light of revelation, and is as false in relation to the natural order as to the supernatural. Even when Protestants make a profession of believing in revelation, they discredit reason. In regard to reason, they are, even when professing to believe, very generally Pyrrhonists. The Evangelical sects, for instance, do not merely deny the sufficiency of reason as our only guide, but they deny its trustworthiness altogether, and assert that we must take for our guide the Scriptures, not as interpreted by an authority accredited to reason, nor as interpreted by reason itself, but as interpreted by the private illuminations of the spirit. They thus supersede, as it were, annihilate, reason, and reduce themselves to the condition of irrational beings, virtually declare man incapable of receiving

a supernatural revelation, and then call upon him to believe the Bible, and to walk by the supernatural light of faith. As long as their enthusiasm lasts, as long as they can keep up a sort of unnatural excitement, they may half persuade themselves that they are supernaturally illuminated ; but as soon as their fever abates, and they sink to their ordinary level, they experience the most painful misgivings, the supposed supernatural light fades away, and, having no reason on which to fall back, they can believe nothing, and either openly avow themselves infidels, or, merely keeping up a show of piety, seek relief by devoting all their energies to worldly distinctions or pleasures. They begin by proposing revelation, not as the complement, but as the substitute, of reason ; and when revelation fails, as fail it must if not supported by motives of credibility addressed to reason, and satisfactory to it, nothing remains for them but universal skepticism.

The formalistic sects, as the Anglican and Episcopalian, reach the same result, though by a different process. Building on sham, taking the shadow for the substance, and denying both the substance and the light the shadow necessarily implies, — or, in other words, refusing to draw from their premises their logical consequences, afraid to make a complete proposition, to say two and two make four, and stopping short with saying two and two, lest they lose the *via media*, and roll over to Rome, or fall off into dissent, — they destroy reason by mutilating and enslaving it, and find themselves without anything by or to which a supernatural revelation can be accredited. The Rationalistic sects, seeing the errors of Evangelicals and formalists, think to save reason by resolving the supernatural into the natural ; but in doing this they lose revelation, and therefore reason, — because no man can deny revelation without denying reason, and because reason without revelation is insufficient for herself, inadequate to the solution of the great problems of life which she herself raises. Beginning by asking of reason more than she can give, they end by discarding her and falling into universal skepticism, the ultimate term of all Protestantism.

Protestants, it is well known, are able to keep up the self-delusion that they are believers only by obstinately refusing to push their principles to their legitimate consequences, and by shutting their eyes to the objections which may be suggested or urged against them. The condition of a Protestant wishing to retain his Protestantism, and yet keep up the appear-

ance of being a believer, is most pitiable. The poor man has no mental freedom, no intellectual courage, but is a cowardly slave, with all the weakness and meanness characteristic of slaves in general. He never dares trust himself to his principles, and follow them out to their remotest logical consequences, and is doomed, turn which way he will, to be inconsequent, and to submit to a most tyrannical and capricious master; for otherwise he would find himself, on the one hand, approaching too near Catholicity to remain a Protestant, or, on the other, too near to nihilism to even pretend to be a believer. Alas for the poor man! He hugs his chains, and, by the strangest infatuation imaginable, fancies his slavery is freedom. All who have studied the subject know well that Protestants are Protestants, not by virtue of reason, but in spite of reason, — not because they reason, but solely because they do not, will not, and dare not reason. The rejection of reason is their fundamental vice. Reason is our natural light, and, though of no value out of its sphere, in its sphere is ineradicable. It does not suffice of itself for all the wants of the human soul, but its annihilation reduces us below the condition of men, and renders us incapable of receiving even a supernatural revelation. Revelation does not abrogate or supersede reason; it restores it and supplies its deficiencies. Grace supposes nature. Christianity is a system of pure grace, — is, in fact, a supernatural creation, but a supernatural creation *for* the natural, designed to repair the damage nature has incurred by guilt, and to enable man to attain the end to which his Creator originally appointed him. Man is not for the Sacraments, but the Sacraments are for man. The first office of grace is to restore nature, or to heal its wounds; having restored it to health, it elevates it, indeed, but always retains it, and uses it. Here is the grand fact that Protestant theologians always overlook. They, in reality, always present nature and grace as two antagonistic powers, and suppose the presence of the one must be the physical destruction of the other. Luther and Calvin, weary of the good works, and shrinking from the efforts to acquire the personal virtues enjoined by Catholicity, began their so-called reform by asserting the total depravity of human nature, and maintaining that original sin involved the loss of reason and free-will, reducing man physically to the condition of irrational animals, and superadding the penalty of guilt. Here, in the very outset, they denied natural reason, all natural religion, and all natural

morality, and consequently asserted for man in the natural order, left to his natural powers and faculties, universal skepticism and moral indifference ; for without reason there can be no belief, and without free-will no moral obligation, no moral difference of actions.

The Arminians, indeed, saw this, and sought to remedy it by reasserting the natural law ; but as they still held to total depravity, the reassertion amounted to nothing ; or, if they sometimes abandoned total depravity, they rushed to the opposite extreme, and reasserted Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism, and restricted the office of grace to enabling us to do more easily what, nevertheless, we are able to do without it. If they succeeded in escaping the peculiar error of Luther and Calvin, they fell into Rationalism. As Luther and Calvin annihilated reason and free-will, the whole spiritual nature of man, and made man purely passive in the work of regeneration and Christian perfection, the Arminians, become Rationalists, disregarding the necessity of grace, made the natural law sufficient, and asserted only a natural morality. But experience proving the inadequacy of the natural law, when taken without its revealed complement and sanction, — of natural morality, when not elevated by supernatural Christian virtue, — they, like the others, lapsed, of necessity, into the same skepticism.

The error of each class is avoidable only by understanding that grace always supposes nature, and that grace without nature would be as a telescope to a man without eyes. Revelation supposes reason, and we as effectually deny Christianity when we deny reason as when we deny revelation ; both must be asserted with equal firmness and emphasis, each in its own sphere, in relation to its appropriate office, or nothing is asserted. To deny reason is, *a fortiori*, to deny revelation, and to deny revelation is virtually to deny reason ; because the evidences of the fact of revelation are amply sufficient to satisfy reason, and because reason, without revelation, being undeniably insufficient to solve the problems which torture the mind without faith, and to satisfy the craving of our nature for something above itself, cannot maintain itself practically in credit, and necessarily loses its authority. Philosophy, undoubtedly, rests for its basis on natural reason, otherwise we should be unable to distinguish it from Catholic theology, or to draw any intelligible distinction between the natural and supernatural ; but without the aid of revelation as an instrument in its construction, we shall never be able, in our fallen condition, to

construct a sound and adequate philosophy. So, on the other hand, without a sound and adequate philosophy, we can never possess a true and adequate theology; for as revelation is necessary as an instrument in the construction of philosophy, so is philosophy necessary as an instrument in the construction of theology,—that is, theology as a science, and as distinguishable from faith. Hence, in all courses of Catholic instruction, the student makes his philosophy before he proceeds to his theology.

It is clear enough, from what we have said, that the most pressing want of Protestants, under the intellectual point of view, is a sound philosophy, which, so to speak, shall rehabilitate reason, and restore them to natural religion and morality. They have lost reason, and have fallen below the religion or morality which lies in the natural order, and which all revealed religion and morality presuppose. The philosophy needed is nowhere to be found in the Protestant world, and cannot possibly be created by Protestants, for the reason that the revelation which must serve as its instrument they have not, or at best only some detached fragments of it. The only respectable school of philosophy to be found amongst Protestants is the Scottish School of Reid and Stewart; but this school dogmatizes rather than philosophizes. It very justly assumes that all philosophy must proceed from certain indemonstrable principles, and it does not err essentially in its inventory of these principles; but it fails to establish them, or to show us that they have scientific validity. It calls them the constituent principles of human belief, and says, very truly, that they must be admitted, or all science, all philosophy, is out of the question. But this is no more than Hume, whom it aims to refute, himself said. Is science or philosophy possible? is the precise question to be answered. Without the conditions you assert, we grant it is not possible; but what then? Therefore your alleged principles are sound? Why not? Therefore all science, all philosophy, is impossible? No doubt, the Scottish School has protested vehemently against the skepticism of Hume, but its refutation of that skepticism is a mere paralogism, a simple begging of the question, and therefore, scientifically considered, worthless.

But, after all, we cannot place our chief reliance on philosophy as an instrument in the conversion of Protestants. Philosophy is too indirect and too slow in its operations to meet their wants. They are too far gone, too restless, too impa-

tient, too averse to calm reflection and continuous thought, to listen to us while we set the true philosophy before them, or to submit to the labor absolutely requisite to comprehend and appreciate profound philosophical science. An age of balloons, steam-cars, and lightning telegraphs is not exactly the age for philosophers. Moreover, Protestant perversity would find in the necessity of the long and patient thought, and close and subtle reasoning, demanded by philosophy, an objection to our religion itself. Your religion, they would say, if true, is intended for all mankind, and therefore should be within the reach of every capacity. The thought and reasoning necessary to create or understand the philosophy you insist upon transcend the capacity of all but the gifted few, and therefore, if necessary to establish your religion, prove that your religion is not true. We might, indeed, reply, that the thought and reasoning objected to are necessary to refute the errors of Protestants, not simply to establish our religion; but that would amount to nothing in practice. The nature of the Protestant is to devise the most subtle errors in his power, and to find an objection to our religion in the very labor he makes necessary for their refutation. When he objects, he may be as subtle and as abstruse as he pleases; but when we reply, he insists that we shall be popular, and never go beyond the depth of the most ordinary capacity, — that we shall answer the objection not only to the mind that raises it, but to the minds of all men. Only the candid among Protestants would acknowledge the justness of our reply, and these would fail to comprehend it; for if you find a candid Protestant, you may safely conclude that he lacks intelligence, as when you find an intelligent Protestant you may be sure that he lacks candor. There must, then, be some briefer and more expeditious way of dealing with Protestants than that of philosophy, if we wish to affect them favorably.

We have defined Protestantism to be hostility to the Church, and virtually nihilism, because Protestants in general, sooner than return to the Church, will push their hostility to its last consequence, which is the denial of God, therefore of all existence and existences. But this is not all that we have to say of the matter. No man loves error for its own sake, or wills what does not appear to him to be good. The natural heart of every man recoils instinctively from atheism; and it is seldom, if ever, that one without a fearful and even a protracted struggle abandons all faith and piety, resigns all

hope of an hereafter, and consents to place himself in the category of the beasts that perish. Hatred, no doubt, will carry a man to great lengths ; but even hatred must have its cause, real or imaginary. Hatred is love reversed, and intense hatred of one thing is the reverse action of intense love of something else. Protestants hate the Church. Wherefore ? Because they love truth ? Nonsense. Because they believe her false, and destructive to the souls of men ? Nonsense again. We hope there is no Catholic so stupid as to believe it. Hatred of the Church has nothing to do with concern for truth or for salvation. A large portion of Protestants believe in no truth, in no salvation ; a larger portion still are of opinion that all men will be saved, and that truth is whatever seems to a man to be true ; and the remainder hold that the Church is substantially orthodox, and that salvation is attainable in her communion, as well as in their own. Whatever, then, the cause of their hatred of the Church, it is a cause unconnected with considerations of another world, or with truth as such.

We need not look far for this something which Protestants love and the Church condemns, and for condemning which they are full of wrath against her. It is nothing very recondite, or very difficult to seize. We make quite too much of Protestantism, which is, in reality, a very vulgar thing, and lies altogether on the surface of life. Protestantism is nothing more or less than that spirit of lawlessness which leads every one to wish to have his own way, — very common in women and children, and perhaps not less common in men, only they have, generally, a better faculty of concealing it. Objectively defined, it is expressed in the common saying, "Forbidden fruit is sweetest"; and subjectively, it is a craving for what is prohibited, because prohibited. It imagines that the sovereign good is in what the law forbids, and opposes the Church because she upholds the law, — hates the law because the law restrains it, duty because duty obliges it ; and since, as long as it admits the existence of God, it must admit duty, it denies God ; and since, as long as it admits the existence of anything, it must admit the existence of God, it denies everything, and lapses into nihilism. Here is the whole mystery of the matter, — Protestantism in a nutshell.

The source of this impatience of restraint, and this desire to have one's own way, is the pride natural to the human heart, the root of every vice and of every sin. "Your eyes shall

be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," said the serpent to Eve; and she reached forth her hand, plucked the forbidden fruit, ate, and sin and death were in the world. Pride is, on the one hand, a denial of our dependence, and, on the other, the assertion of our own sufficiency. Here you may see the origin and the essential characteristic of Protestantism, which is as old as the first motion of pride or of resistance to the will of God. Protestantism, after all, is more ancient than we commonly concede. Dr. Johnson, in his Dictionary, would have been no less correct in saying the Devil was the first Protestant, than he was in saying that he was "the first Whig." It offends pride to be compelled to acknowledge our own insufficiency, to admit that we cannot be trusted to follow our own inclinations, that we must be subjected to metes and bounds, and placed under tutors and masters, who say, Do this, Do that; and we are galled, and we resolve we will not endure it; we will break the withes that bind us; we will stand up on our own two feet, and assert our freedom in face of heaven, earth, and hell. Hence we see Protestants, in every age, mounting the tallest pair of stilts they can find or construct, and with more or less vehemence, with more or less eclat, according to the circumstances of time and place, magniloquently asserting the "inborn" rights of man, proudly swearing to be free, to stand up in their native dignity, in the full and resplendent majesty of their own manhood, and making such appeals and forming such alliances as they fancy will best secure their independence, relieve them from all restraints, and give them the opportunity to live as they list.

Such is the general and essential characteristic of Protestantism; its particular character or form is determined by, and varies with, the circumstances of time and place. In itself, as Balmes well shows, it is a phenomenon peculiar to no period of history, but whatever it has that is peculiar it borrows from the character of the epoch in which it appears. It is always essentially the spirit that works in the children of disobedience, but the form under which the disobedience manifests itself depends on exterior and accidental causes. What it resists is what it finds offensive to human pride, to pure, unmitigated egotism, and what it asserts is always asserted as the means of securing free scope to its independent action. In the sixteenth century, pride found itself galled by submission to the Church, for the Church could not tolerate its wild speculations and its theological errors. It then denied the authority of the

Church ; and in order to make a show of justifying its denial, it asserted the supremacy of the Scriptures, interpreted by private reason, or by the private Spirit. Soon it found that the assertion of the supremacy of the Scriptures, so interpreted, limited its sovereignty, and that it was as galling to its sense of independence to submit to a dead book as to a living Church, and then it denied the Scriptures, and, to justify its denial, asserted the supremacy of reason. But reason, again, galled it, reminded it of its dependence, and would not suffer it to live as it listed. Then it cried out, Down with reason, and up with sentiment ! — a Transcendental element paramount to reason,—and thus reached the jumping-off place. In order to resist effectually the Pope, it at one time, as in England, proclaims the divine right of kings ; and then, in order to get rid of the divine right of kings, it proclaims the divine right of the people, or, to speak more accurately, of the mob ; and finally, in order to get rid of the authority of the mob, it proclaims the divine right of each and every individual, and declares that each and every individual is God, the only God, — thus resolving God into men, and all men into one man, which implies the right of every man to take the entire universe to himself, and possess it as his own property. You laugh at its absurdity ? Upon our conscience, we invent nothing, we exaggerate nothing, and say nothing more than is asserted, in sober earnest, by men whom the Protestant world delights to honor.

Turn Protestantism over as you will, analyze it to your heart's content, you can make nothing more or less of it than mere vulgar pride, and the various efforts pride makes from time to time and place to place to secure its own gratification, to realize the assertion of the serpent, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," — that is, ye shall know good and evil of yourselves, as God knows them of himself, and shall be independent, and act as seemeth to you good, even as God is independent and doth according to his will, not as subject to a power above himself, and in obedience to another will than his own. Just see the proof of this, in the sympathy now universally given to every revolt against established authority. All your modern literature is Satanic, and approves, and teaches us to approve, every rebel, whether against parental, popular, royal, or Divine authority. The Protestant readers of *Paradise Lost* sympathize with Lucifer, in his war against the Almighty, and if they had been in heaven, as one of our friends suggests, would have sided with him. Our friend, J. D. Nourse, defending

himself against the strictures, in this Review for last April, on his book, boldly asserts that God is a despot, and his government a despotism, — nay, that all authority is despotic.

Finding the essence of Protestantism to be mere vulgar pride, that it is a moral disease rather than an intellectual aberration, it is evident that we are to treat it as a vice rather than as an error, and Protestants as sinners rather than as simply unbelievers or misbelievers. This may not be very flattering to their pride ; nevertheless, it is the only way they deserve to be treated, and the only way in which they can be treated for their good. We honor them quite too much when we treat them as men whose heads are wrong, but whose hearts are sound. The wrongness of the head is the consequence of the rottenness of the heart. The remedy must be applied to the seat of the disease, or it will be wholly ineffectual ; and as the disease is in the will rather than in the intellect, we must, as we do with sinners in general, avail ourselves of motives that tend to persuade the will, rather than of those which tend primarily to convince the understanding. Get the heart right, and the intellect will soon rectify itself.

Now it is certain, that, so far as the great body of Protestants are concerned, it is of no use to appeal to any love of truth or regard for salvation they may be supposed to have. They are very generally prepared, with Macbeth, “to jump the world to come,” and think only how they shall manage matters for this world. They are worldly, and their wisdom is earthly, sensual, devilish ; even their virtues, their honesty, their uprightness of conduct, have reference, not to God, but to their justification, either in the eyes of the world, or in the eyes of their own pride. They are too proud or too vain to do this or that act which is contrary to good manners. We must therefore approach them as men who are wedded to this world, who are Protestants for the sake of living for this world alone, and refuse to be Catholics because Catholicity enjoins humility, detachment from the world, and a life of self-denial and mortification, lived for God alone. As long as it is conceded, or as long as they believe it true, that their Protestantism is more favorable to man, regarded solely as an inhabitant of this world, than Catholicity, we cannot get them to listen to what we have to say for our religion. If they hear, it will be as if they heard not.

But it is a fact, as clearly demonstrable, in its way, as any mathematical problem, that Catholicity enjoins the only normal

life for man, even in this world, letting alone what it secures us in another. Human pride just now takes the form of Socialism, and Socialism is *the* Protestantism of our times. It is human pride under this form that we must address, and show to the Socialists, not—as some silly and misguided creatures calling themselves Catholics, and sometimes occupying editorial chairs, are accustomed to do — that Catholicity favors them by accepting their Socialism, but that it favors the object they profess to have at heart, — that it is the true and only genuine Socialism, the basis of all veritable society, and the only known instrument of well-being, either for the individual or for the race. We must show, that, under the social point of view, under the various relations of civilization, Protestantism is an egregious blunder, and precipitates its adherents into the precise evils they really wish to avoid. That it does so is evident enough to all who have eyes to see, and is proved by the very complaints Protestants make of their own movements. Their own complaints of themselves show, to use a vulgar proverb, that they always “jump from the frying-pan into the fire,” in attempting to better their condition. They could not endure the authority of the Church ; they resisted it, and fell under the tyranny of the sect, even in their own view of the case a thousand times less tolerable. They rebelled, in the name of liberty, against the Pope, and fell under the iron rule of the civil despot ; in England, they could not endure the Lord’s bishops, and they fell under the Lord’s presbyters, and from Lord’s presbyters under the Lord’s brethren, and from Lord’s brethren under the capricious tyranny of their own fancies and passions. In political and social reforms it has fared no better with them. In France, the *Constituante* were more oppressive than the old monarchy, the *Gironde* than the *Constituante*, the *Mountain* than the *Gironde* ; and the present French government, in order to save society from complete destruction, is obliged to adopt measures more stringent than ever Charles the Tenth or Louis Philippe dared venture upon. The overthrow of one tyranny leads to another of necessity more heartless and oppressive, because weaker and possessing a less firm hold on the affections of the people. A strong government can afford to be lenient. A weak government must be stringent. Yet the wise men of the age rush on in their wild-goose chase after worldly felicity, while it flies ever the faster before them. Like the gambler, who has played away his patrimony, his wife’s jewels, and pawned his hat and coat, but

keeps playing on, they insist on another throw,— though losing all, fancy they are just agoing to recover all, and make a fortune equal to their boundless wishes. If they could but see themselves as the unexcited bystanders see them, they would throw away the dice, and rush with self-loathing from the *hell* in which they find only their own ruin.

The principle on which Protestants seek even worldly felicity is false, and we can say nothing better of them, than that they prove themselves fools, — yes, pure, unmitigated fools, — in following it. When was it ever known that pride, following itself, did not meet mortification, or that any worldly distinction or good, sought for its own sake, did not either baffle pursuit, or prove a canker to the heart? Did you ever see a man running after fame that ever overtook it, or a man always nursing his health that was ever other than sickly? Have you no eyes, no ears, no understanding? Fame comes, if at all, unsought, greatness follows in the train of humility, and happiness, coy to the importunate wooer, throws herself into the arms of him who treats her with indifference. All experience proves the truth of the principle, “Seek first the kingdom of God, and his justice, and all these things shall be superadded unto you.” Take it as inspiration, as the word of God, or as a maxim of human prudence, it is equally true, and he who runs against it only proves his own folly. “Live while you live,” says the Protestant Epicurean. Be it so; live while you live, but live you cannot, unless you live to God, according to the principles of the Catholic religion. Live now you do not, and you know you do not; you are only *just agoing*, and not a few of you fear that you are never even agoing to live, as all your poetry, with its deep pathos and melodious wail, too amply proves.

Here comes in to our aid the excellent work before us. It exactly meets the present state of the Protestant world, and makes the only kind of appeal to which, in their present mood, they will listen. Its author makes no apology for Catholicity, he offers no direct argument for its truth; he simply comes forward and compares the respective influences of Protestantism and Catholicity on European civilization, and shows, that, while Catholicity tends unceasingly to advance civilization, Protestantism as unceasingly tends to savagism, and that it is to its hostile influences we owe the slow progress of European civilization during the last three centuries. He shows that Protestantism is hostile to liberty, to philosophy, to the higher

mental culture, to art, to equality, to political and social well-being. He shows it, we say ; not merely asserts, but proves it, by unanswerable arguments and undeniable facts. If any one doubts our judgment, we refer him to the work itself, and beg him to gainsay its facts, or answer its reasoning, if he can. The Protestant who reads it will hardly boast of his Protestantism again.

ART. II. — *The Christian Church and Social Reform. A Discourse delivered before the Religious Union of Associationists.* By WM. H. CHANNING. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1848. 8vo. pp. 31.

WE perhaps said all that is really necessary for the refutation of the principles of this Discourse in our Review for last April ; but as we set out with the intention of giving them a somewhat thorough examination, we shall resume our comments, although in continuing them we may be obliged to repeat many things which, in substance, we have already said.

Our readers, we trust, will recollect that Mr. Channing supposes man to be composed of three elements, — love, intellect, power, — which give birth, respectively, in their outward expression, to the Church, the University, and the State ; and that his aim is to harmonize these three institutions in society, so as through them to harmonize in the interior of man the three elements from which they spring. He assumes that there has been a development of Christendom, that is, of the nations professing the Christian religion, and that, by ascertaining the law of this development, we can arrive at the principles and methods of effecting the harmony proposed. We let him now speak for himself.

“ Now the development of Christendom may be best understood by tracing the formation, union, division, of its Church, University, State, — or its Religious, Scientific, and Political organizations, — in successive eras. Let us pass in review Four of these, already gone, which will lead us to a Fifth, in the unfolding of which our lot is cast.

“ 1. In the *first* era, the constituent elements of Christendom existed in a condition of relative *Independence*. Amidst the breaking up of once stately institutions and the incursions of fresh barbaric

tribes, amidst desolating wars and corrupting courts, — amidst societies dissolving from decrepitude, or dying by suicide, — the life of love, the law of brotherhood, the hope of heaven, which from the divine benignity of Jesus had passed into the hearts of his followers, lay hid, like a vital germ in the decaying seed. Oriental philosophy, Greek and Roman mythology, the guesses of Alexandrian or Gnostic mysticism, the lawlessness and rude traditions of savage minds, offered no reconciling bond between small persecuted congregations united by the fluent power of charity, and distracted nations jostled together in violent destruction. Who, in that feeble embryo, foresaw a Godlike Humanity slowly maturing? Yet, formless as were then the Church, the University, the State, and at first glance seemingly hostile, convergent tendencies gradually appear; till at length the faith of a Galilean sect becomes the religion of the Roman empire, — and sages, summoned to council from distant regions, announce a Creed.

“2. And so we enter the *second* era of Christendom. This era is characterized by its pervading spirit of *Authority*, its aspiration after order, its determination at any cost and by any means to establish relations of intercommunion and of hierarchy among the yet incongruous elements. A vast confederacy of archbishops, bishops, and inferior clergy, ranked in grades around a common head, constitutes the aristocracy of the Church. Nobles, surrounded by loyal vassals, stand grouped in haughty circles about their kings, who strive by craft or war to establish one central monarchy which may hold the balance of power among the allied though rival nations; and thus is organized the aristocracy of the State. Meantime, theology formed into a system, and ancient philosophy recast in modern moulds, and subtile metaphysics and stern logic, establish the dynasty of the Schoolmen, the aristocracy of the University; while the spiritual power threatening excommunication upon heretics, and the temporal power punishing as magic the discoveries and inventions of genius, uphold dictatorship in the realm of thought. The unity of *Force* fulfils its end, when Pope and Emperor and Council conspire to cramp elastic Europe with the leading-strings of a monotonous despotism.

“3. But crosier and sceptre wielded by tyrants lose their claim to reverence; and a creed that makes believe is mentally abjured, while the lips profess it. The Church, claiming to use the purse and sword, the prison and fagot, becomes a corrupt politician; the State, arrogating to itself control over conscience belonging to God alone, and turning religion into a prop of power, convicts itself of blasphemous usurpation; while youthful thought, under the mentorship of classic antiquity, and cheered to adventure in the wide world which science discloses, laughs the censorship of the University to scorn. The time for protest has come. This is the *third*

era of Christendom; its characteristic is *Individual Freedom*. The reform is at first incomplete, its progress slow; its very authors establish petty popedoms of their own, hold tenaciously to the shattered fragments of feudalism, and strive to fence in the new soil wherewith the freshet has overspread old landmarks. But it is all in vain. The thought of the inviolability of the individual has taken form in men's consciousness. In simple yet saintly souls, spiritualism abides like an angel of the Lord, suggesting the freest flights of piety; to thousands of earnest seekers, truth comes, and, putting aside the masks of tradition, smiles out in original beauty; and the instincts of multitudes feel afar the gathering earthquake, which is to swallow up caste, privilege, and unjust distinctions. The variety, latent in the formal unity, buds forth and branches and blooms. The Church and University and State divide again for freer, fuller growth. Sect rises from sect, and system from system, and party from party; restless aspiration, controversy, enterprise, stimulate the nations to gigantic exertions; there is a prophetic yearning for a good not yet accomplished, a reaching forward to a new world.

"4. Liberty of conscience, of thought, and of action, acknowledged in principle and partially exercised, cannot but thoroughly embody themselves in deeds. Asserting the direct communion of every spirit with God, through his appointed mediations, the reformer must carry out his doctrine of personal sacredness through all departments, intellectual and physical. An unconscious logic pervades nations and ages, and rigidly determines their conduct. And thus opens upon us the *fourth* era of Christendom, whose characteristic is *Practical Equality*. The unity of the Church is broken, and with the loss of its prestige has gone much of its sanctifying power; by unavoidable reaction, the senses, long curbed or constrained to deceptive indulgence, demand the rights which asceticism has denied; priests, proved guilty of outside morality, sink into objects of contempt; and goodness, manifested in kindly acts, becomes the only tolerable worship. Thus all are equals before God. Again, the authority of the University once shaken off, minds follow impetuously the lead of wild speculation; seated on the temporary judgment-bench of common sense, they call up for trial every time-hallowed rite, dogma, law, and custom; or, driven on by the mob-spirit of iconoclasts, blacken with flaming torches of skepticism the temples of faith, and deface with careless ridicule the shrines of once-honored sages. It is the sans-culottism of free inquiry, where learned and ignorant are 'hail, fellow, well met'; and every one, in his claim to hold and declare opinions, ranks as his neighbour's peer. Above all, as specially marking this epoch, is the desire for a practical test of principles manifested in the sphere of the State. The form of political institutions which it naturally

seeks to organize is democracy, the establishment of equal rights. But — whether hindered from realizing this ultimate manifestation, or successful, as it has been in this nation, and will soon be elsewhere — it bursts on all sides resistlessly forth in Utilitarianism ; and, seizing control of industry, finance, commerce, social usages, the press, the pulpit, — under pretence of equal protection to property, — and in the name and authority of Political Economy, makes money the ruler alike over priests and scholars, over nobles and people. Intense individual selfishness, *laissez-faire*, competition, exaggerated estimate of outward good, expediency as the habitual rule, wealth as chief title to honor and power, are the final consummation of this fourth era of Christendom, — which is passing, — has passed.

“ 5. When this last-described era is thus spoken of — like those which have preceded it — as already gone, let the assertion be understood to mean, that a *new principle* is working to-day throughout Christendom. Slowly, very slowly indeed, to one whose span is threescore years, sweeps by the procession of the ages, — each under its special banner, clothed with its own insignia, and bearing the emblems of its appropriate work. In the marching and countermarching of the mighty host, principles and tendencies may seem to approximate, and even to walk in parallel columns, which really are separated by the lapse of centuries ; and laggards there are, too, behind their times, who, limping after their own divisions, block up the path which of right belongs to the new-comers. Still, ever onwards moves mankind ; and the Tricolor banner of this generation is greeted with cheer on cheer of ‘ Fraternity ’ from the hearts of millions, while hands long sundered by selfish jealousies are clasped in pledge of mutual service. We have entered a *fifth* era of Christendom, whose watchword is *Coöperation*. As, in the first era, he was the truest Christian who bore his glimmering light into the forests of barbarism, and translated from parchment manuscript the Gospel of peace to armed hordes camped around their watch-fires ; as, in the second era, he was the truest Christian who, in loyal consciousness of the unity of Christendom, took his station, high or low, with the magnanimous intent to sacrifice life, wealth, affections, conscience, all, for the collective good of the Kingdom of God, — now immersing himself in the cells of monasteries, now with dying breath upon the battle-field praying his fellow-crusader to bear his heart to the holy sepulchre ; as, in the third era, he was the truest Christian who confronted prelatric bigotry, corruption in high places, and vulgar prejudices, — who bore unmoved the ridicule of the courtier at his puritan primness, grew prematurely gray with study, or led out bands of stern and godly pilgrims to plant colonies in savage lands ; as, in the last age, he was the truest Christian who, firmly centred in a pure conscience, trusted reason

boldly in every field of investigation, followed out principles fearlessly to their extreme consequences in action, demanded the widest diffusion of learning, the freest exercise of speech, the most active charity, the strictest justice, and who unscrupulously brought his battery of reform to bear against every bastille of oppression and palace of exclusiveness;—so, in *this* generation, he is the truest Christian who most unreservedly yields up mind, heart, and energy to the grand impulse of RECONCILIATION.

“What Humanity commands to-day is not destruction, but construction; not revolution, but reform; not dissolution, but resurrection. It would keep all it has gained in past eras of divergence, and multiply each partial good by prolific interchange. It wishes Independence for the Church and University and State, not as unrelated, but as correlated in concentric spheres,—the *THREE ESTATES*, whose functions are diverse, though complementary to each other; whose boundaries should be mutually inviolate, while their forces are allied. It wishes Unity throughout the Divine,—the Spiritual,—the Natural departments of life, collective and individual, not by constraint or sacrifice, but by fulness of development and harmonious counterpoise. It sanctions Individual Freedom without bounds, in religion, science, and politics; but it teaches that the only liberty in the universe is love,—that finite creatures live in and for one another, and that their common destiny is compassed by an Infinite original and end. Finally, it demands Practical Equality,—the only equality, that is to say, which, in a universe of graduated relations, whereon as a ladder the angels of God’s mercy are for ever descending and ascending, is *practical*,—unchecked opportunity for every being to develop its powers symmetrically, and to use them for the common good. The privileges and responsibilities, the temptations and encouragements, the trials and the joys, of such an age are as many as the results which it aims to realize are magnificent. And the devotedness, the reverence, the heroism, the energy, of earlier times, like silver-headed ancestors, are gathered round the baptismal font of this New Era, to anoint it with their benedictions.”—pp. 8–15.

It strikes us, with our very limited knowledge of history, that these five eras or epochs are purely arbitrary, and, if modern history is really divisible into distinct periods, Mr. Channing has failed to characterize them. We must complain, moreover, of the absence of chronology. We can guess at the date of the commencement of the series, but where the author ends his first era, and begins and ends his second, his third, or his fourth, it is impossible to determine with any tolerable degree of certainty. This is a serious defect, and gives him a chance to evade, if he chooses, many of the criticisms we

might be disposed to offer, by replying that they are applicable only to an earlier or later period of time than is included in the given era. This is not fair. A man who writes to instruct, to communicate truth, and not merely to confuse the reader, to support a theory, or to escape conviction, should study to be definite and exact. In reasoning on history, facts and dates are of considerable importance.

Mr. Channing assumes that there has been a development of Christendom, and supposes it capable of a scientific exposition. He aims at what is called philosophy of history, and, in creating it, attends only to what are called principles. Facts and dates, as nations and individuals, he counts for nothing. All he looks for is the ideas which the race is engaged in realizing, and he determines the idea of a given era *a priori*, — deduces it from the psychological or ontological principles recognized by his theory, not from the actual facts and events in space and time which history records. It is necessary to his purpose, or the purposes of his theory, that history should have been so and so, therefore it was so and so, and may be written without any reference to the chronicles or annals of nations. This is convenient for the system-monger, or the philosopher who fancies that he can spin the world, spider-like, from his own bowels; but it can hardly satisfy the man who seeks truth, and would build his castle on solid ground, not in the air. It presupposes, also, a system of fatalism, which is unsupported by any authority, and is contradicted by all the laws, usages, and common sense of mankind. History can be written *a priori*, reduced to a science, or logically deduced from either psychological or ontological principles, as Hegel and Cousin would have us believe, only on condition that there is nothing contingent in the universe, that there is nothing in history but these principles themselves, and that they are developed by a law of stern and invincible necessity. But this is not true; for in human affairs we must always recognize the freedom of God on the one hand, and the free agency of man on the other, which no philosophy can measure, and the influence of which on the events of history no science can determine, either beforehand or afterwards. History is simply a record of facts, and can be ascertained, without special Divine inspiration, only in the study of the facts themselves. Hence your philosophies of history are and must be all arbitrary, illusory, chimerical, unworthy of the least confidence. You must measure the infinite freedom of the infinite and eternal God,

and calculate the free agency of man, as elements in the production of historical events, before you can reasonably aspire to the creation of a philosophy of history, in the sense of modern philosophers.

Assuming a regular development of Christendom, the author supposes that this development has been in four successive eras, which have passed, and is now entering the fifth era ;— yet not because he finds this number of eras distinctly marked in history, but because his theory of development requires that there should be that number to give an era to each of the principles he wishes to find successively developed. The principle on which he writes is not the old one of bending theory to facts, but the modern one of bending facts to theory. Why should not facts bend to theory ? Theory is deduced from principles intuitively apprehended by reason ; facts rest on the authority of ignorant chroniclers, stupid annalists, and uncertain tradition. Is not theory, then, superior to facts, and ought it not to govern facts ? If the facts were as they ought to have been, will they not harmonize with theory ? And, if they do not, is it not a proof that they were not what they ought to have been, and therefore wicked or rebellious facts, with which the less we have to do the better ? Well, having determined that there ought to be the number of successive eras mentioned, the author concludes that there has been. Having determined, again, what, according to his theory, should have been their several characteristics, he concludes what they actually were, and proceeds to state his conclusion. The first epoch was characterized by the “relative independence” of the Church, University, State, or the religious, scientific, and political organizations of Christendom ; the second, by the “pervading spirit of authority” ; the third, by the predominance of “individual freedom” ; the fourth, by “practical equality” ; and the fifth is to be characterized by the principle of “coöperation,” or association, *à la* Fourier, or *à la* somebody else. Let us examine the question for the moment, and see if history really bears out the author in his statements.

1. The limits of the first era are not given, but we shall assume it to extend from the time of our Lord and his Apostles to the accession of Constantine the Great. We are not certain but the author means to extend it even from the birth of our Saviour to the downfall of Rome, say from the beginning of the first to the close of the fifth century ; but we take the shorter period as the more favorable to his view. But during

this period there was no Christendom in the sense in which the author uses the term ; for the State was pagan, and Christians had no political organization, except the Church herself. How, then, can he say that the three institutions were relatively independent ? If he object, and insist on including the pagan state as one of the elements of Christendom, he can with still less propriety, if possible, say the three elements were relatively independent ; for the pagan state claimed supreme authority in spirituals over the religion of all its subjects, and promulgated its edicts against Christians, and sought by the most cruel persecutions to suppress the Church. The political order occasionally tolerated the Church, we grant, but in no respect acknowledged her independence. Nor was the University, that is, education, independent of both Church and State. The Church claimed authority over the education of her own children, and required it to be Christian and orthodox. The State maintained a system of public schools, had the supreme control of them, could open or close them at its pleasure, and determine what should or should not be taught in them. We cannot understand, then, in what sense the University, that is, education, was independent, or how scientific institutions were independent of both civil and ecclesiastical control. It seems to us somewhat singular that the author should have selected the period known in history as the martyr age — which is specially characterized by its fierce and unrelenting persecution, when the political authority exerted its whole power to suppress, to exterminate, the Christian religion, and also many of the forms of Oriental paganism — as the era of freedom of thought and conscience, the only meaning of the independence of Church and University. Does the author find the characteristic of an era in what it has, or in what it has not ?

The author, it will be seen, still further asserts, that, during his first era, the Church, the University, and the State were “formless,” — that is, were unconstituted, and therefore no institutions at all. These institutions, according to the author, are the constituent elements of Christendom, and therefore without them there can be no Christendom. But in the first era they were “formless,” that is, had no actual existence. The author must therefore suppose that there passed an entire era of Christendom before there was a Christendom ! Again, nothing exists without form ; how, then, during the era when Church, University, State, were formless, that is, non-

existent, can the author say that they "*existed* in a condition of relative independence"? Would the author teach us that there is no difference between existence and non-existence?

Then, on what authority does the author assert, that, during his first period, Church, University, and State *were* "formless"? Surely, the State was formed, was constituted, under Augustus, Tiberius, Trajan, the Antonines, and Diocletian, — thoroughly formed, whether well formed or not, — as it was under Constantine, Theodosius the Great, and Justinian, if the author chooses to bring his first era down to a later date than we have supposed. Of the particular constitution of what the author calls the University, that is, of public education, we are only imperfectly informed; but we know that public provision was made for education, and that celebrated schools flourished in most, if not in all, of the great cities of the empire. As to the Church, she certainly was not "formless" in the third century, but was constituted with a hierarchy, as at present. We know, also, that she was not "formless" in the first century; for St. Paul, at least good historical authority, writing to the Corinthians, tells them, that "God hath set some in the Church, first, apostles, secondly, prophets, thirdly, teachers," &c.,* which implies that the Church then had a constitution, and, if it had a constitution, it was not "formless." That she had a constitution in the *second* century, we may learn from Irenæus and Tertullian, and various other sources. During the first three centuries, then, the Church had a constitution, though *what* constitution she had is foreign to our present purpose to inquire. Since the third century, nobody pretends that the Church *has* been formless, for we see her constitution as complete at the Council of Nice as at the Council of Trent. The author, then, drew upon his imagination or his theory, instead of history, when he asserted, that, during the first era, Church, University, and State were "formless."

2. The second era, according to the author, was characterized by the "pervading spirit of authority." Of the extent of this era we are not informed; but we judge, from the author's incidental remarks, that he extends it from the downfall of Rome to the rise of Protestantism, and intends to include the whole period commonly called the Middle Ages. Now, according to our historical reading, this period is characterized,

* 1 Cor. xii. 28.

so far as in its endless variety it can be characterized by any one element, by the spirit of lawlessness, barbarity, tyranny, and contempt of authority. It opens, for all Western, Central, and Northern Europe, with the destruction of the political order, and long ages passed away in the effort to restore it; and at no period do we find authority as all-pervading, as well established, and as peacefully discharging its functions, as it was under imperial Rome, pagan or Christian. The University, during the first half of the period, hardly existed; and when it was reestablished in the twelfth century, it was with a freedom and independence it never before enjoyed. The academic bodies were almost independent polities, well-nigh able to resist both the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities. The Church claimed, as always, her spiritual supremacy; but she was restricted in its exercise by the civil powers and the barbarity and turbulence of the times. The lay society were perpetually questioning her authority, and were less submissive to it than they had been in the first era, or than they were in the third. It strikes us that an age marked by the struggle to preserve the wrecks of civilization, and to establish order, to check despotism, and to vindicate the freedom of religion and conscience, the independence of the spiritual society, can hardly be said to be characterized by a "pervading spirit of authority," which is, as every one knows, or ought to know, the basis of all order and all real freedom.

"A vast confederacy of archbishops, bishops, and inferior clergy, ranked in grades around a common head, constitutes the aristocracy of the Church." But this confederacy, if the author chooses so to call it, — although "a confederacy ranked around a common head" is rather unintelligible to us, — whether good or bad, is no peculiarity of the author's second era. In the only sense in which it exists in one of his eras, it exists in them all; nay, it had, apparently, more the character of a confederacy in the first era than in the second, for the power of the patriarchs, primates, and archbishops was then greater than in subsequent times; that is, while the great patriarchates of the East remained steadfast in the apostolic communion, fewer cases were carried to Rome for decision, and the monarchical or papal element of the Church was less apparent. Yet, a confederacy there never was, for a confederacy supposes a union by the will of the parts, whereas, in all the eras enumerated, the union of the parts of the hierarchy has been held to derive from the head, the centre of

unity, which makes the hierarchy not merely a union or confederacy of independent bodies, but one body, dependent for its unity on the head, the Pope, who is, so to speak, the personality of the Church. For this reason, the author makes a gross mistake when he states that the archbishops, bishops, and inferior clergy constitute an aristocracy. In an aristocracy, as in a confederacy, the unity derives from the parts, and therefore is never, properly speaking, unity, but merely a union; whereas in the hierarchy it derives from the common centre, from the head, which is one, and not from the members, which are many.

"Meantime, theology formed into a system, and ancient philosophy recast in modern moulds, and subtle metaphysics and stern logic, establish the dynasty of the Schoolmen, the aristocracy of the University." We are at a loss to understand what the author means. His thesis is, that the Church, the University, and the State, during his second era, were subjected to authority, that is, were not free. But in what does he place their freedom? The Church is free when she is not controlled by any power foreign to herself, and can teach, govern, discipline, worship, according to her own constitution and laws. The State is free when no foreign or extraneous element interferes with its discharge of its legitimate functions. So, also, must be the University. How, then, the University is pervaded by a spirit of authority, is controlled in the discharge of its functions, when it is free to govern itself, and is subject only to its own laws, we do not and cannot understand. Perhaps the author means less by the Church, University, and State than we suppose. He uses these words to designate both the interior elements, love, intellect, power, and the outward institutions which spring from them; or rather, he confounds the interior elements and the outward institutions, and means one or the other, both together, or not exactly one or the other, as he finds it most convenient. The interior element, love, is the Church, in its principle; and when he complains of authority exercised over the Church, perhaps he means merely that the interior element, which founds the outward Church, is not free to push itself out at will, to overthrow existing, and to found new church organizations at pleasure. The grand defect, then, of the Middle Ages would be, under the point of view of Church, that they attempted to preserve the Church they received, and to maintain ecclesiastical order, or, in other words, that they labored to main-

tain for the inward element its outward organization. Under the point of view of State, the defect would be, that they labored to restore political order, and preserve society from dissolution or anarchy, and thus interfered with the liberty of revolutions. So the defect of the University would be, that it sought to give to the inward conception an outward expression, and to satisfy the intellect by clear, distinct, and well-established truths. The doctrine of the author would seem to be, since he is severe upon all revolutionists and destructives, that nothing should be fixed or established in Church, State, or University, and that every organization, every institution, every law, every formal statement, is repugnant to the interior freedom of man, and contrary to the true liberty. He would cure all the vices, crimes, and errors of society, as Lycurgus cured adultery, by abolishing the law which enjoined conjugal fidelity. But be this as it may, the dynasty of the Schoolmen, in so far as dynasty it could be called, and as distinguished from the political authority, on the one hand, and from the ecclesiastical, on the other, was the result of the free intellectual development the author contends for, and proves, not the presence, but the absence of the authority to which he objects.

"While the spiritual power threatening excommunication upon heretics, and the temporal power punishing as magic the discoveries and inventions of genius, uphold dictatorship in the realm of thought." That the spiritual power not only threatened excommunication upon heretics, but actually excommunicated them, during the Middle Ages, is no doubt true; but so it did in the primitive age, and so does it even now; it therefore is nothing peculiar to the author's second era, and cannot be adduced to prove its peculiar character. That the temporal power punished magic in the Middle Ages is possible; it did so under the pagan emperors, and has done so almost within our own day; but we shall be obliged to Mr. Channing to name to us one well-authenticated discovery of genius, or scientific discovery, that was punished as magic in the Middle Ages, or in any other age. We are aware of no instance of the sort. The dictatorship in the realm of thought was no greater in the author's second than in his first or his third era. "The unity of *Force* fulfils its end, when Pope and Emperor and Council conspire to cramp elastic Europe with the leading-strings of a monotonous despotism." The author here uses *force* as the synonyme of *authority*, or he changes, without notice, his subject, neither of which is allowable. If force fulfils its end, it

does what is legitimate ; what, then, is there to complain of? But when and where did "Pope and Emperor and Council conspire to cramp elastic Europe *with the leading-strings of a monotonous despotism*"? Popes and councils have not seldom labored to check despotism, and to secure the freedom of conscience and worship ; but we recollect no instance in which they conspired to establish a despotism. If the author does, we wish he would name it, — the place where, and the time when. It is easy to make loose assertions if one is unscrupulous, but an honest man is cautious how he makes assertions for which he has no authority, to the prejudice of his neighbour. That there was despotism in the Middle Ages we do not dispute, for there is always despotism where there is barbarism; but that there was in them a *monotonous* despotism we have yet to learn. So far as we have studied those ages, monotony was by no means one of their characteristics. The only monotony we have detected in them is the monotony of the ocean in a storm, — the monotony of the mountain torrent, swollen by recent floods, — the monotony of movement, change, and variety. But this may be owing to the fact that we have not read them, lately, through the spectacles of a world-reformer, by which one sees much that is not to be seen.

3. The third era is characterized by "Individual Freedom," and therefore, negatively, we suppose, by the absence of authority in Church, State, and University. This era, like the others, is left indefinite; but we shall assume that the author means to extend it from the breaking out of Protestantism to the peace of Utrecht, in 1713. We cannot commence it earlier without running back into his second, nor extend it later without running forward into what is obviously his fourth era. This period of two hundred years is, we had supposed, remarkable for the absence of individual freedom. It is the period of the rise, progress, and decline of Protestantism, the destruction in favor of monarchy of the old feudal nobility throughout the principal states of Europe, the suppression of the Estates in Sweden and Denmark, of the States General in France, the Comuneros in Spain, and, virtually, the Parliament in England under the Tudors and the Stuarts, the centralization of government, and the consolidation of the power of the monarch. It is the golden age of absolute monarchy, as we see in the Austrian House of Hapsburg and the Prussian House of Hohenzollern ; in Henry the Eighth, Elizabeth, and James the First and his son Charles, in England ;

Richelieu and Louis the Fourteenth in France ; and Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second in Spain. Indeed, the principal outward effect of Protestantism for these two hundred years, aside from the destructive and protracted wars to which it gave rise, and which threatened to replunge Europe into barbarism, from which the Church, by a thousand years of unremitting labor, had in a measure rescued it, was the establishment of absolute monarchy in nearly all Protestant, and, indirectly, in nearly all Catholic Europe. It did this by its resistance to the Papal authority, and by the centralization of the powers and administration of government it rendered necessary on both sides to carry on the wars it engendered.

In the University, there was very little of what Mr. Channing calls individual freedom. Indeed, in Protestant countries, during the whole period, very little is done for education ; the great mass of the people are suffered to grow up in utter ignorance, and the Universities that flourish are entirely under the control either of the sect or of the state. As to Catholic countries, it is enough to say that it is the glorious era of the Jesuits, who are the masters, under the Church, of education, and the principal educators ; and Mr. Channing will hardly contend that the most striking feature of Jesuitism is individual freedom in his sense of the term, although, we grant, it may be in ours ; for no man is or can be more free than he who has no will but that of his legitimate superior.

The Protestant nations, we grant, threw off the authority of the Pope, but they fell under the civil despot ; they discarded the authority of the Church, but only to become slaves of the sect, — to say the least, as hostile to individual freedom as the authority discarded, Mr. Channing himself being judge. Under a religious point of view, in the Protestant world, there may have been a struggle for individual freedom, but there was no individual freedom obtained. It was, we must remember, the period when Protestants not only persecuted Catholics, fined, imprisoned, massacred them without mercy, — which we do not expect a Protestant to regard otherwise than as praiseworthy, — but when they persecuted one another, — Calvinists, Socinians ; Gomerites, Arminians ; Lutherans, Anabaptists and Sacramentarians ; Anglicans, Puritans ; and Puritans, Anglicans ; and both Puritans and Anglicans, Quakers and Unitarians. It is the period, we must also remember, of Cavaliers and Roundheads in England, of Irish and English penal laws, of Episcopalian intolerance in Virginia and Maryland, and of Con-

gregational exclusiveness in New England, where the law even forbade, as it is said, the making of minced pies or plum-puddings on Christmas, lest some countenance might be shown to prelacy and Papacy. Surely, in the Protestant world, there was, in Church, State, University, anything but individual freedom.

In Catholic countries, the Church relaxed nothing of her claims, and perhaps in no previous period of her history was the Papal authority more resplendent, or more fully recognized, or more cheerfully submitted to, by the great body of the faithful, than in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In no previous period had the Church been more vigilant in detecting and condemning heresy, or more rigid in her control over the doctrines held by the faithful. It was in this period that was celebrated the great Council of Trent, in which the Christian doctrine was defined to a far greater extent than it had ever been in any previous Council. If the Church lost the Northern nations of Europe, which became Protestant, she was compensated by her conquests in the East, and in the newly discovered continent of America; and perhaps the number of her children had never been, for any previous two hundred years, greater, or more worthy of her name of Catholic. Indeed, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so calamitous to Protestants, may almost be called, for Catholics, the Age of Saints. Whatever else the author may say of this period of history, he cannot with the least truth represent it as characterized by the presence of individualism and the absence of authority, ecclesiastical or civil. Indeed, if he had reversed his statement, and represented his second era, the Middle Ages, as characterized by individual freedom, and his third by the "pervading spirit of authority," he would have been, though still incorrect, less far from the truth.

4. The author's *fourth* era is characterized by "*Practical Equality*," by which we understand him to mean equality in the material order, the material interests of life. This period, like the others, is left undefined; we presume, however, that we shall meet the author's views, as far as he has any, if we consider it as extending from the peace of Utrecht, the commencement of the modern industrial system, of which Great Britain may be considered as the chief, to the publication of Fourier's *Theory of Unity*, in 1822, — what, in a loose way, is termed the eighteenth century. In some respects, the author's outlines of this epoch are just, though his tone and coloring are false; and he proves that he has at least glanced at its history, or

rather, that the masters he follows, for the most part educated in the eighteenth century, were better acquainted with its facts than they were with the preceding centuries. Nevertheless, to name it the age of *practical equality* is wholly inaccurate. Of all known ages, it was the least practical. It was carried away in pursuit of Utopias, even more than the present. The wildest, the maddest schemes were imagined, and pursued as realities. Was it not the age of Law's Mississippi Scheme, — of Mesmer, Cagliostro, and the Republic of all the Virtues, — of atheism, *L'Homme-plant*, *L'Homme-machine*, Voltaire, Condorcet, Hume, Hartley, Price, Thomas Paine, Jacobinism, the perfectibility of human nature, and dreams of man's immortality on earth? It should be called the age of impracticable dreams, and mad fancies, — and yet not wholly, for it was also the age of Vico, Reid, William Pitt, Edmund Burke, Napoleon Bonaparte, and George Washington. As to equality, never was there less approach to it, nor was there ever set in operation a series of causes more hostile to it. Political equality was established here, but it operates chiefly in favor of material inequality, in covering the land over with industrial corporations which defy individual competition. Labor-saving machinery has been invented and introduced to an incalculable extent, but it results in throwing out of employment millions of laborers, in concentrating the business of production in the hands of capitalists or soulless corporations, in destroying the class of small manufacturers, and compelling the operatives to toil for the mere minimum of human subsistence. It is to get rid of the effects produced by it and other kindred causes, the hopeless inequalities and the terrible physical degradation of the laboring classes resulting, that Socialism is preaching up reform, and effecting its anarchical revolutions in Europe, if we may believe Mr. Channing and his friends. The only sense in which the author can say the last century was marked by practical equality is in the sense that it had it not, and made wholly ineffectual efforts to gain it.

The author says the unity of the Church was broken, and its prestige lost. But this is a mistake. The unity of the Church has never been broken, and never can be broken as long as there is a successor of St. Peter, the centre of unity; for where Peter is, there is the Church, — *Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia*. Individuals and nations may lose the unity of the Church by breaking from her communion, and thus losing the Church herself; but, if they do, it is they, not she, that lose

unity. The unity of the Church was never more perfect than during the last century, when all the powers of earth and hell seemed to be let loose against her, and when Jansenism, Protestantism, infidelism, and Jacobinism, strengthened by gross impurity and unbounded license, made their combined assaults upon her, and in their madness shouted a triumph which proved to be illusory. And it was in the very moment of their intoxication and frantic excesses, when the Holy Father was stripped of his temporal dominions, and was dying in exile or languishing in prison, that the reaction in favor of Catholicity began in the heart of Protestant Europe; a reaction which still continues throughout the world, — nay, which Mr. Channing himself has felt more than once, and to which, had he followed the promptings of Divine grace, and not struggled against tendencies which he was conscious of, he would long ere this have yielded.

5. The fifth era is the present, and is characterized by the principle of "Coöperation," or rather, is to be so characterized. Of this era we have not much to say, for we do not, like Mr. Channing, claim to be a prophet. The principle of coöperation, however, is no new principle, as Mr. Channing asserts; it is as old as society, that is, as old as the human race itself. The "Fraternity" the author preaches was known from the beginning, and ceased to be a fact only with the confusion of languages and the dispersion of the human race. In the Christian sense, fraternity by election and grace, as distinguished from that by natural generation, has always been proclaimed and realized in the Church. Coöperation must be either by force of nature or by virtue of grace, either compelled or voluntary. What it is or can be by force of nature, the author may learn from the history of gentilism, which, we imagine, is not precisely what he wishes for. It cannot be compelled without a despotic authority, against which he declaims. If voluntary and by grace, it can be realized only in the Christian Church, which reëstablishes unity in the elected human race, or chosen people of God, and will make the elected commensurate with the natural human race, in proportion as men voluntarily submit to her authority.

We pass over what the author says of "Revolutionary Tendencies," or "the Position of Judge," and also what he says of "Unitary Tendencies," or "the Position of Prophet," the fourth and fifth general divisions of his Discourse; for we do not know who has installed him as judge, and because he appears

to us to be one of those prophets whom the Lord commands us not to hear, — prophets of their own hearts, of whom the Lord says, “I did not send these prophets, yet they ran.” “The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath my word, let him speak my word with truth; what hath the chaff to do with the wheat? saith the Lord.”* He who asks us to listen to him as a prophet must show us the seal of his commission from the Almighty. We pass over, therefore, these two divisions of his Discourse, and come at once to his official statement of what he terms the “fundamental principles of Social Science.”

“1. The One God, Infinite and Eternal, lives in three modes; of which Love is the Principle, — Beautiful Joy the End, — and Wisdom the harmonizing Medium; and throughout creation every existence, as made in the likeness of the Being of beings, is triune also, — having an impulse of good for its motive power, a coöperative use for its ultimate destiny, and a form of order as the law of its development.

“2. The Divine Idea of Man is of Many men made One, or, in other words, of a race unfolding, through ages, around the globe, from simple, original unity into every possible variety, and thence by combination into fulfilled, composite unity. The centre of this race is God in Man; its destined end, a Heaven of Humanity; and the mode of its growth, the formation of Societies, whose members may be trained to wise beneficence, and in whose confederacies, peaceful and prosperous, may be brightly imaged the Divine Blessedness.

“3. The Life of Man is Love, inspired continually by God, who, from everlasting to everlasting, attracts the members of every race to Unity, and to Himself, by rational freedom, — thus governing his children by the law of liberty, while rewarding them by the liberty of law; and the method of holy and humane existence is so to harmonize Collective and Individual good, that societies and nations may be reconciled in all interests, and become fit temples for the indwelling Divine Spirit.

“4. The Form of this Unitary Life is the Law of Series, by which, throughout creation, Divine Justice graduates, — intermingles, — combines the varieties latent in every unity, and out of seeming discord evolves sublimest concord. This plan of perfect order so distributes the functions of society, that each primitive affection finds the freest play, and persons the most diverse in character and power are bound in one by mutual service, as are the organs of a living body.

* *Vide Jer. xxiii. 21 - 34.*

"5. As Divine Goodness is manifested in the impulses which animate all creatures, — and Divine Wisdom in the law which, regulating all movement, finds expression in intelligent spirits, — so Divine Power reflects itself in the beauty of the universe, whose every particle and coacting whole symbolize the perfect peace of God; and as Nature, thus fashioned in image of the Almighty, is designed as the mould for finite energy, the indispensable condition of human refinement is Organized Industry, and Work exalted into Art.

"6. The aim of a Community should be to form a Collective Man, wherein the inspiring principle of Love, the distributing method of Law, and the refining conditions of Beauty, may be severally developed and mutually completed, and thus, by interaction, their common end fulfilled. Property should be held in joint-stock ownership; — Labor made coöperative in groups and series of groups; — economy, refinement, and pure influences secured by families united in a Combined Dwelling; — profits equitably distributed to partners, in proportion to Labor, Skill, and Capital; — anxiety and sorrow lightened by a system of Mutual Guaranties, extending to all the risks and responsibilities of life; — honors and trusts assigned by election according to approved Usefulness in special functions, or in general direction; — physical, mental, moral growth insured by an Integral Education, at once spiritual, scientific, and practical, and embracing the whole of life; — and chiefly the Divine rule of All for Each, and Each for All, embodied and actualized in Unity of Interests.

"7. In such Organized Societies alone can Individual Men be formed to Integrity; — for only *there* can infants be worthily welcomed at birth, — children purely and symmetrically developed, — young men and women guided to vocations appropriate to their peculiar powers, — the mature upheld in magnanimous efficiency by a consciousness, that, in laboring for the commonwealth, they are insuring the welfare of their families, and their own highest good, — the aged revered, solaced, cheered, — and every person taught by *life* to know the worth of a human being, and the loyalty due to a united race; and, finally, only from Societies thus constituted can States, Nations, Humanity, become One in that fraternity of freemen, which, in spirit, truth, and deed, will be the Kingdom of God." — pp. 22–24.

This statement has evidently been drawn up with great care, and that it is satisfactory to the author we may infer from the fact, that he has recently republished it, as an official statement of principles, in *The Spirit of the Age*, a paper of which he is the editor, and which takes the place of *The Harbinger*, whilome the organ of the Fourierists, or American Associationists. But

however carefully it may have been drawn up, and however well satisfied the author may be with it, it is to us exceedingly obscure, confused, vague, and uncertain; and without referring to the author's antecedents and concomitants, and drawing upon our own knowledge of the authors he has studied, and from whom he has borrowed most of his doctrines, we should be utterly unable to extract the least intelligible meaning from it. To analyze the seven paragraphs cited, or articles of the author's creed, to ascertain the precise number of propositions they contain, and to determine the precise sense and value of each, would far transcend our ability, or, if not our ability, at least our limits, and our patience, as well as — what is more to the purpose — the patience of our readers. We must therefore confine ourselves to some three or four of the more general and more fundamental propositions.

1. "The one God, Infinite and Eternal, *lives* in three modes." What does the author mean by saying that God *lives*? Does he mean to distinguish between the Divine *esse*, or living, and the Divine *existere*, or existence? We presume so. He, then, holds that our primary conception of God is that of pure essence, the *reine Seyn* of the Hegelians, and supposes that the conception of God as existence — *das Wesen* — is secondary. Hence God does not live or exist in himself, but in his evolutions, his works, or the universe, which express him. This is the doctrine of the school to which the author appears to us to belong, and is in accordance with what, in our former article, we found to be his own doctrine. Hence God is not conceivable as living or actually existing God without the universe, and the universe is as necessary to him as the medium of his life, as he is to the universe as the fountain of its being. God, regarded in himself, is the ideal of the universe, and the universe is his realization, — to him, as Mr. Channing once said to us in conversation, what the picture is to the ideal or design of the artist. But as God is the infinite Ideal, and tends to the infinite revelation of himself, he must run through an infinite variety of being in order to actualize his infinite potentiality. This tendency to infinite realization of himself implies his infinite progress in his life, and the infinite progress in the universe, from the lowest and least perfect forms of existence, to the highest and most perfect. Here is the foundation of the modern or pantheistic theory of progress, which we find in Hegel, Cousin, and Pierre Leroux, and the law of which Fourier professes to have determined.

But this doctrine implies, as ordinarily taken, that the ideal can realize itself, that pure essence can clothe itself with existence, and that the cause is completed, fulfilled, perfected, in the effect,—that is, what does not exist can act, and imperfection can, of and by itself, perfect itself. As we actualize our potentiality by our efforts, and may be said to grow and to consolidate and enlarge our powers by acting, and to live only by *doing*, so it is thought that the same may be predicated of God himself,—as if the reason why this is true of us, namely, that we live, move, and have our being in God, could apply in his case as well as in ours! Under another point of view, the progression of life supposed is merely a progression in order, irrespective of space or time,—that is to say, God and the universe form one eternal and indissoluble whole, embracing in itself every conceivable variety or form of existence. This seems to us to have been the view of Hegel himself, and is the only consistent pantheistic view conceivable. This, so far from proving the common theory of progress, denies it, and reduces all to eternal immobility, and real silence and death,—teaching that life and motion are only sense-illusions, arising from the contracted sphere of our vision, without anything to respond to them in the world of reality. But take the doctrine in either sense, it is incompatible with the ends Mr. Channing contemplates. If the first view is taken, progress is impossible, because pure essence without existence is nothing but mere potentiality or possibility, and the possible cannot reduce itself to act,—that is, mere possible existence cannot make itself actual existence; for it must be actual before it can act, or perform anything. If the second view be taken, progress is equally impossible; for all is complete as it is, can be neither more nor less, nor other, than it is, either in whole or in part. Yet Mr. Channing and all the Associationists are great believers in progress, and will tolerate no immobility,—no, not even in God.

Theologically considered, the distinction between the Divine *esse*, or being, and the Divine *existere*, or living, is inadmissible. Being, abstracted from existence, is merely possible being, not actual being; and therefore the distinction, if asserted, implies that God, considered in himself, in our ultimate conception of him, is merely potential or possible God, and must be reduced to act, before we can assert that he exists, or *actually* is. But the possible cannot reduce itself to act, for to reduce is to act, and only the actual can act. How, then, from merely possible God obtain actual, living God? The author must either say

there is no God, or else suppose something more ultimate than God, which reduces the pure essence to existence. If he says the former, he concedes that his distinction is tantamount to the denial of God ; if he says the latter, he supposes an exterior cause of God, and therefore a cause prior to the first cause, and a cause of the cause of all causes, which, we need not add, is absurd. He cannot say this ; he is not at liberty to deny God, for he begins with the assertion of the existence of the one, infinite, and eternal God ; nothing, then, remains for him, but to agree with the Schoolmen, that God is most pure act, *actus purissimus*, excluding from his being all potentiality, and all conceivable distinction between his essence and his existence, his being and his life. His essence is existence, and his existence is essence. He is infinitely and essentially living, — living from, by, and in himself.

A little philosophy, of which Mr. Channing and his school claim to have so much, would suffice, we should suppose, to teach him that pure essence, or being, without existence, is absolutely inconceivable. God, non-existent, but as the dark background of existence, as some profess to conceive him, is absolutely unintelligible, and really indistinguishable, as Hegel himself says, from nothing. In God we live, move, and are ; and therefore it is only in him we can see, know, or conceive at all, as Malebranche has shown in his theory of *Vision in God*, whatever we may think of the theory itself. Every conception of which we are capable, whether of the actual or the possible, conceals at bottom, connotes, or implies the conception of God as actually existing, living God. The idea of God logically precedes all our other ideas, and in fact chronologically, although not distinctly, or as distinguished from our other conceptions ; for to distinguish implies reflection, — what the Italians very finely term *ripensare*, — which belongs to a later period of life. This idea, the idea of God, — not of pure abstract being, as Rosmini, if correctly reported to us, maintains, — is the *forma*, or formative principle, of the intellect, or faculty of intelligence. It is the light by which the faculty is constituted intelligent faculty, and by virtue of which we see all that we do see. Take away from the mind this idea, you take away the very power of intellection, and leave to man nothing intelligible. To take away this idea is to deny God, and if you deny God, you deny, not only all actual existence, but all *possible* existence ; for the possible is conceivable as possible even only by virtue of the conception of God

as actually existing being, whose actual power can reduce it to act, make it actual, if he pleases. Hence, we must either say that we can conceive nothing at all, and assert nihilism,—which is impossible, for we cannot, if we would, deny our own existence without at the same time asserting it,—or else we must concede that our primitive conception is the conception of God as living God, in whom no distinction between essence and existence is admissible or conceivable, as the Church has defined, as all Catholic theologians teach, as every sane philosopher maintains, and the common sense of mankind asserts.

But “the One God, Infinite and Eternal, lives in *three modes*.” Since we can admit no distinction between Deity and God, between the Divine essence and the Divine existence, whatever be the distinction of modes here intended, they must be understood as distinctions in the Divine being or nature. To suppose them to be in the Divine being or nature is to suppose that nature to be composite, essentially composed of substance and mode, or of subject and accident. But this is not admissible. The composite is subsequent to the components, and God, if composite, can be resolved into something more ultimate than himself. The substance is potential in relation to the mode, the subject in relation to the accident; but God, we have seen, is most pure act, and therefore excludes from his being all potentiality. If we suppose God to be composed of substance and mode, we must suppose a power anterior to him that composes him, or unites the substance and mode so as to form from their union the living God; which, as we have seen, is to suppose a cause prior to the first cause, and a cause of the cause of all causes. Our readers may be inclined to believe, that Mr. Channing predicates the three modes of God operating out of himself, not of his being, but of his operations. This, however, is not the case; for he is evidently speaking of God, regarded in his own life, not as operating in space and time, but as infinite and eternal, therefore above and prior to his external operations in time. He must, therefore, predicate the modes of his being, and not of his operations.

“The One God, Infinite and Eternal, lives in three modes; of which Love is the Principle, Beautiful Joy the End, and Wisdom the harmonizing Medium.” But what is the antecedent of which? *Three modes*? Then what are the modes themselves? Love will be the principle of all three, beautiful joy the end, and wisdom the medium; but of all three what? This does not appear. *Lives*? It is not, we believe, accord-

ing to Lindley Murray to make a verb not used as subject, or as subjective member of a sentence, the antecedent of a relative pronoun ; but world-reformers may, no doubt, reform grammar as well as other things, and we suppose the author really means to tell us, that, of the Divine life or living, love is the principle, beautiful joy the end, and wisdom the harmonizing medium. As God lives from, in, and by himself, and no distinction between his essence and his existence is conceivable, we must predicate the love, joy, and wisdom of the Divine *being*, and they are themselves the three modes of its existence ; which, after what we have said, must mean, if anything, that God, in our highest conception of him, is essentially composed of principle, means, and end, which are love, wisdom, joy. What all this means is more than we know. It is a doctrine of the author, that all existences mirror or image God, and he has told us that every man is constituted of three elements, namely, love, truth, power, related to each other as inmost, mediate, outmost, or as motive, means, end (p. 7). It is, therefore, only fair to presume that he holds that God is constituted, in like manner, of three elements, which are in him, as in man, related as motive, means, and end, as inmost, mediate, and outmost. God, then, is to be regarded as a whole, composed of beginning, middle, and end, like a good oration ; but what this really means is not very intelligible to us. That God, in operating out of himself, that is, in creating the universe, acts by means, from a motive, or for an end, may be said ; and that the motive is his own infinite love or goodness, wisdom the means, and, as to his creatures, beautiful joy the end, may also be said ; but this has nothing to do with Mr. Channing's doctrine. He asserts that God lives in three modes, and that he lives from love to joy, by or through wisdom. But what, since these three elements constitute God, is he who lives thus ? He cannot be the love, for that is his motive ; he cannot be the joy, for that is the end he seeks ; and he cannot be the wisdom, for that is the means he uses. To say he is no one nor all of these taken singly, but is all of them taken together, in their union or composition, is — besides the absurdity of supposing a being seeking an end which he essentially is — to suppose the Divine nature to be complex, and therefore subject to analysis and dissolution. It denies the unity and substantiality of God, by making him a mere union or totality, and is open to all the objections already urged.

In republishing this first article of his creed in *The Spirit of*
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the Age, Mr. Channing has made a slight addition, which may help us to understand him. "The Absolute Being, infinite, eternal, though in *Himself* utterly unapproachable, is presented to our highest conceptions as Triune, — the one, the one in many, and the many in one. To us he appears to live," &c. The doctrine of the author, we think we cannot be mistaken in saying, is, that God is for us human beings only in his manifestations, — that to our highest conceptions he is presented only as, so to speak, the manifested or actualized God, inseparable and indistinguishable from the principle, means, and end of the manifestation, or actually evolved universe. Whether back and independent of the actual universe he exists, we know not ; for out of the universe — that is, as living in and of himself, independent of the universe — he is inconceivable, "utterly unapproachable," even in conception. Thus Cousin says : — "Le Dieu de la conscience n'est pas un Dieu abstrait, un roi solitaire relégué par-delà la création sur le trône désert d'une éternité silencieuse et d'une existence absolue qui ressemble au néant même de l'existence ; c'est un Dieu à la fois vrai et réel, à la fois substance et cause, toujours substance et toujours cause, n'étant substance qu'en tant que cause, et cause qu'en tant que substance, c'est-à-dire étant cause absolue, un et plusieurs, éternité et temps, espace et nombre, essence et vie, indivisibilité et totalité, principe, fin et milieu, au sommet de l'être et à son plus humble degré, infini et fini tout ensemble, triple en fin, c'est-à-dire à la fois Dieu, nature, et humanité. En effet, si Dieu n'est pas tout, il n'est rien ; s'il est absolument indivisible en soi, il est inaccessible et par conséquent il est incompréhensible, et son incompréhensibilité est pour nous sa destruction. Incompréhensible comme formule et dans l'école, Dieu est clair dans le monde qui le manifeste, et pour l'âme qui le possède et le sent."* The identity, on this point, of Cousin's doctrine and Mr. Channing's cannot be reasonably doubted.

God, according to Cousin and our author, is at once one and many, — is one in many, and many in one. But this is not conceivable. Unity necessarily excludes multiplicity, and multiplicity unity. If God is one, he cannot be many ; if many, he is not one. Nothing in the world is more certain. Mr. Channing is in pursuit of unity ; but if he supposes plurality in God the first cause, or the first link in his series of evolutions, he can never obtain unity ; for unity can no more

* *Fragments Philosophiques*, 3e éd., Paris, 1838, Tom. I. p. 76.

be obtained from plurality, than perfection from imperfection. Plurality proceeds from unity, not unity from plurality. In God is the cause of multiplicity or plurality ; but not, therefore, is he himself multiple or manifold. It is false to say that God is many in one, or even that he is one in many. God does not lose his unity in creating variety, any more than an artist loses his, in producing a variety of pictures. Is the artist a man in designing a man, a horse in designing a horse, a flower in designing a flower, a fly in designing a fly ? And does he become many in designing many, and they become one and identical in him ? If he loses his oneness in the variety of his designs, where is the unity in which they become one ? If God, in creating many, is himself many, he retains no unity in which the many can be one. The absurdity of Cousin's and Channing's doctrine results from the assumption, that God does not and cannot create, but simply evolves, and, in order to produce man, becomes himself man ; a horse, becomes himself horse ; a cabbage, becomes himself cabbage ; that is to say, what we call creatures are but forms or modes of the manifested God, — pure pantheism.

The author misapprehends the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and is mistaken in supposing that he represents God as triune. His God is not triune, but threefold ; for, by introducing divisibility, plurality, variety, diversity, into the one primary conception of God, he denies the unity of the Divine Being. His God is complex, not simple ; a totality, not a unity ; for a divisible unity is inconceivable, — a contradiction in terms. His love, wisdom, joy, are not the three hypostases of the Christian Mystery, and in no sense respond to them, or can by any possibility be the real sense of the Christian symbol, — what Christians would mean by it, if they understood themselves, as Mr. Channing would say ; because they are all three essential to the Divine nature. In neither one nor another of them is God without the other two. They are distinctions in the Divine essence. Love is not God, if distinguished from wisdom, nor wisdom, if distinguished from love. But the sacred Mystery asserts that God is absolutely one in his substance, being, nature, or existence ; indivisible, indistinguishable, and most simple. The triune God is not God existing in a threefold being or nature, but one nature, one essence, one substance, one being, one existence in three persons. Personality is the last complement of rational nature. The Divine nature, which is rational nature, if we may

so speak, is one and indivisible, in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the plurality is only in the last complement, or personality ; so that "the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, yet are there not three Gods, but one God." Mr. Channing cannot say, Love is God, Wisdom is God, and Beautiful Joy is God, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God ; for, according to him, God is only the union, or totality, of the three ; and, since they are distinct by nature, if he should call each separately God, he would assert three Gods, not one Divine Being in three persons. He therefore neither asserts the substance of the Christian Trinity, nor a triune God, as he supposes.

So far as the three elements Mr. Channing names are to be regarded as attributes of the Divine Being, they are undoubtedly distinguishable from one another, in our apprehension of them, or manner of conceiving them ; but not in God, nor from his Divine *esse* or being. This distinction of attributes, which we concede, does in no sense respond to that of three persons ; because all the Divine attributes are common to each of the Divine Persons. Moreover, it is only virtually real, and exists in our minds with merely a foundation in reality. Regarded in himself, since God is most simple, — *simplicissimus*, — as he must be if, as we have proved, he is most pure act, — *actus purissimus*, — there can be no distinction between him and his attributes, nor between one attribute and another. His attributes are himself, and in himself all his attributes are identical. He is goodness, wisdom, justice, power, &c. ; and goodness, wisdom, justice, power, &c., are in him one and the same. But he being infinite, and we finite, we cannot conceive him adequately, and are obliged to conceive his attributes separately, and, in our conceptions, distinguish them both from his Divine *esse* and from one another. This is allowable, because he *eminently* contains the distinctions we make, or contains himself that which equals, and more than equals, all that we conceive in our separate conceptions.

But we must quicken our pace, or we shall never reach the end of our journey. "And throughout creation every existence, as made in the likeness of the Being of beings, is triune also, — having an impulse of good for its motive power, a co-operative use for its ultimate destiny, and a form of order as the law of its development." This throws some light on what has preceded, and proves that God, as well as his creatures,

has, in Mr. Channing's view, an ultimate destiny, that is, Beautiful Joy. Who appointed to God his destiny? Does God work to realize or perfect his own beautiful joy? Do you suppose him, in the beginning, destitute of complete blessedness, and that he creates out of his own emptiness to fill up his joy, not out of his own fulness, and that his blessedness is completed or perfected in his creatures? This is what we have all along seen to be Mr. Channing's doctrine. He does not appear to be able to conceive a God perfect in himself, and creating from pure disinterestedness, for the sake, not of increasing his own joy, but of communicating his goodness and blessedness to creatures. He condemns selfishness, and yet, with an inconsistency not uncommon in system-mongers and world-reformers, makes God himself intensely, infinitely selfish, laboring only to perfect his own existence, and to fill up the measure of his own joy. He would seem, then, not to wish us to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect, but more perfect, to have an altogether higher perfection, so as, by our noble and disinterested conduct, to help perfect God, and complete his "Beautiful Joy."

If every creature is made in the likeness of God, as Mr. Channing represents him, it by no means follows that every creature is triune; for according to him, as we have seen, God is not triune, since he is a totality, not a unity, a mere union or complexity of different elements. Theologians find in man, who is made to the image and likeness of God, some faint analogy to the most Holy Trinity; but that every creature's existence reproduces in itself the image of the three Persons of the Godhead, is a proposition the author may find it not a little difficult to prove. But letting this pass, we are unable to conceive — perhaps owing to our native and acquired dullness — how a being can be essentially constituted of an impulse, a coöperative use, and a law of development. An impulse implies some one who imparts and some one who receives it, and from both of which it is distinguishable. But who or what gives the impulse? It cannot be man himself, because the impulse is a constituent element of his nature. Who or what receives the impulse, or is moved by it? Not man, again, for he is indistinguishable from it. A coöperative use implies a thing used, distinguishable from the user, and an end to which it is used. What is the thing that is used? Not man, because he is the use, — the use being one of his constituent elements. Who is the user, or coöperator? Not

man, for the same reason. What is the end to which the co-operative use is directed? Beautiful Joy? But that also is a constituent element of man, without which man is not constituted, and therefore identical with the use and user. Cannot the author see, that, if he makes the three elements constitutive of the creature, he must write — nonsense? No being, conceived to contain its motive, means, and end in itself, as constitutive of its nature, can be conceived as active. The actor must be one, simple, indivisible, and the whole being must be on the side of the actor, and distinguishable from the end for which it acts. If man is divided into motive, means, and end, there is no entire man to be placed on the side of the actor, or to seek, by the means, the end. One third is detached, and set before the other two as the end; and the other two, again, are separated, and one third takes the other third as its means of gaining the first. Is this really conceivable? Can the third part of man, distinguished from the other two thirds, be a simple, complete, active being? Or suppose Mr. Channing does not mean to separate them, — suppose he considers them united; then he must consider the whole man essentially and entirely in each of the three terms, — that he is all motive, all means, all end, simultaneously and together, and therefore that man uses himself as the means to obtain himself! We have seen a young dog amuse himself running round after his own tail; but that is nothing in comparison with a man running round after himself, like one of the characters in Jean Paul Richter's *Titan*, who is everywhere seeking his *Ich*, his *Ego*, which he fancies he has lost.

2. "The Divine Idea of Man is of Many men made One, or, in other words, of a race unfolding, through ages, around the globe, from simple, original unity into every possible variety, and thence by combination into fulfilled, composite unity." This means, we suppose, that man, properly viewed, is many men made one, or unity unfolded, in space and time, into every possible variety, and through that variety becoming completed or actualized unity. But this, if it mean anything, must mean something which is not admissible. Mr. Channing recognizes in his system no simple, original unity, from which the race can unfold into variety; for he makes man essentially the mere union of three distinguishable elements, related to each other as motive, means, and end; and he also represents God, the fountain of all being and existence, essentially composite, composed, as man, of three distinct elements, which

are in like manner related to each other in him. He supposes plurality, multiplicity, in God, or first link in his series of evolutions, which is reproduced in each and every evolution or existence, and therefore denies all simple, original unity as his point of departure, whether for God or for creatures. Besides, unity cannot unfold. *Simple*, original unity *unfolding*, is a contradiction in terms. Only complexity, multiplicity, plurality, can unfold, all of which are excluded by simple unity, and, in turn, exclude it. Even if the author could, without contradicting himself, assert simple, original unity, he could not assert that the idea of man is of a race unfolding from unity. There is no difference between a unity that unfolds into variety, and no unity at all.

“And thence by combination into fulfilled, composite unity.” Here is queer philosophy. The race unfolds from simple unity into every possible variety, and from variety into fulfilled, composite unity. Unity is fulfilled in variety ; that is to say, unity, considered in itself, is not actual unity, is only potential unity, and becomes actual unity only in multiplicity and composition ! Unity, then, must cease to be unity in order to be unity. Our modern philosophers have made strange discoveries. “Thence by combination into fulfilled, *composite* unity.” Composite unity ! What sort of an animal is that ? Why not talk of a round triangle, or a square circle ? A *composite* unity is no unity at all, but a sheer contradiction in terms. Composition denies unity, and unity denies composition. By no conceivable combination of particulars can you obtain unity ; for combination gives only a union, a whole, an aggregation, all terms which are excluded by unity, and which exclude it in turn. Mr. Channing can hardly be ignorant of this, for he has once, unless our recollection fails us, been able to distinguish between union and unity.

The contradictions and absurdities which meet us at every turn in the author, and which we grow weary of pointing out, result, we suppose, from his eclecticism, or rather syncretism, in which he includes and attempts to harmonize systems essentially incongruous and irreconcilable. He has some reminiscences of Christian theism, which he would retain and reconcile with the pantheistic conceptions he has, consciously or unconsciously, adopted ; and these last he wishes to harmonize with the doctrine of progress furnished him by the dominant sentiment of the age, or modern *Welt-geist*, and which is his favorite doctrine, to which all in his system is subordinate.

Some whom he respects advocate Christianity ; others whom he respects equally as much, perhaps more, advocate pantheism ; and both these classes advocate progress. He concludes, therefore, that Christian Theism, German Pantheism, and French Socialism or Progressism are, at bottom, identical, or, at least, mutually reconcilable. He throws them all into the same category, and reasons from them as if there was no fundamental difference between them, and hence the confusion and contradictory character of his thought and speech.

Christian theism asserts one God, infinitely perfect, self-existing, eternal, independent, absolutely one and most simple, excluding from his being all potentiality, all complexity, composition, multiplicity, variety, distinction, and therefore asserts other existences, or the universe, visible or invisible, only as created by his omnipotent power out of nothing, or, what is the same thing, out of his own infinite fulness ;—fulness, we say, not *stuff*, as Cousin maintains, which would imply the eternity of matter, or that God is the *materia prima* of the universe. Pantheism denies the creative Deity, and asserts that God is all, or the whole, and that nothing but God exists. Man and nature, as distinguished from him, are, in its view, no real existences, are nothing but the infinite fulness of his own being. The world of space and time is a mere illusion, for there are and can be no separate existences coexisting, and no succession of events. All is eternal, immovable, silent. But now comes the great difficulty. To reconcile the idea of a creative Deity, *Deus Creator*, with the idea of an uncreative Deity,—a God who creates the heavens and the earth, and all things visible and invisible, with a God who creates, does, nothing, and is all that is or exists,—is hard enough ; but to reconcile this latter idea, which denies the world of space and time, and therefore all progressibles, with the idea of universal and unlimited progress, is for Mr. Channing a still harder, as well as a more pressing, problem.

To solve these problems, the author, while he asserts the creative God, as he must in order to assert the world of space and time, quietly assumes that creative and uncreative are the same, or that creation and evolution have one and the same meaning, and that to assert a God unfolding himself in variety is the same thing as to assert a God creating the universe. This disposes of the first difficulty. He then, in order to be able to conceive of God unfolding, and to reconcile the idea of the uncreative Deity with the idea of progress,

imagines multiplicity and variety in God himself ; that is, in the first cause, or the first link of his series. All now is simple and easy. God contains infinite variety, which he is infinitely developing. Each evolution, since it is an evolution of God, is an image of God, — or, so to speak, God himself in miniature, God in its own sphere, — and therefore contains a variety in itself, which, in its turn, it must evolve. Its evolutions, again, each in its degree, contain a variety, which also must be evolved, that is, actualized. These successive or serial evolutions are what is meant by progress. When God, as the first evolver, has evolved all his variety, actualized his entire potentiality, and each evolved existence has evolved all its variety, actualized its entire potentiality, according to the law of the series ascertained and determined by Fourier, all potentiality is actualized, and the universe is the actualized God, — God in his completeness and integrity. Then nothing more remains to be evolved ; the work is done ; and God, from whom and for whom are all things, is completed. Plurality and variety are commensurate with unity, and God and the universe may go to sleep, or, as Fourier seems to hold, may die altogether, and universal night and silence close the scene.

But as simple, as beautiful, and as *scientific* as all this may seem to our modern philosophers, it by no means reconciles the different ideas which are forced into juxtaposition. By resolving creation into evolution, the author loses Christian theism, and falls into pantheism ; and by placing multiplicity and variety in God in order to be able to assert evolution and progress, he dissolves his pantheism, and falls into pure atheism ; for atheism consists precisely in the denial of unity, and the assertion of multiplicity, plurality, variety, in the first cause. Atheism, again, is irreconcilable with progress ; for multiplicity, plurality, variety, &c., are subsequent to unity, and inconceivable without it. Hence, if placed in the first cause, represented as essential in the first link of the series, by excluding unity, they deny themselves, and therefore all existences, and then all progressibles. Thus every effort the author makes only removes him the farther from the goal he seeks, which we have found to be uniformly the case with every one who engages, outside of the City of God, in schemes of world-reform, however great their abilities, or praiseworthy, in itself considered, the general or particular end they propose.

A little sound philosophy and common sense, we should

think, might enable the author to perceive, that, if he takes multiplicity and variety for his starting-point, though he must arrive at nihilism, he can never arrive at unity ; and that unless he asserts Christian theism, he can never assert progress, for it is only inasmuch as he admits a *creative* God that he can conceive of progressibles. He must assert the God of the Christian and common sense, or the dead unity or uncreative God of old Xenophanes and the Eleatics ; or, in fine, he must deny unity and assert plurality in the origin of things, with the atheist, and therefore nihilism, since we have already shown, that, without the conception of God, no conception is possible. If he asserts the second, he loses the universe, and can talk no more of progress ; for unity has no progression, and, however multiplied into itself, gives and can give only unity for its product. If he says the third, still he can talk no more of progress, for nihilism has as little progress as unity. But if he takes the first, he escapes every difficulty, and can assert the universe with all its variety ; for then he supposes for it an adequate cause. He can also, since he has a world of space and time, talk of progress, not indeed in attaining to a perfection never actual, and by means of imperfection, but in recovering a perfection lost, and approaching a perfection eternally actual in God. Progress is conceivable only in space and time, and to be able to assert its possibility we must be able to assert the reality of the world of space and time, which we cannot do either as pantheists or as atheists. Progress also implies motion, but motion is inconceivable without a prime mover, who is himself immovable, at rest. This is as true in the moral as in the physical world. Pantheism denies the prime mover, by asserting a dead, uncreative unity, which, if immovable, nevertheless imparts no motion ; or, if you take Mr. Channing's view, God, as anterior to creation, is not actual, but merely potential ; and the potential cannot move, for it cannot act, since only the actual can act. Atheism, of course, denies the prime mover ; for, rendered consequent, it denies all things, is universal negation. Christian theism asserts a prime mover, the eternal and immovable God, who causes motion, but does not himself enter into motion. Under any and every point of view, then, our modern advocates of progress could never have committed a more serious blunder than in denying the creative God, — *Deus Creator*, — and in seeking a foundation for their doctrine in pantheism and atheism.

But "the Divine Idea of Man is of Many men made One."

In what are they *made* one ? The unity of the human race, that is, of what is for Mr. Channing the human race, does not now exist, and he admits it does not by the very fact that he is seeking its unity, and proposes it as the end to be gained. If made one, then, they must be so made in something which they are not and have not. What is this something ? Variety ? So Mr. Channing appears to teach ; but this is a mistake. Never will you arrive at unity through variety ; for the farther you travel in variety the farther do you recede from unity. Mankind, in themselves considered, are many, as Mr. Channing himself concedes, otherwise he could not speak of “ Many men made One.” If many, if a multitude, as they certainly are, they have not, and cannot have, the principle of unity in themselves, and can be made one only by virtue of some principle of unity above themselves, existing out of them and independent of them. What or where is this principle, of which men may participate, and by participation become one in it. It is not in nature, for nature is multiple, diverse ; it is not in man, for the very idea of man, Mr. Channing says, is of many men *made* one, and therefore the many must participate of it before *man* is conceivable ; it is not in grace, for the author recognizes no order of grace distinguishable from the order of nature. If not in one or another of these, it can be nowhere, cannot be at all. Mr. Channing, then, really recognizes no principle of unity, nothing in which the many are or can be made one. And yet he calls his doctrine the *unitary* doctrine, — professes to be seeking *unity*, in obedience to *unitary* tendencies !

“ The centre of this race is God in Man.” Thus, according to Mr. Channing, God lives in man, and not man in God, as religion teaches. This confirms what we have presented as his doctrine, that God lives in his evolutions, and is completed, actualized, or perfected in them ; that is, the cause is completed, fulfilled, in the effect, and therefore the cause depends on the effect for its perfection ! “ The centre of this race is God in Man.” This proves conclusively that Mr. Channing recognizes no unity, or principle of unity. He cannot say the human race attain to unity by participating of God, and becoming one in him ; for he is in them, not they in him ; and although he is in them, they are, nevertheless, without unity. God cannot, then, impart unity to them, or by their union with himself make them one. Let the author talk no more of unity. But if God lives in man, what more do

you complain of? "Its destined end, a Heaven of Humanity." The end of the race can, whatever it be, be actualized only in individuals. If the end is humanity, it can be nothing else than the production of individuals, that is, the fulfilment of the command, if command rather than permission it is, *Crescite et multiplicamini super eam* (sc. *terram*). But what is the destined end of individuals? Do they count for nothing in your world-scheme? It is remarkable how little account our modern reformers make of individuals, and of individual rights. They are genuine philanthropists, — love all men in general, and no one in particular: seek to make all happy in general, and render every one miserable in particular. "Its destined end, a Heaven of Humanity." A *heaven* of humanity! What is that? We are sure we do not know.

But we are transcending our limits, and are weary of the subject. We have, either in what we have heretofore advanced or in what we have now said, anticipated all we wish to say on the remaining propositions we have cited. We have aimed throughout to preserve our gravity, and to treat Mr. Channing with the kindness and affection due to the sweetness of his disposition and the gentleness of his manners. Whether we have in all instances succeeded, or not, our readers must judge. Mr. Channing sees, as all men see, and not more clearly nor more vividly, perhaps, than thousands of others not of his school, that there are innumerable evils in the world; and he holds that every man should do all in his power to remedy them. He believes men might and should live as brothers, and that, if they would, wrongs and outrages would cease, there would be no more war, no more oppression, no more injustice, and the whole earth would be filled with love and joy, — and so do we. If every man did right, nobody would do wrong; if every one lived as he ought, nobody would live as he ought not to live. Nothing in the world more true, my brother. We agree with you exactly. But how do you purpose to make all men live as brothers? Here is, for you, the question of questions. This, the only question that it was necessary to answer, Mr. Channing answers not; and none of our modern world-reformers or system-mongers answer in a very satisfactory manner. We have listened to most, perhaps to all the more notable, of their answers, but not with much edification. The only direct and practical answer we recollect to have heard is the world-famous answer of the Jacobin, "Be my brother, or I will kill you." This

is plain and direct, and has, at least, the merit of expressing truly the spirit of those who deafen us with their everlasting declamations about "brotherhood," "universal fraternity."

Mr. Channing, we cheerfully admit, does not precisely hold to killing; but he has a great affection for the Jacobin, and takes him under his protection. Moreover, in his unwearied efforts to stir up discontent, to make people sensible of their sufferings, to tear open the wounds of society, to uncover its running sores, and exhibit them to everybody, — in dwelling upon the evils we suffer, forgetful of the good we receive, so much more than we deserve, and exciting hopes that can never be peacefully realized, nay, never realized at all, — he, whatever his intention, effectually prepares the millions, as far as his influence extends, for the Jacobin movement, and the adoption of the Jacobin answer. The Associationists, we deny not, profess to be opposed to the resort to physical force, and to advocate only peaceful modes of reform; but, if we recollect aright, Robespierre made his first appearance before the public as the author of an essay against capital punishment. The Associationists, whatever their intentions or professions, are but panders to the physical-force party, or, if they like the figure better, recruiting-sergeants to the destructive army of revolutionists. Let them not imagine that we can be taken with their professions, even when we do not question their sincerity. They cannot promulgate their principles, and continue their declamations against civilization and society, without loosening all social bonds in their adherents, and rousing up the wild and ferocious passions of our nature, — passions which no theory, no reasoning, no smooth-toned rebuke or mild entreaty, can restrain, and which, when once broken loose, will precipitate the populations moved by them into war, bloodshed, and plunder. Hope not, madmen, ye can apply the lighted torch to flax without having it burn, or to a magazine of powder and not have it explode. You cannot go on, year after year, denouncing social order, denouncing society itself, denouncing every restraint of law, all faith, piety, conscience, everything the race has hitherto held sacred, and hope that the multitude, if they heed you, will remain quiet, charmed to peace by the dulcet persuasions you, at rare intervals, let fall from your sweet lips, or that they will not take up arms to realize the visions of Mahomet's paradise on earth, with which you have maddened their brains and inflamed their lusts. We should shudder at the bare thought of doing you injustice.

We would not willingly offend your pride or wound your sensibility ; but we tell you, pretended peaceful reformers, that the basest and most horror-inspiring criminals, on whom our society inflicts the supreme vengeance of the law, are harmless in comparison with you, pure-minded, moral, and heroic as ye fancy yourselves, and kind-hearted as ye really may be ; for you kill reason, you murder the soul, you assassinate conscience, you sap society, render order impossible, take from law its moral force, from our homes all sanctity, from our lives all security, and leave us a prey to all the low, base, beastly, cruel, violent, wild, and destructive propensities and passions of fallen nature. O, mock us not with the words Brotherhood, Fraternal Love, Universal Peace ! We have heard those words from profane lips too often ; and never have we heard the multitude echoing them from their leaders but we have seen society shaken, order overthrown, virtue treated as a crime, the prisons crowded to suffocation with the loyal and the true, the scaffolds groaning beneath their burden of innocent victims, the guillotine growing weary with its unremitting toil, and the earth drenched with the blood of her fairest and her noblest children. Repeat those words outside of the City of God, in what gentle tones and peaceful accents you will, you, at least your followers, will come at last to the answer, " Love me as your brother, or I will cut your throat."

Yet suppose not that we war against the words themselves. Rightly applied, they are good, noble, and spirit-stirring words. Brotherhood, fraternity, the unity of the race, and the union of all men in one grand and true association, are great ideas, and, in their only practical sense, no discovery and no possession of yours. The human race began in unity, and their unity was preserved in the race, as perpetuated by natural generation, till the confusion of tongues at Babel, and the consequent dispersion of mankind, as recorded in Genesis. Since then, in that race, unity, brotherhood, fraternity, have not existed, nor been attainable. They have since been attainable only by election and grace in the chosen people, in the " seed of Abraham " ; for there only has the ideal truth, in which alone man finds his unity, been preserved in its integrity. But there they have been, and are, and will continue to be, realized. You cannot have these without the principle from which they are derived ; and since that principle is lost in the natural human race, you can have it only as God supplies it by a new creative act, an act not included in nature, there-

fore supernatural, — and then only through the medium and on the conditions it pleases him to appoint. We know this is distasteful to you ; but, instead of rejecting it, you would do well to correct your taste, or put yourselves in the way of having it corrected.

Since the calling of Abraham, the father of the faithful, the true integral human race has been found only in his posterity by election, the chosen people of God, — that is, the Catholic Church. It is there only that the race, broken by the Fall, and deprived by guilt of the unity in which alone is true intellectual and true spiritual life, can be reintegrated, restored to pristine unity, and enabled to live a normal life. Out of this society you may vegetate, you may intellectually conceive of unity, nay, even intellectually apprehend many fragments of the truth which is whole and entire in it ; but to come into immediate relation with it, to participate of it and become one in its unity, you cannot. Concoct as many theories of unity, of association, as you please, they will be only theories of unity, they will not be it ; contrive all the machinery you can invent for realizing it, and you will find yourselves with a well-spread table of — empty platters and glasses ; for if you have it not as the integral principle of your life, you must be born again or you cannot have it, cannot partake of it otherwise than as a hungry man eats rich viands in his dreams, and awakes and finds it was only in his dreams.

The history of gentilism, from the dispersion of mankind in the days of Phaleg, should have taught the Associationists all this ; and they might, one would think, have inferred as much from the failure of every attempt to recover unity, or to reform individuals or nations, outside of the integral elected race, or Catholic society. Out of that society, out of the Church, you have only the shadow or echo of truth, never truth itself ; you have only far-off glimpses of life, which you mostly misinterpret, — only plurality, diversity, division, mutual repugnance, as you yourselves not only concede, but prove ; and what sane man, with these for his starting-point or his means, can hope to attain to unity, concord, peace ? Did not old Archimedes even demand a whereon to stand, a *ποῦ στῆ*, in order to move the world ? Are ye so silly, then, as to fancy that you can move it with your fulcrum resting on nothing ?

ART. III. — *Naomi : or Boston Two Hundred Years ago.*
By ELIZA BUCKMINSTER LEE. Second Edition. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1848. 12mo. pp. 324.

IT is not easy for a descendant of the Puritans, who has had the mercy to be received into the Catholic Church, to speak of his ancestors, or of Boston two hundred years ago, in those terms of filial respect and patriotic affection which they who count religious faith and association for nothing suppose they have a right to demand, or at least may reasonably expect. But we confess that we are of the number who regard the spiritual relationship as superior to the natural, and Mother Church as above father-land. Our Lord said, "Whosoever shall do the will of God, he is my mother, my sister, and my brother,"* and also, "He that loveth father or mother, son or daughter, more than me, is not worthy of me."†

The Church is the Christian's father-land, and the Catholic society, which derives through election and grace from Abraham, whom God chose to be the father of the faithful, is the Christian's human race. In this society, the society of the chosen people of God, since the coming of Christ, all national distinctions are obliterated, all divisions of caste, clan, tribe, or family are abolished, and all are made one in the unity of the spirit, — of the spiritual life they live in Christ their head, and of whom they are members. This society and its relations, affections, and duties take precedence of all others, and no others are to be cherished, save as subordinate and subservient to these. Our Puritan ancestors were outside of this society, outside of the chosen people of God, outside of the mankind reintegrated by grace and election in unity, destitute of both true spiritual and true intellectual life ; — branches severed from the vine, wilting and drying for the end they had chosen for themselves. However we may regret their delusions, however much we may weep that they were not wise in time, and did not become incorporated as integral members of the living human race, we cannot, as Catholics, claim kindred with them, or feel that we are bound to respect or defend their memories. To us, as Catholics, they were publicans and Gentiles, aliens to the Christian commonwealth, or Gospel kingdom.

Nevertheless, there are aspects under which their characters

* St. Mark iii. 35.

† St. Matt. x. 37.

become to us matters of interest, and under which we may have, not only things to say against them, but also things to say in their favor. In one sense, all outside the Catholic society, or the Church, are alike ; — they are alike in the want of unity, of truth in its integrity, of true human life even, and of the means, where they are, of fulfilling the law of charity, that is, supreme and exclusive love to God, and the love of our neighbour as ourselves in God. Yet are there degrees in their fall, and differences of character among them, which are appreciable, and which, when the question is between one class of them and another, may well afford just grounds of preference. When the question is between Catholics and non-Catholics, the lowest and most unworthy Catholic, who retains his faith, is far above the highest and most exemplary in the ranks of even the least deformed among the sects, on the principle that “a living dog is better than a dead lion,” — not because faith alone profiteth a man, but because as long as one retains the faith he retains the principle of life, and may at last repent, and elicit acceptable works. But when the comparison is between sect and sect, between Puritans and Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, Unitarians, Quakers, or Universalists, or, in our own country, between non-Catholics of the Northern and non-Catholics of the Southern, Middle, or Western States, we may not only have our preferences, but sometimes find it, as American citizens, expedient to express them.

It is only when the comparison is between sect and sect, and between section and section, that we have ever spoken favorably of our Puritan ancestors according to the flesh, and ventured to vindicate the New England character. We have not done this so much because we revere the memory of the one, or sympathize with the other, as because we have found them made answerable, if not for more than they were guilty of, yet for what they were not guilty of. In itself considered, or compared with the Catholic, we do not like the New England character, and could say as severe things against it as do our friends farther south, though, if wishing to censure it, we should not bring against it the precise charges which they do. There was little in the stern old Puritan to our taste, — little with which we do or ever did sympathize ; and yet we dislike him less than we do any of the other sectaries that had a share in colonizing this country. His faults were those of Protestants in general, but he had virtues which were peculiarly his own, and which have left their mark on the country. He was English,

Anglo-Saxon, it is true, and that is no recommendation ; but he had his full share of the better, and not more than his share of the worse, qualities of his race. He was a bigot, but neither alone nor peculiarly fierce in his bigotry. He was a persecutor, and resorted to violence against those who differed from him, whether Catholics or Protestants ; but in that he was not at all distinguished from Protestants in general. The right to burn heretics was defended by Calvin in a pamphlet approved by Melancthon ; and, with the exception of the Quakers, and some later sects deriving from Lord Herbert and Voltaire rather than directly from Luther and Calvin, we are aware of no Protestant sect that holds the punishment of heresy by the civil power to be wrong. And, if the several sects — Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Baptists, Methodists — do not now fine, imprison, scourge, or burn those they regard as heretics, the reason, most likely, is, not the lack of the disposition, or of belief in their right, but their lack of power, to do so. Let the Presbyterians of the Middle States but once get the civil power into their hands, for which they have been striving ever since the formation of the Federal government,— and it would have been with success, if their language had not been confounded,— and they would soon prove themselves not unworthy sons of Farel, Calvin, and Knox. Their spirit is willing, but their power to perform is wanting. Protestantism, till it degenerates into indifference, is essentially bigoted, and every bigot is at heart a persecutor. The several sects, no longer in authority, no longer able to maintain and propagate themselves by the strong arm of the law, by pains and penalties, by fire and sword, as in former times, now turn demagogues, and seek to do it by flattery, wheedling, trickery, craft, and management, in which they are great adepts.

It is the common opinion that the Puritans of New England were, in their day, remarkable among Protestant sects for their bigotry and intolerance ; but such was not the fact, and we are inclined to believe that the opinion has arisen from the fact, that a large body of New-Englanders, for the last sixty or seventy years, have fallen into religious indifferentism, and have made the country echo with their exaggerated accounts and condemnation of the bigotry and intolerance of their ancestors ; whereas, in the rest of the old States of the Union, if there has been an equal lapse into indifferentism, those who have fallen have been too filial or too indolent to parade the errors and crimes of their early settlers. Few of the sons of Virginia have ex-

posed to the gaze of the world the intolerance of her Episcopalians ; and when the liberal Marylander exposes the Protestant intolerance and persecution so conspicuous in his own State, and which he cannot deny, he charges it upon the poor Puritans, forgetful that the Protestants of whom he complains were Episcopalians, — that the Puritans hated prelacy hardly less than papacy, and would as quick have established Catholicity by law as the Protestant Episcopal Church, which, if we recollect aright, is what the Protestants of Maryland did establish, when they abolished the toleration introduced by the Catholic Lord Baltimore. No portion of the descendants of the early Presbyterian colonists in the Middle States have, to our knowledge, exposed the intolerance of their ancestors, and, indeed, few of them, comparatively, are known in the republic of letters. The simple fact is, we suppose, that New-Englanders, who have taken the lead in the literature of the country, have published the full history of all the sins committed against both religious liberty and religious indifference by their ancestors, and made them known to the whole world, whereas the sins of a like nature committed in other parts of our common country have been suffered to sleep in forgetfulness, or, instead of being exaggerated, have been glossed over and made as little revolting as possible.

Mrs. Lee's *Naomi*, now before us, tends to confirm this conclusion. Mrs. Lee is a highly intellectual lady of this city, sister to the well-known Joseph Stevens Buckminster, one of the earliest and most promising of the Unitarian ministers of New England. What she herself is, it would be difficult for us, and still more difficult for her, to decide. She was the daughter of a Puritan minister, brought up in the rigid doctrine and discipline of the Puritans ; and, like so many thousands of the generation now passing off brought up in the same way, she became, as did her distinguished brother, a Unitarian, and, we believe, is still reckoned in the Unitarian ranks ; but she has never been able to satisfy herself with Unitarianism, which hardly rises to the level of natural religion, and she has been for years searching, with throbbing heart and aching head, for something more positive, more substantial, more able to meet the wants of the human soul. As yet, her search has resulted only in disappointment ; and, with a masculine intellect, a woman's heart, and a nature remarkable for its religiosity, she finds nothing to believe, nothing to love, nothing to worship. She has sought everywhere but in the right place, and by all means

but the right ones. Alas ! she is not alone in this, but merely one of a large class of both men and women among us, commonly reckoned as Unitarians, who have outgrown the revolting Calvinistic system in which they were reared, who understand well the shallowness and falseness of every form of Protestantism, and who, though deeply impressed with the necessity of religion, and hardly doubting that somewhere there is and must be true religion, yet feel that they have not found it, know not where to look for it, and must despair of finding it, — taking it for granted, in the outset, that it cannot be with us. Their children are in a state perhaps even more deplorable. Some of them continue going to the Unitarian meetings, — Dr. Gannett's, Dr. Frothingham's, Mr. Lothrop's, Mr. Huntington's, — from habit and a regard to decorum, rather than from conviction ; some return to the ranks of the Puritans, and try to find relief in fanaticism ; a few pass over to Anglicanism ; but the greater part grow up in indifferentism, and in real ignorance of all religion, plunge into business or dissipation, soothe their consciences now and then by a little fashionable philanthropy, declaim on abolition and against capital punishment, patronize Socialism, and talk, and sometimes write, about pauperism and the elevation of the laboring classes, — trying to appease their hunger with the east wind, and finding that they do but sow the wind and reap the whirlwind. Alas for them !

But the state of mind in which most of these are necessarily renders them hostile to the old Puritanical exclusiveness, and disposed to exhibit and condemn the bigotry and persecution of their ancestors. Thus Mrs. Lee, in *Naomi*, lays her scene in Boston, in the time of the troubles with the Quakers, and evidently writes her story mainly for the purpose of exposing the errors of the old Puritans, and of advocating religious liberty, or rather religious indifference. Not that she fails to sketch with much freedom and truth the characteristic traits of Bostonians two hundred years ago, but she brings out in bold relief only the bigoted and the persecuting features, and leaves the impression upon her readers that intolerance and persecution were what chiefly distinguished them. She enlists all our sympathies for Naomi, a concealed Quakeress, who exposed herself to persecution, not so much for her Quakerism as by her attempts to interfere with the regular course of Puritanic justice, and excites our indignation against her proud, gloomy, heartless, and sanctimonious judges. No book could be better devised to confirm the common notion entertained of the old New England

Puritans, or to make a Bostonian of the liberal school either blush for his ancestors, or applaud himself for his own indifference and unexclusiveness.

We cannot give anything like an analysis of *Naomi*, and we have space for only a few brief extracts ; the book deserves a notice, and some extracts we must make, as specimens of the style of the gifted authoress, if not for their own truthfulness and beauty. The following is in a kindly spirit, and is the best that can be said of the motives of the early settlers of New England.

“ Puritanism was, as those who embraced it believed, a protest of right against wrong, of good against evil, of heaven against hell ; in many it was a true heroism, inspired by holy motives, pursued with devoted energy, purified from all selfish ends, and rewarded with the joys of conscience.

“ The views and motives that led the Pilgrims and planters to these New England shores were as various and as widely different as the characters of the persons who composed the successive companies. Winthrop and his companions were as true, as pure, as heroic a company as ever set foot upon our sterile and severe coast. They were inspired by deep, conscientious, but yet narrow and mistaken conceptions of religious liberty. They wished to escape persecution in England, but no sooner did the occasion present itself than they became persecutors in their turn ; tolerance for their own opinions was the only tolerance admitted. That tolerance itself implies intolerance was an idea which had never dawned upon the religious mind of the period.

“ Many came merely to enjoy an untrammelled worship, — to be rid of surplices, and what were to them the idle ceremonies of formalism and the ritual. A very large number came to this country upon commercial speculations, with the hope of making or bettering their fortunes, and yet a larger number with a union of purposes, of which, although none perhaps were of an entirely elevated or disinterested character, yet were none censurable or unworthy.

“ Included among the latter class was the merchant who was most largely interested in the ship that had just arrived, and whose carriage had been waiting upon the wharf to receive a passenger from the vessel. The reader must not suppose that a carriage was at this time a frequent appendage to a rich man’s establishment. There were perhaps half a dozen in the whole country, and the merchant of whom we speak was as able as any one to maintain this luxury.

“ Mr. Aldersey, to whose house *Naomi* had been borne, was one of the most wealthy merchants of Boston, although not one of the

company who came with Winthrop. At the time of Winthrop's embarkation, he was living in London, and reaping a fortune from one of the extensive monopolies common at that period; but he was a Puritan, and belonged to the patriot party that opposed all monopolies. He would have gladly remained in the enjoyment of his own, by a connivance in which he should not be known. It was, however, discovered and withdrawn, and he came to hide his mortification in the New World. He returned, however, at the end of a few years, and married. His wife, whom he now brought with him, a lovely and excellent woman, had large connections in England of her own family, and of her first husband's (she had been a widow), which made the rending of the ties to the mother country most difficult. Naomi, the little daughter of the first husband, was the darling of many old relatives, who set their hearts and their faces against the proposal of bringing the little girl to the New World. Like Mrs. Wilson, the partner of the reverend gentleman of that name, their imaginations exaggerated the dangers of the sea, the terrors of the savages and monsters that infested the land. Mrs. Aldersey accompanied her husband, therefore, with a divided and bleeding heart; for the little Naomi, a child of nine years old, must be left behind." — pp. 18 – 20:

As to the purity of the motives, devotion, and heroism of the Pilgrims, if taken in a religious or Catholic sense, the less we say the better; although, in a merely human sense, we can subscribe to the greater part of Mrs. Lee's account. But it is a great mistake to suppose that they *professed* to come here to establish what is called religious liberty. Religious liberty, in its modern popular acceptance, was not an idea which they did not comprehend, as Mrs. Lee intimates, but an idea they expressly rejected. Their complaint before leaving England was, not that all sects or all forms of religion were not free in their native country, as many believe, but that the true religion, to wit, their own, was bound, and they were not at liberty to profess it. They scouted from the first the idea that there may be many forms of religion, all true and salutary, or that men have or can have the permission of their Maker, freedom before God, to embrace any other than the true religion. They came here, not to found a commonwealth which should hold all religions, all sects, all opinions, all fancies, alike sacred, and maintain their equal freedom, but to found, in their estimation, a Christian commonwealth, based on the Gospel, subject to the law of God as promulgated in his word, and professing and maintaining, as its religion, the one only true religion. Their exclusiveness was no inconsistency, but a rigid deduction from the prin-

ciples they avowed. The error was not in seeking to establish a Christian commonwealth, was not in their exclusiveness, but in assuming that their sect was the Church of God, and in supposing that they, fallible men, with no Divine commission, with no infallible authority to judge, and no authority at all in religious matters but a self-constituted authority, had a right to erect their own doctrines into a creed, and to condemn all who did not choose to conform to them ; thus arrogating to themselves the authority of the Church of God, and making conscience amenable to a merely human tribunal, — conscience, which is accountable to God alone.

The following sketch of Mr. Aldersey is very well done, and may be taken as an accurate sketch of the genuine Puritan in both Old England and New England, as he was, as he is, and as he must be, or cease to be a Puritan.

“ I have said that Mr. Aldersey did not exile himself to get rid of the hierarchy, the surplice, or the bishops ; he came because he could no longer enjoy the revenues of a monopoly which his party had long condemned, and his principles had barely suffered him to connive at. He was already rich, and the commercial prosperity of the colony under the favorable regard of Cromwell had enabled him to double his fortune since he came to the country.

“ In this religious community, men lived apparently above the world. Religion was lord of their life. To attain any degree of consideration, it was as requisite to be religious as it is now to be honest. Mr. Aldersey had joined the Boston church the first Sabbath after his arrival ; he was a zealous church-member, an Assistant of the General Court, a magistrate, a keen detector of heresy in opinion and of latitudinarianism in practice ; liberality of judgment in one or the other, with respect to others, was a thing that had never dawned upon his mind, yet he exempted himself from any particular strictness of principle or practice. His great Bible lay open before him on Sunday, and upon its very leaves he wrote his commercial letters. He had obtained secretly, this very Saturday night, news and information of the state of the market in England, which would be imparted to others only on Monday morning, and which enabled him to add some thousands to his property. Yet his family devotions had never been apparently more fervent than upon this very evening, when his thoughts were far away, busied with commercial speculations. He was not, however, an unmitigated hypocrite. He had always been prosperous, and deceived himself into the conviction, that it was the special blessing of God that crowned all his inferior speculations and his fraudulent gains. Such persons are not wholly without excuse. The homage that even the most upright pay to success, to worldly prosperity ;

the kind of acquiescence that even the best accord to prosperous selfishness; the flattering anticipated epitaph, written upon the countenances of all those who approach the man known to have the most avaricious appetites, but attended with ostentatious charities,—all these deceive him. They know he is the toad, ugly and venomous, but they are dazzled by the jewel borne on his front. All this makes the true heart, the discerning spirit, weep, and fear that the great day of justice is yet afar off.

“The principles of Christian love, the beatitudes, can never influence society while those mean and grovelling propensities are honored and flattered because wealth and luxury attend them. While the man whose heart is moulded from the downtrodden mire, where serpents have hissed, and swine have rooted,—whose intellect, of coarse flint, is only capable of being struck into light by the hope of gain,—gilded with the trappings of wealth, is placed on high to receive the homage of the world, while the worshipper of truth, the man of pure, unsullied conscience, is thrust aside, or bears the obloquy of public opinion, such society, whether it be Puritan or orthodox, can never be Christian.

“Mr. Aldersey was not ostentatious in his house or his furniture; he lived, indeed, rather beneath than above his means; his income constantly accumulated. Ostentation was not then shown in the pride of luxurious living. Boston has retained the stamp that was given it in the first century. Its munificence is displayed at this very day, as it was thirty years after the arrival of the *Arbella*, in its patriotic and religious charities, rather than in luxurious living.” — pp. 22 – 24.

We add the following sketch of Naomi as a fair specimen of the author's manner in her more ambitious passages.

“Beauty is spiritual; the most perfect features are unmeaning until irradiated by the light of the soul,—like those vases which are opaque and indistinct till the light shines from within, when they reveal forms of exquisite beauty. Naomi, when sleeping, possessed that species of beauty that had long informed her features. They were now calm and motionless, like the marble statue that will never awake to life. A noble breadth of forehead, smooth and pale, like the leaf of the camellia, was surrounded by soft brown hair, that had never been festooned or curled, but lay in wavy folds upon the pure marble. Her eyes, now veiled by their lids, were of a deep gray, or blue, or even hazel, according as the light was reflected from them; they were not brilliant and sparkling, but serious, thoughtful, sometimes sad, and, when fixed earnestly upon one, a mild light seemed burning within them. Her complexion was pale, but not unhealthy; and the soft but serious mouth disclosed perfect teeth. No one, on first looking at Naomi,

would have thought of her beauty. The regularity of her features was lost in something more precious ; —

‘ A sweet, attractive kind of grace,
A full assurance given by looks ;
Continual comfort in her face,
The lineaments of Gospel books.’

“ Yes, it was the full assurance of perfect truth beneath those transparent features that made the charm of her presence. It is a common expression ‘ as true as the Gospel ’ ; in that sense the word is used above, and we may add that in Naomi it was a true gospel of love, that comforted all who looked upon her.

“ There had been few incidents in the life of Naomi. Her character had not been formed by external circumstances. Hers was one of those pure poetical souls, that had as yet found no manifestation. They seem made for an age of perfection that does not yet exist. Painting has succeeded in representing characters of this kind, in the early Madonnas of the Catholic Church ; — pure types of nature in humble life, exalted, because they have been *chosen*. Poetry has spoilt, by endeavouring to idealize them, forgetting that their essence consists in being simply what they are, — divine.*

“ The fact of Naomi’s early orphanhood, the solitude of the heart in which she had been left at the most important period of her growth, was perhaps the cause that spiritual consciousness instead of external interests pervaded her whole character. She had never known her father, but to her mother’s love and influence her young heart had been completely open. The early separation from her mother had been the misfortune of her life ; for although left with the kindest relatives, the tendrils of the young heart, thus torn away from their early support, could not entwine themselves again, but floated loose upon the air. Solitude and want of companionship, of the interchange of thought upon the most interesting subjects, had formed in the little Naomi habits of reserve and of secret musings in her solitary hours, when her pillow would be wetted with the tears wrung from the lonely heart that longed to love. Not that she had not objects of love. She lived with indulgent friends, and in the truest domestic harmony ; but hers was a heart that could only surrender to tenderness, and to the most intimate sympathy. To her absent mother she poured out in her letters the riches of an affluent, of an exquisitely beautiful nature, already overflowing with love and enthusiasm. But the too fearful mother, imagining in those divine gifts an exaggerated sensibility, and fearing the evils and sorrows involved in unrestrained, unguarded affections, did not respond to the ardent, heart-warm expressions of her daughter. Her letters in return inculcated the cold and guarded

* This thought is derived from a foreign writer.

precepts of a more mature, even a more worldly experience, throwing over the exuberant blossoms of this young spring of feeling the wet blanket of an April snow, blighting for one season the expanding flower, but strengthening and enriching the plant whose deep roots centred in the rich soil of the heart.

"The solitude in which Naomi lived might have made her a superstitious devotee, or a dreaming enthusiast; but fortunately nature had endowed her with a vigorous reason, a strong good-sense, that prevented her from becoming either the one or the other. But her young heart thirsted for excellence; she yearned for an unknown, but a possible, goodness, which she found not around her, — neither in nature nor in the world, neither in the church nor in society, neither in sermons nor in books. The conception of this ideal goodness was ever before her; but she found it not in herself, and wept that she was never nearer to it than to the rainbow in the horizon. Dwelling as Naomi did upon the things of her own consciousness, she was in danger of sinking into melancholy, had she not been arrested by a circumstance which we shall soon mention." — pp. 28–31.

The circumstance which saved Naomi was being taken by her nurse to hear the fanatic George Fox, before her arrival in Boston. She listened to George, and became, in principle and in heart, a Quaker, but without deeming it necessary to make an open profession of Quakerism. She holds it sufficient to "believe in the heart," without "confessing with the mouth," and so remains outwardly attached to the Puritan body, and passes, even with her friends and relatives, as still a Puritan; — nay, on arriving in Boston, she makes an open profession of Puritanism, by joining Mr. Wilson's church or meeting. Here is a specimen of what may be called Unitarian morality. Naomi is the author's favorite, and appears to be intended as a model character, at least as a character free from all that is morally or religiously censurable. Yet she can join a church in which she does not believe, and openly profess a creed her heart abhors. Thus it is with our New England Unitarians generally. They accuse Trinitarians of idolatry, and call all who offer supreme religious homage to our crucified Lord idolaters; and yet they are perfectly willing to commune in *sacris* with these same idolaters, and one of their chief complaints against their so-called "Orthodox" brethren is, that they refuse to commune with Unitarians. What is the difference between an idolater and one who communes with him in his idolatry? Young Buckminster, the author's brother, a Unitarian in his belief, accepted the call to be the pastor of

Brattle Street Church, a professedly Trinitarian congregation at the time, without even hinting to them that he rejected the Trinity, and believed it idolatry to honor the Son as the Father. This laxity of moral principle, this readiness to conceal one's own faith or want of faith, when duty requires its distinct avowal, and this willingness to commune *in sacris* with those who, if they themselves have the Gospel, have "another Gospel" and are under anathema, — so common and made so light of on the part of Unitarians, — was a great scandal to us while we were a minister of that sect, and led us then, as it leads us now, to distrust the sincerity of its members, or to look upon them as regarding all forms of faith and worship as alike indifferent, — a point to which we could never for a moment really bring our own mind or heart.

Margaret, the nurse that led Naomi to hear George Fox, has come over to New England, a raving, fanatic Quakeress, and is concealed for several months by Naomi, aided by Faith, Mr. Aldersey's housekeeper. We extract a characteristic passage from the conversation which Naomi and Faith had with Margaret in her place of concealment.

"Naomi and Faith did not leave Margaret to the solitude of her garret; although the state of exaltation in which she was, like the delirium of a person slightly insane, made her totally indifferent to the place in which she dwelt, yet they did not leave her alone. As soon as Ruth had retired for the night, they resorted to her little room. At such times, Naomi's pale complexion and the pure outline of her features were defined by the light of the fire, for they dared not take a candle, and this uncertain and varying play of light gave her the form and expression of an angel visitant; and as she sat between the two women, the one burning with heretical zeal, the other shuddering with all the horror and detestation of the times against the heresy, tolerating the heretic only from feelings of humanity, Naomi was indeed what she seemed, a mediating and reconciling spirit.

"The conversation often reverted to the mother country, and to circumstances that occurred there. I have said above, that Faith never suspected Naomi's Quaker principles, as there was nothing peculiar in the exterior to betray the secret fountain that fed and refreshed the roots from which sprang the fresh and lovely flowers of her every-day life. One evening, Margaret, led on by reminiscences of home, mentioned the meeting when they had been so much moved by the preaching of George Fox.

"Naomi looked at Faith while she answered, — 'Ah, yes! I never can forget what has changed the whole complexion of my character, and given peace to my soul.'

"Faith did not start, nor express any surprise; but she turned very pale, and, looking again at Naomi, she rose to leave the room.

"*'Stay, Faith,'* said Naomi; and taking her gently around the waist, she drew her again into her chair. *'You must know it sooner or later,'* she added; *'I, too, am a Quaker, — a Quaker in heart and principle; but I do not feel compelled, as others do, to proclaim my faith to the world. I am but a babe and a humble learner in this pure belief, and do not yet feel it my privilege to encounter martyrdom.'*

"Faith looked at Naomi, as though possessing herself completely of the meaning of her words, and repeated very slowly the words Naomi had used, pausing between every syllable: — *'You are a Quaker in heart and principle, — you are a Quaker — Ah, well! that cannot be an evil faith, — that cannot lead to evil that produces such fruits as I see in you.'*

"Faith's plain good-sense and candid disposition had come exactly to the truth; she had struck the nail upon the head; illiterate, but true and simple-minded, she had discerned the truth, — that could not be bad in itself that cherished and fed with its secret springs the beautiful riches, the lovely graces, of such a character as Naomi's. It was the abuse, the extravagance, the perversion of these pure principles, she thought, that did so much mischief.

"*'Well,'* said Margaret, her zeal beginning to kindle; *'you see what are the fruits of pure Quakerism; you see them in Miss Naomi; will you not also inquire and be convinced, and join the company of the faithful?'*

"*'No,'* said Faith, and she shook her head; *'I am content with my own church. It is good enough for me. I must be permitted to go to heaven in the old way. I believe it has done very well for everybody since the days of the Apostle Paul. I think it quite unnecessary, to say the least, to give new names to old things; and, as far as I can see, Miss Naomi's faith produces as good works as Mr. Wilson's, or even our old minister's, whom I remember well, Mr. Cotton; there never was a holier saint; but I dare say he has met in heaven many that he never expected to welcome there.'*

"*'Yes,'* said Naomi, *'the paths diverge, but they meet at the gate; and O, how many shall we there find with their beautiful robes, — the white robes of seraphs, — who have here sat in the dust and ashes of contempt; who have been turned from the gates of the church; whom the Pharisees have passed by, shaking their robes as they passed them, lest they should have contracted the taint of heresy!'*" — pp. 118 – 120.

We like Faith's answer very well, that she must be permitted to go to heaven in "the old way"; but, poor soul! she never thought that her "old way" was quite a new way, and only a score or two of years older than Margaret's way. Yet

Mrs. Lee has made no blunder in putting the answer into her mouth. We remember, that, when a boy of some ten or twelve years old, we felt that we ought to "join the church." In our neighbourhood we had Methodists, *Chryst-yans*, as they called themselves, Universalists, and here and there a Congregationalist, or member, as the phrase then went, of "the standing order." Which of these was the true church, and the one we ought to join, was the puzzle for our young brains. The Methodist minister certainly spoke the loudest, and the fastest; but the *Chryst-yan* had the sweetest voice, and was decidedly the best singer; while the Universalist appeared to have the most wit, and made us laugh as often as the others made us cry; — so they seemed to us pretty nearly balanced. In our perplexity, we went to a good old Congregational lady, and stated the case to her, with the reasons *pro* and *con*, as fairly as we could. She listened patiently till we had finished. "My child," she replied, "don't join any one of them. They are all new-comers; they have come off from the Church, and cannot be it. The Church is one; it was founded by Christ and his Apostles; it has existed ever since, and all that have sprung up since are too young to be the true Church. They are a new way, and all new ways are false. You must walk in the old way. So, my child, you should join the 'standing order.'" "Yes; but has 'the standing order' stood ever since the time of Christ and his Apostles?" "You must join it, or you will not join the true Church." Poor old lady! She had, if we may so speak, a good major, but a very bad minor; yet her conversation made an impression on our young mind which has never been wholly effaced. "They are new-comers, and not the Church." We never forgot that, and for more than twenty years we kept ourselves out of the Church by persuading ourselves that our Lord and his Apostles founded no church, and that it was never intended that Christians should form a peculiar people, a distinct society; for we had no sooner glanced at history, than we saw clearly enough, that, if our Lord and his Apostles did found a church, the Roman Catholic Church must be the one.

Faith exclaims to Naomi, "That cannot lead to evil that produces such fruits as I see in you." Now, we do not recollect any remarkable fruits Mrs. Lee represents Naomi as having produced. She is a sensible, kind-hearted girl, serious, thoughtful, and free from a large share of the vanities and frivolities of her age and sex, with the good sense to despise Puritanism, and the weakness to conform to it. This is about

the sum of her excellences, and they are nothing more than may result from ordinary sense, moderate education, good breeding, and an amiable disposition. As to roads which diverge, meeting at last at the gate of heaven, we are not quite clear. According to our philosophy, divergents do not meet. *Convergents* may ultimately come together; *divergents*, we should suppose, never. If old John Cotton, the first minister of Boston, ever got to heaven, we make no doubt that he met unexpected company; but is it certain that he ever got there? Protestants make a great ado about the canonization of saints by the Church; but it seems that they can canonize as many as they please, and without any examination into character. Let any old Protestant sinner die, and it shall rarely happen that the sleek gentleman in white cravat and black coat who preaches his funeral sermon will not pronounce him at rest in heaven.

In the progress of the story, the Quakers pour into Boston, and are punished by the magistrates, the ministers urging or consenting. Among others who are taken up and sentenced is poor Margaret, Naomi's old nurse. She is sentenced "to receive thirty lashes, and to be whipped from town to town at the cart's tail, and then to have her tongue bored with a red-hot iron." Naomi, with a young collegian, a free-thinker, plans a rescue, and succeeds in saving her from the principal part of the punishment; but is, in consequence, herself after a while accused, tried, condemned, and finally sent out of the country as a heretic, which she certainly was, though no more so than her Puritan judges. We may add, for the satisfaction of one class of our readers, that the young collegian, Herbert Walton, who had assisted in the rescue of Margaret, becomes a Quaker without the garb of the sect, and, after years of separation and trial, meets Naomi once more; and the kind-hearted authoress concludes her narrative by leaving her "young readers to imagine the bliss that attended his reunion with Naomi."

Let not our readers imagine that they can form any tolerable notion of *Naomi* from the partial glimpses we have afforded them. We do not claim for Mrs. Lee a rank along with the great modern masters of fiction, — of the domestic, historical, philosophical, or romantic novel, — but she is no every-day woman. She possesses rare talents in her way, a rich imagination, — rather too Transcendental, perhaps, — she has read much, and reflected more, and has here given us, not, indeed, a perfect work of art, but a very pleasant histori-

cal tale, very readable, which, while it amuses the fancy and rarely offends good taste, gives one a very passable notion of our Puritan ancestors of Boston, and, indeed, of New England, "two hundred years ago." *Naomi* compares favorably with *Hope Leslie*, and, in its kind, is not at all inferior to the *Wept of Wish-ton-wish*. The author is sometimes a little careless in her expression; but, in general, her style and language are to be commended. Her story is full of incidents, many of them of deep interest; it is well managed, naturally and gracefully told; and if we were, like the author, without faith, without worship, suspended between Transcendentalism and Catholicity, we could cheerfully commend it to our readers.

The question as to the proper manner of treating the Quakers — who, with their wild fanaticism, came among the Puritans, disturbed their meetings, scorned their magistracy, and ridiculed or denounced their "godly" ministers, very much resembling Silas Lamson, Abby Folsom, Stephen Foster, and Lloyd Garrison of our own day — was a troublesome question for Bostonians two hundred years ago. Indeed, the proper method of treating dissenters from their doctrine or worship, and disorderly persons who defend their conduct under the plea of conscience, is and always must be a perplexing question for Protestants, no matter of what sect. Protestants, in order to justify their own separation from the Church, are obliged to appeal from authority to the Scriptures interpreted by individual reason, to sentiment, ignorance, or caprice; and this appeal cannot but be as available for all who choose to dissent from them as for themselves. They cannot assume the authority to punish dissenters, heretics, or fanatics, without condemning themselves, and asserting, as it were, Lynch law. They have, and can have, no spiritual authority; for they are Protestants only by virtue of protesting against all spiritual authority, and therefore they have no right to take cognizance of any spiritual offence whatever. Moreover, they are fallible, are unable to decide between truth and falsehood with infallible certainty, and are as liable to condemn orthodoxy, under the name of heterodoxy, as heterodoxy itself, and, in fact, even more so; for error is with them the rule, truth the exception. Hence, they may, under pretence of suppressing heresy, persecute the truth, and convert the victims of *their* justice into martyrs. Indeed, they must either run the hazard of being persecutors, that is, of punishing as crime the profession of the true religion, or else recognize the equal right

of all opinions, and their duty to protect every man in the free profession of any and every set of religious or moral opinions he takes it into his head to embrace. Here is the difficulty. We are far from regarding the Quakers as innocent, — far from feeling that they received, in general, more than their deserts ; but we can conceive of no principle on which the Puritans were or could be justified in punishing them. The murderer should, undoubtedly, be hung, but not by Lynch law, — not save after sentence by the proper tribunal, and then only by the officers legally commissioned to carry the sentence into execution. What we mean is, that, however much the Quakers deserved punishment, the Puritans were, as to themselves, persecutors in punishing them, because they had no right to punish them. It is this fact that gives to their conduct its peculiarly odious character.

But while we deny to Puritans the right to punish for heresy, — while we hold in utter detestation their treatment of Quakers, Baptists, Antinomians, &c., — we cannot go with the amiable authoress so far as to hold that all opinions are harmless, and that every one who suffers for conscience' sake or opinion's sake is a martyr. As to those who suffer it, — we say not as to the spirit from which it proceeds, — persecution is never persecution, unless directed against those who profess, and for professing, the true religion ; and no man ever is or can be a martyr in the cause of error. Only true religion can have martyrs, false religion can have none ; and before you can call a sufferer for opinion's sake a martyr or a confessor, you must establish the fact, that he suffers, not for error, but for the truth. Not every man who suffers for his opinions, or for what he calls his conscience, deserves for his own sake our sympathy. An atheist, an infidel, for instance, has no conscience ; and a heretic, or a fanatic, has only a false conscience, which, in itself considered, deserves no respect. Opinions, when false, are never sacred, and nothing in the world is less free from blame or more mischievous than false opinions as to religion and morals. While, then, we condemn bigotry, intolerance, persecution, in any and every shape or degree, by whomsoever exhibited, it becomes us to take care how we lavish our sympathies upon errorists, and represent all opinions as harmless, nay, as respectable, as sacred. The sentimentalism which weeps so bitterly, or whimpers so pathetically, over every sufferer for opinion's sake, so characteristic of our times, like most modern sentimentalisms, may, in general, be regarded as indicative of a weak head and a perverse heart.

There is prevalent on this subject a great mistake, which it is very important to correct. The dominant spirit of the age takes it for granted, that whoever, in the political, intellectual, moral, or religious world, resists authority, departs from the old paths, and declares himself the champion of innovation, is necessarily on the right side, and that to oppose him is to oppose God, and to war against truth, morals, faith, and the legitimate interests of mankind. It is assumed, that whatever is fixed is wrong, whatever has been generally received is false, and that whoever would uphold and defend an existing order is necessarily a tyrant, — instigated by the Devil. And yet they who so assume hold to the divinity of humanity, to the infallibility of human instincts, the divine right of the multitude, and propose to decide all questions by a majority of voices !

Our modern philanthropists, in all their reasoning, assume, that, if not positively praiseworthy, all opinions which are opposed to moral, religious, and social order are at least innocent. Nothing is more horrible to a mind rightly constructed, than the punishment of the innocent as guilty. Assume that all who take up and seek to propagate opinions repugnant to those in authority are innocent, and it is easy to conclude that to punish them is an outrage upon justice and humanity, against which every lover of truth or of mankind should protest with all his energy. But our philanthropists, before drawing their conclusion, would do well to inquire into their right to make their assumption. Opinions which tend to bring all legitimate authority into contempt, to pervert conscience, to weaken moral restraints, to loosen the bonds of society, to render property and person insecure, and to introduce disorder, anarchy, despotism, — like those of the Red Republicans, Communists, Socialists, revolutionists, whether of one country or another, — and whose punishment by authority is gravely termed “martyrdom,” so far from being innocent, are criminal ; and they who hold and propagate them are criminals of the deepest die. However men may suffer for holding and propagating such opinions, they can suffer no more than they deserve. To magnify them into patriots, heroes, martyrs, is an insult to the common sense of mankind, and would itself be a crime deserving a halter, were it not rather an insanity in need of a strait-jacket. Instead of sympathizing with these men, calling them sincere, pure-minded, moved by noble and holy impulses, and palliating or excusing their licentious and blas-

phemous words and deeds, as if mere innocent mistakes, we should look on the other side of the picture, to the rights and interests of the peaceable, orderly, and virtuous portion of society, who are made their victims, and who have at least some claims upon our sympathies. Woe to the society that lavishes its sympathy upon scoundrels, upon criminals, and weeps over the just punishment which outraged law inflicts upon them, and never thinks of the thousands, the millions, of honest and virtuous persons who are ruined by their scoundrelism, their licentiousness, their iniquity, and their blasphemy! Woe to society when it is afflicted only because the murderer is doomed to a halter, and never thinks of the sufferings of the innocent family whose father, mother, son or daughter, sister or brother, he has murdered, whose stay and support, whose all, he may have taken away! Alas! our modern society is falling into a wretched state; and its greatest curse is the miserable men and women whose profession is philanthropy, — who would convert the prison into a palace, and prepare the delicate repast and the luxurious couch for the thief, the robber, and the murderer, — *philanthropists*, with their tear-stricken visage, whimpering speech, and hearts, where the defence of scoundrelism is not the question, harder than the nether millstone. They are the plague-spot on modern society, and deserve the utter detestation of every right-minded and sound-hearted man. Of all modern cants, the cant of philanthropy is the most detestable and the most mischievous. It is the Devil disguising himself as an angel of light.

Men are not necessarily doomed to error, so far as any of the great and essential principles of religion and morals are concerned. Almighty God has revealed the truth and declared his will, and all men have ample means of knowing it; and if they remain ignorant of it, it is their own fault, for which they are responsible, and will, one day, be called to an account. Sincerity in error that is persisted in is all moonshine. Error, on any question of moral, religious, or social magnitude, is never inevitable, and, when indulged or persisted in, is itself evidence of moral perversity, and should be treated as such. Wicked deeds are but the embodiment of wicked thoughts. The understanding is corrupted through the will, as the will itself is perverted through concupiscence, base propensities, vicious appetites, and vile lusts. When you see a man advocating falsehood, promulgating licentious doctrines, and spouting blasphemies, set him down — whatever his exterior deport-

ment in other respects, whatever his professions of sincerity, purity, honesty, benevolence, disinterestedness — as a servant of the Devil, as corrupt in heart, as rolling sin as a sweet morsel under his tongue ; whose mouth is an open sepulchre, and who labors but to ensnare the soul, and people hell with his victims. Weep over his delusion ; weep over his awful depravity ; pray for his conversion ; do all in your power to rescue him from destruction, to save him from the impending wrath of God ; but never think of him as innocent, or feel that, however severely society may punish him, he gets more than his due.

While, then, we condemn all persecution, while we censure, in the strongest terms we can use, the conduct of Protestants in general, and our Puritan ancestors in particular, in presuming to practise violence against individuals for their opinions, we must be careful not to let our detestation of bigotry and intolerance become religious indifference, and lead us to assert that men are not responsible for their opinions, and may innocently hold and propagate the most licentious, blasphemous, and anarchical doctrines, without moral blame. Opinions are deeds, and the parents of deeds ; and let no man entertain the folly uttered by Milton, and Jefferson after him, that error is harmless when truth is free to combat her. No such thing. Error assumes a thousand disguises, and does her mischief before truth can strip them off, and expose her in her nakedness ; and for her mischief men are as responsible as they are for any other mischief they do.

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- ART. IV. — *God in Christ. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover. With a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford : Brown & Parsons. 1849. 12mo. pp. 356.
2. *Ten Discourses on Orthodoxy.* By JOSEPH H. ALLEN, Pastor of the Unitarian Church, Washington. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1849. 12mo. pp. 227.

WE have brought these two works together, because we must take some notice of them, and we would do it with as great economy of space as possible. Their authors belong to different sects, and resemble one another very little in their manner of presenting their respective views ; but they advocate

pretty much the same doctrines at bottom, and with very nearly equal ability, and equal—ignorance. Both prove that they have as yet found no form of religion that satisfies them, and both come forward as reformers, each endeavouring to improve upon the formal teachings of his sect. Dr. Bushnell is the older man of the two, and has naturally the more comprehensive and energetic mind; but Mr. Allen is the more clear, logical, and acute. The former falls into the more ridiculous mistakes, the latter is more systematic in his errors, and keeps more uniformly at a distance from truth.

Dr. Bushnell is the pastor of a Congregational parish in Hartford, Connecticut, and professes what are called in New England “Orthodox” doctrines; Mr. Allen is the pastor of a Congregational society in Washington, D. C., and professes what is termed Unitarian or Liberal Christianity. The “Orthodox” doctor labors to prove that orthodoxy is liberal, and excludes no heresy; the Unitarian pastor labors to prove that orthodoxy is heresy, and heresy orthodoxy, or that, to be truly orthodox, one must be heretical. The Liberal Christian seeks to demolish orthodoxy; the Orthodox minister seeks to accommodate orthodoxy to every heresy; both agree in this, that all heresies are to be kindly welcomed and warmly embraced. So, at bottom, as we say, there is not much difference between them, and we may with propriety include both in the same category.

Dr. Bushnell, for the last five or six years, has produced considerable excitement in New England, and is just now one of our principal “lions.” He is certainly not without influence, and we are assured that he carries with him a large portion of his own denomination, and is followed, it is said, by the larger part of the younger Congregational ministers. *The New Englander*, the organ of the New Haven school, fully indorses his views, and Andover, we are told, adopts them as explicitly as it can, without forfeiting its funds. The indications now are, that the Bushnellites will either divide the Congregational body into two sects of nearly equal strength, or that they will leaven the whole lump with their peculiar views, change essentially the character of New England theology, and virtually obliterate the last traces of New England Calvinism. Such are the indications; but what the result will actually prove to be, we by no means venture to predict,—though the latter alternative seems to us the more probable.

We have discovered little that is new in Dr. Bushnell’s

views, — little with which we were not in former years perfectly familiar, or which has not had for a long time a large number of adherents both at home and abroad. He is evidently dissatisfied with all the recognized forms of Protestantism, and desirous of hitting upon something which shall dissolve and recombine them all in a new and far more comprehensive form, or rather no-form, in which all men shall unite, however divided and mutually hostile they may be in their mere doctrinal statements. Mr. Allen has the same aim, and, to realize it, he comes out boldly and denounces as false and mischievous all the doctrinal statements about which men are divided, and insists that nothing should be held essential, or even important, except such points as nobody disputes. But Dr. Bushnell thinks the end is attainable by a shorter method, and without the labor of clearing away any false doctrine, or abolishing any extant creed or formula of faith. All creeds and formulas, according to him, are tentative, and never final. Yet they all serve to suggest the truth to the mind and conscience of those who adopt them, not adequately, indeed, but in the least untrue manner in which the given mind and conscience are capable of receiving it. The union already exists at bottom, and the only difficulty is, that men are not aware of it, do not know it, and suppose they differ when and where they do not. The work to be done is, not to induce men to believe otherwise than they do, but to show them what it is they really do believe, — not to persuade them to change their formulas, but to enable them to see what it is their formulas really stand for in their own minds, and to appreciate their real significance.

To understand this, we must advert to the author's theory of language, which he develops at length in his preliminary essay. This theory he promulgates as if it were original and profound, although it strikes us as an old acquaintance, and the one now very generally resorted to by unbelievers. Language, he assumes, has a divine origin only in the sense that it is the creation of man who is himself the creation of God, and is therefore strictly a human invention, — a notion which we are far from accepting ; for language presupposes society, and society is impossible without language. Man cannot create language out of society ; for whatever system of signs he should invent, being invented by and for himself alone, they would have no significance for any but himself, that is, no common significance. He cannot create it in society ; for where there is no language, that is, no common medium of intercommuni-

cation between individuals, there is no society conceivable. Doubtless, a man can think, that is, perceive intuitively, externally and internally, without words or signs ; but he cannot note his perceptions, retain them in his memory, or make them objects of reflection, without the aid of language of some sort ;—or, in other words, he cannot take a reflective cognizance of his perceptions or intuitions, mark, or distinguish them even in his own mind, without the aid of signs. Language must have been a Divine revelation, for it is not possible to conceive man, without language, setting about the invention of language. We do not, however, suppose that God gave to man in the outset, before giving him the ideas to be expressed, a complete language ; it is sufficient to suppose it infused along with the knowledge itself, or supplied as occasion demanded. But this amounts to little, because we cannot suppose a moment when man wanted the ideas. Adam was not created a baby, but a full-grown man, with a knowledge as extensive, as complete, as has ever been, or ever will be, possessed by any of his posterity. He did not grow into his knowledge, or acquire it by his own efforts, as we do ; for he possessed it at the first moment of his existence. It must, then, have been given him, or infused into him, by his Maker. It is not possible to conceive of him as a perfect man, possessing from the moment of his creation a perfection never to be surpassed by any of his posterity, and yet destitute of the faculty of speech. Even those of our philosophers who hold language to have been a human invention are obliged to suppose him originally endowed with that faculty. But the faculty of speech cannot be understood to mean a power or faculty to invent or create speech, but the power or faculty of speaking, that is, of using language. The object or material of the faculty is language ; and since no human faculty does or can either work without object or material, or create its own object or material, it follows that the faculty, where language is wanting, is as if it were not. The very assertion, which all are obliged to make, that man is endowed by his Maker with the faculty of speech, then, presupposes, prior to the faculty or independent of its exercise, the existence of signs as signs which it uses, and therefore language.

The attempt to make language a human creation or invention seems to us to proceed from a forgetfulness of the fact, that Almighty God instructed immediately the first man in what pertains to the natural order, as well as in what pertains to the supernatural, and therefore that Adam's knowledge was in-

fused, instead of being acquired ; and also from an unconscious leaning to the modern doctrine of progress, that man began, not in perfection, as reason and faith both teach, but in imperfection. Our modern philosophers have a singular tendency to remove God as far as possible from the world, and manifest great reluctance to ascribe anything to his direct agency. They will in no instance, where they can help it, allow him to have done more than create the mere germ, and seem to fancy that they have made an important advance towards the secret nature of things, when they have supposed the germ developing itself. All that comes from the Creator, they wish to suppose, comes rude and imperfect, and is subsequently perfected by its own efforts. They will not allow us to believe that God created the heavens and the earth glorious and perfect, but they would have us believe that he merely created their germs, or rather certain rude and formless bodies, which have, in the process of ages, by the operation of secondary causes, been developed or wrought into what we now find them. Some, not content with the application of this principle within the natural order, would extend it to the supernatural, and have us suppose that the Christian revelation itself was made originally only in germ, and has been since developed and matured by the agency of secondary causes. All these notions belong to one and the same general system, which develops all things from rude and feeble beginnings, and seeks perfection from imperfection, the actual from the potential, as teach the Saint-Simoni-ans and all other classes of modern Socialists, — a doctrine alike repugnant to sound philosophy and Christian theology. A religious-minded man should think twice before assigning an origin to language which demands for its basis the blasphemous doctrine of modern Socialists, or adopting notions which involve, if pushed to their logical results, the old Epicurean doctrine that the Divinity, having launched the world in space, concerns himself no more with it, but retires to doze, as the excellent Dr. Evariste Gypendole would say, in his great arm-chair, leaving the world to take care of itself, or to “go ahead on its own hook.” Perhaps, the less we are disposed to magnify the sphere of secondary causes, the more likely we are to arrive at truth.

But this by the way. Dr. Bushnell, having given language as the product of a human faculty or instinct, supposes it to consist primarily in symbols borrowed from the outward or material world, and absolutely incapable of *expressing* thought, or

of serving as the medium of communicating, from one mind to another, truths which pertain to the intellectual or spiritual order. Its signs are all signs of merely sensible objects, and never are and never can be signs of any other class of objects. When they are used as media of spiritual or intellectual truths, they do not communicate or express those truths to the one addressed; they only suggest them, or direct his attention to them, and occasion his recognizing them in the intelligible world by his own intuitive power. Thus, the word *love* does not convey an intelligible idea to the mind, but merely suggests a fact of inward experience, and will mean one thing or another, more or less, according to the particular inward experience to which it is addressed. So, the word *God* is the sign of no invariable idea, but stands in each mind for one or another idea, means this or that, more or less, according to each one's particular capacity, discipline, or internal experience. The truths suggested by language to each one, the moment it leaves the material world, are not presented by it, are not beheld in it or through it, as the medium of their revelation, but independently of it, in the intelligible world or idea,—in the Platonic sense,—in immediate relation with which, in varying subjective degrees, all men are placed by their Maker. The plain English of all this is, we take it, that the Creator has not endowed man with the faculty of speech, save for the sensible world, and that for the intelligible or spiritual world we have no language, and intercommunication of ideas or spiritual conceptions is impossible; and though we may converse with one another on sensibles, we can yet hold no *intelligible* conversation. This seems to us, nevertheless, very *intelligible* language against *intelligibility*.

That there is a partial truth in what Dr. Bushnell asserts we are not disposed to deny. Language can mean nothing to unintelligent beings, and *intelligible* conversation is possible only between intelligent persons. This, we suppose, is undeniable, and we have never heard it disputed. Intelligible conversation requires, certainly, that the one spoken to, as well as the one speaking, should be by his own constitution intelligent, that is, in relation with the intelligible. It cannot be perfect where there is a lack of unity in those who undertake to converse. There is no proper conversation possible between a man and a horse or a dog, nor between any irrational individuals. But this does not necessarily deny, as the author's doctrine implies, that man has "discourse of reason," is en-

dowed with the faculty of rational or intelligible speech. The human race began in unity, and its unity was in the unity of the intelligible, that is, the reason, — the Platonic idea or Logos, — taken objectively, not subjectively. By virtue of the unity of the intelligible, that is, of the non-sensible, or super-sensible, intelligible language was possible, and men were capable of intelligible conversation. The idea, or the intelligible, being one in itself, — for all truth is one, and therefore the same for all men in relation with it, — its language was the same to all men, having the same significance for all. Intelligible language depends on the unity of the intelligible, and the fact that men are one in that unity, or live in immediate relation with it. As the human race in the beginning were one in that unity, they could have, and in fact had, intelligible language. If they lose this unity, if they become divided, if they cease to be one in the intelligible, and able to behold it only obscurely, indistinctly, to apprehend it only partially, and to obtain only broken and detached glimpses of it, the diversity of meaning the author asserts will, no doubt, be a consequence; their language will then, certainly, be confounded, and they will no longer be able to converse intelligibly together, as happened, we know, at the building of the Tower of Babel. Thus far we do not dispute, but in some sense agree with, Dr. Bushnell.

But Dr. Bushnell pushes his theory too far, and even fails to perceive that the loss of unity in the intelligible is, *a fortiori*, a loss of unity in the sensible. The world of the sense is manifold and various, and its language has unity or common significance only in the intelligible; and consequently the denial of intelligible speech is the denial of all speech. The formative principle of language, whether it makes use solely of sensible images or not, is in the intelligible, not in the sensible, as is evident from the fact, that the advocates of sensism, or sensualism, in philosophy have never been able to conform any language to their system, and from the further fact, that every known language is more philosophical, contains a truer system of philosophy, than can be found in the speculations of any modern philosopher. Understand thoroughly any known language, ancient or modern, and you have a sound philosophy; and whoever finds it necessary to create a new language, or to distort an old one, in order to state his philosophical principles and conclusions, proves by that very fact that his philoso-

phy is false, and worthy of no consideration. Philology is the true and only safe introduction to philosophy.

Modern philosophers greatly mistake in supposing, that, either logically or chronologically, the sensible in human life precedes the intelligible. The dictum of even the ancients, that *nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu*, cannot be received without Leibnitz's famous exception, *nisi ipse intellectus*, — nor even then, unless we take note that the intellect or understanding itself is not constituted without the idea or intelligible world, which is objective, above the human intellect, and independent of it. The sensible depends on the intelligible as its condition, and always presupposes it, as sensation presupposes intellection, since not the organ perceives or senses, but the intelligent agent himself, and the perception of an external object by means of the organ of sight, smell, touch, taste, or hearing is as much an act of intellect as the perception of a non-sensible truth, and also the sensation of pain or pleasure ; for it would not be a sensation, if not intellectually apprehended. Hence the patient, whose consciousness is suspended by ether or chloroform, receives no sensation from the knife of the surgeon. A non-intelligent agent cannot be conceived as a sensitive agent, although we may conceive agents intelligent no farther than is requisite to be sentient, — that is to say, agents capable of perceiving, but not capable of noting or distinguishing beyond the sensitive perception ; that is to say, again, agents that are simply percipient, and not reflective. Nevertheless, as there can be no intelligence without the intelligible, we must suppose all percipient beings to be, in their respective degrees, in relation with it as the formative principle of all intelligence.

Language, if admitted at all, then, must be admitted as primarily adapted to the intelligible, otherwise it would not be adapted to the constitution of the human mind, and could serve no purpose even in the sphere of the sensible. It would also be a gross reflection on the Divine wisdom to maintain the contrary ; for God has evidently placed the intelligible above the sensible, and our great concernment in life is chiefly with truths which pertain to the supersensible order, that is, moral, political, and religious truths. It is these truths, that, in the commerce of life, it is chiefly necessary to communicate from one to another, and around which all serious conversation does and must turn. To suppose that God has given us a language for sensibles, and not for these, is to suppose that he has taken

care of what is comparatively trifling, and neglected to provide for matters of grave importance, which would be to suppose him to act from folly, not from wisdom.

That the difficulty Dr. Bushnell suggests does to some extent exist, though not to the extent he supposes, and is attended by grave consequences, we do not deny ; but it does not lie precisely where he supposes, nor does it depend on the causes he assigns. The difficulty does not lie in language as such, whether the signs used are primarily symbolical of sensible objects or not,—for the signs are, in fact, as adequate for signifying spiritual or intelligible truths as sensible facts, as we know from universal experience ; but it lies in the fact, that the natural human race, the race deriving from Adam, has through transgression lost its unity, and is no longer one in the idea or the intelligible, has no longer in its full strength a common reason, on which the unity of language or its common significance depends. The same signs do not signify the same truths to all minds. Men's speech is confused, and they cease to understand, clearly, distinctly, and adequately, one another, because they are themselves no longer one in the objective reason, idea, or ideal truth, in which alone the unity of the race consists. This is an evil, a great evil, we admit ; and, though incurable out of the elected human race deriving from Abraham, the father of the faithful, — the chosen people of God, — yet not an evil for which there is no remedy. Reintegrate men in the ideal truth, restore them to their pristine unity in the intelligible, as they are restored through grace in that chosen or elected society, and unity of language is recovered, and spiritual conversation is once more practicable. In that society men are of one mind and heart, and therefore of one speech, and the same words have the same meaning for all its members, as they would have had for all men in the natural human race, had they not lost primitive unity by transgression.

But Dr. Bushnell — overlooking the fact that the natural human race has lost its original unity, and making no account of the stupendous intervention of Divine Mercy for its restoration through grace, in an elected humanity, a chosen people, into which all men may enter if they will, and be reintegrated in the unity of the intelligible, as Christianity teaches us — proceeds on the assumption, whether consciously or unconsciously we pretend not to decide, that the diversity he finds in regard to the intelligible is original and fundamental in the intellectual nature or constitution of man, and therefore concludes that

unity of spiritual or intelligible language is absolutely impossible, and never to be sought.* “ Words of thought or spirit,” he says (p. 48), “ are not only inexact in their significance, never measuring the truth or giving its precise equivalent, but they *always* affirm something which is false, or contrary to the truth intended. They impute form to that which is really out of form. They are related to the truth only as form to spirit,—

* Dr. Bushnell rarely takes the trouble to be consistent with himself, and through his whole Dissertation there runs a double train of thought, which makes an exact statement of his views exceedingly difficult. According to our view, he certainly supposes the diversity of intellect, or the want of unity in understanding, to originate in the infirmity of language, in its unsuitableness to express spiritual truth ; and his general doctrine as to the union of Christian sects seems evidently to imply that the diversity is mainly in the expression, not in the thought vainly attempted to be symbolized. This supposes a real unity of the race in the intelligible, and affirms only diversity in the verbal statements. But, on the other hand, he makes language a human creation, and therefore the exponent of the interior state of the human race ; consequently, he must ascribe its want of unity to the diversity of the human mind or constitution itself. Moreover, as he makes the significance of words of thought or spirit depend on the spiritual understanding and experience of those addressed, he seems to us obliged to make the diverse meaning of language the effect, and not the cause, of the diversity of the human understanding. We are inclined to believe that this is his real doctrine, and the unity which he evidently assumes as coexisting in the human race with intellectual diversity he supposes, no doubt, to consist, not in the intellect, by virtue of the unity of the intelligible, but in some deeper and more ultimate element than intellect, which he imagines there is in the human constitution.

We cannot help remarking here, that Gioberti (*Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia*, Cap. III., Brusselle, 1844) ascribes the loss of unity in the order perpetuated by natural generation from Adam to the confusion of language. That the confusion of tongues, as recorded in *Genesis*, operated and operates to prevent the recovery of unity in the intelligible in the order so perpetuated, we do not doubt ; but we are inclined to believe the confusion of speech is the consequence rather than the cause of the loss of unity. The unity of the idea or the intelligible is lost by pride, which is, when fully developed, pure, unmitigated egotism, which asserts the sufficiency of the subjective, and denies both the need and the reality of the objective, and is the very principle of diversity and separation. Pride, undoubtedly, led to the building of the Tower of Babel, and therefore the race must have virtually lost their unity before God confounded their language, which he did in mercy, to prevent the mischief they would do, if, following their pride, they could for a while maintain commerce with one another. In order to compel them to break off from their mad and impious undertaking, God confounded their language, and dispersed them abroad over the earth, which was after all only the external accomplishment of what pride had already commenced and virtually effected in the interior of man.

earthen vessels in which the truth is borne, yet *always* offering their mere pottery as being truth itself." As falsehood is unintelligible in itself, and stands opposed to the intelligible, or, to speak more accurately, is the negation of the intelligible, it follows, since words of thought and spirit always affirm what is false, that there really is and can be no intelligible language, and no true statement, in words, of intellectual or spiritual truth can ever be made !

That the mass of men do not always clearly and distinctly apprehend the truths they seek to express, and do really express, in consequence of their confused perceptions and intuitions, more or less of error along with the truth, is no doubt the fact ; and that many whose perceptions are clear and distinct express them in words which may retain traces of a meaning incompatible with the one they intend, nobody disputes ; but that unintended meaning, though possibly implied by the word used, does not necessarily constitute an element of the affirmation itself, either in the mind of him who makes it, or in the mind of him to whom it is made. When we say of some one, he *attends* to what we say, we use a word which conceals the figure of a body bending to or towards some one ; but not, therefore, do we affirm, or are we understood to affirm, that he stands bent forward towards us. The figure is eliminated both in our mind and in the mind we address, and the word stands in both minds as the sign of a purely intellectual or mental act of listening. The word has a spiritual as well as a material sense, and is as precise, as definite, as exact, in the former as in the latter ; nay, the material sense, or the figure, serves to intensify the spiritual meaning, for *bending to* a thing indicates resolution and earnestness. It is no objection to a word, that it has many senses, or senses incompatible with the one intended, if the particular sense intended is sufficiently marked and determined, as it may be, and always is, by careful speakers and writers. Men who do not think, who pay no attention to what a speaker or writer intends, may, no doubt, mistake the "pottery" of words for the truth they are used to express ; but that is not the fault of the words, but of the men themselves.

But assuming the incapacity of language, denying its adequacy to express truth in the intelligible or spiritual order, Dr. Bushnell concludes against all formal or dogmatic statements of doctrine : — " Dogmatical propositions, such as are commonly woven into creeds and catechisms of doctrine, have not the certainty they are commonly supposed to have. They

only give us the seeing of the authors at the precise stand-point occupied by them at the time, and they are true only as seen from that point,—not even there, save in a proximate sense. Passing on, descending the current of time,—we will say two centuries,—we are brought to a different point, as when we change positions in a landscape, and then we are doomed to see things in a different light, in spite of ourselves. It is not that the truth changes, but we change. Our eye changes color, and then the color of the eye affects our seeing.” (pp. 79, 80.) Evidently the author holds that all dogmatical statements of spiritual doctrine are more or less inadequate, and, indeed, at best, only proximately true. But, after all, they are so, not only because language never does, and never can, tell the truth, but because the formula of doctrine embodies only our partial views of truth, which are variable and varying, not truth itself, or views which in all times and places are true views. This last reason, which shows that the author makes the difficulty consist in the mind as well as in language, would be a good one if we had no Divine revelation,—if we were abandoned to the order of nature, compelled to draw up our own creeds and catechisms, without Divine instruction or assistance, and able to embody in them only our own variable and ever-varying views. But Dr. Bushnell’s idea of a formula of doctrine is not exactly that of the Christian. The Christian supposes the formula embodies, not our views, but, so to speak, God’s views, which do not vary with time, place, or position, and is drawn up, not by us to express our views of truth, but by God himself, as a statement for the human intellect of the views we ought always and everywhere to take, or of the truth which we must in all times and places apprehend and believe, on pain of error and the Divine displeasure. Dr. Bushnell’s idea is the reverse of this. Having assumed that “language is rather the instrument of suggestion than of absolute conveyance for thought,” he concludes that to teach, that is, to impart knowledge, or present truth to the minds of others, is impossible. We can tell no man anything whereof he is ignorant. Hence the truth, for us human beings, is never anything but the view we actually take of it ; that is, for us human beings, there is no truth but our variable and ever-varying notions of truth. The creed or catechism can express only those notions as held at the time and from the point of view it is drawn up ; and as these are constantly varying with time, and as we shift our point of sight, the creed or catechism, in order to express or embody the truth, must constantly vary

with them. The principle the "Orthodox" doctor adopts is, that the formula, to be true, must conform to human belief, not that human belief, in order to be true belief, must conform to the formula !

That men out of unity, out of the reintegrated humanity, persisting in the diversity and variety of the natural human race in its fallen state, developing pride as its principle, do shift, with regard to spiritual truth, their positions, and change their views accordingly,—that for them the creed or catechism loses, with time and change, its original significance, and fails to embody their ever-varying notions of truth,—that their eye changes color, and sheds its own hues over the objects they contemplate,—is, no doubt, very true ; but is this a proof that the formula loses its truth, becomes false, or is it a proof that they lose sight of the truth, or perceive it, if at all, only through a colored or distorting medium ? If, in process of time, there arises a discrepancy between the original formula of doctrine and men's views, is it the formula that needs changing, or men's views that need rectifying ? Is it certain that men's notions are always the standard of truth, and that every statement of doctrine not conformable to them is therefore to be rejected, either as false or as inadequate ? If the "Orthodox" doctor were pleading the cause of error instead of truth, or if he were laboring to prove that there is no real difference between truth and error, what else, or what more, could he say, than he does ?

But as language is never a medium of truth, and as its sole office is to direct the mind to the truth intuitively apprehensible, already in it or before it, every statement of doctrine it is possible to make in words, in itself considered, is erroneous. Thus, the Orthodox statements of the sacred mysteries, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, regarded as statements for the intellect, or logical understanding, are inadequate and erroneous. Indeed, the truth, in itself formless, can never be truly stated, because the statement gives it a form, and every form falsifies it. Here is the grand fact that has been overlooked. It has been supposed that Christian truth could be drawn out in formal propositions, and stated in formulas fully expressing it, and having the same meaning for all men ; but this is a mistake. Christian truth spurns all forms, defies all formal statements, and the more adequately we conceive it, the more paradoxical and contradictory shall we be in our speech, and the less shall we submit to the restraints of logic.

"There is no book in the world that contains so many repugnances, or antagonistic forms of assertion, as the Bible. Therefore, if any man choose to play off his constructive logic upon it, he can easily show it up as the absurdest book in the world." (p. 69.) "We find little, therefore, in the Scriptures, to encourage the hope of a complete and sufficient Christian dogmatism, or of a satisfactory and truly adequate system of scientific theology. Language, under the laws of logic or speculation, does not seem to be adequate to any such use or purpose." (pp. 76, 77.) "Considering the infirmities of language, all formulas of doctrine should be held in a *certain spirit of accommodation*. They cannot be pressed to the letter, for the letter is never true. They can be regarded only as proximate representations, and should, therefore, be accepted, not as *laws of our belief*, or opinion, but more as badges of consent and good understanding." (p. 81.) "Unquestionably, the view of language here presented must produce, if received, a decided mitigation of our dogmatic tendencies in religion. It throws a heavy shade of discouragement on our efforts in that direction. It shows that language is, probably, incapable of any such definite and determinate use as we have supposed it to be in our theological speculations; that, for this reason, dogma has failed hitherto, and about as certainly will [fail] hereafter." (pp. 91, 92.)'

Our readers must not suppose that Dr. Bushnell means merely to reject scholastic theology, for he objects to creeds and catechisms themselves, unless taken in a loose, accommodating sense, as each one chooses to interpret them for himself, and therefore means to assert that language is inadequate to the distinct, formal, and exact statement of Christian doctrine, or the Divine *revelata*. According to him, all spiritual truth is formless, and every formula is contrary to its nature, and falsifies it. Our study should be, not to give it a form for the understanding, but to be moved and excited by it as an interior and all-pervading force or principle of life. He does not propose at once to abolish "all platforms and articles," for to that men will not as yet hear (p. 341). But it is clear that he proposes to do it ultimately, and to get rid of all *credenda*, all dogmas or articles of faith, and to have no truth for the understanding insisted upon. In other words, he holds that Christianity is a life, not a dogma; an interior principle, a living force that is felt, loved, obeyed in the conduct of life, but not a collection of articles or a system of doctrines to be intellectually apprehended and believed. Unity of language or of mind is not to be looked for or desired; the only possible unity is the unity of love, the unity of sentiment, and all who have the sentiment

have the unity of the spirit, and really and truly worship God, whether they conceive of him as "Jehovah, Jove, or Lord," or manifest it outwardly in the forms approved by the Protestant, the Catholic, the Gentoo, the Chinese, the Thibetian, or by the ancient Phœnicians, Greeks, or Romans. This is clear enough from an article of his which appeared some time since in *The New Englander*, entitled *Comprehensive Christianity*, that is, a Christianity which comprehends all forms, and is itself without form ; which accepts all the mutually contradictory and repugnant doctrines extant, with all their contradictions and repugnances, and avails itself of all their partial and one-sided views and statements as so many various and useful modes of duly infusing the spirit of love into the human heart, and effecting the concord of affection and harmony of life.

But this conception of Christianity, while it makes them of little value, allows the author to retain all creeds, formulas, and statements, not as expressive of the whole truth, truth in its purity, integrity, and completeness, nor of truth for the intellect, but of truth for the affections, sentiments, feelings, conscience. The Orthodox statements of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement are, indeed, inadequate and false for the logical intellect ; yet, in a large class of persons, they produce the true affections, quicken Christian sentiments, and aid in conforming the life to the spiritual reality. In another class they produce contrary effects, and these, therefore, should not be required to accept them, but suffered to modify them, or to substitute other statements for them, better adapted to their peculiar modes of thought and feeling. The statements preferred by Unitarians, in Unitarian minds and hearts, produce the same affections that Orthodox statements do in Orthodox minds and hearts. The truth for the affections, the only truth in the case to be considered, suggested by the two sets of statements, though one contradicts the other, is the same truth in each, and both sets should be suffered to stand ; both are as true as statements can be for those they suit, and as false as false can be for those they do not suit ; let the Orthodox have his statements, and the Unitarian have his, and both will be suited, and Christian affection promoted. Hence the "Orthodox" doctor protests against no creed. "So far," he says (p. 82), "from suffering even the least consciousness of constraint or oppression under any creed, I have been readier to accept as great a number as fell in my way ; for when they are subjected to the deepest alchemy of thought, that which descends to the relation between

the form of truth and its interior formless nature, they become, thereupon, so elastic, and run so freely into each other, that one seldom need have any difficulty in accepting as many as are offered him. He may regard them only as a kind of battle-dooring of words, blow answering to blow, while the reality of the play, namely, *exercise*, is the same, whichever side of the room is taken, and whether the stroke is given by the right hand or the left." The Doctor's notion of what accepting a creed means appears to be somewhat peculiar, but very liberal, withal.

Such, briefly, are the principal characteristics of Bushnellism. It must be apparent to the most careless student, that our "Orthodox" doctor cannot, without contradicting his whole theory, admit the possibility of a Divine revelation, made to mankind through the medium of inspired prophets and apostles, as the Christian world has hitherto held, because such revelation can be communicated by the inspired to the uninspired only through the medium of language. But language is not a medium of thought from mind to mind, and can only by its symbols suggest to the mind addressed the truth it already possesses, or that lies intuitively perceptible or apprehensible before it. Since the revealed truths, the *revelata*, at least as *revelata*, pertain to the supernatural, lie in a sphere above the naturally intelligible, are, in regard to our natural cognitive faculty, super-intelligible, they are not intuitively apprehensible or perceptible by the uninspired, and therefore cannot be communicated to them even by the inspired. Revelation, therefore, is possible only to those whom God directly and immediately inspires ; and only those whom he does so inspire have, or can be believers in, a Divine revelation. To all others, in the language of Thomas Paine, "revelation is mere hearsay." This is, substantially, Quakerism, and is a conclusion the author appears not only to accept, but even to contend for. He holds to a present, immediate, personal inspiration (pp. 350, 351), — probably claims it for himself ; but we shall so far adopt his doctrine as to hold ourselves excused from accepting what he says as Divine revelation, till we find it either confirmed by an authority we respect, or are ourselves personally inspired to believe it.

The doctrine of the author also denies that God himself can make a revelation to the human mind, even immediately, without supernaturally enlarging, not merely its creditive, but its cognitive power, so as to enable it by its own inherent ~~or~~

intuitiva, or intuitive energy, to behold or perceive the supernatural truth he would reveal ; for it denies that truth is communicable, or that it can be *mediately* apprehended. Consequently the doctrine denies the possibility of belief in anything which is not an object of immediate intuition ; for no one can believe what he does not apprehend. Hence faith is possible only in so far as it is intuition, sight, knowledge, or science ; that is, it is possible only in so far as it is *not* faith ; for faith is to believe what we do not see,—is, if we may believe St. Paul, “the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” *Est autem fides sperandarum substantiarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium.* Whether Dr. Bushnell is right or wrong in this, it is pretty evident that his doctrine is irreconcilable with the faith of the Christian world and the common sense of mankind.

The intelligent reader of Dr. Bushnell's work is everywhere struck with the tendency he manifests to confound faith and science, dogma and speculation. He is offended by the theological speculations of *theologians*, as he contemptuously calls them, and therefore condemns Christian dogmata, as if Christian dogmata were mere speculations ! Does he need to be told that the dogma is the *revelatum*, the revealed truth, and essentially non-speculative, preceding theological speculation as its postulate ? The dogma is enjoined or imposed by authority, and demands simple assent ; speculation is an operation of the discursive reason, assuming the dogmas as its postulates or axioms, and its results are conclusions depending on the authority of the logical process which demonstrates them ; the dogma is accepted on the veracity of God, whose word it is, immediately or mediately spoken or transmitted to us. We do not suppose that Dr. Bushnell is ignorant of this distinction ; but does he act wisely to treat it with contempt, and to reason on and about dogma and speculation, as if both belonged to the same category ?

The same tendency, which leads the author to confound the dogmas of faith with the speculations of theologians, leads him to confound faith with science. By confounding faith with science, or resolving it into science, denying it to be faith if not science, he denies the possibility of faith in mysteries, and holds that all that is believed in the mysteries of religion is simply what the mind of the believer not only apprehends, but comprehends. This compels him either to deny, with Mr. Allen, all mysteries,—that God has revealed or reveals anything

above the natural understanding,—or else to assert a direct, immediate, and personal revelation from God to each man,—what he calls Mysticism,—which enables us to perceive intuitively their intrinsic truth. “Christian character itself,” he says (p. 351), “and all its graces, are forms of inspiration. It requires inspiration to understand or really come into the truth of Christ at all.” “No man,” he had said (p. 331), “really knows Christ, or *can know* or *be taught* the Christian truth, who is not in the spirit of Christ.” “Words cannot bring it—the Christian plan—into his heart; dogma cannot give it in the dry light of reason.” And again (p. 332), “We can know the things which are freely given us of God only *as Paul knew them*,—by the spirit that is of God.”

The author first asserts Rationalism as the condition of rejecting the mysteries, and then Mysticism as the condition of accepting them, not as mysteries, but as things intrinsically apprehended; that is, he is alternately a Rationalist and an enthusiast, as suits his purpose. It is very true that we cannot believe with *divine faith* the things which God has revealed, without the grace of faith; but the author abuses the word *inspiration*, if by inspiration he means this grace. The grace by which we believe the Divine *revelata* is not inspiration, is not a grace of science, but simply a grace of faith, and elevates not necessarily the *vis cognoscitiva*, but the *vis creditiva*,—gives us, not the power of seeing the intrinsic truth of the *revelata*, but of holding them in our belief with a supernatural firmness. This grace does not reveal to us the truth, as does inspiration; it simply enables us to believe it with divine faith. The truth itself, as proposed to our belief, is, when proposed, apprehensible by the natural or unelevated human intellect. The propositions of faith, as to their intrinsic truth, for the most part transcend the reach of the human intellect, and therefore must be taken, if at all, on the authority proposing them; but as propositions to be believed on authority, that is, as simple propositions of faith, they do not transcend that intellect, and can be apprehended by it without difficulty, even in the simple and unlettered, and ordinary reason can also apprehend the competency of the authority. The error of the author is in confounding inspiration with the *donum fidei* of the theologians.

The Gospel was preached by the Apostles, and is every day preached by missionaries, to men not incorporated into the mystic body of Christ, not one in him, nor living his life. But this would be absurd, if no man could learn, or be taught,

while out of Christ, Christian truth, which must be believed as the condition of becoming one with him, of being in him, or having him in them. Certainly no man can *live* Christian truth out of the mystic body of Christ ; but not therefore does it follow that no man out of that body can know intellectually what the Christian faith requires him to believe, the authority on which it is to be believed, — whether the Church or the Scriptures, — or, even with human faith, believe them. The devils certainly have not the spirit of Christ, are not in Christ, have not him in them, are not Divinely inspired, and yet St. James tells us they “believe and tremble.” If the truth cannot be taught to unbelievers, to men who are not yet Christians, how are they to be converted ? Moreover, will the author name to us a single proposition of Christian doctrine which, as a proposition of faith, not of science, is unintelligible to the natural human understanding, supposing that understanding really exerted to apprehend it ? God is one Divine Being subsisting in three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; in Christ are two distinct natures subsisting in one person ; in the blessed Eucharist, when the priest pronounces the words of consecration, the elements are changed into the substance of the body of our Lord ; we cannot elect to concur with grace without the aid of grace, and yet grace does not aid us without our concurrence. We know nothing in Christian faith more difficult to understand than these propositions ; but who dares say that the assertions contained in them are not apprehensible even by a child old enough to begin his catechism ? The explanation of them, the answer to the question how they can be true, and all that, is no doubt difficult ; but nothing of all that is proposed as an object of faith, or is required to be understood by the believer in order to believe what is proposed. We know that a spire of grass grows, but how it grows we know not. By faith we know that the world was framed by the word of God, yet how God framed it is no object of our knowledge, or of our faith. Shall we therefore say that we cannot believe that he framed it by his word ? It will never do to say that we apprehend nothing because we do not comprehend all things, or that what is not comprehensible is not believable. If the good Doctor had distinguished between apprehending and comprehending, and between the simple apprehension of Christian truth as the intellectual object of faith, and the spiritual appropriation of that truth in Christian life and character, he would have escaped the blunder of asserting that “no

man can be taught Christian truth who is not in the spirit of Christ," or learn it otherwise than by immediate, personal inspiration.

That the end we are to aim at is not the intellectual apprehension of the objects or propositions of faith, the human or even the supernatural assent to them, is of course true. The end to be sought is never the intellectual apprehension of the truth, for that the devils have, but obedience to the truth, or life conformable to its teachings. There must not only be the perception of the intellect, but the consent of the will ; and without the latter, the former, instead of being meritorious, only augments our guiltiness. Faith without works, the *fides informis* of the Schoolmen, is dead ; and to be living, meritorious, it must be conjoined with love, be *fides formata*. Everybody knows, or ought to know, this. The Christian life, Christian truth as the inward principle of life, the vivifying or formative principle of character, is the main thing, without which nothing is of any value. So far as Dr. Bushnell means simply to insist on this commonplace truth,—commonplace truth with all except those sectaries who preach justification by faith alone,—we have no quarrel with him ; but when he goes farther, and tells us that Christian truth is not addressed primarily to the human intellect, and seeks to exclude the intellect from all share in the formation of the Christian character, we recognize in him neither the Christian nor the philosopher. We must apprehend the truth, or we cannot obey it, or voluntarily submit to it ; and the intellect is our only faculty for the apprehension of truth. It is our only cognitive faculty. It is the light or the sight of the will, which, considered in itself as a distinct faculty, is blind. The will acts only for an end, and cannot act for an end which is not apprehended. Suppress the intellect, and you suppress the will ; suppress the will, and you suppress all voluntary obedience, all virtue, all *human* acts. Impossible, therefore, is it to have the Christian character, to live the Christian life, without intellectual apprehension of Christian truth. The first step is always intellectual apprehension, and it is by faith that we are incorporated into the elected human race, where only we can live in unity, and complete the Christian life. Is it not a little too bad that we should be called upon to defend intellect against a modern *enlightened* reformer, and to maintain against him that intellect is not a useless appendage to the human constitution ?

But truth to the human intellect must always be presented

in some form more or less distinct, more or less definite. Doubtless, it is not necessary for every mind that it should be drawn out in detail, in all the minuteness we find in scientific theology ; yet the more clearly, distinctly, and definitely its several propositions are drawn out and stated, the more perfect will be our apprehension of it, and the less likely shall we be to mistake it, or fall into errors opposed to it. Even the Apostles' Creed, with which the author closes his volume, and which he professes to believe, is a formula of faith, a formal statement of Christian truth, to the intellect. And how will you teach Christian truth, except by means of formal statements ? What else is every sermon that is preached, every book that is written, with a view to induce men to believe and practise the Christian religion ? No teaching, no instruction, is possible, without formal statements to the understanding. Do you propose to abolish all teaching, all science, all intercommunion of thought, and leave every man to the solitary workings of his own mind ? What will you do with children ? Will you abolish all primary and secondary schools, all academies, colleges, seminaries, and universities, — all preaching, all catechizing, all talking, all reading, all literature ? If not, you must and will have teaching of some sort, and then formal statements, formulas of doctrine, addressed to the intellect. Or do you propose to follow the cant of the day, to declaim against all intellectual education, and say you will have only *moral* education, the education of the feelings, of the moral and religious affections and sentiments ? But how will you contrive, without addressing the intellect, to impart this education ? Will you do it in perfect silence, or will you now and then open your mouth ? If you open your mouth, you must say something, make some formal statement, true or false. You cannot speak to the feelings, you cannot even move them, except through the intellect. Then, in what will your moral education consist ? Is it to be conformable or not conformable to the truth ? How, without the exercise of intellect, will you know which is truth, which is falsehood, and determine what is the education conformable to the one or the other ? A *moral* act is the act of a free agent, done for the sake of the end which the law of God commands us to seek. How, without teaching your pupils this end, the means and conditions of fulfilling it, will you give them a *moral* education ? Is that a moral education that leaves the pupil ignorant of the precepts of morality ? Were you to reduce your system to practice, how long would

you be in reducing your community below the condition of the most degraded savage tribe ?

Then, again, does the Doctor act wisely in sneering at logic, and making himself merry with what he calls "logicking" ? Does it never happen that the truth is assailed, and needs to be defended ? that falsehood is promulgated, and needs to be refuted ? How is one or the other to be done without logic, — *logicking*, if the author pleases ? The author requires us to live Christian truth ; he, then, must hold that there is a difference between truth and falsehood, — that the former is good, and the latter is bad. Will he, then, deny that it is necessary to distinguish between them, to defend the truth if assailed, and repel the falsehood if it attempts to usurp the throne of truth ? Nay, is not the author himself "logicking" against logic, from the beginning of his book to the end ? Does he not bring out views of his own, and seek to give us logical reasons for accepting them ? and does he not point out what he holds to be errors, and endeavour to show us why they are errors ? Has he, then, the face to turn round and deny the very instrument he has used, the very authority to which he appeals ? Does he persuade himself that it is a sufficient answer to say, that he admits his inconsistency, but then all deep thinkers, all profound minds, are inconsistent in their statements, and cannot, owing to the imperfection of language, state the truths they behold, without violating the logical understanding ?

But we have exhausted our space, and can proceed no farther. We did intend to consider the application which Dr. Bushnell makes of his principles to the explanation of the sacred mysteries of our religion, but it is not necessary. What we have said is sufficient for the full understanding of his theory, and how he applies it is a matter of little importance. We do not suppose that Dr. Bushnell is naturally a very weak man, nor, compared with the common run of Protestant ministers, a very bad man ; but he is, undoubtedly, a very ignorant man, and unacquainted with the theology of his own denomination. He has, doubtless, read some, thought a little, felt much, and imagined more ; but he lacks mental discipline and scientific culture. He appears to have lighted, in the course of his experience, upon certain speculations, to have caught up certain half or quarter ideas, which, being novelties to him, he has presumed to be novelties to all the world. These he appears to have dwelt upon till his head has become a little turned, and he fancies that he is, as it were, a seer and a prophet. To those

who have passed through a state similar to that he is now in, and have late in life done what they could to supply the defect of early discipline, he is an object of tender interest, and they pity him at the same time that they laugh at the antics he plays, and the capers he cuts. He may, perhaps, some day, grow sober, lower his estimate of his own supereminent greatness, blush at his folly, and marvel at his delusions. He seems to us, after all, a man on whom the truth will not always fall powerless. He shows the marks of his Calvinistic breeding, it is true, but he has comparatively little of that cold, dry, hard, wiry, sly, crafty disposition, so characteristic of Calvinistic ministers; and seems to retain at bottom even something of the simplicity of the child, and the frankness of the youth. He seems really to have a little earnestness, which is not precisely fanaticism; and we shall not be surprised if we hear, one of these days, that he has abandoned system-making, has given up his trade of reformer, has bowed in sorrow and humility at the foot of the cross, and been received into the society of those whose glory it is to glory only in a crucified Redeemer. He is now mentally and morally in a chaotic state; who knows but the spirit of God may yet breathe over the chaos, and cause order to spring out of confusion, and light to arise out of darkness? Our brethren should pray for his conversion.

We have said less of Mr. Allen's book than we intended. We shall be obliged to make it the subject of some remarks hereafter. Mr. Allen is a less hopeful subject than Dr. Bushnell; but he is young, and we will not as yet despair of him.

ART. V. — *The Law of the Press. Speech of Count de Montalembert, in the French Legislative Assembly, July 21, 1849.*

IN an article on *European Events*, in this Review for July, 1848, written before we had received the news of the memorable Socialist insurrection in June of that year, which it took four days of hard fighting to suppress, and which resulted in the victory of the party of order under General Cavaignac, we made the following remarks, which we beg leave to recall to the attention of our readers.

“What is likely to be the result of the recent events in Europe? France is now decidedly a republic. Will she be able to establish and maintain the authority of the state and the freedom of the subject? This is a matter about which we do not wish to speculate. We have found nothing in our historical reading which leads us to augur her success. The historical precedents are all against her. But we cannot pretend to fathom the designs of Almighty God, to whom belong the ordering of all events and the determination of their issues. Whether he has designed the revolution in mercy or in judgment to the nations, we can know only as he himself is pleased to make it manifest; but whichever it be, it is ours to be silent and adore, for his judgments are as adorable as his mercies. That the French people will find it an easy task to reconstitute the state, which the revolution of February dissolved, and reestablish and maintain order, the indispensable condition of liberty, we presume nobody with a grain of political philosophy or experience will pretend. The ideas and passions, the schemes and wishes, which have destroyed the old government, and reduced French society to its original elements, are opposed to all government, and if not abandoned, must be as fatal to the republic as they have been to the monarchy. The revolutionary party is in pursuit of Utopia, and has no stopping-place within the limits of practicable government. It must be arrested, or it will subvert the new institutions before they get fairly into operation. But to attempt to arrest them by physical force, by measures of repression, will only renew between them and the new government the very relations which rendered the old government impotent for good, and its longer existence impracticable. Under Providence, then, the solution of the problem must turn on the fact, whether the radicals, represented by such men as Ledru-Rollin, that second edition of Danton, Louis Blanc, Blanqui, Albert, and company, are a large, or only a small, minority of the French nation, and on the courage, firmness, and energy of the party opposed to them. If they are only a small minority, confined principally to a few localities, and the friends of order show them from the outset that their opposition is disregarded, and their advice will not be asked, they may be held in subjection till the new government is so firmly established as to render their attempts to subvert it impotent and ridiculous. But if they are a large majority, — absolutely so, by their numbers, or effectively so, by their organization and concentration, or by the uncertainty, hesitation, fears, and anxieties of their opponents, — they will have little difficulty in defeating all attempts to reconstitute the state, and in prolonging the reign of anarchy. How the case actually stands in France we have no certain means of knowing, and cannot pretend to decide.

“The majority of the National Assembly appear to be well dis-

posed, and to entertain moderate views; but they evidently lack experience, and have marked out to themselves no clear and definite line of policy. They are apparently trusting for their success to the chapter of accidents. Their determination is, indeed, to give France a republican government; but they are evidently afraid that the sincerity of their attachment to republicanism will be suspected. This renders them uneasy, deprives them of that calmness, sobriety, and independence, that naturalness and at-home feeling, so essential to their success, and gives the radical minority an immense advantage over them. The radicals have no fears of this sort. Strong in the fact that they represent the revolution, embody its spirit, and obey its tendencies, they march with a bold and confident step in the path of destruction. In settled times, when the revolutionary spirit has not penetrated the body of the people, when the subversion of an old government is looked upon as an exceptional measure, to be justified only on the ground of invincible necessity, the party adopting moderate counsels and cherishing a conciliatory spirit is sure to rally around it the great body of the nation. But when the principle of revolution aspires to obtain a legal recognition, and is held by the great body of the people to be the proper basis of the state, — when all old ideas are confounded, and the general wish is to erect the social fabric, not only after a new fashion, but on a new and untried foundation, — extreme counsels are most likely to prevail, and the party in favor of carrying out the revolution is pretty sure to succeed. We shall, therefore, by no means be disappointed, if Ledru-Rollin turns out to be a stronger man than Lamartine. The Mountain triumphed over the Girondists, the *Sans-culottes* over the Respectables, in the former revolution, and why shall they not do the same in this? They assuredly will, unless the moderate party take their ground at once, declare boldly that the revolution must be arrested, and that a contrary set of maxims from those which prepared and effected it must now be adopted and acted on. The state cannot be constituted on the revolutionary principle, nor recognize the right of the people to abolish the government; for every state must have as its basis the right of the state to command, and the duty of the citizen to obey. Whether the moderate party have the courage to face the revolution in the moment of its victory, and recognize a solid basis for authority, the event must determine. We fear, however, that, captivated by fine phrases about *fraternity*, they will attempt to conciliate the revolutionary party by compromise, and thus destroy themselves, and prepare the triumph of disorder or of despotism." — New Series, Vol. II. No. III. pp. 399 – 401.

At the time when this was written, Lamartine was the great man of the revolution, and Ledru-Rollin was apparently without

influence. Yet events have proved, what we then supposed to be true, that the latter was from the first the real leader of the revolutionary party. He is a bold, reckless demagogue, not without talent of a certain kind, with a determinate end in view, which he is prepared to seek at any and every hazard, — a daring and unscrupulous revolutionary chief, who cares not how much virtue he tramples upon, how many hearts he wounds, how much blood he spills, or how much misery he causes, if he can accomplish his purposes. Such a man, in times of disorder and confusion, is always sure to have a strong and determined party, and never ceases to be dangerous so long as he lives.

On the other point on which we expressed our views, our fears have not been fully justified. The party of order, the moderates, as they were then called, have proved themselves stronger and more resolute and energetic than we dared hope ; but the Red Republicans, though defeated, have not yet been vanquished, or ceased to be formidable ; and the party of order are yet far from having gained a definitive victory. One thing, however, they have gained. “ The state,” we said, “ cannot be constituted on the revolutionary principle, nor recognize the right of the people to abolish the government ; for every state must have as its basis the right of the state to command, and the duty of the citizen to obey.” “ The revolutionary party,” we said, “ must be arrested, or it will subvert the new institutions before they get fairly into operation.” Every sober Frenchman appears now to be well convinced of this. Three times, within less than eighteen months, the revolutionary party has attempted to subvert the very republican institutions it had forced upon the country, and France seems now to be thoroughly convinced that her regeneration must come from order and liberty, not from revolution and anarchy. She has taken her stand on the side of the former against the latter, — solemnly proclaimed, No more revolution, no more destruction, no more anarchy ; but whether she will be able to maintain the very just and common-sense position she has assumed remains to be seen. Thus far, she has maintained it firmly, and, under the circumstances, nobly ; and the government of Louis Napoleon, thus far, deserves the gratitude of Europe and the Christian world.

But the enemies of order, of society itself, are in France and in entire Europe neither few nor inactive, and he who to-day counts on the speedy triumph of authority in the European

nations, and the restoration of social peace, will most likely be deceived. A large portion of the people have been corrupted, and the infection spreads from the cities and towns into the villages and country. In the earlier half of the eighteenth century, it was the higher classes — kings, nobles, and even, to some extent, the clergy — who were corrupt, who had lost their faith, despised morals, and dreamed of a sensual paradise. The bulk of the people, especially the peasantry, were comparatively sound and virtuous. Now, it is or is becoming the reverse. The French revolution of 1789 chastised and corrected the upper classes, and they are now in general the most upright, moral, and religious portion of the community ; but the lower classes have taken the infection, have learned to scoff at religion, and ceased to look for a celestial recompense, or to believe in immortality. They become the ready instruments of base and unscrupulous demagogues, — combustibles, which a licentious press can at any moment kindle for a universal conflagration. In all European countries there are plenty of educated scoundrels, especially Poles and Italians, ready to inflame them with their incendiary appeals, and of able military men to conduct them in their nefarious war against society, — and plenty of decently dressed sympathizers in England and the United States to cheer them on, to pass resolutions in their favor, and even to vote to send them a flag. Under these circumstances, we cannot but apprehend a protracted struggle, although as to the ultimate issue we have no fears.

Unquestionably, for the party of order, one of the first and most important means of self-defence and of the preservation of society is to restrain, as far as possible, the radical press. In this country, we hold the freedom of the press sacred, and regard its censorship with horror ; and not without reason, for here the imbecility of the press renders it comparatively harmless, and we have few motives to rebellion. Englishmen and Americans have little confidence in ideas, — believe in few things except roast-beef and plum-pudding. They retain much of the old Anglo-Saxon character, and seldom feel, except in the pocket and the stomach. They have been bred under Protestantism, which disdains logic, and renders reason superfluous. Protestantism blunts the intellect, destroys confidence in principles, and superinduces a habit of stopping midway in a chain of reasoning. People trained under it never find any difficulty in asserting premises, and denying the conclusions which legitimately flow from them. Besides, it is an Anglo-Saxon char-

acteristic, never to put one's self in the way of learning what is repugnant to one's prejudices. The Anglo-Saxon takes a paper, not to learn what he ought to think, but to learn from it what he already thinks. If a journal advocates a view contrary to his own, or what he has a vague suspicion is his own, he eschews it, or resolutely refuses to believe one single word it says. The press has, therefore, little other influence, in England and in this country, than it exerts by expressing already existing views of the several coexisting parties, and no more influence on the ultimate action of either country than the speeches in Congress have on the final vote of the House, which, it is said, is just nothing at all. We can therefore understand no reason why, in England and the United States, the press should not be perfectly free; for in both, though pretentious, it is, comparatively, uninfluential. It rarely strengthens or weakens a party, rarely determines any public measure, or affects the final issue of any public contest. Things would go on without, pretty much as they do with it, while it operates as a sort of safety-valve to the superfluous steam of demagogues.

But on the Continent of Europe, the case is altogether different. Mental culture there is of a superior order to what it is in Great Britain, or in our own country, and the people are more disposed to act in conformity to their principles. There is and always has been in the Continental nations more mental freedom than in Great Britain, and there is more in Great Britain than in the United States. Of all civilized countries, ours has the least freedom of thought, and is, not by the laws, but by the manners, habits, and customs of the people, subjected to an intolerable mental slavery, unequalled elsewhere. He is a brave man who, among us, dares publish his honest convictions; and he is a still braver man who dares examine convictions contrary to his own with candor and impartiality. We are the freest people in the world—on paper, but in reality, especially in the interior world, the most enslaved. But on the Continent of Europe, even with those who have thrown off the Catholic faith, there remain some traces of Catholic culture,—a respect for intellect, for systematic thought, and a strong feeling that what a man holds to be truth he should seek to reduce to practice. Hence the press has there, and must have, an influence for good or for evil, of which we, in this country, can form no conception; not because the European populations are more ignorant than our people, but because, in reality,

they have more mental freedom, are more logical, and have received a superior intellectual culture.

In revolutionary times, the press, with these populations, is a tremendous engine ; and a revolutionary press cannot coexist with public peace and safety. It is absolutely necessary, if order is to be preserved, if revolutions are to be arrested, and liberty consolidated, that the law should restrain the license of the journals, and suppress them, as promptly as it would arrest and imprison the conspirator. The journal is a conspirator ; its words are deeds, and must be prevented ; for it is too late to punish them after they have been spoken. As well might you consider it a sufficient precaution to lock the stable door after the colt has been stolen.

Entertaining these views, and believing no government can fulfil its mission if perpetually assailed with impunity, we were among those, though a violent Liberal at the time, who, with the late Secretary Livingston, approved the famous September laws of Louis Philippe, restraining the seditious press. We cannot but rejoice, then, that the present French government has had the courage and firmness to propose and adopt similar laws. We have thought the subject so important, and have been so desirous that our American Catholic community should understand the necessity and the motives of the recent French legislation on the press, that we have translated and publish entire the masterly speech in its defence of Count de Montalembert, made in the Legislative Assembly, July 21st. M. de Montalembert was a member of the former Chamber of Peers ; he is a man without ambition, a man of extraordinary talents, of a highly cultivated and polished mind, a genuine orator, a sincere Catholic, and the acknowledged political leader of the Catholic party in France. In times past, we feared that he had a taint of Liberalism, and that he would not bear up with sufficient firmness against the revolutionary and Socialistic ideas of the age. Nobly has he disappointed us, and earned the reputation of being, if not the first, one of the very first, Catholic laymen of Europe. The speech we lay before our readers was received by the Assembly with unbounded applause, and proved a terrible blow to the Mountain, whom it virtually silenced.

The session of the Legislative Assembly, on the 21st of July, opened by some remarks from M. Mathieu (de la Drôme), who “ maintained ”—we translate from the report of the *Amie de la Religion* of July 24th—“ that the proposed law on the press

violated the constitution, and even the law of nature ; for only He who has endowed man with speech can take from him his right to use it. To exact the deposit of a certain sum of money as the condition of granting the right to publish a journal, is to create a privilege in favor of the rich. There is no grave reason for presenting the project, unless it is fear,—fear of Socialism. Wherefore combat Socialism with the most absurd and odious religious beliefs ? The real enemy is want ;—destroy that. A society which permits a single one of her members to die of hunger is a homicidal society. Proclaim that boldly, and you need no longer trouble yourself about the press ; for if it should then be against you, it would destroy itself.”

M. Montalembert replied :—

“ The honorable gentleman who has just spoken appears to me to have strayed far from the question before the Assembly. Though I intend to embrace it, as far as possible, in its greatest generality, I cannot follow him into the arena where he has sought to place the discussion. There is, however, one point that he has made, on which I acknowledge that I fall under his strictures. Fourteen years ago, I began my political career by speaking and voting against the laws of September ; I am here to-day to speak and vote for a law which in his opinion is even worse than the laws of September. I am not the only one here who must do the same ; others more illustrious than I are in my position ; I wish, therefore, to explain this change in our conduct, and in explaining it I believe I shall render homage to truth, warn my country of a great public danger, and discharge towards her my first duty.

“ But before proceeding to this explanation, I must reply to an objection daily urged against the laws of September, which it is pretended we wish to revive. Those laws, it is said, did not save the monarchy ; those you propose to enact will be equally impotent to save the republic. Be it so. But, Gentlemen, I hesitate not to say, that if the law we propose shall procure the republic twelve years of prosperity, security, and freedom, such as followed the laws of September, I shall, for my part, be very well satisfied, and hold myself fully justified in having voted for them. Let the republic give us by this law twelve years without the dictatorship, without a state of siege, with security and freedom, and I for one will hold her highly honored, and myself her very much obliged servant.

“ I speak not now either for or against Republicanism ; I believe society can exist under the republican form of government ; but I do not believe that it can exist with the spirit of sedition, of revolt, and of revolution, which this law is intended to repress. This is my belief, and this is wherefore I come here to defend this new law of September.

"I need not say that I am not here to combat the factious without, or even to convert adversaries within. My sole ambition is to clear up, if possible, the doubts, and remove the scruples, of some few friends, who, like myself, have always served, loved, and defended the freedom of the press, and who have some hesitation in supporting the measures which the force of the unhappy circumstances in which we are placed compels some of us to propose and others to adopt. Here is my aim.

"But how explain this change in my own conduct and in that of others? *Explain*, I say, for there is, I should hope, no need of justifying it. If a physician were consulted on the regimen of a robust man, accustomed to all the exercises and labors of ordinary life, he would very properly, in view of his constitution, prescribe a substantial, strong, and stimulating diet. This is precisely what we prescribed for France when we saw and studied her constitution fifteen years ago. We thought her constitution robust and able to bear the regimen of absolute freedom which then existed. But if the same-physician, after a lapse of ten years, should be consulted again on the same subject, and should find the patient exhausted by his excesses, a prey to fever, delirium, and chills, would he prescribe the same regimen? If he should, he would be an ignorant quack, a madman, an assassin.

"The whole question is, whether French society can be justly compared to a sick man. In my opinion, it is grievously, I was about to say mortally, sick. We are called upon to save it,—to save it at any price, Gentlemen, and with it to save liberty,—yes, with it to save liberty, but not to save it without liberty.

"But how are we to save liberty? Certainly only by restricting it. All experience proves that. The experience of the last eighteen months shows to complete demonstration that unrestricted liberty is the deadly foe of liberty, that the suppression of the journals is the natural and necessary remedy, and that between the unbounded license of the press and the Dictatorship there is hardly a step. I believe, in my soul and conscience, that unlimited liberty—such liberty as we should have now if the state of siege was raised and this law not voted—would give us the Dictatorship to-morrow.

"Such being my conviction, I come here, Gentlemen, to practise a sad and difficult trade. It is not the clamors nor the sneers of certain gentlemen that make it sad and difficult, but my own heart and my love of my country. It is always a sad and difficult trade to be a pessimist, an alarmist, to paint things in black, but it is not seldom the trade of an honest man and a good citizen. We have all of us a grave fault, that of flattering ourselves. We no longer flatter kings, and for the very good reason, that kings are no more. But under the transparent veil of society, humanity,

country, nation, and the actual state of things, we flatter ourselves; we daily, in speaking of our society, of our country, and of our age, pass the bounds of adulation, and this, at bottom, is nothing but mere self-flattery. That, Gentlemen, is a trade I have never followed. I have never been a courtier, I have never flattered any one, and I will not now be either a courtier or a flatterer of my age or my country.

“Let us look beneath the surface, and see where our society and our civilization are at the present moment. To-day, after the two experiments, one of June, 1848, and the other of June, 1849, I need not fear to say that our whole society — not this or that administration, but our entire society itself — is at the mercy of sudden insurrection [*coup de main*]. If you doubt it, as does the honorable gentleman who preceded me, I beg you to consider seriously the events of this thirteenth of June, of which he spake to you in terms so singularly inexact. What is the difference which we have observed between the June of 1849 and the June of 1848? Allow me to press this question. The honorable gentleman told you truly, and no one, I think, will deny it, that the law we are about to vote originated in the events of last June. Permit me to call your attention to the real character of those events. What was it we saw in June, 1848? We saw a formidable insurrection break out in Paris, but the provinces unanimously fly to the aid of law and order, threatened in the capital. What, again, saw we in June, 1849? An insurrection, begun in Paris, forthwith suppressed; but, precisely the contrary of what happened in 1848, we saw its ramifications extended through all the provinces, the functionaries of the triumphant insurrection everywhere named in advance, and its forces everywhere pass in review. If the conspirators could have prolonged the struggle in Paris for but two days, you would have seen a thousand insurrections break out all at once in every quarter over the whole surface of France. This is what you would have seen, Gentlemen; the republic, the republic, honest, moderate, — the *constitutional* republic, if you prefer the term, — would have perished, as perished the monarchy in February, by the sudden stroke of an insurrection, and you would have seen France all terror-struck, — terror-struck, did I say? — all crushed, beneath a danger, of which, the night before, she had not the slightest suspicion. It is the truth, and it is useless to deny it. It is as clear as the sun. Well may I say, then, in view of what was the actual state of things one month ago, that our entire society itself is at the mercy of an insurrectionary surprise.

“There is nothing in this to inspire us with confidence in our civilization or in our constitution, — nothing honorable either to the one or to the other; but there is something which should make us modest when speaking of what we are, modest in view of what we have done, — modest and perspicacious at the same time.

"Be not deceived. We are in a besieged town. Society to-day is a town besieged, — and besieged, as the honorable gentleman has truly said, by Socialism. Know you not what usually happens to besieged places? Know you not that they almost always fall at last? The siege of our society has commenced; the trench is opened; several assaults have been made and repulsed; you have made successful sorties; you made a successful one last June, of which we have just spoken; but have you vanquished your enemies? Not at all. Scarcely have you disarmed them. And how have you disarmed them? You have disarmed their hands, not their hearts; you have taken away their guns, but not their ideas. The besieging army, instead of being disorganized and dispersed, increases every day in numbers and boldness. You cannot expel it as a foreign army; it remains ever there in its place to watch our blunders and divisions, and to profit by our weaknesses. It is there, as the lava of the volcano, always boiling. What sustains it? It is idle to attempt to deny it, it is the press, the seditious press; not the liberty of the press, but the excess of the press, which up to this moment has been unrestricted in its liberty. I say not that without the press the volcano would be extinguished; I know not that it would be so; perhaps it would; but this much I do know, that it is the press that now feeds it.

"But if anything more is necessary to overcome the honorable scruples of my friends, of conservatives, who all their lives have been the sincere and ardent friends of the freedom of the press, I invoke, to complete their conversion, two great forces, — and if I were addressing an assembly of ancients, of pagans, I would say two great divinities, — PITY and PEACE.

"Gentlemen, I invoke Pity; but for whom? In the first place, precisely for these poor people, this rural population, of which the honorable gentleman has spoken, I doubt not, in the tones of sincere sympathy. I ask, I implore, your pity for this rustic population. They are now the victims, the special victims, of the licentious excesses of the press. On them falls the weight, on them falls all the bitterness of the poison which the press each day distils. For a year there has been in France a press whose special vocation it is to speculate on the base passions of the peasantry, — base passions, which they have in common with us and with all men. Above all, it speculates on their ignorance and credulity, making them believe whatever is most absurd and revolting in human thought; it speculates, also, on their fears, and alarms them with a thousand chimeras about the reëstablishment of tithes and the *corvée*; in fine, it speculates on their cupidity, and tells them, daily, that the possessions of others belong of right to them, and makes them regard as their enemies all who are not dispossessed, that it may induce them to become the instruments or the accomplices

of spoliation. Here is what I assert, and what no one dares deny, and such is the actual state of things with regard to our rural districts.

“ But not to rest in general statements, I will cite a particular fact, one of itself sufficient to enlighten every mind and every heart. There was among us a man, who, I do not fear to say, was the noblest and most illustrious type of that rural population, — I mean Marshal Bugeaud. No man could be better qualified to inspire the esteem and affection of that rural population from which he sprang, which he loved, and which he honored by his example and his glory. To it he had consecrated the greater part of his illustrious life, — all in that illustrious life which he did not consecrate to the defence of his country, and the defeat of the enemies of France. His last speech in this place — you, Gentlemen, remember it — was an exhortation to moderate measures ; his death followed that speech, and has, if possible, enhanced his glory. But what did the press — the press with unlimited liberty — do to this man. It rendered him odious in the country, nay, rendered him ineligible in that very canton of which he was the immortal honor ; it rendered this illustrious warrior in his own district ineligible, not only to this Assembly, not only to its general council, but even to the municipal council of his native village. This is what the base and licentious press did. This is what was done in the Dordogne, in the illustrious Marshal Bugeaud’s own department. Permit me now to relate what has passed in regard to him in mine, the Côte d’Or, in which I reside. I pray you to remark how an organ which is called popular expresses itself on the death of Marshal Bugeaud, — an organ entitled *The Citizen*, which circulates among the rural classes of the Côte d’Or. The article is not unknown ; several of you have read it ; but I must be allowed to inflict on it the stigma of publicity in the *Moniteur*. I ask pardon for reading it, but it is for your instruction. Here it is : —

“ ‘ Marshal Bugeaud is no more. The people were too slow in decreeing his accusation ; God ’ — (what profanation, Gentlemen, the perpetual invocation of that holy name by such fanatics !) — ‘ God grew impatient, and summoned him to his bar. He said to the cholera, Seest thou that man down there, leaning on his huge sword ? He thinks himself eternal, he believes that he is invincible. Many has he seized ; go now and seize him, and cast him into that black dungeon called the grave. I have judged him.’ [Several voices. “ It is shameful ! ” “ It is horrible ! ”]

“ But this is not all, Gentlemen ; I continue : —

“ ‘ Yes, God has judged this ferocious man, as ferocious as the savage South Sea Islander who nails a death’s head to the mast of his canoe. Bugeaud was the scourge of the Democracy. In the plains of Perigord, his native district, he was *truffed* with a stupid

hatred of the people [*il s'était truffé d'une haine stupide contre le peuple*].’ [*Marks of indignation from the right, several voices exclaiming, “It is abominable !”*]

“This is what is printed in the department in which I reside, — this is what is read every day in the village from which I come. It is not merely political society that is unable to withstand such attacks, but even moral society; the human heart itself is too feeble to withstand them. No, the human heart, the heart of fallen man, cannot bear such appeals, or resist such dangers and excitations.

“I ask, therefore, your pity for these poor country people, — for the simple peasants; and after having implored it for them, I implore it in the next place for our soldiers, that is, for the sons of these peasants, who are the first victims of the insane theories daily and everywhere vented by that vile press whose licentiousness we would restrain.

“Here I will read you only a few words, — only a single phrase. It is from the close of an article in the *Emancipation* of Toulouse of June 15; — mark the date: — ‘To-day, the pen; to-morrow, the musket.’ And against whom are these pens, converted into muskets, to be directed? Against the enemies of France? Against foreign invaders of her soil? No, no; — against the children of the people, — against our soldiers. They are French soldiers who must pay with their blood the ransom of these declamations. If they betray their duty, — if they yield to the abominable appeals addressed to them, — what is done with them? It is what was done at Lyons, where they were placed in the front ranks on the barricades to fight their comrades. If, on the contrary, they remain faithful to their colors and their duty, they are slain. They fall under French balls, and, it must be said, balls cast by the journalists. Since the meeting of this Assembly, I have heard frequently that its ranks were decimated; would you know what ranks have really been decimated? They are the ranks of our regiments at Paris, in June, 1848, and at Lyons, in June, 1849.

“We are continually speaking in this place of foreigners, of Cossacks, and of the dangers incurred from them; and nobody shares more than I and my friends in that just solicitude with which we must all be animated for the greatness and independence of France; but, meanwhile, who is it that now levies this impost of blood on the children of the people? Are they foreign invaders? Are they Cossacks? No; — they are the Socialists; they are the Red Republicans; they are men inflamed by the demagogical press. Here is the simple truth; and I do not hesitate to say, that I know nothing more culpable or more cowardly than the conduct of these journalists, who, in the security of their offices, cast, as I said, the balls which are to prostrate our soldiers, and who, for

themselves, run no other risk than a few months' imprisonment, while they peril the life of those they arm, and of those against whom they arm their dupes. In all our protracted civil struggles, we have seen, indeed, stream the blood of the children of the peasantry, of workmen and soldiers; but we have never seen in them a single drop of a journalist's blood. A journalist, recently one of our colleagues, related to us that he contented himself with going one day to witness at a safe distance the sublime horrors of a cannonade! This is the heroism displayed by the revolutionary journalists in our civil struggles.

"I said, that, to overcome your scruples, I would, after Pity, also invoke Peace,—Peace, the first want of every society, and of every man as soon as he issues from the savage state. Well, have we peace? Without, we have, I grant; but within? Call you that state in which we live peace? You know it is not; yet peace is not only the first want, but the first duty, of every social man; it is the goal of all progress, the end of all laws, and of all the inventions of civilization,—nay, of war itself; for war is justifiable only when it has peace for its end.

"Nor is peace necessary merely to enable us to enjoy these material goods, whose possession and enjoyment are always legitimate when the goods themselves are; but it is, above all, necessary to enable us to enjoy domestic life, private life, the life of the heart, of family, of what is most dear and sacred to the heart of every man. Is it possible to enjoy this life amidst the convulsions, the threatenings, and the terrors which now besiege us? Where are the fathers, where the mothers, that can look upon the heads of their children without trembling for their future, without tears moistening their eyelids,—tears of a too just apprehension, of a too legitimate solicitude for the future, which the madmen who doom our country and our society to a perpetual conflagration reserve for these dear pledges which God has given them? Behold what they do, these enemies of family and the state! I speak of what I myself have felt, and therefore from the height of this tribune I hurl upon their heads, not only the reprobation of an honest man, of a good citizen, an ardent friend of liberty, but also the malediction of a *further*.

"But are these madmen alone guilty? No, Gentlemen, in my judgment they are not. And here I broach the most difficult and the most delicate part of the task which I have imposed upon myself. Has the party which is called conservative, moderate, the party of honest people, in fine, the party to which I make it my boast to belong,—the party of resistance, if you please, in all the various elements of which it is now composed,—nothing in the actual condition of the country with which to reproach itself? No; I cannot say that it has not. I believe that it is in some

measure, indirectly, unintentionally, partially, the accomplice of the evil we all deplore.

“ I refer not merely to that really supernatural blindness of many in presence of danger, nor to that foolish security in which multitudes indulge the day after a struggle, nor to the disposition so humorously described by one of our colleagues, that, with us, on the morrow of a victory over disorder, order has the air of begging pardon of disorder for having conquered it ; but more especially to that spirit of opposition, of criticism, which exists in the bosom even of those who seek now to defend and preserve society. Who is it that reads these vile and seditious journals of which I have spoken ? Who is it that purchases them, and gives them their most efficient encouragement ? Who, but conservatives like ourselves ? Moreover, where find we that depraved taste for permanent and perpetual opposition, which, if not manifested now, was, at least, manifested in the past ? Are we not all guilty of it ? Are we not habituated to the unwearied indulgence of every one who assails, blames, criticizes, the government, and at the same time to implacable severity towards its dispositions and acts, be it what it will ? Who is to be accused of this strange inconsistency ? Is it not, again, the respectable classes, conservatives, proprietors, moderates ? And yet these people require the government to protect them. To protect them, the government is obliged to struggle continually for them, — to struggle day and night, — to have for them vigilance, prudence, courage, mind, intelligence, everything ; and yet they would be held to nothing towards a government which represents and protects them.

“ Know you what is the height of the impartiality of these men ? — I exclude not myself from their number ; — know you what is the height of impartiality with them ? It is to hold themselves aloof, and to judge events as if they had no bearing upon us, either for us or against us. Now I assert, that, so long as we remain in these dispositions, we cannot, we shall not, save society.

“ I have said that we were all guilty. In fact, Gentlemen, it is easy to prove it ; for since the Empire fell, we have all more or less, when out of power ourselves, sympathized with the attacks aimed at authority, no matter what it was. Under the Restoration, the Liberals of all shades ; — under the monarchy of July, the Legitimists at first, then the Republicans, then the Dynastics, and lastly, — must I say it ? — the Catholics themselves ; less than the others, it is true, far less, yet too much, as I now perceive ; — all, in different degrees, have presumed too much on the strength of society, and the solidity of its ramparts. We have not appreciated nor sufficiently understood how extremely fragile the roof that sheltered us. We must all reproach ourselves with having sympathized with the aggression directed against authority, when we

were not in power, or when we did not thoroughly sympathize with it. I hesitate not to declare, that the country cannot be saved until men strangers to power, men who are neither its depositaries nor its confidants, shall consent to defend, love, and protect it, by all means supplied either by civilization or the constitution. This is the only condition of safety for society.

"Instead of this, what have we seen? We saw, under the late monarchy, men scarcely removed from office—who were soon, almost immediately, to resume it—employ that short space of time to weaken and discredit that very power of which they had long been, and were soon again to become, the depositaries. We have seen other men—men of undoubted talent—continue for eighteen years, with perhaps the best faith in the world, to attack under all its phases this same power. We can name them, if you desire it. M. Guizot, M. Barrot, both have been successively obliged to employ all their patriotism, all their talent, all their energy, to defend that very power they had formerly depreciated. What, then, does this prove? That these men are corrupted, apostates! No one of you has dared to say it,—no one dares to suppose it. But what, then, does this prove? That, in our manner of entering into political life, in the manner of our appreciating the functions of power and of society, there is something radically false, radically presumptuous; something incompatible, not with the interest of society alone, but also with the interest of liberty itself, and with the duty which we all are under of preserving this liberty from that certain ruin which awaits it, when for too long a time loose reins have been given to that which is hidden under its veil, and bears its name.

"But how is it with public men in our country? They commence with a want of sufficient confidence in authority, with not sufficiently respecting it, and they end, either by falling into the depth of the abyss, whither they seek to drag society with them, or by consecrating their talents and their energy to preserve society with those arms whose edge they have blunted, and whose utility they have lessened, by too frequent use.

"After having arraigned others, permit me now in a few words to arraign myself.

"I ought not to name or to speak of myself, after those illustrious men I have just mentioned; but I desire and I am bound to share in the criticisms which I have directed against them. I also have all my life opposed authority, not systematically, but too often, and in vivid and exaggerated terms. My situation was—I dare say it—favorable for such a course; for I had neither animosity towards others, nor ambition for myself. I was without animosity, for no one had injured me; without ambition, for I never recognized any more than I now do in myself the necessary capacity for the exer-

cise of power. I have, however, been an oppositionist ; and my voice—I regret it—has too often swollen that rash and senseless clamor which rose at once from all parts of Europe, and which has resulted in that explosion wherein it has been attempted to overthrow all thrones, all powers, all governments, not because they were oppressive, as some in fact were,—not because they had committed faults, which is not denied,—but because they were powers, and because they were governments possessed of authority ;—for this and no other reason. For acting thus I forgive myself, and may God forgive me ; for I acted in good faith. But I assure you that I would never forgive myself, did I believe myself of sufficient importance to have contributed in any way to the catastrophe I have designated. You see, then, how indulgent I should be towards those of whom I speak, since nothing was wanting save the abyss which yawned under my feet on the morrow of the 24th of February, to make me understand how far I also had deviated from political truth. Let us, then, Gentlemen, acknowledge that we have all been culpable towards the great law of respect, which is the basis of society, since without it you can conceive of neither of those three great things we profess to defend,—not of religion, for what is religion without respect ?—not of property, for what is property without respect ?—nor of family, for what is family without respect ? It is respect that yields what is good and social. Contempt and insult bring forth evil. And I will add, that respect renders one free, truly worthy of liberty, and capable of enjoying and understanding it. But we have forgotten, Gentlemen, the very conditions of liberty ; we have forgotten that it is a delicate as well as a hardy plant,—that it requires time to grow and become strong,—that it requires us to watch over its delicacy, I had almost said its sanctity, with the most scrupulous care. We have thought that we could expose it with impunity to all the attacks, caprices, and trials of our desires or our fantasies. We have treated it like those liberty-trees, those poor poplars, which are sometimes given as its symbols, which are torn up by their roots, and, decorated with ribbons, planted in paved places, where they soon perish,—perish to be despised or forgotten.

“Such is not liberty. Liberty, on the contrary, is an oak which strikes out deep roots and grows slowly, but which, when once its roots have taken firm hold, extends its branches far and wide, and affords shelter, consolation, and honor to many generations. Here is the symbol of true and real liberty, such as I understand it, such as I have desired and labored to serve.

“That liberty may spring from a revolution is a point I do not dispute ; but it cannot live, I fear not to say, it cannot live, save on the sole condition of killing its mother,—the revolutionary spirit. It is thus it has acted in England. There it sprang from two revo-

lutions ; but what has it constantly attempted to do ? It has constantly applied itself to put down the spirit of sedition, the spirit of revolution.

“ You may say that England is a monarchy, an aristocracy, and that of such liberty as hers you want none. I tell you that the French Republic, the Democratic Republic which we have, has existed as long as it has, only by killing, as far as in its power, or at least by combating with energy and courage, the revolutionary spirit. It was this which it did in June, 1848, which it did last June, and it is what it must continue to do. If it does not, it will perish. It will then be replaced by two dictatorships. The first will be the dictatorship of anarchy. This dictatorship we already know ; its code is already promulgated ; its laws are already written ; its satellites are enrolled, and panting for the day of rapine and plunder. And know you what dictatorship will follow this ? Not the dictatorship of Napoleon, not that of St. Louis, nor that of Charlemagne, but the dictatorship of the very first corporal who shall come bearing the matter-of-fact argument of the sword ; him you will all bless [*lively interruption from the left*] ; him you will receive, you who interrupt me. [*Continued interruption.*] Your fathers did so. [*Repeated interruptions from the left.*]

“ I repeat, that those who interrupt me, if they be not previously borne away and engulfed by the fury of the storm, will be the first to bless, and perhaps to serve, this dictatorship ; their fathers did so, those of the old Mountain, and so also will act they who have taken, I know not whence, their name.

“ I shall, therefore, vote for this bill, certainly not because it is against liberty, — the liberty of the press in particular ; but, on the contrary, because it is for the liberty of the press, because it is intended to preserve us from the dictatorship, because it is intended to save liberty from its own excesses, because it will render homage and service to that liberty which I have always loved and served, and which I will ever love and serve. It is this very devotedness to liberty that fills me with deep resentment against those who have made me doubt, not of the existence of liberty, — for of that I will not doubt, — but, perhaps, of the possibility, of the capacity, of France to understand it, to defend it, to preserve it, against those who have shown me, in the future, the terrible alternative of the two catastrophes to which I have alluded, the dictatorship of anarchy, or the dictatorship of despotism.

“ Permit me a few words more, before I close, on a point which strikes me as worthy of some consideration. Our adversaries complain of the part which our majority takes, — of the abuse, as they say, of the power of the majority. They remind us, as they have an undoubted right to do, that this majority may one day become the

minority, that the minority may become the majority. I am ready to confess that I regard such an event as very possible, and, for my part, I expect it daily. But I never cast a vote in this Assembly without first questioning myself, and demanding, if I were in the minority, whether I would vote otherwise than I am now about to do, as a member of the majority. One or two speakers of the minority, when marking the abuses of power of which, according to them, we are guilty, have taken occasion to promise, in advance, that they will not imitate us; the honorable M. Lagrange said, only day before yesterday,—‘When we shall have become the majority, we will not treat you, the minority, as you have treated us.’ Now I place implicit confidence in the words of M. Lagrange, as far as he himself, in particular, is concerned; but I fear that what he has said is even more true of others than of himself. They will not treat us as we have treated them. O, no! I believe it. Being only a minority, they have outlawed us! Judge, then, what they would do, if they were the majority!

“I return, then, to the possibility of such an event, and I consider it under all its aspects. They speak to us of reprisals. I accept them; and though I am sure none of my friends would belie me, yet I speak here only in my own name. If they become the majority, and we act against the Constitution, against the laws, and against public order as have acted those men whom we have already struck, and whom we design to strike by the bill under consideration, I consent beforehand to all which they shall do against us. If ever our journals preach civil war,—if ever they say, ‘To-day the pen, to-morrow the musket,’—we consent in advance that these journals be suppressed. If we come here to this tribunal to proclaim an appeal to arms,—if we then descend to the streets, and protest against the liberty, the dignity, the commission of our colleagues,—if this should happen to me, to myself personally, and if, after having committed all these crimes, I should escape with a few months of preventive detention, exacted by the lamentable slowness of the guardians of justice,—if I should escape after a few years in prison, terminated, as was always the case under the monarchy, and as I believe it will also be under the republic, by a generous amnesty,—if I should escape at so easy a price, I could be quite resigned to it; I could console myself for it, and I forgive you for it, in advance.

“But what I could never pardon myself for, what I should reproach myself and all my party for, would be, the not having profited by the time we continued to be the majority, by the leisure you so opportunely leave us, to make good laws, consolidate our authority, fortify our power, and save society, every day threatened, every day undermined, every day shaken, as if it would by some dreadful explosion engulf us all in its ruins.

What I could never pardon myself for would be, the not having profited by the liberty of this tribunal, which we, the majority, have thus far maintained, to speak the whole truth,—to speak the truth to you, minority, to you and the entire nation. Our poor country thirsts for the truth,—for truth, and, at the same time, for authority and veritable freedom. To you, Gentlemen, does it belong to guaranty these supreme goods by salutary laws, of which this we are about to vote will be the first chapter.”

Count de Montalembert is very far from asserting that the Catholic party, under Louis Philippe, were wrong in opposing the government, or implying that their motives were not justifiable, or that the ends they sought were not both legitimate and desirable ; all he means to censure is the manner in which they conducted their opposition, or the spirit and tendencies they indirectly and unintentionally encouraged. In this he is doubtless right. Our pages, and the liberal censures of some of our friends, amply prove, that, long before the explosion of February, 1848, we were convinced that the Catholic political party in France, and wherever else it was in opposition, yielded too much to the so-called Liberalists of the day, and were not sufficiently careful to mark the line which separates loyal and conservative from factious, radical, and destructive opposition. M. de Montalembert is himself now aware of this, and, with that candor which belongs to all manly natures, he frankly acknowledges it ; and we doubt not, that, if the illustrious O’Connell had lived to witness the events of the last two years, we should have had his acknowledgments to the same effect to place alongside those of his scarcely less illustrious friend.

The age in which we live is by no means one whose spirit can be safely followed. Man is a social being, and demands society ; society is impossible without even a strong and stable government ; and a strong and stable government cannot exist, where the great body of the people fail to respect it, and a large minority are actually engaged in undermining its authority, and forming conspiracies and fomenting insurrections against it. The presumption is always in favor of the government, and against all who seek its overthrow, whether, as to its form, it is monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic. It is not for it to prove itself in the right, but for those who oppose it to prove themselves free from crime. The rebel against established and legal authority is guilty of the blackest crime of which man can be guilty against society. He is even a rebel against the Church, for she enjoins obedience to such government,—a

rebel against God, for all legitimate power is from God, and whoever resists it resists God, and incurs damnation. Yet the age sympathizes with every rebel. Wherever it finds a party in revolt against authority, in arms against their legitimate sovereign, it blesses them ; and it has only curses and execrations for those who generously shed their blood in defence of society against them. It pronounces the traitor taken in arms against his government, and shot as he deserves, a glorious martyr ; and pious journalists — pious after a Satanic fashion — dip their handkerchiefs in his blood, and preserve them as sacred relics. The people rejoice over the victories of the insurrectionists, and weep over their defeats, but have not one generous tear to shed over the brave soldiers who are murdered in their heroic endeavours to preserve social order, and whatever else is dear and sacred to the unperverted human heart. Their heroes and model men are such enemies of God and man, of society and true liberty, such miscreants, as the Mazzinis, the Kossuths, the Ledru-Rollins, the Blums, the Bems, the Garibaldis, — vile criminals, deserving nothing but the extreme vengeance of the law, and the execration of every man who has a human heart. As long as such is the spirit of the age, it behoves every one to take care how he embarrasses the government, or exercises even his constitutional right of opposition. The great danger now is everywhere, not in the strength, but in the weakness, of authority ; and all good men are bound in conscience to labor to increase respect for it, to lessen its embarrassments, and to smooth the way for its free and beneficent action.

Let it not be supposed for a moment, because we thus speak, that we hold a legal, firm, and judicious opposition to such measures of government as are believed to be contrary to the common weal to be uncatholic, or that it is uncatholic to demand a redress of grievances, — if real grievances, not imaginary, — or to labor for the melioration of society and the advancement of civilization. This, certainly, may be done, but it must be done with wisdom and discretion, with loyalty of heart, with profound respect for all legal authority, and a sincere regard for the permanence and stability of the existing government. A weak government, which is constantly assailed, which finds only enemies in its subjects, and is obliged to constant vigilance and effort, not to perform the ordinary functions of government, but to preserve its own existence, is in no condition to prove a blessing to the country ; and they who

constantly assail it and compel it to bend all its energies to its own preservation have no right to complain if it prove even a curse. In times like these, all loyal subjects, all good citizens, all honest men, should rally around authority, and uphold the government, even if not so wise or so perfect as they could wish it,—even if it has committed, or commits, grievous faults, and fails to secure all the good they have a right to expect from it.

We are not disposed to censure with much severity the political conduct of the Catholic party in France, or in other countries where it has found itself in the opposition, for it is suffering severely the penalty of its mistakes, and now appears to be generally aware of them, and to be doing all that can reasonably be expected to repair them. From 1830 to 1848, it yielded too much to the radical spirit of the age, and too often made common cause with the so-called Liberals, whose principles are subversive of all order, and of society itself, and against whom it is now obliged to wage war to the knife. The heresy of La Mennais and his associates, who proposed a sort of alliance between Catholicity and radicalism, has not been unfruitful. It was promptly condemned at Rome, and disavowed by all who had shared it, except its unhappy author; but its subtle poison, nevertheless, continued to spread far and wide in the Catholic body. We detected it occasionally in some of the masterly speeches, before the Revolution of February, of De Montalembert himself, and in the writings of the Rev. Father Lacordaire; and we found it in nearly all its virulence in the famous *Funeral Oration* on O'Connell by Padre Ventura, who even attempted to make the world believe that he was merely expressing the views of Pius IX. The terrible consequences of making, or appearing to make, common cause in politics with the radical party throughout Europe, from which young enthusiasts hoped so much, both for society and the Church, have pretty well developed themselves during the last two years, and are now apparent to all who have eyes, or who are not struck with judicial blindness. The mad attempt, it is now seen and admitted, must eventuate, as far as possible, in the destruction of both Church and state.

We claim no credit for having foreseen and warned our readers of this. When a liberal, a radical, we had studied the subject, and had regarded the policy recommended by the Neo-Catholics, as they were called, as highly favorable to the views we then held, and as hostile to all in Church and state

to which we were ourselves opposed ; it was not difficult for us, when we had ceased to belong to the " movement," and had, through the mercy of God, been admitted into the Church, to see that it was directly hostile to everything we must, as a Catholic, uphold as dear and sacred. We had no new discovery to make, no new investigations to go through ; we had only to oppose as a Catholic what we had approved as hostile to Catholicity when we were ourselves hostile to it ; we had no new judgment to form, for the judgment we had from the first formed was its condemnation in the view of every intelligent Catholic. We need not say that events have justified our judgment, nor adduce the acknowledgments so frankly made by the illustrious leader of the Catholic political party in France, as our answer to those mistaken, but no doubt well-meaning, friends who have abused us for it. This is no time for boasting or for recrimination. Our duty as Catholics, here and elsewhere, is to break loose from any connection we may have had with radicals, and parties animated by a Jacobinical, insurrectionary, or Socialistic spirit, to return to the maxims of a sound political science, and to labor to reconstruct and consolidate social order. We must call things by their right names, and bestow our sympathy, not on rebel chiefs and insurrectionary bodies, but on men of loyal hearts and firm principles, who stand, in these trying times, by authority, and are ready at any sacrifice to save society from complete shipwreck. We must look upon the praise of such journals as the *New York Tribune* and the *Boston Chronotype* as a deep disgrace.

We confess that we were obliged to draw upon our Catholic faith for relief, when we heard the whole Protestant, infidel, and Socialistic world applauding Pius IX. to the echo, — when we saw a Horace Greeley reporting, and a New York sympathy meeting, approved by a William H. Seward and a Ben. Franklin Butler, adopting, an address to the "venerable Father" of Christendom, — when we found multitudes of the faithful half frantic with joy at the supposed popularity of the Head of their Church with the enemies of God and man ; and we even breathed freer when the mob took possession of the Eternal City, and the Holy Father sought an asylum at Gaëta. Those shouts of " Long live Pius the Ninth !" from infidel throats, would, if anything could, shake a Catholic's faith in the promises of our Lord to Peter. We must be traitors to God and criminals to society in order to command the sincere

applause of our age ; and whenever we find ourselves commended by any of the popular organs of the day, we should retire and make our examen of conscience, and ask, with fear and trembling, " O Lord, what iniquity hath thy servant committed, that the wicked praise him ? " Redress of grievances, the melioration of society, and the advancement of civilization, are to be effected, if at all, through government, not by overthrowing it and resolving society into chaos. The nonsense vented about " the people," " popular governments," " democracies," " the republic democratic and social," we shall do well to despise, and to remember that our first duty is " to fear God and honor the king,"—that is, the prince, the sovereign authority of the state. We shall do well to remember, that allegiance is a duty, and disobedience—except when the prince commands what is contrary to God's law—is criminal ; that loyalty is a virtue, and rebellion a crime punishable by all laws, human and Divine. Wherever you see a party at war with the government, hold them for traitors, rebels, deserving your deepest execration, till you have clear and indubitable evidence to the contrary. Give no ear to the modern blasphemous absurdities of " the sacred right of insurrection,"—an absurdity in keeping with the character of Sir Charles Grandison Cromwell Lafayette, as Carlyle not inaptly calls him, with whom, so far as we are informed, it originated, but which every loyal citizen and honest man hears with horror and disgust.

What will be the result of the present state of things in France we have no means of determining. We believe France is pretty thoroughly aroused to the dangers of Red Republicanism, or Socialism, and we do not think that her principal danger just now is to be apprehended from that quarter. Judging from such *data* as we have before us, we should say that her present danger is from the party represented by such men as De Tocqueville, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs. These men are destitute of all true statesmanship ; they are mere theorists, who have not the sense to perceive that a policy that might be admissible when the question is the gradual restriction of an authority too unlimited for liberty, must be wholly misplaced when the question is the reconstruction of power and the reëstablishment of order. They are not exactly Socialists ; they are not exactly democrats ; they reject and accept a little of all parties, and pass for moderate, judicious men ; but being men without any consistent principles of their own, men of

compromise, neither exactly one thing nor another, and appealing to no great and commanding principle in the national mind or heart, they cannot but prove themselves utterly impotent to found a strong and stable government, such as France now needs.

We know not when we have read anything which more disgusted us than the brief report which has appeared in the papers of De Tocqueville's speech in the great debate in the Assembly on the affairs of Rome. The intervention of France in those affairs, if undertaken in good faith for the purpose of rescuing the Roman people from the oppression of the foreign rabble, miscreants, and vagabonds calling themselves the Roman Republic, to put an end to the sacrilege that was daily committed, and to restore the Holy Father to the exercise of his temporal sovereignty, was noble and generous, honorable to her government, and not undeserving the gratitude of Christendom ; but if undertaken merely for the purpose of establishing French influence in Italy, and of imposing restraints on an independent sovereign, as the minister asserts, it was mean, contemptible, wholly unjustifiable, and utterly disgraceful to France and her extemporary rulers. We wish to believe the French government was governed by the more honorable motives, and we would fain hope that the explanation of the minister will turn out to be as false as the motives it implies are unjust and contemptible. But even if so, it proves the weakness, the wickedness, and the blunder of the minister. France is Catholic ; let men say what they will, the great majority of her people are Catholic ; and no government, not administered in accordance with Catholic principles, can hope to restore her internal peace, or to take a strong hold upon her affections. There are but two principles in French society, — the Catholic principle and the Socialistic, — and no government can live, and perform the proper functions of government, that does not make its election, and conform strictly to the one or the other of these. The French government must be Catholic or Socialist. Socialist it cannot be, for Socialism is incompatible even with the existence of human society. It must, then, be Catholic ; and if so frankly, if it take care to do nothing to wound the Catholic conscience, and make its appeal boldly to the Catholic principle, it will have but little difficulty, and may easily correct the defects of its present constitution, and secure the blessings of liberty and internal peace.

But men of the De Tocqueville stamp—who in politics are what Anglicans are in religion; who have no decided religious belief or principle, but up to a certain extent pretend to patronize all religions; who are really infidels at heart, without the energy to avow it—are wholly unequal to the courage and wisdom of adopting that which is not, in fact, more injurious and offensive to Catholics than direct and open opposition. Their wisdom consists in attempting to hold the balance even between them and Socialists,—the maddest, or rather the silliest, policy imaginable. In attempting this policy they will destroy the republic, for it will leave them without a party. It is the policy to madden the Socialists, and to disgust and alienate the Catholics, without whose cordial support no government in France can stand.

If Louis Napoleon himself approves the policy of the De Tocqueville portion of his ministry, he is far less of a statesman than we have supposed him, than we have been anxious to believe him. Fine speeches in praise of religion which mean nothing, and acts positively injurious to it, will not regenerate France. The government that admits the necessity of religion and morality, as the basis of social order, betrays its folly no less than its infidelity, if it begins by claiming authority over religion, instead of setting an example of submission to it. We can assure Prince Louis Napoleon, that the former liberal opposition will prove as impotent for good to France as the now defunct *Nationals*, who came into power with the revolution of February, have proved themselves; and if he wishes to prove that he is not a mere name, he will, as far as depends on him, throw the government into the hands of men who do not presume to sit in judgment on Almighty God, and who have firm and fixed principles, religious as well as political. Away with your Odillon Barrots, your De Tocquevilles and Dufaures, and call to your aid, not a mongrel cabinet, but a cabinet of decided and uniform principles, composed entirely of such men as De Falloux, De Tracy, and the noble De Montalembert,—men who are not ashamed to avow themselves believers in God, and obedient and loving sons of his Church. Heed not the clamor of infidels, and men who affect a homage for religion in general and despise all religion in particular. The Catholic portion is the only sound portion of the population of France, and is, as it was in the time of the First Consul, the only portion on which any government that wishes to be strong and stable can rely for its support. If this

policy is not pursued, we think the republic will be short-lived, and what will succeed we need not undertake to conjecture.

ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *The Works of the Right Reverend JOHN ENGLAND, first Bishop of Charleston. Collected and arranged under the Advice and Direction of his immediate Successor, the Right Reverend IGNATIUS ALOYSIUS REYNOLDS, and printed for him.* In Five Volumes. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1849. Vols. I., II., and III. 8vo.

THE first three volumes of the promised edition of the collected works of the first Bishop of Charleston have been issued, and the two remaining volumes, we are assured, will soon follow. We received them at too late a moment to prepare a suitable review of them for our present number. We have been able, as yet, only to glance through them and read here and there an essay; but of their learning and ability there can be no doubt, and works written by Dr. England, and published under the advice and direction of the present Bishop of Charleston can need no recommendation from a journal conducted by a layman. That on a few questions, not of faith, but of great importance, these volumes express views which this journal has strenuously opposed, is very possible, but we have been instructed by the admirable essays on *The Roman Chancery*, and in refutation of *The Calumnies of Blanco White*. Dr. England was, unquestionably, unsurpassed as an eloquent preacher, and as an able, learned, and acute controversialist, by any Catholic divine in the country; and it was due to his memory to collect his various writings, and publish them in a permanent form. This has been done, under the advice and direction of Bishop Reynolds, by the Rev. Dr. Corcoran and the Rev. Mr. Hewit, who appear to have performed their task with zeal, industry, and discretion. The volumes, we doubt not, will receive a cordial welcome by the Catholic community, and find admission into many a Protestant private library. We hope to be able to speak of them soon at length, and in a manner due to their distinguished author.

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2. *A Lecture on the Nature of Law, delivered before the Chrestomathian Society of St. John's College, Fordham, N. Y.* By the REV. J. W. CUMMINGS, D. D., of St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York City. New York Freeman's Journal, July 28.

WE refer to this Lecture as printed in the *New York Freeman's Journal*, because the pamphlet edition of it is so full of typographical errors, as not only to disfigure, but in several passages to pervert, the author's meaning. The Lecture itself is a noble production, highly creditable to its author, and even to the young men who requested a copy for publica-

tion. It is the first production of the sort that we have seen, published by a society of young men connected with one of our American Catholic colleges, of which a Catholic has no occasion to be ashamed. We have, since we became a Catholic, received several Lectures and Orations, sent us by societies connected with our colleges; but, as a general rule, we have found them deficient in literary merit, written in a loose and bombastic style, and crammed with the disgusting cant of Liberalism. A recent number of the *Catholic Observer* says wittily, as well as severely, — “We learn that there are some Catholics out West who are so very democratic, that, in repeating the Lord’s Prayer, they will not say, ‘Thy kingdom come,’ but ‘Thy democracy come.’” There was no occasion for confining these Catholics to the West, for they may be found in this diocese as well as elsewhere.

The truth is, there has been and is, among no small number of Catholics in this country, a mode of thinking, or at least of speaking, on the relations between religion and politics, which, logically considered, implies that God and the people are one and the same, — that religion is subordinate to the temporal order, and that the Church should be *national*, not *Catholic*. Most of our Catholic population have come from monarchical countries, where they have been for ages oppressed, not indeed because the government was monarchical, but because it was Protestant and opposed to their religion; but, not considering this fact, they have identified in their minds monarchy and despotism, and concluded that where the government is monarchical there can be no liberty. They find, as they suppose, that democracy is the established order here, and conclude that it is not only their right, but even their duty, to be democrats. Finally, they find their Church is opposed on the pretence that she is incompatible with popular institutions, and they very naturally seek to repel the charge by making extravagant professions of their devotion to democracy, and of their political independence. These three causes, combined and operating together, have rendered a considerable portion of nominal Catholics the most extreme democrats in the country, and the least worthy of the political confidence of those who believe that no government, not a government of law, can be a good government. Nor is this the worst of it. We cannot oppose their extravagance, and labor to correct their errors, without seeming to condemn the political order of the country, and justifying the charge brought against our religion of being hostile to republican institutions. Thus the folly and extravagance of these ultra democratic Catholics tend to confirm the very charges they are so anxious to repel.

But our religion is paramount to our politics, and whenever we see our friends making their religion subordinate to their politics, or defending it on principles that imply its falsity, we feel that we are not at liberty to be silent. We know our religion is compatible with any and every form of legitimate government, and we cannot but think that those of our friends who are so very anxious to prove that it is compatible with the political order established in this country would accomplish their object much more effectually if they showed less anxiety, and if they would make up their minds to treat the charge of our adversaries to the contrary with simple indifference. Catholics can be good republicans, can be faithful supporters of the political institutions of this country; but no Catholic who knows anything of his religion, and is able to comprehend at all its bearings on the temporal order, can be a radical, a Socialist, or a

democrat, as the term is now understood in Europe, and to some extent among our own politicians. The right, under God, to govern no doubt vests in the people, according to their particular civil constitution; the magistrate is responsible to them for the exercise of his power, and if he abuses it, they, we hold, may cashier him, and appoint a new one. Power is not, and never can be, the private property of any individual, family, or class; it is always a trust held for the public good, and is forfeited if not so exercised. All this our Catholic theologians teach, with scarcely an exception, from St. Augustine down to our own times. The Protestant doctrine of the divine right of kings is no Catholic doctrine. But, on the other hand, the right of the people to govern is not a right inherent in them, and the law does not derive its capacity to bind from the fact that it is directly or indirectly the expression of their wisdom or of their will. No act of any legislative body, popular or otherwise, as every lawyer will tell you, that contravenes the law of nature, the law of eternal justice, or the revealed law of God, is or can be binding. It is null and void from the beginning. Nor, moreover, have the people the right of insurrection, or of revolution; for this right always implies their competency, when they please, to subvert the existing political order, not because it has forfeited its trust, but because they take it into their heads that some other order would be more for their interest or their pleasure. Such a right would be incompatible with all government, with all order, and therefore cannot be supposed. The right of revolution negatives the right to govern, and cannot be asserted if the right to govern be asserted. The existing government must fail utterly to fulfil its trusts, must violate its constitution, and must become wholly illegitimate, before the right to resist commences; and even when, so far as it is concerned, the right to resist commences, that right cannot be rightfully exercised, unless its exercise is authorized by prudence, and there is a reasonable prospect, not only of successful resistance, but of establishing something far better than the government it is proposed to displace. The moral law imposes these restraints on the people, and the Catholic who makes light of them makes light of his religion.

Here is, substantially, the doctrine of the able, philosophical, and manly Lecture before us. The learned and truly Catholic lecturer raises no question as to the form or constitution of government, enters into no discussion with the advocates of monarchy or republicanism, but brings out the ethical aspect of law itself, as common to all forms of government. He shows that human law, to be obligatory, must be a transcript of the law of God, for it derives its obligation only from the will of God, as expressed in the natural or the revealed law. Consequently, he concludes that law is *ethical*, and cannot be resisted without sin, and therefore that the mobocratic spirit, the spirit of revolution, which denies the sacredness of law, cannot be encouraged by a Catholic, nor, indeed, by one who would possess even natural morality. But at the same time that his doctrine binds us in conscience to obey the law, it binds the law-makers to enact nothing not in strict conformity to the law of God. It then protects liberty on the one hand and authority on the other. It is the true Catholic doctrine on the subject, and, we need not add, the precise doctrine which is here and now especially necessary to be insisted on. Dr. Cummings deserves the thanks of every friend of religion and good government for having freely, boldly, and energetically proclaimed it; and for ourselves personally, we are not a little grateful to find set forth so

eloquenty, from so high an authority, the doctrine which we have, in our humble way, been for years laboring to impress upon the minds of our countrymen, and for which we have had the honor of being very well abused, even by some who call themselves Catholics. The man who is afraid of being called hard names must not in these times venture to regard politics as a branch of ethics, or assert that the politician is as much bound by the moral law in his public as in his private acts. The assertion of so unpopular a truth is sure to meet the decided disapprobation of the whole band of *Tribunes*, *Chronotypes*, and *Nations*,—the especial organs of that democracy which teaches that power comes not from above, but ascends from below.

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3. — *Meditations for every Day in the Year, on the Principal Duties of Christianity.* Translated from the French of PÈRE GRIFFET, S. J. By the RT. REV. WILLIAM WALSH, D. D., Bishop of Halifax. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1849. 2 vols. 24mo.

THE name of the author and that of the right reverend translator are a sufficient warranty of the excellence of these two beautiful little volumes. We have found them admirable, and they are, what we can so seldom say, admirably translated.

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4. — *Solution de Grands Problèmes Mise à la portée de tous les Esprits.* Par l'Auteur de Platon-Polichinelle. Lyon. 1847. 4 tomes. 24mo.

THESE volumes are admirably adapted to the wants of our times, and address themselves especially to the infidel, skeptical, and Socialistic state of mind now so lamentably prevalent. They are written with great freedom, in a lively and popular style, and are marked by sprightliness, wit, and humor, and at the same time by profound thought, real science, and true learning. We notice them now, because a highly esteemed friend of ours, eminently qualified for the task, has nearly completed a translation of them, which will soon be published. We can promise, in advance, that the translation will be faithful, tasteful, and classical,—a model of what translations should be, and we can assure the American public that they will find in the work when it appears a rich fund of pleasure and instruction.

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5. — 1. *Little Frank, or the Painter's Progress; and, What a Mother can endure.* From the Flemish of HENRY CONSCIENCE. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1849. 24mo. pp. 153 and 72. — 2. *Fashion, or Siska Van Roosmael.* By the same. New York: By the same. 1849. 24mo. pp. 170.

THESE two handsomely printed and illustrated little volumes, from the Flemish of Henry Conscience, the popular Belgian author, make Nos. X. and XI. of Dunigan's Home Library, and are a very acceptable present to our young folk. Their author is hardly inferior in his genius to Canon von Schmid, and they will prove hardly less favorites with the public than the Canon's exquisite Tales. Indeed, it has been objected to Canon

von Schmid that he too studiously conceals the necessity of the Sacraments to the practice of heroic virtue, and too uniformly rewards his good little boys and girls with temporal prosperity. The objection is not without foundation. Virtue does not always insure a temporal reward, and perhaps it is not well to accustom our youth to expect it; perhaps it is better that they should see it not unfrequently go unrewarded here, in the goods of this world, that they may early look to its spiritual reward, both here and hereafter. Yet we find, in Holy Scripture, the heroic patience of Job rewarded with a double measure of temporal prosperity. The other objection is no doubt a grave one, and would condemn the whole series, if our children are to be presumed to read nothing else, and to be uninstructed in their catechism; for every Catholic knows that the heroic virtue the author represents his little folk as practising is impossible without the aid of the Sacraments. That Protestants may draw a wrong and dangerous inference from these little Tales, namely, that the virtue described is practicable out of the Catholic Church, is possible; but no Catholic, properly instructed in his catechism, seems to us likely to draw any such inference, and we are by no means disposed to retract anything from the high commendation we have given them. But however this may be, the little volumes before us are not open to this objection, and the author does not reward all his heroes and heroines with temporal prosperity. As substitutes for devotional books and spiritual reading, we have never recommended the Tales of Canon von Schmid, nor as such do we recommend the little volumes before us; but as a secular literature attractive and not unprofitable to the young we recommend both, and feel that our Catholic community owe a debt of gratitude to the Messrs. Dunigan for placing them within their reach. In an age like ours, popular reading is a necessity of life, and must and will be had, — if not such as we could desire, such as we cannot approve. We know nothing of the sort to be preferred to the moral Tales of Canon von Schmid and Henry Conscience.

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6. — *The Analogy of Ancient Craft Masonry to Natural and Revealed Religion.* By CHARLES SCOTT, A. M. Philadelphia: Grigg, Elliot, & Co. 1849. 8vo. pp. 396.

THIS volume has been sent us with a request that we would review it; — a request with which, having on becoming a Catholic renounced our former slight connection with the Masonic fraternity, we are unwilling to comply. Personally, on our own knowledge, we know nothing bad of Masonry, excepting that it is a secret society, and no one can be initiated into its mysteries without taking a rash oath. But it is enough for us that the Church condemns it, and forbids us to belong to the craft. We have looked over the work before us, and learn from it that the author labors to establish the coincidence of "Ancient Craft Masonry to Natural and Revealed Religion." If he could prove this, we see not wherefore we want Masonry. If we find in Masonry only what we find in the Christian Church, it is unnecessary; for the Christian Church is sufficient of itself. If we find something else, we do not want it; for that something else must be false and hurtful. But the author counts too much on our credulity, if he expects us to believe what he asserts. That in Christian countries Freemasonry recognizes some Christian doctrines, and travesties some Christian forms, nobody denies; but everybody who

